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Abstract
This thesis develops a general theoretical approach to political identity 
building under emerging conditions of globalisation. This theoretical approach is 
used to analyse political developments in Israeli and Palestinian societies since the 
start of the Oslo process in 1993. Combining Rosenau’s concepts of ‘frontiers’ and 
‘fragmegration’ with Wendt’s analysis of identity in international relations, a three 
level model for political identity building is developed. It argues that political identity 
is formed on the substate, state and the supra-state level. Although the state level is 
maintained as an important location for political identity, it is argued that the concept 
of ‘national identity’ is too limited a variable under emerging conditions of 
globalisation. Six main significators of political identity are analysed: territory, 
ethnicity, histoiy, language, religion and gender. These cut across all three levels. The 
case studies use a series of in-depth interviews with political actors on all three 
levels. It is shown that both societies are currently experiencing a deep identity crisis. 
Different political identity groups have developed which lack common ground in 
their conceptions of what kind of states Israel or Palestine should be. Israeli society is 
increasingly fragmenting on all three levels of political interaction. In consequence, 
the state level is turning into a battleground for particular political identities and is 
increasingly unable to establish societal cohesion. Palestinian society experiences an 
increasing isolation of the state level. This is due to the autocratic and neo- 
patrimonial structure of the Palestinian Authority which marginalised the substate 
and the supra-state level from political decision making. Therefore, here too, societal 
cohesion cannot be generated on the state level. In consequence, opposition to the 
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Introduction
The question of identity formation and its influence on policy decisions has become 
of increasing interest for scholars in International Relations. “The world-wide 
upsurge in identity politics in the past three decades and the re-awakening of long- 
suppressed expressions of identity in the post-Cold War world have forced 
International Relations to put the question of identity onto its research agenda in 
recent years"1 2.
This thesis takes political identity building as its central analytical variable. It 
tries to develop a general theoretical approach to political identity building and uses 
this approach to analyse political developments in Israeli and Palestinian society 
since the start of the Oslo process in 1993.
To put political identity at the centre of theoretical analysis challenges the 
‘orthodoxy’ in International Relations theories, namely the Neorealist-Neoliberal 
theories. Looking at concepts of identity formation questions the assumption that 
political identity can be equated with national identity and is an unproblematic 
variable, since the prime bearer of political identity is the sovereign nation state.
“Neorealism is not interested in individual or sub-state levels of activity, 
except perhaps where these activities would have a direct and immediate 
impact upon the capability of a state for international interaction [...] It 
accepts as unproblematic that the prime identity of those who inhabit a state
’ Krause, Jill and Neil Renwick. “Introduction" in Krause, Jill and Neil Renwick (eds) Identities in 
International Relations" (London: Macmillan Press, 1996): p. XIII.
2 I use the concept ‘political identity building’ throughout the thesis. With this concept I refer to the 
transformation and change in political identities under the emerging conditions of globalisation.
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is provided by that state itself, therefore, there is no need to move ‘below the 
level of the state “3.
The assumption of the ‘state as a unitary actor’ in the international system and the 
theoretical consequence to locate meaningful and effective political identity at the 
state level in form of ‘national identity’ rests on specific modem notions about the 
structure and workings of the international system. “The paradigm of nationalism 
which was so widely accepted until recently is that of classical modernism. This is 
the conception that nations and nationalisms are intrinsic to the nature of the modem 
world and to the revolution of modemity“4. At the heart of this notion of nationalism 
and national identity lie the assumptions that, at least in principle, the state has 
exclusive control over its territory and exclusive sovereignty over its citizens. 
However, in the last two decades changes have occurred in the international system 
that question these assumptions. These changes have been summarised by analysts 
under the term ‘globalisation’. Changes in the structure as well as in the workings of 
the international system have been observed.
“Not only [...] the operating structures have changed - with world politics no 
longer defined as essentially by an ideological military struggle between the 
two dominant centres of power controlled respectively by two ‘superpowers ’ 
[...] but also that ‘agenda’ of world politics has been transformed [...] The 
international community is now preoccupied with other issues such as the 
search for a ‘New World Order ’, the disparities in wealth between developed 
and less developed countries (LDCs), and environmental/ecological issues “5.
3 Tooze, Roger. “Prologue" in Krause, Jill and Neil Renwick (eds) "Identities in International 
Relations" (London: Macmillan Press, 1996): p. XIX.
4 Smith, Anthony D. "Nationalism and Modernity" (London: Routledge, 1998): p. 3.
5 White, Brian, Richard Little and Michael Smith. “Issues in World Politics" in White, Brian, Richard 
Little and Michael Smith (eds) "Issues in World Politics" (London: Macmillan Press 1997): p. 3.
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In addition, the impact of new information technologies, is seen as crucial, since they 
enhance communication between distant locations. These changes on the macro level 
of the international system are complemented by and cause, as Rosenau would argue, 
an increase in the analytical skills of individuals to cope with the complexities of 
world politics.
“In the last decades of the twentieth century, the abilities of individuals to 
connect to world politics and cope with its complexity have reached new 
heights [...] to an increasing degree, world politics are being shaped by 
powerful and restless people who can discern their remoteness from the 
centers of decision, who have the skills with which to do something about 
their situation, who are questioning the authority, and who are willing to 
accept the fast-paced cascade of events that mark the decentralized structures 
of the postindustrial world"6.
One important question and the central one for the analysis in this thesis, is the 
impact of these changes on the state. There are two general positions that analysts 
have been taking regarding this issue. On the one hand, analysts in the modern 
theoretical tradition argue that these changes will have some impact on the state but 
that the state will adapt and continue to be the primary actor in international relations. 
In consequence, “the ideal of nationhood today continues to exert its hold over the 
political imagination; it continues to be reproduced as the cause worth more than 
individual life; and it frames the practice of political democracy"7. On the other hand, 
writers that use a postmodern framework of analysis perceive the influence of these 
developments to be so fundamental, that they see the state level on the demise and no 
longer having an important influence on political identity. The concept of the ‘state’
6 Rosenau, James N. ‘‘Turbulence in World Politics. A Theory of Change and Continuity1' (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1990): p. 335.
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has been replaced by a much wider and analytically amorphous concept of 
‘community’.
“We can see how community has in fact become a key concern of some of the 
more recent postmodernist approaches [...] These approaches provide us 
with a means of seeing how community today can be seen as what Benedict 
Anderson terms an ‘imagined community' but one which is always self-
o
consciously incomplete “ .
However, it will be argued in this thesis that, while the modem approach does not 
appreciate the impact of these changes enough, postmodern approaches go too far in 
assuming the complete demise of the state as an analytical variable. Identity in 
postmodern thinking is a complex web formed by a potentially unlimited amount of 
social interactions. This can hardly be used for an empirical analysis of political 
identity building. In addition, it will be pointed out that these postmodern approaches 
do not appreciate enough the uneven spread of globalisation. In the theoretical 
approach developed here, insights of modem and postmodern approaches will be 
combined to allow a more comprehensive understanding of political identity building 
in international relations under conditions of globalisation. In this way it should be 
possible to create a theoretical framework which can be used to better explain and 
predict policy outcomes.
The case studies to which this theoretical approach will be applied are the 
Israeli and Palestinian societies since the Oslo process. These cases are of particular 
interest for a ‘testing’ of this theoretical approach for two reasons. Firstly, the Middle 
East, one can argue, is in the early stages of globalisation. Due to the limited access 
to information technologies, the effects and changes on the level of the individual *
7 Billig, Michael. “BanalNationalism" (London: Sage, 1995): p. 177.
8 Delanty, Gerard. “Modernity and Postmodernity “ (London: Sage, 2000): p. 114f.
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have not yet reached as dramatic heights as in Europe or North America for example. 
However, the beginning impact of these technologies can be seen. For example, not 
only the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority have opened web pages but 
also different political groups in Israeli and Palestinian society begin to amend their 
political activities with world wide campaigns over the internet.9 Therefore the 
analysis of both Israeli and Palestinian societies presents an adequate case for a 
theoretical approach to political identity under conditions of globalisation. If under 
the emerging conditions of globalisation the theoretical approach has analytical force 
then the impact of these changes on the process of political identity building has been 
judged correctly.
The second reason why these particular cases have been chosen is the fact that 
one can argue identity politics have reached unprecedented importance in both 
societies since the beginning of the Oslo process. This is because the process itself 
concerns negotiations about one of the basic elements of political identity: territory.10 
The negotiations are complicated by the fact that, since the establishment of 
settlements in the occupied territories after 1967, both societies are living in a 
complex entangled infrastructure which is not easy to separate.
However, not only the negotiations about territory make political identity 
building a central issue in both societies. The very fact that the negotiations exist 
bring problems of political identity to the forefront. Until the Declaration of 
Principles (DOP) in 1993 both societies by and large employed a discourse that 
described the ‘other’ as the enemy whose aim it is to destroy and annihilate the ‘self.
9 Israeli government: http://www.israel.gov.il; Palestinian National Authority: http://www.pna.net/; A 
few examples of political groups: Hebron settler community: http://wwsw.hebron.org.il; Peace
Now/Shalom Achshav: http://www.peacenow.org.il; Hamas: http://www.palestine- 
info.net/hamas/index.htm; LAW The Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the 
Environment: http://www.Iawsociety.org
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Both sides perceived each other as a danger to their individual and collective 
existence. The negotiations challenge this exclusionary discourse because now the 
‘enemy’ is the partner in negotiations with whom a modus vivendi has to be found.
The combination of these two factors led to a crisis of political identity in 
both societies. That this crisis is not just an intellectual problem but can have serious 
violent consequences can be seen in the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin in 
1995 and the violence between the Palestinian Authority and supporters of Hamas in 
1994 respectively. Therefore an analysis of political identity building in both 
societies is crucial if one wants to understand the political realities of the Oslo 
process and assess the possible future implications of this situation for the process as
a whole.
Before an overview of the different chapters is given, a few general remarks 
about the aims and the structure of this thesis are necessary. The thesis tries to 
develop a general theoretical approach to political identity building and then assess 
the explanatory force of this approach for the Israeli and Palestinian societies. It does 
not aim at a simple theoretically informed discussion of the cases. Therefore, the 
theoretical approach will be developed first, then the cases will be presented and 
afterwards the implications of the cases for the theoretical approach will be outlined.
Both modem and postmodern approaches to the problem of political identity 
have produced a wealth of literature. It cannot be attempted in the limited space of
this thesis to review all of this literature. The decision about what to include and what
not to include was made according to two criteria: Firstly, literature has been selected 
which is representative of the thinking within the modem and postmodern paradigms. 
Secondly, literature was chosen which could be combined without ending up with an
10 For a discussion of this point see: Sucharov, Mira. “Regional Identity and the Sovereignty Principle: 
Explaining Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking" in Newman, David (ed) “Boundaries, Territory and
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argument that is based on completely opposing analytical and philosophical 
assumptions.
Furthermore, the aim of this approach is to analyse political identity building. 
When we speak of political identity building we are concerned with the ideas, 
motivations, convictions and identifications of actors (individuals and groups) that 
translate directly into political action. This thesis does not (and because of the spacial 
limits it cannot) attempt to analyse all aspects of identity in general. While personal 
identity is to a certain extent covered by this theoretical approach, the theory cannot 
claim to be a comprehensive analysis of identity. An additional reason for this 
limitation of the analysis is that during the case studies it will be attempted to explain 
and predict policy outcomes on the basis of the political identity of actors. In order to 
focus the argument it is necessary to concentrate on the political aspects of identity 
building.
The thesis is divided into five chapters. The theoretical approach is developed 
in the two first chapters. The first one will review the literature on political identity 
building In International Relations and argue for a multilevel approach. This chapter 
centres on modem and postmodern attempts to theorise political identity building. It 
will be shown how the classical theories of International Relations, namely 
Neorealism and Neoliberalism are based on the ‘state as the unitary actor model’ 
which in turn is based on specifically modem notions of ‘territoriality’, ‘sovereignty’ 
and ‘state’. It will be argued that these assumptions are now challenged by the 
different analyses of the effects of globalisation. Moreover it will be demonstrated 
that modem approaches to globalisation undervalue the effects of these changes and 
postmodern approaches go too far in this respect. Therefore, an alternative approach 
will be suggested. Based on Rosenau’s concept of frontiers and Alexander Wendt’s
Postmodernity “ (London: Frank Cass, 1999).
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work on the role of identity, a new model of political identity building will be 
developed: the three level model of political identity building.
The second chapter will look at the ontological breadth and depth of political 
identity. It will explore the process of political identity building on three levels of 
political and social interaction: substate (individual/group) level, state level, and 
supra-state level. The ontological depth of political identity will be analysed by a 
discussion of six central variables: ‘sense of ethnicity’, ‘sense of territoriality’, ‘sense 
of history’, ‘sense of religion’, ‘sense of language’, and ‘gender’. It will be argued 
that these variables cut across all three levels of political identity building.
The third and fourth chapter will look at the historical developments and the 
structures of political identity building in Israeli and Palestinian societies 
respectively. In the analysis of Israeli society the cleavages that have been developing 
since the yishuv and became prevalent during the Oslo negotiations are going to be 
examined. During the analysis of Palestinian society special attention will be paid to 
the constraints on free development of political identity building that have been put 
in place by the Oslo agreements and by the internal structure of the Palestinian 
Authority.
The fifth chapter will bring the empirical and theoretical discussion together. 
Here, an analysis of the main political identity groups on all three levels will be 
attempted. The political identity of the different groups will be outlined according to 
the six significators identified in the theoretical model. In a comparative fashion it 
will be shown that the identity groups have developed conceptions of what kind of 
state Israel or Palestine should be which lack common ground. It will become clear 
that the state level in both societies remains an important location for political 
identity building. The concept of a ‘state’, of ‘having a state of one’s own’ is crucial 
for the political identities of all groups in both societies. Nevertheless, the state elites
8
have increasing difficulties in establishing societal cohesion. The basic societal 
consensus of what it means to be an Israeli or a Palestinian and in consequence what
kind of states Israel or Palestine should be is in the process of breaking down. Groups 
on the substate and the supra-state level try to put pressure on the state level of both 
societies to make their demands heard. This increases the fragmentation of both 
societies and makes the negotiations between them increasingly difficult.
In the conclusion the implications of the case studies for the three level model 
of political identity will be analysed. In addition, the influence of the emerging 
globalisation on both societies will be discussed. It will be argued that the effects of 
globalisation and the prevalence of identity politics in Israeli and Palestinian societies 
have two different effects. In Israeli society, the state level is facing increasing 
fragmentation due to the growing influence of diverging political identity groups. In 
Palestinian society, the cohesion of the state level is maintained due to the weakness 
of the opposition and the autocratic and neo-patrimonial structure of the Palestinian 
Authority. However this isolates the state level and its elites from Palestinian society 
at large and increases opposition to the peace process in general and the Palestinian 
Authority in particular.
The central aim of this study is to show that political identity building under 
the emerging conditions of globalisation can no longer be analysed by looking at the 
concept of ‘national identity’ only. All three levels of political interaction, the 
substate level, the state level and the supra-state level have to be taken into account.
9
Theoretical Approach to Political Identity in
International Relations
This chapter centres on modem and postmodern attempts to theorise political identity 
building. The modem approach to political identity building is especially important 
as a theoretical approach in International Relations, since it has been directly 
translated into the ‘state as unitary actor’ model of the ‘classic’ theories of
International Relations, Neorealism and Neoliberalism. The modem and the
postmodern approaches to political identity building offer directly opposed 
epistemological and analytical answers to this issue. While the modem approach 
situates political identity building uniquely on the level of the state, the postmodern 
approach sees identity building as a complex web of loyalties and affiliations below 
and above the state. In addition to this the postmodern assumptions about political 
identity are based on epistemological assumptions that reject any possibility of 
knowledge. This will be made clear along the three central concepts on which the 
modem conception of political identity building is based: ‘territoriality’, 
‘sovereignty’ and ‘the concept of the modem state’. These concepts translate then 
into the modem concept of ‘national identity’ which will be analysed in the second 
chapter. The modern assumptions of each concept will be outlined first, then they 
will be opposed by the postmodern criticism. This will enable the reader to see 
exactly which modem assumptions are attacked directly by postmodernism and how 
postmodernism completely undermines these modem concepts. However it will 
become equally clear that the postmodern alternatives pose serious problems if they 
would be introduced into a theoretical framework for an empirical analysis. Because 
of this it will be necessary to introduce a new set of analytical approaches. Based on
10
Rosenau’s concept of frontiers and Alexander Wendt’s work on the role of identity, a 
new model of political identity building will be developed, combining the two 
approaches: the three level model of identity building.
The chapter consists of five major parts. The first part is a discussion of the 
idea of political identity building in the ‘classic’ theories of International Relations: 
Realism, Neorealism, Neoliberalism. It will become clear that these theories see the 
issue of political identity building not as an analytical problem. They see political 
identity building as simply resting on the state level. Waltz’s theory of international 
relations is the most radical example of this line of thinking. This is why it will be 
dealt with in some detail. The classical Realism of Morgenthau, Neoliberalists and 
more recent Neorealists will only be treated in passing to point out that they follow 
the same set of assumptions. This will lead to the question of how these assumptions 
are justified.
The second part of the chapter will try to answer this question. The three basic 
concepts which justify the modem thinking about political identity are examined: 
territoriality, sovereignty and the modern concept of the state. The modem 
assumptions will be outlined. The analysis will move from the most basic concept 
which is used to justify modem political identity: territoriality, to look at the legal 
expression of the modem sense of territoriality, sovereignty and will finally look at 
the concept of the state which translates these assumptions into a political framework
In the third part the influence of globalisation on the role of the state will be 
discussed. Here modem and postmodern attempts to grasp these changes will be 
analysed. It will become clear that modern approaches see the state adjusting to these 
changes and remain the prime political unit. The postmodern approaches see the 
changes that the process of globalisation introduces into the international political 
realm as fundamental, so that a reconceptualisation of the concepts of territoriality
11
and sovereignty is necessary. As a consequence of this the modem concept of the 
state can no longer be used in the analysis of political phenomena. However, the 
complex web of social relations in an ever changing environment poses severe 
problems if it is going to be used for an empirical analysis. Therefore a new
conceptualisation is needed.
The fourth part of the chapter looks at Rosenau’s alternative conceptualisation 
of international relations which tries to include postmodernism’s idea of the flow of 
information, goods and people which erode state boundaries and at the same time 
tries to put this complex web of interactions into an intelligible framework. The basic 
structures of this conceptualisation will be outlined and critically analysed. Although
Rosenau’s approach cannot be completely accepted as a basis for theoretical 
approach to political identity building, it points in the right direction.
The fifth part of the chapter is a first attempt to develop a new approach to 
political identity building. Based on Wendt’s structuralism and constructivist 
approach to state identity, a three level model of political identity building is 
proposed. This model narrows the complex structure of political identity down to 
three levels: substate level (individual/group), state level and supra-state level. This 
approach is therefore analytically capable of serving as a basis for empirical research. 
The three level model will only be introduced in this chapter. The second chapter will 
look in more detail at the relationships inside and between the three levels. The main 
‘signifiers’ of political identity building (perception of territory, perception of history, 
perception of ethnicity, language, religion, and gender) will also be analysed.
We now turn to the analysis to the modem conceptions of political identity
based on the ‘state as actor model’ in international relations.
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I. Questioning the ‘State as actor Model’ - Opening up the
‘Black Box’ of the State
The ‘classical’ theories of International Relations, namely Neorealism and
Neoliberalism are based on the ‘state as unitary actor’ model. They see the 
international realm as a system of states, the stuctures of which are forming the 
states’ political identities. Domestic influences are therefore not important for the 
analysis of political decision making. In consequence meaningfull political identity is 
existing solely on the state level.
This line of argument can be seen most clearly in the work of Kenneth Waltz 
and Robert O. Keohane.11 In Kenneth Waltz’s work one can observe a significant 
change away from a theory which could have taken a more in-depth and 
differentiated discussion of identity formation into account. While in ‘Man the State 
and War' Waltz was still arguing for a connection between what he called the ‘first, 
second and third image’ (namely the individual, the state and the system level)12, by 
the time he published ''Theory of International Politics' Waltz had arrived at a purely 
systemic theory. Approaches other than on the systemic level were labelled 
‘reductionist’ and disregarded in the light of the new systemic theory. In a second 
step, the international political system was separated from other international systems 
(like the economic sphere). “We concluded [...] that international politics does not fit
11 The work of Keohane shows similarities to the work of Waltz on the basic theoretical assumptions. 
The author does not imply that Keohane’s Neoliberalism is to be seen as similar to Waltz’s 
Neorealism.
12 “The third image describes the framework of world politics, but without the first and second images 
there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy; the first and second images describe the 
forces in world politics, but without the third image it is impossible to asses their importance or predict 
their results." See: Waltz, Kenneth “Man, the State, and War“ (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1959): p. 238.
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the model closely enough to make the model useful and that only through some sort 
of systems theory can international politics be understood/413
At this stage of theorising, identity formation can no longer be taken into 
account. Waltz arrived at a purely statist model, which assumes that states are the 
unproblematic unit of the international system. This becomes very clear if one looks 
at Waltz’s theory of international relations more closely. The basic question Waltz 
answers in his theory of international politics is: why do states with different internal 
structures implement similar foreign policies?13 4 15Waltz’s basic answer to this question 
is that the structure of the international system constrains the choices a state has in 
foreign policy. Therefore Waltz emphasises “the need for a systems approach.4415 
Only by concentrating on the functions of the system and by an attempt to explain its 
constraining nature can international politics be fully explained. The international 
structure is characterised by three main features:
“by the fact that it is anarchic, in the sense that there is no higher authority, 
that there is no differentiation of function between units, i.e. all states 
perform roughly the same functions; and by an unequal distribution of 
capacities, i.e. the distinction between great and small powers. ”16
The anarchic structure is the ordering principle of the international system. Because 
there is no higher authority, the system is characterised by a self help environment.17 
This anarchical structure came into existence through the interaction among states: 
“International structure emerges from the interaction of states and then constrains
13 Waltz, Kenneth “Theory of International Politics" (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979): p. 79.
14 See: Waltz (1979) op .cit.: p. 65.
15 Ibid: p. 68.
16 Halliday, Fred "Rethinking International Relations" (London: Macmillan, 1994): p. 33.
17 “To achieve their objectives, and maintain their security, units in a condition of anarchy [...] must 
rely on the means they can generate and the arrangements they can make for themselves." Waltz 
(1979) op. cit.: p. 111.
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them from taking certain actions while propelling them towards others?418 The 
structure of the system constrains the units in two different ways: through 
socialisation and through competition. Socialisation changes the behaviour of states 
while they interact: “Consider the process of socialisation in the simplest case of a 
pair of [...] states. A influences B. B, made different by A’s influence, influences 
A.“18 9 20 21 22The behaviour of the pair, so Waltz states, cannot be explained by a unilateral 
view of either member. It is also impossible to look at socialisation only as a two way
relation, because “each element of behaviour that contributes to the interaction is 
itself shaped by their being a pair.4420 The two states are part of a system which 
deeply changes their being. Although each reacts to the actions of the other, they are 
both influenced by being part of the system. Socialisation therefore reduces variety 
among the units, the states.
The second way in which the system constrains the units is through 
competition. “Competition generates an order, the units of which adjust their 
relations through their autonomous decisions and acts.“21 If a state doesn’t adopt the 
behaviour which is required by the system it risks self-destruction. As an analogy 
Waltz cites competitive behaviour in economics. If a firm does not take part in the 
competition according to the rules of the market, it will fail. This is what Waltz calls 
the “rationality of the more successful competitors4422 A state has to adjust its 
behaviour to the self help environment of the international system in order to be able
to survive.
18 Waltz, Kenneth “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory" in: Kegley, Charles W. Jr. “Controversies 
in International Relations Theory. Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge" (New York: St Martins 
Press, 1995): p. 74.
19 Waltz (1979) op. cit.'.y. 74.
20 Ibid: p. 75.
21 Ibid: p. 76.
22 Ibid: p. 76.
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The units in Waltz’s view of the international system are the states. These, as Waltz 
explains, are assumed to act as unitary actors (state-as-actor system). Differences in
the internal structures of the states do not make for different functions and behaviour
within the system. “The units of the system are not formally differentiated with 
distinct functions specified as are the parts of hierarchic orders?4 The difference 
between the states is based on the distribution of capabilities (difference between 
small and great powers). There is a constantly shifting distribution of power within 
the system. The capabilities a state has (in Waltz’s terms capabilities are means to 
secure one’s own security and in the ultimate sense, to wage war against another 
state) defines its placement within the system.23 4 Therefore the distribution of power 
within the system is a key to understanding the position of a state. “Great powers are
marked off from others by the combined capabilities (or power) they command. 
When their number changes consequentially, the calculations and behaviours of 
states, and the outcomes their interactions produce, vary.“25
Waltz sees hardly any possibility for a change of the international structure. 
The advantage of a stable and persisting structure is that the structural effects can be 
observed more easily. Therefore “what continues and repeats is surely not less 
important than what changes.4426 Structural change can only come in the form of 
revolution, a change to a different type of anarchic structure. Different anarchical 
structures would be a shift from a bipolar (two great powers) to a multi-polar (three 
or more great powers) system. Because this change gives rise to new expectations it 
will alter the outcomes of the units interactions. These outcomes change, because the 
position of the units within the structure changes. They increase or decrease their
23 Ibid: p. 75.
24 All states face a security dilemma. The more power they accumulate in order to ensure their security, 
the more other states will accumulate power to ensure their security. Therefore it becomes increasingly 
difficult for a state to ensure its own security needs.
25 Ibid: p. 74.
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capabilities and power. A change of the ordering principle (anarchy) is not possible 
as Waltz states. The basic systemic constraints on the individual units remain the
same. More recent work of Neo-Realists, like that of Stephen Walt and Mearsheimer 
has tried to engage in a theoretical discussion with ‘critical’ approaches in 
International Relations. However, they failed to go beyond the ‘state-as actor’ 
model.26 27 8
Neoliberalism argues along similar lines. The anarchic self-help environment 
is supplemented by agreed norms which can limit the power struggle and give rise to 
institutionalised regimes. However these only reflect the intent and relative power of 
the states. The states’ interests are taken as given. In addition systemic theory is 
opened up to economic questions, the state (now seen more as a penetrable 
collective) remains as the core unit of analysis. The state is the unit in the 
international system whose behaviour has to be explained. “The concept of 
international regimes has fostered research on the evolution of rules and institutions 
in world politics, and, to some extent, on the impact of rules and institutions on state 
behaviour [emphasis added].“29 30The number of actors in the international system is 
increased in comparison with Neorealism. It includes international corporations and 
other non-state actors, but “nation states continue to be important international 
actors.“ Issues of identity and identity formation can not be explained by this 
model. They remain within the idea of the ‘state as actor model’, other groups within 
the states are not dismissed as unimportant rather as irrelevant. “In sum, both
26 Ibid: p. 70.
27 See: Ibid: p. 70.
28 See: Walt, Stepehen M. “Revolution and War" (London: Cornell University Press, 1996) and 
Mearsheimer, J. “The False Promise of International Institutions44 in International Security 19 1995.
29 Keohane, Robert O and Joseph S. Nye. "Power and Interdependence" (Harper Collins, 1989): p. 
267.
30 Holsti, Ole R. “Theories of International Relations and Foreign Policy: Realism and Its Challengers44 
in Kegley, Charles W. Jr. "Controversies in International Relations Theory. Realism and the 
Neoliberal Challenge" (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995): p. 43.
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orthodox theories treat the boundaries of the state as ‘preordinated facts’ rather than 
as the temporary outcome of strategies of social struggle necessary to problematise 
identity.”31
The approach of ‘classical’ Realism, namely that of Morgenthau seems to 
offer more promising insights into the issue of identity building. Morgenthau bases 
his insights into political behaviour on an understanding of human nature. “Human 
nature, however imperfect, is fixed and ought to be accepted for what it is rather than 
what it might be.“32 Morgenthau sees human nature as basically malevolent, 
exhibiting a lust for power. This concentration on human nature would have opened 
up a possibility to develop a theory of identity. Also Morgenthau’s remarks on the 
state as not being the only possible expression could have opened up the possibility 
of moving away from the state as actor model. In 1970 he wrote that the forces of 
globalisation would challenge the nation state’s prime role in international politics. 
“The sovereign nation-state is in the process of becoming obsolete.”33 However 
Morgenthau never developed these assumptions. In contrast to this, Morgenthau 
argued that the national interest would be fixed, regardless of changes in a state’s 
domestic structure. The struggle for power, which is part of human nature has, 
according to Morgenthau, to be taken into account. Therefore the struggle for power, 
defined as interest, is the only rational course of action. “The aspiration for power 
being the distinguishing element of international politics, as of all politics, 
international politics is of necessity power politics.”34 Therefore the domestic 
structure of the state cannot play any significant role in international politics. As
31 Tooze op.cit.: p. XIX.
Burchill, Scott. “Realism and Neo-Realism“ in Burchill, Scott and Andrew Linklater (eds) ''‘Theories 
of International Relations" (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996): p. 76.
33 Morgenthau, Hans “The Intellectual and Political Functions of Theory44 in Der Derian, James (ed) 
"International Theory. Critical Investigations" (London: Macmillan Press, 1995): p. 50.
34 Morgenthau, Hans J. “Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace “ brief edition 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993): p. 35.
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Burchill argues, Morgenthau assumes that the “nation state is a unitary actor but is 
completely uninterested in its internal nature, including composition of its 
commercial and state elites/'35 As can be seen, Morgenthau follows as well the ‘state 
as actor’ model.
It has become obvious that the ‘classic’ theories of International Relations (Realism, 
Neorealism and Neoliberalism) treat the state as the prime unit of international 
relations. Therefore political identity as such does not present itself as a analytical 
problem. Since the state is the prime unit of analysis, it is seen as the prime bearer of 
political identity. Identity is assumed to be limited to an interest in survival and 
possibly domination. The international system, as conceived by Waltz does not allow 
any significant and meaningful political identity above or below the level of the state. 
Realists like Morgenthau and more recent Neorealists like Stephen Walt and 
Mearsheimer follow the same basic line of argument as Waltz, although they 
attribute slightly less importance to the system. Neoliberalists like Keohane and Nye 
allow additional actors in the system in addition to nation states. However as far as 
the question of political identity is concerned, the state remains in its privileged 
position. In order to fully understand the limits of this approach to international 
relations and political identity it is necessary to look at the underlying assumptions 
and concepts of the ‘state as actor’ approach: the notion of territoriality, sovereignty, 
and the resulting modem conception of the state.
35 Burchill op. cit.: p. 78.
19
II. ‘Modern’ IR Theory and the Concept of the ‘State’
ILL The Concept of Territoriality
The first conceptual pillar on which the modem conception of the state rests is the 
concept of exclusive control over territory. In order to understand the importance of 
the concepts of territoriality in modem political thinking it is necessary to look at the 
most important features that separate modernity from pre-modem conceptions. 
Modernity, according to Giddens can be characterised by three features: 1) separation 
of time and space, 2) disembedding of social systems, and 3) reflexive ordering and 
reordering of social life according to impacts of knowledge.36 37The most important 
feature for the argument presented here is the first one: separation of time and space. 
Giddens argues, that in pre-modern conceptions time and space were always 
connected: “’when’ was almost universally connected with ‘were’ or identified by 
regular natural occurrences?437 The day was structured according to sunrise and 
sunset, the year was structured according to the seasons. This conception changed 
with the invention of the mechanical clock and its widespread distribution. Now for 
the first time, an exact measurement of time was possible without reference to socio­
spatial markers. Giddens calls this the invention of ‘empty time’. This was paralleled 
by the uniformity of social organisation, as it was now possible to divide time into 
zones, the ‘working day’ for example. “The ‘emptying of time’ is in large part the 
precondition for the ‘emptying of space’ and thus has causal priority over it.“38 The 
‘emptying of time’ allowed connections between a distant other apart from face to 
face relations. This development allowed social institutions to function independently 
from time and space. A co-ordination across time and space was possible, which
36 See: Giddens, Anthony “The Consequences of Modernity “ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990): p. 16f.
37 Ibid: p. 17.
38 Ibid: p. 18.
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allowed a rationalised organisation of social institutions and interaction. Social 
relations became ‘disembedded’, they were lifted out of particular space-time 
connections by the creation of symbolic tokens (money) and the establishment of 
expert systems. By expert systems Giddens means “systems of technical 
accomplishment or professional expertise that organise large areas of the material
and social environments in which we live “
Based on the changing conceptions of time and space, the idea of the modem 
state and the modem state system began to emerge. The most distinguishing feature 
of the modem state system is a new conception of territoriality. “The distinctive 
signature of the modem - homogenous - variant of structuring territorial space is the 
familiar world of territoriality disjoint, mutually exclusive, functionally similar 
sovereign states.“40 This new conception allowed the distinction between an internal 
and an external realm. The internal characterised by order imposed by central 
authority and the external by anarchy and the states ability to wage war to resolve 
conflicts. Two factors influenced this transformation: the change in material 
environment and doctrinal development. The material environment in the 13th 
century was favourable to dynamics which would in consequence erode the 
organisation of political space based on personal relationships. Favourable 
environmental conditions allowed a growth in population, this in turn allowed an 
economic development. The increasing monetization of economic relationships 
enabled taxation which financed standing armies and allowed internal pacification. 
The economic growth reaches institutional limits in the late 13 th and early 14th 
century. Among the institutional limits was the feudal structure of agricultural 
economics. Therefore in order to overcome the constrains of the feudal structure, 39
39 Ibid: p. 27.
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economic and political importance turned towards the towns. These were less 
involved in this structure.40 1 The external shocks of the 14th century (plague, 
economic decline) strained the existing social order and created a new matrix of 
constraints and opportunities for social actors by further weakening the feudal 
structure which was based on personalised relationships. This changed situation was 
reflected in the develoment in doctrine. On the doctrinal level, the concept of 
sovereignty was developed, signifying a more impersonal way of governance. The 
doctrine of sovereignty developed in stages from the ‘cuius regio eius religio’ 
doctrine (subjects have to have the same confession, Protestant or Catholic, as the 
ruler) of the Peace of Augusburg 1555, to the ‘rex in regno sua es Imperator regni 
sui’ (ruler has exclusive sovereignty over his/her subjects) in the peace of Westphalia 
in 1648. These concepts, in connection with the rediscovery of absolute and 
exclusive property rights from the Roman law, aided in the development of the 
notion of absolute and exclusive sovereignty. From the perspective of social 
totalities, domestic and international “private property rights and sovereignty may be 
viewed as being analogous concepts in three respects. First, they differentiate among 
units in terms of possession of self and exclusion of others. Second, because any 
mode of differentiation inherently entails a corresponding form of sociality, private 
property rights and sovereignty also establish systems of social relations among their 
respective units. [...] Third, the most successful theorists of the two realms [...] 
developed an autonomous legitimation of the political order based simply on the 
minimalist social needs of its component units“42. As Ruggie shows there are three 
levels on which this new concept of the world had to be put into action: 1) the
40 Ruggie, John Gerard “Territrotialy and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International 
Relations41 in International Organization. 47, 1 1993: p. 151.
41 Ibid: p. 155.
42 Ruggie, John Gerard. “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity" in. Keohane, Robert O. 
(ed) “Neorealism and its Critics" (New York: Columbia Universtiy Press, 1986): p. 145.
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domestic, social structure, 2) the territorial formation, and 3) the collectivity of
territorial units.43
Excursus: Gidden ’s Notion of ‘Administrative Power’
Having established the basis on which the modem state and the modem state system 
emerged, it is now helpful to look at Gidden’s notion of ‘administrative power’ to 
explain which forces enabled this new conception of political organisation to become
the dominant one. The notion of‘administrative power’ rests on two premises: 1) that
states use surveillance i.e. the collection of information and then use of this
information in the supervision of human beings and 2) that the surveillance is backed
up by sanctions. The combination of surveillance and sanctions is what Giddens calls 
‘administrative power’. “Organizations of all types develop legal rules of some sort. 
All forms of law, in turn, involve sanctions administered in one way or another via 
officials. Such administration is backed, in a direct or more indirect manner, by the 
threat of the use of violence/*44 The state therefore is characterised by 1) its 
territoriality, 2) the ability to enforce a code of conduct beyond its own apparatus and 
3) the dominant capacity of violent sanctions. According to Giddens, the shift from a 
traditional to a modem state and the traditional to the modem states system was 
based on an intensification of these three capabilities and the enhancement of 
administrative power. This is a very complex development. The resolution of the 
three problems influence and interact with each other.45 The basis of this 
development is the domestic pacification joined with the emergence of a clear 
definition of legality and illegality and the backing up of this system by an
43 Ruggie (1993) op. cit.: p. 160.
44 Giddens, Anthony “The Nation-State and Violence. Volume Two of A Contemporary Critique of 
Historical Materialism" (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985): p. 16.
45 For the argument see: Rosenberg, Justin “A Non-Realist Theory of Sovereignty?: Giddens’ the 
Nation-State and Violence" in Millenium. Journal of International Studies. 19, 2 1990: pp. 249-259.
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appropriate sanctioning apparatus. This enabled the emergence of exact borders in 
contrast to the pre-modem frontiers (which can be characterised as blurring zones in 
which the state power was weak). Once this was established the emergent states had 
to find ways to interact with each other. The first step was to establish a mutual 
recognition of exclusive sovereignty for the respective territories. It is to this concept
that we turn now.
ILIL Concept of Sovereignty
After having looked at the basic analytical concept of modem International 
Relation’s theory: territoriality, it is now time to look at the concept which is its legal 
expression: sovereignty. This part will consist of two major lines of argument. First
the social construction of sovereignty will be outlined. It will be argued that the 
concept of sovereignty, if seen as analytically unproblematic and ahistorical is 
severely limiting. It will be shown that sovereignty has to be seen as socially 
constructed and in the process of constant renegotiation.
Traditionally state sovereignty has been seen as the mutually recognised basic 
rule between states in the system they constitute. It is seen as an analytical category 
that is beyond time, ideology and politics. One example should suffice:
“Hegelianwise, we can not avoid the temptation that bids us make our State a 
unity. It is to be all-absorptive. All groups are to be but the ministrants to its 
life; their reality is the outcome of its sovereignty. “46
However sovereignty is an ambiguous concept, since it is enmeshed in the social 
system of relations between states. Following the conceptualisation of Biersteker, it
46 Laski, Harold J. “Studies in the Problems of Sovereignty “ (George Allen and Unwin, 1968): p. 1.
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is easier to separate the concepts of state and sovereignty.47 48 49 50 51 52State, as Biersteker 
defines it, is a “geographically constituted structure whose agents can claim ultimate 
political authority within their domain?448 Sovereignty then is the “externally 
recognised right to exercise final authority4449. As can be seen, the concept of 
sovereignty has an internal and an external dimension. Both of them are socially 
constructed. The most important aspects of sovereignty understood in this sense are: 
territory, authority, and population. “However we contend that each of these
components of state sovereignty is also socially constructed, as is the modem state 
system.445 0 Biersteker is rather vague on the specific practices that construct these 
elements and state sovereignty as a whole. He argues that the “meaning of 
sovereignty is negotiated out of interactions within intersubjectively identifiable 
communities4451 . His main argument is that sovereignty is constantly renegotiated by 
interactions between states as far as the external realm is concerned. The basic
variable is ‘recognition’. “The components of state sovereignty are intimately tied up 
with the construction, reconstruction, and negotiation of boundaries.4452 These 
political practices are, as Biersteker points out, involved in the production of 
domestic communities. Based on the modem notions of territoriality and its legal and 
doctrinal expression of sovereignty the modem conceptualisation of the state as the 
prime political unit emerged. It is to the analysis of this concept that we turn now.
47 See: Biersteker, Thomas J. and Cynthia Weber “The Social Construction of State Sovereignty" in 
Biersteker, Thomas J. and Cynthia Weber (eds) '‘‘‘State Sovereignty as Social Construct" (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996): p. 2.
48 Ibid: p. 2.
49 Ibid: p. 2.
50 Ibid: p. 3.
51 Ibid: p. 11.
52 Ibid: p. 13.
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ILIIL Modern Definitions of the ‘State’ (Hoffman and
Pierson)
The analytical concept of the ‘state’ as a modem concept is a very complex 
phenomenon. It is difficult to grasp in the form of a definition. It has even been 
argued that the whole concept is nothing more than an illusion and should be 
replaced by the term ‘political system’ which is supposed to be more analytically 
concise.53 Hoffman argues that “while the state is certainly a complex and elusive 
institution, it can and must be defined“54. The most famous definition is that of Max 
Weber. His definition of the state as the holder of the monopoly of legitimate 
violence in a specific territory is used here as the basis for definition.55 All four 
elements of the Weberian approach: monopoly, territory, legitimacy, and force need 
to be included. They create an interrelated totality so that it is impossible to define 
the state with one of the four elements missing. The definition has also an internal 
structure with force as the structuring element.
“Force is however not only an attribute which contributes to a coherent 
definition. It is the dimension which gives the Weberian definition its 
structure. A coherent definition must be a structured definition since the 
interrelationships which constitute it need to be linked together in a way 
which is not indeterminate “56.
Therefore one can speak of a ‘state’ only when the force which is exercised is 
legitimated, monopolised, and focused territorially. There are obvious problems with 
this definition, for example: what does legitimate force mean? When is it legitimate?
53 See: Easton, David. “The Political System" 2nd edition (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1971). However 
it can be easily shown that the concept of‘political system’ suffers from the same analytical problems 
as the concept of ‘state’. See: Hoffman, John. “Beyond the State. An Introductory Critique" 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995): pp. 22ff.
54 Hoffman: p. 19.
55 See: Ibid: p. 35.
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When is a monopoly reached? How does legitimate force relate to the force of 
organised crime? Hoffman argues that these elements: legitimacy, monopoly, and 
focused territorially are ambiguous. The state aspires to reach these elements 
however it never reaches its goal. It is in a constant process of working towards them. 
“All states assert a monopoly which they do not and cannot possess, and this 
contradictory identity manifests itself in all the attributes enumerated in the Weberian 
definition**56 7.
Pierson, also following Weber’s definition, identifies nine mechanisms of the
state: monopoly control of the means of violence, territoriality, sovereignty, 
constitutionality, impersonal power, public bureaucracy, authority/legitimacy, 
citizenship, and taxation.58 Pierson’s approach is less structured than that of 
Hoffman. However if one looks through his explanation of the nine state 
mechanisms, it is possible to construct a concise description of the state.
-Monopoly control of the means of violence:
Like Hoffman, Pierson sees the problem of ‘monopoly of violence’. The state can 
never attain a complete monopoly. However “the more effectively is the use of force 
monopolised by the state, the less frequent may be the actual resort to violence**59. 
-Territoriality:
The state has to claim the exclusive rights to one particular part of the globe. “States 
may also lay claim not just to jurisdiction over a particular tract of land, but also to 
the minerals that lie beneath it, to the waters that surround it (and to their economic 
product), to the airspace above it, and, most importantly to the people who inhabit 
it“60.
56 Ibid: p. 36.
57 Ibid: p. 62.
58 See Pierson, Christopher. "The Modern State" (London: Routledge, 1996).
59 Ibid: p. 10.
60 Ibid: p. 12.
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-Sovereignty:
Pierson describes the idea of sovereignty as the claim by a state to the final and 
absolute authority in the political community.
-Constitutionality:
Constitutionality refers to the fact that in many polities there is a document or a set of 
documents that lay out and often at the same time justifies the state’s basic political
arrangements.
-Rule of Law and the Exercise of Impersonal Power:
This refers to the classic idea that the state should not be ruled by the subjective and 
arbitrary will of particular men (or women for that matter) but by the objective 
determination of general and public laws.
-The Public Bureaucracy:
Here Pierson follows Weber’s characterisation closely.61 He identifies four major 
characteristics: 1) Bureaucratic administration is conducted according to fixed rules 
and procedures within a clearly-established hierarchy and in line with clearly 
demarcated official responsibilities. 2) Access to employment is based on special 
examinations and its effective operation is dependent upon knowledge of its special 
administrative procedures. 3) Bureaucracies management is based upon a knowledge 
of written documents (the files) and upon the impartial application of general rules to 
particular cases. 4) The civil servant acts not in a personal capacity, but as the 
occupier of a particular public office.
61 See: Weber, Max. “Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der Verstehenden Soziology" 4th edition 
(Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1980): pp.l28ff.
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-Authority and Legitimacy:
“Authority and legitimacy imply that, under normal circumstances and for most 
people, the actions of the state and its demands upon its population will be accepted 
or, at least, not be actively resisted4462.
-Citizenship:
Citizenship is a very complex concept. “In essence, the citizen is one who is entitled 
to participate in the life of the political community. Citizen status in the modem 
world typically denotes a mixture of entitlements or rights of participation and a 
series of attendant obligations or duties44 . As Pierson points out, citizenship 
involves a mechanism of exclusion. Citizenship rights apply only to those who have 
the status of citizens in a political community, not to others.
-Taxation:
Taxation is one of the central elements of the modem state. It creates the resources
without which the modern state could not operate. “Taxation (and the apparatus 
required to collect it) is one of the most basic constitutents of the modem state 
helping to mark it off from its ‘feudal’ predecessor4464.
A useful distinction that Pierson’s definition enables us to make is between the state
and civil society.
“The real point is that society cannot be coterminous with the nation-state; 
that the boundaries of most societies are not as clearly demarcated as those 
that surround these states; that we are all members of multiple societies, 
some of which are much smaller and others larger than nation-states; and * * *
62 Pierson op. cit.'. p. 22.
63 Ibid: p. 27.
64 Ibid: p. 31.
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that all societies exist not as free-standing social systems, but within the 
context of a range of other overlapping and abutting societies1,6 .
The definitions of the concept of the ‘state’ presented here are distinctly modem. 
They use modem conceptualisations of ‘territoriality’ and ‘sovereignty’ which have 
already been discussed. The concept of the ‘state’ is seen as an unchanging political 
unit which is striving to hold sway over political power and in consequence political 
identity. However the recent changes in the international realm, summarised in the
term ‘globalisation’ make this assumption highly problematic. It is to the question of 
the changing role of the state under the conditions of globalisation that we turn now.
III. Withering Away of the State under Globalisation?
HLI. Modern and Postmodern Conceptualisations of
Globalisation
“Globalisation has, over the past decade, become a major feature of commentaries on 
contemporary social life“65 6. The current changes in the international system: 
technological revolution, spread of education, and the rise of supra-national as well 
as subnational actors enhanced the skills and capabilities of the individuals. This had 
two main effects: First of all, there is an increase in the abilities of the individuals to 
form and mobilise political groups and movements. Secondly, individuals feel 
interconnected on a world-wide scale. During the case studies we will see that while 
the first effect can be clearly observed in Israeli and Palestinian society, the second 
feature is not as strong in both societies. Therefore we will talk about the ‘emerging 
effects or preliminary stages of globalisation’ in Israeli and Palestinian society. These
65 Ibid: p. 65.
66 Holton, Robert J. “Globalisation and the Nation-State" (London: Macmillan Press, 1998): p. 1.
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changes in the international system as a whole spurred the discussion about the 
changing role of the state. “The most frequently discussed - and most vigorously 
disputed - question in respect to globalization and governance concerns the role of 
the state“ . Modem as well as postmodern approaches analyse what they see as the 
major changes in the international system. We will see that the modem approaches 
go to great lengths to deny the current changes in the international system any 
fundamental transformative power. This is done in order to save the concept of the 
‘nation-state’ as the primary analytical variable.
By contrast, postmodern approaches to the problem of globalisation attribute 
radical transformative power to the changes in the international system. This goes so 
far that reality is replaced completely by simulation and identity becomes radically 
fluid. It will be pointed out that there are two major drawbacks in these approaches. 
The first one is a methodological problem. These approaches can not be used as a 
basis for an empirical analysis as it is attempted in this thesis. The second drawback 
is that postmodern approaches do not pay enough attention to the unevenness of the 
process of globalisation. They assume the changes to be evenly distributed all over 
the globe, which is clearly not the case. The uneven character of the process of 
globalisation will be shown. In the conclusion the consequences of this new approach 
for the process of political identity building will be pointed out.
III.I.L Modern Approaches to Globalisation
Globalisation “has become part of the established conceptual vocabulary for 
addressing social relations on a global scale“67 8. The emphasis is put on the growing
67 Scholte, Jan Aart. "Globalization. A Critical Introduction “ (London: Macmillan, 2000): p. 132.
68 Kofman, Eleonore and Gillian Youngs. “Introduction: Globalization - The Second Wave" In. 
Kofman, Eleonore and Gillian Youngs (eds). “Globalization. Theory and Practice" (London: Cassell, 
1998): p. 1.
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economic interconnection, aided by the revolutionary developments in technology 
and communication. These, so the argument goes are transforming spatiality. 
According to Kofman and Youngs, “we need to link our considerations of the nature 
of political and economic relations more strongly to our interpretation of spatiality“69. 
Different modern attempts to theorise the changes will be presented here. Each one 
acknowledges more fundamental changes than the preceding one to the nature of the 
nation-state in a globalised world. It will be shown how these approaches argue for 
these changes and then go through great difficulties to maintain ‘the state’ as the 
central analytical category.
Scholte argues, that because of the increase in the volume and speed of 
communication, the world is perceived to have become a single space.
“In the globalized world of today people can by various means relate with 
one another irrespective of their longitudinal and latitudinal position, as it 
were on a ‘supraterritorial ’ plane. Global events can - via 
telecommunications, digital computers, audio-visual media rocketry and the 
like - occur almost simultaneously anywhere and everywhere in the world"70.
This new sense of spatiality is then perceived to translate into a new form of social 
relations. The importance of the boundaries of the nation state are seen to become 
penetrated and loose importance. However having said this, substantial qualifications 
are immediately introduced:
“It is not claimed here that globalization has touched every person, location 
and sphere of activity on the planet, or each to the same extent; nor that 
globalization is a linear and irreversible process, even if it has often 
appeared to have a juggernaut quality; nor, in reductionist fashion, that
69 Ibid: p. 4
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globalization constitutes the sole or primary motor of contemporary history; 
nor that territory, place and distance have lost all significance; nor that state 
and geopolitical boundaries have ceased to be important; nor that everyone 
enjoys equal access to, an equal voice in, and equal benefits from the 
supraterritorial realm; nor that globalization entails homogenization and an 
erasure of cultural differences; nor that it heralds the birth of a world 
community with perpetual peace “ .
One can agree with the point about the uneven character of the process of 
globalisation. However, these qualifications bring one to wonder what Scholte sees 
as the new quality of social relations introduced by globalisation. It is not entirely 
clear with these qualifications who is left to experience the effects of globalisation.
In a similar fashion Marc Williams defends the central importance of the
state. He argues on the one hand that “globalization must signify more than 
interdependence. One way of thinking about this is to define interdependence as 
interconnectedness which erodes the effectiveness of national policy and threatens 
national autonomy4*70 71 2 73. On the other hand at the end of his argument, William 
concludes that “globalization is a multi-faceted process and, as such, not all 
tendencies point to the growing irrelevance of the state. Sovereignty provides a 
perspective on the world but has never been a fixed concept. It will remain important 
as territorial actors seek to enhance their capabilities4473.
Phillip G. Cemy goes down the same avenue. He goes to great lengths to 
argue that the state is being transformed by the process of globalisation. Cemy points
70 Scholte, Jan Aart. “Beyond the Buzzword: Towards a Critical Theory of Globalization“ in Kofman, 
Eleonore and Gillian Youngs (eds) "Globalization. Theory and Practice" (London: Cassell, 1998): p. 
46.
71 Ibid: p. 47.
Williams, Marc. “Rethinking Sovereignty" in Kofrnan, Eleonore and Gillian Youngs (eds) 
“Globalization. Theory and Practice" (London: Cassell, 1998): p. 116.
73 Ibid: p. 120.
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out that the capacities of the nation-state have been undermined in all three of the 
principal categories of traditional public goods - regulatory, productive/distributive 
and redistributive - by the growing global economy. He also points out that the 
sovereign inclusive character of the state is being eroded. The nation-state is 
fundamentally changed in its character as a civil association. This, according to 
Cemy, has severe consequences for the analyst: “globalization profoundly challenges 
our understanding of such central concerns as security, collective choice, political 
obligation, citizenship, legality, democracy and justice"74. However after having 
acknowledged all these profound changes to the character of the state he is still 
unwilling to see the state loose its importance as a analytical category. Cemy argues 
that the state is adapting to its new role.
“The state is increasingly being transformed into a complex mix of civil 
enterprise and association - the ’residual state’ rooted in the competition
state. The state retains a certain hold over national consciousness and
constitutional legitimacy, and its residual functions (the ’competition state ) 
are still central both to the globalisation process and to carrying out a range 
of crucial political, economic and social tasks ”75.
Cemy displays a strong attachment to the state as an analytical category. The 
beginning and the end of this quotation stand diametrically opposed. On the one hand 
Cemy describes a fundamental change in the nature of the state, on the other hand he 
is not willing or not able to see that this must have necessarily transformative effects
on the ‘national consciousness’.
It has become clear that modem approaches to the problem of the growing 
relevance of the international sphere are inherently state centric and try to defend the
74 Cemy, Phillip G. “What Next for the State" in Kofrnan, Eleonore and Gillian Youngs (eds) 
“Globalization. Theory and Practice'' (London: Cassell, 1998): p. 121.
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analytical category of the state at all costs. They theorise the international sphere as 
an international sphere in which the states still occupy the central role. They maintain 
‘the state’ as the central analytical category and it follows that the category of 
‘national identity’ remains the overriding level of political identity building.
Some modem approaches, however, try to find alternative political structures 
that emerge in consequence of the changing conditions of globalisation. Chris 
Farrands argues that a new form of regionalism is emerging. He argues that a dual 
process is characterising the international system: globalisation and regionalisation. 
“Regionalism is in part a condition, in part an identity, in part a focus, an ontological 
choice on the pail of the user of the word [...] One facet of regionalisation involves 
the creation of regional identities4476. In Farrands view, the account of regions as 
inclusive and exclusively boundaried is wrong. Instead of this he argues for a view 
that sees regions as more inclusive and overlapping.
“Regions nest with each other [..J they overlap; they represent different 
functions or different kinds of identity, they represent different imagined 
geographies and spatialities. Regional identities arise from differing 
practices which oppose different logics in a discursive power structure. 
Regions are constituted out of particular language and particular narrative 
performances in specific contexts which give them meaning and force “75 76 7.
Farrands explains that regions comprise spaces but not necessarily territories. By 
territories Farrands refers to something physical and defined; space on the other hand 
is not necessarily physical or indeed tangible. “It follows from this distinction that we 
can talk about the deterritorialisation of space, and about competing geographies
75 Ibid: 136.
76 Farrands, Chris. ‘‘Regionalisation, Globalisation and the Re-imagining of Post Cold War 
International Relations" Paper Presented at the Conference ‘The 350th Anniversary of the Peace of 
Westphalia’ Enshede, 16th-19th of July 1998: p. 4.
77 Ibid: p. 5.
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which construct space rather than recognise it ‘out there’“78. Farrands distinguishes 
two ideas of regionalism: The first is defined as marginal, outside the core of the 
state and cutting across boundaries of nation states. Nevertheless these regions are 
meaningful to those within them which are those that act out its identity as a region. 
One example Farrands mentions is the region between Rhone-Alpes, Liguria and 
Italian Savoy and the French and Italian speaking areas of Switzerland. The second 
idea of region is different in the sense that “identities and interests are constructed in 
terms of ‘ancient conflicts’ especially between Russian and Turk, Armenian and 
Azeri, Iranian and almost everyone else“79. International business also forms regions 
with an impact which can be compared to nation-states. Farrands points towards the 
special importance of the communication media.
Hobsbawn, seeing similar changes in the international system that Farrands
does, points toward the changes this situation has on the forces of nationalism and 
national identity as unifying forces. “Nationalism, however inescapable is simply no
longer the historical force it was in the era between the French Revolution and the 
end of the imperialist colonisation after World War II“80. In Hobsbawn’s view, the 
importance of the ‘national’ economies is declining which leads him to speculate that 
regional associations might be more rational sub-units of large economic entities like 
the European Union. Because of the apparent loss of importance of the nation-state 
for the ‘politics of identities’, a new search to find firm monopolithic identities, at the 
substate level is taking shape. “Monolithic aspirations of this kind are already leading 
to automist and separatist aspirations of threatened minorities within such nationalist 
entities, and to something better described as Lebanization than Balkanization“81.
78 Ibid: p. 10.
79 Ibid: p. 14.
80 Hobsbawn, E. J. “Nations and Nationalism Since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality" new and 
revised edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991): p. 169.
81 Ibid: p. 186.
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Therefore Hobsbawn sees a possible decline in nationalism and the importance of 
national identities in parallel with the decline of the nation state.
Anthony H. Richmond foresaw the emergence of ethnic nationalism more 
than a decade ago. In his analysis the emergence of substate ethnic rationalism is 
linked to the changes from the industrial and the postindustrial society.82 In his 
opinion postindustrialism is characterised by the emergence of a global economy and 
a technological revolution, especially in communications technologies. These 
influence the character of the political community. Richmond calls this new type of 
society ‘Verbindungsnetzschaft’. However “the complex social and communication 
networks, the Verbindungsnetzschaft that are characteristic of postindustrial societies 
will not entirely replace territorial communities or formal organizations. However, 
relationships based upon interpersonal, interorganizational, international and mass
communication networks, will be the characteristic mode of social interaction in the 
future“83. Because of the increased capabilities to communicate across nation-state 
boundaries, ethnic nationalism can now act not only within the nation-state but also 
be organised across national boundaries by dispersed ethnic groupings. “The 
maintenance of ethnic identity will become less dependent upon either a territorial 
base or formal organizations. It will be possible for ethnic links to be maintained with 
others of similar language and cultural background throughout the world“84.
An argument supporting this transfer of authority and legitimacy from the 
state level to the subnational and transnational level can be found in Huangs 
analysis.85 He argues that the changing conditions of a global economy and the
82 See: Richmond, Anthony H. “Ethnic Nationalism and Postindustrialism“ in Ethnic and Racial 
Studies. 7, 1 1984.
83 Ibid: p. 11.
84 Ibid: p. 15.
85 Huang, Xiaoming. “First Man, Last Governor and the Logic of Human Collectivity" Paper 
Presented at the Conference ‘The 350th Anniversary of the Peace of Westphalia’ Enshede, 16th-19th of 
July 1998.
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advances in technology as outlined above have changed the conditions so drastically 
that the institution of the state has problems to adapt. The existing emotional 
attachments that are still felt towards the nation-state are increasingly felt as limiting. 
In difference to the previous arguments for a decline in the capabilities of the state, 
Huang sees an uneven development. In his view it depends which institutional 
arrangement the state has chosen. In a liberal environment the state is marginalised. It 
is here where the concerns about the shrinking space for the state are the strongest. In
an authoritarian environment, the limits of the state tend to be overstretched, bi the
corporatist environment (like Austria for example) the boundaries of the state are 
blurred with other arrangements. “When the question of vitality of the state is placed 
in this context, one can see that the problem is not just one of territorial boundary or 
exclusive authority. It is an issue of functions and capacity“86 87. Huang sees a distinct 
possibility that the state as an institution can survive if it can adapt. However if it 
survives as a primary institution for the organisation of human collectives, then its 
functions will have to change. “The nation-state is yielding back its over-expanded 
authority and returning to itself as a vital option rather than a self imposed 
necessity4487.
This part of the chapter has made clear that the state can no longer easily be 
seen as the primary source of political identity. It has become a contested concept. 
Under the term ‘globalisation’ arguments have been put forward that the international 
realm is of increasing importance. The next part will present postmodern approaches 
to the problem of the increased importance of the international sphere. These present 
a diametrically opposed argument to the modem attempts of theorisation. 
Postmodern approaches see a complete withering away of the category of the state.
86 Ibid: p. 30.
87 Ibid: p. 32.
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Identity becomes radically fluid and unstructured. The next part will point out the 
rather sweeping assumptions of the postmodern approaches, especially as far as the 
breadth and depth of the globalisation process is concerned.
IILLII. Postmodern Approaches to Globalisation
Postmodern approaches theorise the rise of the international realm in a distinctly 
different way than the modem approaches which were discussed. The emphasis here 
is on the phenomenon of radical space-time compression. “We have been 
experiencing [...] an intense phase of time-space compression that has had a 
disorienting and disruptive impact upon political-economic practices, the balance of 
class power, as well as upon the cultural and social life"88 89. One of the most 
prominent postmodern works on this problem is Harvey’s ‘The Postmodern 
Condition'. Harvey argues that through the developments in technology and 
communication, the speed of production, consumption and flow of capital has been 
increased. Because of this “the annihilation of space through time has radically 
changed the commodity mix that enters into daily reproduction4489. This has major 
social consequences. The first one is an accentuation of the volatility and 
ephemerality of fashions, products, production techniques, labour processes, ideas 
and ideologies, values and established practices. “The sense that ‘all that is solid 
melts into air’ has rarely been more pervasive"90. This has, in Harvey’s view, a 
profound impact on political life. Politics is now driven and performed through the 
media and here especially the electronic media. The political and intellectual leaders 
try to give the illusion of stability of common values as part of their power base. 
They have to project this illusion against the reality of fluidity in everyday life.
88 Harvey, David. "The Condition of Postmodernity" (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990): p. 284.
89 Ibid: p. 299.
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“This becomes in effect, the fleeting, superficial, and illusory means whereby 
an individualistic society of transients sets forth nostalgia for common values. 
The production and marketing of such images of permanence and power 
require considerable sophistication, because the continuity and stability of 
the image have to be retained while stressing the adaptability, flexibility, and 
dynamism of whoever or whatever is being imaged”90 1 92.
The image becomes more important than reality, or even replaces reality as 
hyperreality. Harvey uses the term ‘simulacrum’ to describe this tendency. By 
‘simulacrum’ Harvey refers to the state of such complete replication that the 
difference between the replicate and the original is impossible to spot. This has 
profound consequences for political identity building. “Insofar as identity is 
increasingly dependent upon images, this means that the serial and recursive 
replications of identities (individual, corporate, institutional, and political) becomes a 
very real possibility and problem. We can certainly see it at work in the realm of 
politics as the image makers and the media assume a more powerful role in the 
shaping of political identities1492. It becomes obvious that identity is no longer bound 
by any level (neither sub-national, national or international). It becomes a free 
floating ever changing activity which can easily be manipulated by those who have 
access to image production.
In order to understand the implications of Harvey’s argument fully it will be 
helpful to examine the analysis of ‘simulations’ by Jean Beaudrillard. The term 
‘simulation’; plays a major role in his analysis. In his opinion the ‘real’, or the reality 
principle, no longer exists. It has been completely replaced by the simulation. The
90 Ibid: p. 285f.
91 Ibid: p. 288.
92 Ibid: p. 289.
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simulation is being invoked in order to make people believe that the real is still 
existing.
"When the real is no longer what it used to be, nostalgia assumes its full 
meaning. There is a proliferation of origin and signs of reality; of second 
hand truth, objectivity and authenticity [...] there is a panic-stricken 
production of the real and the referential, above and parallel to the panic of 
material production: this is how simulation appears [...] a strategy of the 
real, neo-real and hyperreal whose universal double is a strategy of 
deterrence “93.
This complicated argument can best be explained by the use of one of Beaudrillards 
examples: Disneyland. First, it is a play of illusions and phantasms: Pirates, the 
Frontier, Future World. On a second level, however, it is presented as the 
“miniaturised and religious revelling in real America, in its delights and 
drawbacks”94. Disneyland simulates the ‘real’ America. Its values are presented here 
in a miniaturised and comic strip form. Therefore Disneyland serves as a deterrence 
against the fact and realisation that these values are themselves a simulation. The 
argument goes like this: Because our society is based on the reality principle, we 
assume that every simulation must have its ‘real’ counterpart. The simulation of 
‘real’ values in Disneyland, however, do not correspond to any ‘real’ values, they 
have no ‘real’ counterpart. Because they are simulated however one assumes that
these values exist.
"Disneyland is presented as imaginary in order to make us believe that the 
rest is real, when in fact all of Los Angeles and the America surrounding it 
are no longer real, but of the order of the hyperreal and of simulation. It is no
93 Beaudrillard, Jean. "Simulations" (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983): p. 12.
94 Ibid: p. 23.
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longer a question of a false representation of reality (ideology), but of 
concealing the fact that the real is no longer real, and thus of saving the 
reality principle. The Disneyland imaginary is neither true nor false; it is a 
deterrence machine set up in order to rejuvenate in reverse the fiction of the
real"95
Truth becomes then a product of several simulation models. No set of values is more 
‘real’ than the next because all are simulated. This argument forms the basis for a 
new view on society and social relationships. Steven Best summarises Beaudrillard’s 
take on this: “With Beaudrillard we move to a whole new era of social development 
[...] we enter the society of the simularcum, an abstract non-society, devoid of 
cohesive relations, social meaning, and collective representation”96. This has obvious 
consequences for the question of political identity. Firstly ‘identity’ in any shape or 
form is radically atomised. The individual is alone, group identity is no longer 
possible since social relations have lost their meaning. Secondly, identity building 
does not happen on any particular level. It happens everywhere and at the same time. 
To speak' of levels of political identity building is meaningless. Thirdly, political 
identity is no longer real. It is a product of simulation models and radically open for 
manipulation.
William Connolly analyses some ways of thinking about postmodern political 
identity. Connolly speaks of the “enigma of identity in its relations to the other”97. 
Using the example of the dealings of the Spanish with the ‘other’ discovered in 
America in 1492, Connolly shows how the Spanish identity depended on the ‘other’,
95 Ibid: p. 25.
96 Best, Steven. “The Commodification of Reality and the Reality of Commodification: Beaudrillard, 
Debord, and Postmodern Theory" in. Kellner Douglas (ed). "Beaudrillard. A Critical Reader “ 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1995): p. 51.
97 Connolly, William E. “Identity and Difference in Global Politics14 in: Der Deriam, James and 
Michael J. Shapiro (eds) "International/Intertextual Relations. Postmodern Readings of World 
Politics" (New York: Lexington Books, 1989): p. 325.
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the Indios, which were perceived as subhuman and therefore subject to extinction or
as human but in need of assimilation.
“When you remain within the established field of identity and difference, you 
become a bearer of strategies to protect identity through devaluation of the 
other; but if you transcend the field of identities through which the other is 
constituted, you loose the identity and standing needed to communicate with 
those you sought to inform. Identity and difference are bound together. It is 
impossible to reconstitute the relation to the second without confounding the
no
experience of the first “ .
According to Connolly, the postmodern identity by contrast assumes an ironic stance 
to what it is, even while affirming itself in its identity. This means that in the 
postmodern conception identity no longer takes an absolute stand. It recognises that 
there are other possible conceptions of identity which cannot be judged by ‘good or 
bad’, ‘right or wrong’ standards. At the same time in order to maintain ontological 
security and cohesiveness, postmodern identity has to affirm its own position in 
relation to the ‘other’ but still always recognising the legitimacy of difference.
In contrast to the modernist who thinks in categories of coherence and 
consistency of the discourse, the Postmodernist tries to think in the category of the 
paradox. He/she accepts difference as part of this paradox and does not try to bring 
the paradox into coherence. “Only attentiveness to paradox can loosen the hold 
monotonic standards of identity hold over life in the late-modern age“". The 
consequence of this postmodern analysis of the changes in the international realm is 
that the modern conceptions of territoriality and sovereignty also need to be radically 
transformed. Postmodern thinkers transform and replace both concepts and see them * *
98 Ibid: p. 329.
99 Ibid: p. 339.
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largely as irrelevant. This can be seen most clearly in the writings of Der Derian, 
Ashley and Walker.
IILIL Postmodern Reconceptualisation of Territoriality and
Sovereignty
HULL Postmodern Concepts of Territoriality: Der Derian ’s Concept of
Accelerated Time: The Replacement of Space by Pace
Der Derian questions the concept of the separation of time and place, with its 
primacy of place on which, as shown above, the modem concept of territoriality and 
sovereignty rest. The factors which enabled the modem concept of territoriality and 
sovereignty to emerge are at the same time transcending these concepts. The concept 
of extraterritorial space is one of the most important one. As will be shown below, 
the growing importance of these extraterritorial spaces as well as the growing 
porosity of national borders which follows directly from the penetration of these 
extraterritorial spaces aides the demise of the utility of the modem concepts of 
territoriality.
According to Der Derian, “the new techniques of power are transparent and 
pervasive, more ‘real’ in time than in space, produced and sustained through the 
exchange of signs rather than goods.“100 Der Derian shows that in a postmodern 
condition, speed is more important than space. He uses the example of intelligence 
work, terrorism and war to show how the speed of information becomes more 
important than the occupation of a particular geostrategic place. He calls the sphere 
in which postmodern politics are made and postmodern wars are fought
100 Der Derain, James “Antidiplomacy. Spies, Terror, Speed, and War“ (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992): 
p.3.
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•‘hyperreality’. In this sphere “the model of the real becomes more real than the reality 
it models.”101 The new force in postmodern industrialist societies is speed. He breaks 
with the modem conception of time-space differentiation, which implies a logical 
connection of time and space102 and replaces it with accelerated time (speed). His 
proposition is “that international relations is shifting from a realm defined by 
sovereign places, impermeable borders and rigid geopolitics, to a site of accelerating 
flows, contested borders, and fluid chronopolitics. In short, pace displacing space”103. 
The increase in speed not only contests national borders but at the same time limits 
the influence of national governments on the control of their territory. Following 
Virilio’s concept of speed and politics, Der Derian argues that all “realities are 
generated, mediated, simulated by technological means of reproduction; hence ‘truth’ 
becomes an instrument and product of perception”104. After this attack on the very 
basis on which the modem conceptions of territoriality stands, the concept must 
collapse. A new view of the state system is required. The alternative, however, is a 
postmodern web of complicated relationships which are very difficult to grasp and 
even more difficult to work with in an empirical study. The next part will look at the 
postmodern criticism of the concept of sovereignty. It will be shown that the concept 
will also collapse under this criticism and that the alternative postmodern conception 
of sovereignty is too complex and vague to be usefully introduced in an alternative 
approach. This becomes particularly clear if one looks at the writings of Ashley and
Walker.
101 Ibid: p. 5.
102 To construct a binary opposition on modern terms always requires a pair of two signifiers which 
stand in opposition: intemal/extemal, hierarchic/anarchic, space/time. In these binary oppositions the 
first is always given a primacy over the second, signifying the ideal from which the second deviates.
103 Ibid: p. 129f.
104 Ibid: p. 133.
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IILILIL Postmodern Criticism of State Sovereignty
The postmodern discourse on the modern concept of state sovereignty is criticising 
this concept as an arbitrary historical construction and a political practice which 
serves the interests of power and is exclusionary. This approach can be illustrated by 
the analysis of state sovereignty of Ashley and Walker.
Ashley’s analysis of state sovereignty argues that the modem discourse uses 
what he calls the ‘heroic practice’. “A heroic practice is a ‘double -voiced’ practice 
[...] it turns on a dichotomy. It turns on a hierarchical opposition of sovereignty 
versus anarchy, where the former term is privileged as a regulative ideal.“105 
Sovereignty is seen as the transcendental origin of power, since it is the timeless and
universal source of meaning and truth in history. It rests in the already present
domestic society. In the domestic realm all conflicts can be decided, power is always 
grounded in truth. Anarchy however is a danger. It is full of ambiguity, contingency, 
and chance. Here conflicts of interpretation are intrinsically undecidable. All conduct 
is a matter of arbitrary power. “A heroic practice thus invokes anarchic dangers that 
must be excluded from the time and place of the domestic being.“106
This process is a political process, a construction that is both historically 
specific and arbitrary. The modem discourse originated at the juncture between the 
late medieval and the early modem period. The heroic practice justifies in the name 
of reason the authority of a centralised state over its inhabitants. “It disciplines the 
change, contingency, and ambiguity of historical doing in the domestication of 
modern being.“107 It sets specific limits on possibilities of political community. It can 
only be located at the state level. These limits are repeated in modem theories of
105 Ashley, Richard K. “The Powers of Anarchy: Theory, Sovereignty, and the Domestication of 
Global Life" in Der Derian, James (ed) “International Theory. Critical Investigations “ (London: 
Macmillan, 1995): p. 103.
106 Ibid: p. 104.
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international relations. As Walker puts it “They [these theories, HJS] express
authoritative reservations about how far and under what conditions this particular 
account [i. e. the modem discourse, HJS] of political identity and community can be 
sustained in either space or time“107 08 109. State sovereignty is seen as the locus of 
authentic politics inside the state and the sphere of mere relations outside the state. 
Walker calls this a spatial-temporal resolution, Ashley talks about ‘domestication’ of 
global life. Global life has a certain order, anarchy, outside the sovereign states. The 
core idea here is that the concept of sovereignty tries to make sense of the ambiguity 
of life. The heroic practice is what Ashley calls the deep structure of this process.
"It announces an intention to regard global life as a place and time
potentially subordinated to the ideal of a sovereign presence, a universal 
rational principle of interpretation and conduct. It also explains and excuses
a turn to statism by announcing an intention to regard this turn not as an end 
in itself but as part of a story of the emergence of a universal centre or 
principle - a monologically interpretable regime, say - that might negate 
anarchy’s dangers.1,109
One is confronted with a paradox: On the one hand the concept of sovereignty does 
not exist outside the temporality of events. It is a functional concept, which is 
continuously fabricated in history through practice. It exists only to the extent that it 
is working in history and practice (by disciplining, excluding deviating 
interpretations). On the other hand to be effective it must be regarded as 
unproblematic, given for all time, beyond criticism and independent of politics. “It 
must be recognised as something transcendental and foundational within man -
107 Ibid: p. 104.
108 Walker, R. B. J. "Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory" (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993): p. 15.
109 Ashley, Richard K. “Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy
Problematique“ in Millenium. Journal of International Studies. 17, 2 1988: p. 241.
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something that is always and everywhere already there, prior to the heroic practices 
which invoke it.10 Sovereignty can only work if it is not problematised. As soon as 
one starts to treat sovereignty no longer as a natural condition of political life, one is 
challenging its foundations.
The situation becomes even more paradoxical if one allows for the
introduction of non-state actors into the analysis. These non-state actors threaten the 
representation of the state as a well-bounded sovereign actor. It becomes impossible
to decide where a state begins and where it ends. For the heroic practice to work, the 
state has to fulfil this bare minimum. “The state must be represented as an entity 
having a coherent set of interests and possessing some set of means that it is able to 
deploy in the service of these interests. This in turn requires that the state be 
represented as an entity having absolute boundaries unambiguously demarcating a 
domestic ‘inside’ and setting it off from an international ‘outside’“H1. If the stable 
representation of the state is no longer possible, the heroic practice collapses. Now 
state sovereignty is recognisable for what it is: an arbitrary political representation, 
which helps to control and suppress deviating representations.110 * 12 It expresses in an 
authoritarian manner “the decisive demarcation between inside and outside, between 
self and other, identity and difference, community and anarchy that is constitutive of 
our modem understanding of political space“.113
This situation results in a severe epistemological problem. One is left with the choice 
of being either inside or outside the discourse. Either to accept the privileging of the 
‘Reasoning Man’ and the arbitrary heroic practice or to refute it. If one decides to
110 Ashley (1995) op. cit.'. p. 117.
1,1 Ashley (1988) op. cit.'. p. 248.
112 The notion of a ‘social contract’ does not really acknowledge this. A contract must be voluntary
entered by both parties in order to work. However in the modem conceptualisation of sovereignty it is 
seen as a ‘natural’ development of political life. If one assumes such an evolutionary development, 
there can have been no free choice between the partners of the contract.
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refute the modem discourse one has also to accept the impossibility of certain 
knowledge and orientation because every claim to knowledge is automatically 
excluding other possible interpretations. Here the postmodern argument turns against 
itself. On the one hand, one says that there cannot be any certain knowledge and
interpretation while on the other hand, this claim itself is seen as a true statement.
It has become clear in this section that the postmodern view of the effects of 
the changing conditions of globalisation is far more fundamental than the modem 
conceptions of the problem. The postmodern approaches see in the developments of 
technology and communication not only a new importance of the international realm 
to which the state will adjust (like the modem conceptions suggest). The postmodern 
arguments assume that these developments have a fundamentally transformative 
power which will change (and in some cases already has changed) social relations. 
The modem concepts of territoriality and sovereignty are seen as overtaken by speed 
and pace on the one hand and criticised as part of an exclusionary political practice 
on the other. Consequently identity is becoming radically fluid, a simulation no 
longer meaningful, no longer completely ‘real’.
It has become clear that this way of theorising identity building has its merits 
(especially the argument for the openness of discourse and the acceptance of 
difference). However such an approach has methodological problems if one wants to 
base an empirical study on this way of theorising. It is simply not possible to do this. 
The postmodern argument about the death of reality and the resulting death of truth is 
inherently contradictory. On the one hand, one can argue against truth whilst at the 
same time treating this argument against truth as a true statement. Therefore one 
argues against truth whilst assuming truth. If one would neglect this paradox and
113 Walker, R. B. J. “State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time“ in Millenium. 
Journal of International Studies. 20, 3 1991: p. 456.
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assume the death of truth one would have to stop the analysis at this point. There 
would be no way to make meaningful statements of this kind, let alone putting this 
analytical assumption as the basis of an empirical study. If truth is dead then political 
analysis is dead. Another problem is that the developments in technology and 
communication which postmodern approaches see as the motors of transformation, 
are not evenly spread in breadth and depth around the globe. The dimension of 
uneven globalisation is completely missing in the postmodern approaches. What is 
needed is an approach which argues for the transformative character of the new 
developments in technology and communication, while rendering these changes 
intelligible and acknowledging their uneven spread around the globe.
IILIIL Uneven Globalisation
The process of globalisation is not an even global process. It has been argued in the 
preceding sections that the process depends to a large extent on developments in 
technology and communication. The logical point which follows from this is that 
people, communities and societies must have access to these new technologies. 
Although one can argue that nearly everybody on the globe is affected by these 
changes, the effect is different in breadth and depth for different societies.
“The extent to which we can all participate in cultural production and 
consumption clearly varies historically and between societies. It also varies between 
groups within societies, as almost all societies and social entities possess groups of 
specialists who engage in the production and dissemination of culture (priests, artists, 
intellectuals, educators, teachers, academics, cultural intermediaries etc.)“114 *. 
Featherstone argues that the process of globalisation is a two fold process. It is not
114 Featherstone, Mike. “Undoing Culture. Globalization, Postmodernism and Identity" (London:
Sage, 1997): p. 3.
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only an extension of a certain culture (information culture for example) to the limits 
of the globe. It is also the pilling up of cultures on top of each other. Therefore 
globalisation cannot be equated with homogenisation. “This destroys the unitary 
clean and coherent images of modernity that have been projected out of the Western 
centers”115. Featherstone suggests we should speak of ‘global modernities’ rather 
than of ‘global modernity’. Different societies react differently to the process of 
globalisation. In some the influence is direct and strong in others it is rather weak. 
“Not only can we see a series of different entry-points into modernity [...], but a 
series of different projects were also developed as well as demands for selective 
appropriation of the institutional parameters”116. The West and the rest enter into a 
dialogue, according to Featherstone, that is no longer controlled by the West. The rest 
is ‘talking back’ to the West and the West starts to listen. A similar point is made by 
David Slater. Slater analyses the different responses to the process of globalisation 
between the ‘North’ and the ‘South’. He sees that the globalisation process “is 
constituted by a continuance of the North’s will to gain geopolitical power over the 
South, and neoliberalism [Slater refers here to the neoliberal economic theory] is a 
key reflection of this will”117. Globalisation, so the argument goes, is a process from 
‘above’, a new form of imperialism. This situation arises because the West is 
realising its diminishing importance.
“The current era is also marked by a sense of Western unease. New questions 
of politcal identity and difference haunt the traditional landscapes of Western 
privilege and the clash over the cannon in the literary domain, as well as
1.5 Ibid: p. 11.
1.6 Ibid: p. 146.
117 Slater, David. “Other Contexts of the Global: A Critical Geopolitics of North-South Relations14 in 
Kofman, Eleonore and Gillian Youngs (eds) “Globalization. Theory and Practice" (London: Cassell, 
1998): p. 281.
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more broadly the multi-cultural thematic, point to a climate of contestation 
and change1,118.
Slater criticises that ‘Southern’ voices are not heard in the discussion about the global 
changes. He argues that wide parts of the discussion of global changes display a 
“sense of superiority which endows the West with the presumed ability to provide a 
solution to the problems of other societies44119. It has become obvious that the process 
of globalisation cannot be treated as an unproblematic concept which can be evenly 
applied to the entire globe. One has to decide for every country or 
geographical/cultural region under examination how far the process of globalisation 
has developed and what reaction this has evoked. This is not a problem which can be
analytically resolved.
One can argue that the two cases analysed in the thesis, Israeli and Palestinian 
societies are at the preliminaiy stages of globalisation. The state level, as we will see 
during the empirical analysis, is increasingly under pressure in both societies from 
above (supra-state level) and below (substate level). Generating societal cohesion is 
becoming difficult for the elites on the state level. On the other hand, the concept of 
the ‘state’ of having a state, is still a central issue and point of political identification. 
The identification with being Israeli or Palestinian is still very strong, although the 
agreement what it means concretely to be an Israeli or a Palestinian is fragmenting in 
both societies. The different political identity groups in both societies are loosing 
common ground for their conceptions of what kind of state Israel and Palestine 
should be. Both societies are on the brink of loosing their basic political consensus. 118 *
118 Ibid: p. 284.
1,9 Ibid: p. 282.
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This part of the chapter analysed the influence of globalisation on the role of the 
state. Two major approaches have been opposed in the analysis. The first one was the 
modern approaches to the problem. It has been shown that these approaches are 
inherently state centric. They acknowledge the fact that international realm is 
changing and as a result is growing in importance. However they do not see a 
fundamental change that would threaten the role of the concept of the ‘state’ as the 
central analytical category. The argument is that the state will adjust to these changes 
and will continue to play the role of the principal actor in international relations. 
Therefore the problem of political identity is still reduced to the question of national 
identity. The second set of theories were those of postmodern orientation. 
Postmodern conseptualisations see the changes that result from the process of 
globalisation as so fundamental that they undermine severely the political capabilities 
of the state. The two basic concepts on which the state rests, territoriality and 
sovereignty, can no longer serve as a firm basis on which to rest the concept of a state 
as a political actor. Here the problem was that while the fundamental character of the 
changes in the international system is correctly recognised, the underlying 
assumption that these changes are evenly affecting all parts of the globe is flawed. In 
addition to this, these approaches present a methodological problem as they theorise 
identity as radically fluid and constantly changing. Such a conception cannot be 
integrated into an empirical study of political identity building as it is attempted in
this thesis.
Another problem is that the growing importance of the international realm for 
the issue of political identity building is not an even, global process. For each region 
which is under consideration it has to be empirically decided how far the process of 
globalisation is developed and how far it is affecting the process of political identity 
building. While one can assume that every part of the globe is affected to a certain
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extent by this fundamental transformation, there are important differences in breadth 
and depth of this development which cannot be ignored if one wants to talk seriously 
about political identity building. Therefore an alternative approach is needed which 
acknowledges the shortcomings of both the modem and postmodern conceptions of 
the change in the international realm. One alternative is offered by Rosenau’s concept
of frontiers to which we turn now.
IV. Rosenau’s Concept of ‘Frontiers’: A Critique
As shown above, the modem concept of sovereign territoriality and its political 
expression the modem concept of the state collapse under the assumed conditions of 
postmodern approaches. We have argued that because of the uneven character of the 
changes that globalisation introduces, this cannot be generally assumed. One way to 
acknowledge these changes and to avoid falling into a maze of constant flows and 
changing patterns which render themselves unintelligible for a theoretical grasp is to 
redefine the domestic/intemational border. Here it is not seen as a sphere of exact, 
mutually exclusive borderlines but Rosenau’s concept of frontiers is used. As he 
argues, the way ahead would be to replace “’a boundary that isn’t there’ with ‘a new 
and wide political space’ - here called the Frontier, with a capital ‘F’ to stress its 
centrality.“120 The Frontier is seen as an ever widening political space in which world 
affairs unfold, domestic and international issues converge and become next to 
indistinguishable. The concept of Frontiers is not a return to the modem conception 
of territoriality, since the political space of the Frontier is itself a representation and 
not a reality. It is a mere instrument to grasp the complex reality of accelerated time
120 Rosenau, James N. “Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier. Exploring Governance in a Turbulent 
World”. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): p. 4.
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and to bring the web of flows of international politics under the emerging conditions 
of globalisation into a structure that can be grasped.
IV.I Newly Emerging Structures in International Relations
Rosenau’s ‘Frontier’ is not a geographical space but a space of political issues. It is 
what he calls a ‘terra incognita’, a multitude of places. The issue boundaries of this 
Frontier are constantly shifting and so widening or narrowing this ‘space’. “A map of 
the world that highlights the Frontier would depict a wide, contested domain in 
which governance is highly desegregated even as many of its spheres are 
overlapping.41121 The world in Rosenau’s view is highly turbulent and disorderly. It is 
characterised by an ever growing fluidity and uncertainty. Therefore, he argues, a 
new approach to international relations has to be developed. Rosenau points out the 
importance of being able to recognise change. Anomalies, he argues, may be 
indicators of a change in the underlying patterns of international politics. At present 
Rosenau sees three different changes taking place in the international system that
amounts to a difference in kind.
1) A change in the structures that sustain the politics of the Frontier: multiple 
systems of transaction link people in highly complex ways and render territorial 
boundaries virtually useless. New political uncertainties are created.
2) A change in the structures of globalized world economy: New technologies 
render national markets too ‘small’ for competition. They are no longer the 
principal entities. Furthermore the global economy is integrated through 
information systems and information technology which allow postmodern global 
networks to emerge.
121 Ibid: p. 10.
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3) A change in the timeframe in which events unfold. Here Rosenau is very close to
Der Derian’s analysis of pace replacing space in international relations. Rosenau 
argues that the processes of aggregation and disaggregation occur rapidly, to the 
point of simultaneity. Rosenau calls for a “new understanding of the temporal 
dimensions of politics.“122
Nevertheless he argues that states still perform crucial functions whereby the 
collective needs of their peoples are enhanced, preserved, or otherwise met. 
However, states are no longer the primary actors and face challenges from above and
below.
“The combination of internal and external dynamics at work in all societies
generates simultaneous tendencies toward globalization and localization, 
toward more extensive integration across national boundaries and more 
pervasive fragmentation within national boundaries, toward a relocation of 
authority ‘outward’ to transnational entities and 'inward’ to subnational 
groups “123.
He can se'e a marked decline in the ability of states to perform their historical tasks. 
The boundaries of the state can no longer keep those forces out since they are not 
territorially dependent. Rosenau sees that in most states this situation has led to an 
internal authority crisis “in which the legitimacy and governing powers of political 
leaders are being challenged, thwarted, or otherwise questioned by organized 
subgroups, social movements, issue publics, and individual citizens“124. This results 
in a proliferation of challenging subgroups and transnational actors. These undermine 
the authority of the state by showing that they can cope with issues and problems that
the traditional nation-state seems unable to tackle.
122 Ibid: p. 24.
123 Ibid: p. 350.
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IV.II. A new Approach to International Relations
On the basis of these changes Rosenau wants to develop a new ‘worldview’ of 
international relations. A worldview, according to Rosenau, consists of an ontology, 
paradigms and theories. This new worldview should recast the relevance of 
territoriality, highlight the porosity of boundaries, see the spatial and temporal 
dimensions of governance as equally important, point out the importance of 
networking organisations and the shifts of authority from the national to subnational, 
transnational and non-governmental levels. Rosenau calls his worldview: 
‘ffagmegration’ to highlight the equally important forces of integration and 
fragmentation. In the ontology used here, boundaries are seen as porous, transgressed 
by actors and issues. Rosenau argues that there is an ever growing number of issues 
and problems that can not be efficiently be dealt with by the ‘classic’ actors (i.e. 
nation-states). This gives rise to new forms of governance in newly developed 
spheres of authority (SOA). States are only seen as one possible SOA, and not as 
having a privileged position within the international system. “What enables one actor 
to obtain compliance from another actor in a disaggregated world is an 
interdependent convergence of needs and not a constitutional specification that 
assigns the highest authority exclusively to states and national governments/124 25
Based on this ontology Rosenau looks at the different developments in what
he calls the turbulence model:
1) The skills of individuals: He argues that through the spread of information 
technology the skills of individuals have greatly enhanced. “The turbulence 
model posits a world of individuals who cannot be easily deceived and who can
124 Ibid: p. 355.
125 Ibid: p. 41.
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readily be mobilised on behalf of goals they comprehend and means they 
approve.44’26
2) The relocation of authority: Rosenau argues that because the skills of individuals
have been increased the nature of legitimacy has changed. The shift is from a 
traditional acceptance of legitimacy and authority of the state, to a performance 
oriented approach to them. The ‘old’ SO A (nation-states) face an authority crisis, 
because they cannot cope with substantial issues (it is interesting that Rosenau 
uses here the example of Israel, since it coincides with the analysis of Israeli 
society that is presented in this study). This crisis widens the Frontier and 
reinforces the tension between the centralising and decentralising forces, which 
then in turn undermines national sovereignty.
3) The bifurcation of the international system: Rosenau refers with this term to the 
proliferation of actors within the international system. Non-state, non­
governmental, transnational and international actors play an ever growing role 
next to the state system. Rosenau talks of a three way relocation of authority away 
form the state: a) inwards (to subnational groups), b) sidewards (to social 
movements, NGOs), and c) outwards (to transnational, supranational 
organisations). Governance is therefore no longer hierarchical. Rosenau sees a 
dispersion of sites at which authority can be obtained and compliance generated.
The model of fragmegration is made more explicit in Figure 1 It consists of three
streams:
1) globalising tendencies: These are defined as processes that are not hindered or 
prevented by territorial or jurisdictional boundaries. They impel actors to act in more 
encompassing and coherent processes. 126
126 Ibid: p. 61.
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2) dynamics of localisation, decentralisation: These lead actors to narrow their 
horizons and withdraw to less encompassing processes, organisations or systems.
3) the middle stream is the turbulence model, outlined above, which affects 1) or 2) 
depending on the situation.
The feedback processes (shown as arrows) sustain fragmegration and show 
that the three streams are interlinked and act rapidly and simultaneously. The most 
important factor influencing this new system is the rise of dynamic technologies. The
most important is the nuclear revolution and the revolution in communication 
technologies. The nuclear revolution reduced the occurrence of wars and therefore 
deprived the nation states of their prime instrument to regulate their conflicts. It 
effectively limits state action. The emergence of communication technology made the 
transmission of information faster, therefore territorial borders more porous. With the 
emergence of simultaneous events and reactions, they represent an ever present 
stimuli for action to the publics. It also enables leaders of non-state actors to mobilise 
their followers quickly and efficiently.
“Unilateral, multilateral, subgroup, and transnational activities are all 
conceived to be operative in SOAs along the Frontier, sometimes reinforcing each 
other, sometimes negating each other, but all the times at work in one part of the 
world or another.44127 Rosenau argues that the process of fragmegration is an uneven, 
unlinear process. Governance along the Frontier is more an emergent, chaotic pattern 
than a fixed arrangement. Fragmegration is nonlinear, uneven in its evolution, uneven 
in its intensity, uneven in its scope and uneven in its direction.127 28 However, Rosenau 
argues that the fragmegration ontology takes into account a radical change in the 
underpinnings of the world system, the actions and outcomes within the system
127 Ibid: p. 51.
128 See: Ibid: p. 52
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depend on the mental-emotional dynamics of the actors which are only changing 
slowly. Therefore it will take time before the concrete actions which the actors take 
will reflect the change in the underpinnings.
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IV.IIL Criticism of Rosenau9s Approach
Rosenau’s model seems to be useful as a base for the theoretical approach of 
political identity formation presented in this study. However, there are several points 
of criticism: the generality of the model which make it difficult to narrow it down to 
a specific case study, the technological determinism on which the model of 
fragmegration is based, and the unspecified relationships between the different 
elements of the system.
Generality of Rosenau’s Model:
The model presented above is based on very general and only loosely defined terms. 
The prime example of this are ‘globalisation’ and ‘localisation’. These terms, which 
are basic to the model as a whole, are defined in a common sensual way. They are 
described by their outcomes and their influences on the actors. This implies their 
influence in their definition: globalising processes are all those that have the 
possibility of being global and localising processes are those which are local. What 
would be needed are definitions which show what makes global processes global and 
what are the underlying dynamics of these processes and vice versa what makes 
localisation processes local. Because of these general definitions it would be very 
hard to use Rosenau’s model in an empirical study, without amending it.
Technological Determinism:
The model of fragmegration is based on the argument that the nuclear and the 
communication revolution influence the world political system to the point of
substantial transformation. This narrows the causes of this transformation down to
one single variable. It seems that this argument is rather deterministic. First of all, it 
would constrict the model only to the developed world and societies in which the 
flow of information is freely permitted. Rosenau admits that fragmegration is uneven
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in different parts of the world. However he fails to say what the concrete differences 
are between the different regions of the world and how fragmegration works in less 
developed societies and in societies with restricted freedom of information. Secondly, 
the model does not take into account how the mental capacity of publics change - the 
influence of a change in perceptions of authority, for example - and how these 
processes interact with the state system (an increase in information if not met by an 
increase in the state’s capacity to use this information).
Unspecified Relationships within the Model:
The model presented in Figure 1 shows a complex web of interactions between the 
three streams of globalisation, localisation and the turbulence model. At no point in 
his description of the model, however, does Rosenau specify these relationships. He 
talks about feedback processes without saying what these feedback processes are and 
how they work. The model of turbulence is even more general since, as Rosenau, 
puts it the processes are “essential neutral in the sense [of] depending on situational 
determinants.44’30 Rosenau does not give any examples in which situations the 
turbulence model is influencing either of the two streams. Therefore if one would 
like to base an empirical study on the model one would have tremendous problems 
defining what situational determinants are of important for the two tendencies.
What is Rosenau’s model useful for?
As the criticism showed in a very general way, it would be next to impossible to use 
Rosenau’s fragmegration model directly for an empirical study. What it will be used 
here is a basis from which a theory of political identity building will be developed.
The different elements outlined in the model can be used to describe the forces which
render political identity building more complex. It has been argued that even when 
one does not follow the postmodern approaches to the international system, one has
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to acknowledge that the emerging conditions of globalisation do have an effect on 
political structures in the international system, mainly state structure. Therefore, one 
has to argue that because of the changes in the underpinnings of the ‘classical’ state 
centric international system, political identity can no longer exclusively or primarily 
rest at the state level. The state level is now only one level of political identity 
building next to the supra-state level and the substate (group/individual) level. The 
state level is challenged from both below (fragmentation) and above (integration). 
Rosenau’s conceptualisation was presented here as a ‘middle ground’ between 
modem and postmodern assumptions about the effects of the emerging conditions of 
globalisation. He describes the general forces which underlay this change, but his 
model needs to be specified in a theoretical approach to identity building in order to 
be useful for the argument presented here. This will be attempted in the next part. A 
model is proposed, which identifies three levels of political identity building, the 
substate level, the state level and the supra-state level. Political identity building is 
conceived to be happening on all three levels and at the same time. It will be argued 
that only if all three levels are taken into account can political identity be fully 
understood. Based on a combination of Rosenau’s concepts of ‘Frontiers’ and 
‘fragmegration’ and Wendt’s constructivist approach to political identity building, 
this model presents a viable alternative to both the modem and the postmodern 
standpoint towards political identity building by combining both approaches. It will 
transcend the limitations of the modem conception, which is only based on the state 
level, and will make the complex approach of postmodernism more intelligible by 
taking away its radical and epistemologically as well as methodologically 
problematic assumptions.
130 Ibid: p. 47.
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V. The Three Level Model of Political Identity Building
The three level model of political identity building is based on the assumption that 
identity formation is a social construct rather than a preordinated fact. “It seems clear 
that personal identity is experienced as a rich arena of meanings. [...] Identity is also 
structured. It is clear that identity has many aspects which derive from certain sources
and find expression in particular social contexts. Identity is not a single homogenous 
stock of traits, images and habits.”131 The three level model of political identity 
formation takes this thought one step further and disputes that there is one supreme 
level of identity formation which rests in the personal or the national arena for 
example. It points out that identity formation is constructed on a wide range of levels. 
In order to bring structure in this complex web of social interactions, the model 
points out three levels: the substate (individual and group) level, the state level and 
the supra-state level. On all these levels identity is constructed in a two fold way. 
First through exclusion of others, which then helps to create a ‘we’ feeling, an 
identification with the social group to which one belongs. It is necessary to create a 
social ‘outside’ to be able to identify with a social ‘inside’.132 Secondly, the 
interaction on these three levels does not only function horizontally but also 
vertically. The social construction of the outside is therefore also possible between 
the supra-state level and the substate (personal/group) level and between the state and 
the supra-state level. How these social constructions function is best explained by 
Wendt. He focuses on the international level, but the structures he describes can also 
be transferred to the substate (individual/group) level and the state level.
131 Preston, P. W. “Political/Cultural Identity. Citizens and Nations in a Global Era“ (London: Sage, 
1997): p. 4.
132 See: Walker (1993) op. cit.
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V.I. Wendt’s Structurationism
In order to build up a theoretical approach to the influence of political identity 
building on policy making, it is necessary to see how political identity, once it is 
formed, influences the decision making process. One helpful approach is Alexander 
Wendt’s constructivist approach to the influence of state identity on state behaviour 
in particular and the supra-state level133 134 135 136in general.
Wendt’s ontological starting point tries to find a middle way between a 
structuralist approach on the one hand and an individualist approach on the other. He 
tries to connect what he calls the two “truisms44 of social life A) human beings are
purposeful actors and their actions and organisations shape the society they live in 
and B) the structures of the social relationships within a society influence the 
interactions between the purposeful actors. “Taken together these truisms suggest 
that human agents and social structures are, in one way or another, theoretically 
interdependent or mutually implicating entities.441 34 His conclusion is that both 
structures and agents are relevant to the explanation of social behaviour. As far as the 
explanation of international politics is concerned, this implies that neither state 
agents nor the domestic and international system structures which ‘constitute’ them 
as agents can be treated as given or primitive units. “Theories of international 
relations should be capable of providing explanatory leverage on both.44136
To give a firm philosophical foundation to his argument, Wendt discusses the 
empiricist discourse of the social sciences and argues, in contrast to empiricists, that 
entities which are not directly observable can be treated as ‘real’ as long as they have
133 The expression ‘international system’ is used here to indicate the international political sphere. The 
term does not indicate any systemic approach to the problem of international politics.
134 Wendt, Alexander. “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory" International 
Organization. 41,3 (1987): p. 338.
135 Wendt sees the states as the main actors in international politics. His discussion of the agent- 
structure problematique refers to the state-international system relationship.
136 Ibid: p. 349.
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observable effects or if their manipulation permits one to intervene in the observable 
world with effect. Wendt calls this philosophical starting point ‘scientific realism’. 
“As long as they have observable effects or are manipulable by human agents, we 
can, in principle, speak meaningfully about the ‘reality’ of unobservable social 
structures. ‘Generative structure’, in other words, is a (potentially) scientific rather 
than metaphysical concept?4137 The way to proceed from this assumption is to 
emphasise explanatory enquiry into the underlying causal mechanisms of these 
unobservable structures rather than just on generalisations about observable 
regularities. It is important to show how these observable regularities work. 
“Answers to why-questions require answers to how- and what-questions.“138 From 
this philosophical base, Wendt builds his theory. This structurationist approach 
argues that structure in generative terms is a set of internally related elements. 
Because these elements are interrelated they cannot be conceived outside the 
structure they are part of. In terms of International Relations theory, this implies that, 
on the one hand, states are part of the international structure and cannot be identified
as states outside this structure; on the other hand that these international structures
have no independent existence without the actions of the states which are their 
building blocks. “The deep structure of the state system, for example exists only in 
virtue of the recognition of certain rules and the performances of certain practices by 
states [...] Social structures, then, are ontologically dependent upon (although they 
are not reducible to) their elements in a way that natural structures are not?4139
The second assumption is that social structures are not independent from their 
agents’ conceptions of what they are doing. “In other words, social structures have an 
inherently discursive dimension in the sense that they are inseparable from reasons 137 138
137 Ibid: p. 352.
138 Ibid: p. 354.
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and self-understanding that agents bring to their actions/4140 On the other hand the 
self-understanding, interests and powers of the agents are shaped by the structures 
they are operating in. In addition to the external structures in which the agents 
operate, their internal organisational structures are important to their interests and 
powers. These internal structures give the agents (in terms of international structures:
states) three capacities: “1) to have a theoretical understanding (however inaccurate) 
of its activities, in the sense that it could supply reasons for its behaviour. 2) to 
reflexively monitor and potentially adapts its behaviour; and 3) to make 
decisions/4141 The influence of these internal structures then are again only 
examinable in the context of the external structures in which states operate, therefore 
social structures are co-determined. Agents and structures are mutually constitutive.
V.IL Identity and Interest as Dependent Variables
Wendt’s structurationist starting points leads him to argue for bringing identity and 
interest-formation into the scope of international relations theory. His three main 
assumptions are: “(1) states are the principal actors in the system; (2) the key 
structures in the states system are intersubjective rather than material; and (3) state 
identities and interests are in large part constructed by those structures, rather than 
being determined exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic 
politics/4142 These assumptions lead to two main arguments. 1) Wendt argues for a 
“cognitive, intersubjective conception of process in which identities and interests are 139 140 141 142 * *
139 Ibid: p. 359.
140 Ibid: p. 359.
141 Ibid: p. 359.
142 Wendt, Alexander “Identity and Structural Change in International Politics" in Lapid, Yosef and
Friedrich Kratochwil (eds) "77ze Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory11 (London: Lynne
Rienner, 1996): p. 48.
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endogenous to interaction?4143 Wendt sees identity and interests of states as the 
outcome of the interactions among states. 2) Wendt argues that the international 
structures are formed and sustained by the process of interaction among states. The 
self-help system of the international structure is not a given institution (as assumed in 
Neorealism and Neoliberalism) but due to process. “The distribution of power may 
always affect states’ calculations, but how it does so depends on the intersubjective 
understandings and expectations, on the ‘distribution of knowledge’, that constitute 
their conceptions of self and other?4144 The established collective meanings about the 
self and the other (here the other states) that constitute structures are those which 
organise state behaviour. The actors (states) acquire relatively stable identities in 
relation and in interaction with other actors. “Each identity is an inherently social 
definition of the actor grounded in the theories which actors collectively hold about 
themselves and one another and which constitute the structure of the social world?4’45 
These identities lay the ground for the roles a state plays in the international system 
and therefore defines the state’s interests. The absence or failure of roles complicates 
the assessment of a situation for an actor and “identity confusion may result?4’46 
States in the international system construct norms and rules and therefore their 
identities through a continuing process of signalling to other actors and interpreting 
and responding to signals from other actors (see Figure 2). “The sovereign state is an 
ongoing accomplishment of practice, not a once-and-for-all creation of norms that 
somehow exists apart from practice?4’47 This practice establishes certain expectations 
of a given state’s behaviour in the international system and these expectations
143 Wendt, Alexander “Anarchy is what States make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics" 
in Der Derian, James (ed) “International Theory. Critical Investigations" (London: Macmillan Press, 
1995): p. 132.
144 Ibid: p. 135.
145 Ibid: p. 135f.
146 Ibid: p. 136.
147 Ibid: p. 151.
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translate into norms. These norms in turn have an effect on a state’s behaviour. “The
effects are ‘constitutive’ because norms in theses instances specify the actions that 
will cause relevant others to recognize and validate a particular identity and to
respond to it appropriately. In other instances, norms are ‘regulative’ in their effect. 
They operate as standards for the proper enactment or deployment of a defined 
identity.44148
148 Jepperson, Ronald L., Alexander Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein “Norms, Identity, and Culture in 
National Security" in Katzenstein, Peter J “77ze Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in 




Figure 2: The Co-determination of Institutions and Process
INSTITUTIONS PROCESS
149 See: Wendt, Alexander “Anarchy is what States make of it: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics" in Der Derian, James (ed) “International Theory. Critical Investigations" (London? 
Macmillan Press, 1995): p. 143
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In this environment of expectations and norms, states assess their identities and the 
expectations presupposed by the other actors in the system to define their identities 
and interests. This corporate identity of a state leads to four main state interests: 1) 
physical security; 2) ontological security (predictability of social relationships) which 
requires relative stable social identities; 3) recognition as an actor in the system: 4) 
development (meeting the human aspiration for a better life).150
It becomes clear, therefore, that one of Wendt’s main variables is state
identity. Wendt’s constructivism is based on a state centred view of international 
relations. This approach is signalled in his most recent writings. “I shall be concerned 
here with [...] the constitution of states as ‘unitary actors’, which is the starting point 
for theorizing about the international system“151. This identity is formed within the 
international system through interaction with other states. The state itself as a 
variable is not problematized. The domestic structure of a state and its influence on 
the formation of a state’s identity or better of the multiple identities a state can have 
in the international system is excluded by definition. This is where Wendt’s theory 
falls short. It ignores the political subject and its influence on states’ behaviour. The 
link between the individual, the state and the international system is distorted towards
the latter of the three. The next section tries to reverse this distortion and establish a
theoretical approach in which identity formation on each level (individual, state, 
international system) is taken into account and the influence of identity formation 
across levels is appropriately accounted for.
150 See: Wendt (1996) op.cit.: p. 51.
151 Wendt, Alexander “Social Theory of International Relations'1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999): p. 195.
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V.IIL Theoretical Approach to the Influence of Identity
Formation152: Theorising from the ‘Bottom up9
Alexander Wendt’s approach to the influence of state identity serves as the starting 
point to this new theoretical approach. But Wendt’s picture remains incomplete since 
he remains firmly within the state as unitary actor approach. Wendt does not give any 
reason why he excludes by definition identity formation on the domestic level. To 
remain on the international level only is to construct new (or renew) old boundaries 
of understanding. As Gillian Young observes, the state as actor approach has two
consequences:
‘‘The first is that a high level of abstraction [...] of the state as actor
approach, allows for ahistorical universalisations. [for example that the 
emergence of the state is a ‘necessary ’ evolutionary development rather than 
the outcome of a complex political process, HJS] The second is that spatio­
temporal definitions are themselves political, that is, representative of certain 
interests triumphing over other competing but less powerful interests. “153
Young argues that an emphasis on political subjectivity is needed to bring these 
problems to a resolution. Only if the influence of the political subjects (individuals, 
members of states) is taken into account, can the problems be overcome. Young 
argues that states secure their identity by appealing to notions of security. These 
notions of security strongly associate identity with notions of ‘inside/outside’, 
state/intemational, order/anarchy and that these oppositions are used to reach a
152 The theoretical approach presented is not a full sized theory that wants to provide a theoretical 
explanation for every or for even the most important observable political events. It is only an approach 
with the aim to guide the empirical investigation of this thesis. Never the less the approach hopes to 
give new theoretical insights into the matter of identity formation. The aim is to develop a theoretical 
explanation for identity formation on all three levels of political action: the supra state level, the state 
and the substate (individual/group) level with which an individual is affiliated.
153Youngs, Gillian “Beyond the ‘Inside/Outside’ Divide44 in Krause, Jill and Neil Renwick (eds) 
"Identities in International Relations" (London: Macmillan Press, 1996): p. 26.
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unified and secure state identity. To take these processes properly into account, it is 
crucial to “emphasise the direct involvement which individual subjects have in those 
processes and the ways in which these integrate questions of secure individual 
identity with secure state identity.54 Following Walkers account, the argument here 
is for a connection between political theory and theory of International Relations.154 55
Taking these assumptions into account it seems more appropriate to extend 
Wendt’s theory from a state level approach to an approach which takes all levels of 
political activity into account. Figure 2 would then be transferred to a three 
dimensional picture. The first and highest level would be the supra-state level. 
Groups on this level would be having an influence on the state from above. The 
second would be the domestic level of state identity formation, conceptualised as a 
state elite that struggles to construct a coherent, meaningful and generally accepted 
identity for the wider society The third level would be the substate (individual/group) 
level of identity formation. Here the principal actors would be domestic groups 
(parties, pressure groups etc.). The second adjustment has to do with the way identity 
formation works. Wendt presents a horizontal picture of identity formation (state to 
state; state leader to state leader), which excludes vertical processes. The theoretical 
approach presented here allows for vertical processes (state leaders to substate 
public; substate public to supra-state groups; and state leaders to suprastate groups 
and vice versa). The three levels of identity formation are mutually reinforcing. That 
these vertical influences exist, is convincingly shown by Scholte’s account of the 
influences of global processes on identity formation.156 Figure 3 shows a simplified 
abstraction of this new theoretical approach. Each level contains the processes shown 
in Figure 2.
154 Ibid: p. 27.
155 See: Walker (1993) op.cit.'. p. 25.
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157Figure 3: Three Levels of Political Identity Formation
156 Scholte, Jan Aart “Globalisation and Collective Identities" in Krause, Jill and Neil Renwick (eds) 
“Identities in International Relations" (London: Macmillan Press, 1996): pp. 38-78.
157 Figure created by author
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In this diagram the arrows signify the vertical processes, which function similarly to 
the horizontal processes. All levels are interconnected and mutually constitutive.
States appear now as transistors between the individual and the international system. 
Following Giddens’ approach158, the international system is seen as an 
interconnected network of individuals. These individuals are constantly interacting 
with each other and with the structures their interactions create (domestic structures 
and international structures alike). In these interactions the individuals build up and 
reassess their personal identities as well as the identities of groups they belong to and 
ultimately the state they live in. To take an example from the natural sciences, the 
international system can be seen as a molecule of different atoms. The atoms are 
concentrations of electrons, protons and neutrons. These basic building blocks 
represent the individuals of a state, the atoms represent state structures. Each 
individual is a necessary part of the whole molecule but it also cannot exist without 
the atom. Individuals, state structures and the international system are therefore 
mutually constitutive and can only be properly understood as an organic whole. The 
argument here is for a bottom up understanding of the international system, not a top 
to bottom understanding. It turns the neorealist and neoliberalist assumptions on its
head.
Based on these assumptions the argument turns now to identify the important 
elements of political identity building on an individual as well as on a collective 
substate level, the state level and the supra-state level. This list of elements is meant 
to highlight important elements of identity building but is by no means exhaustive. In 
addition to this, the relative importance of the elements in relation to each other 
cannot be generalised, since identity building is highly historical. The relative
158 See: Giddens, Anthony (1990) op. cit.
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importance of these elements is an empirical rather than a theoretical question and
has to be assessed for each individual case.
This chapter looked at the problem of political identity building. It was shown that
the ‘classical’ theories of International Relations, Neorealism and Neoliberalism see
the issue of political identity building not as an analytical problem. Following the 
‘modem’ approach, they treat political identity building as resting solely on the state 
level. It was shown that they deny that there are any politically meaningful identities 
below or above the state level. The international system, as conceptualised by these 
theories is based on the ‘state as unitary actor’ model. This can be most clearly seen 
in the approach of Kenneth Waltz. Neoliberalism, Morgenthau’s classical Realism, 
and more recent Neorealists embody the same idea. Although Neoliberalism accounts 
for more than just state actors it still conceives political identity building as a state 
bound phenomenon.
It was shown that this state-centred approach to political identity building is 
based on the specific modem conceptions of territoriality, sovereignty and the state. 
A detailed analysis of these concepts showed their inherent limitations. The modem 
concept of territoriality rested on a conceptualisation which separated time and space 
and tried to ‘empty’ time and space. Both were disconnected from socio-spatial 
markers. This development allowed the independent functioning of social 
institutions, which allowed the modem conception of the state. Political space was 
now equated with the state, which was defined as the absolute and exclusive control 
over a certain territory. Sovereignty is the legal expression of the modem conception 
of territoriality. It was argued that it is conceptualised as inherently socially 
constructed. However it is treated as an inherently unproblematic and unpolitical in 
the modem political and theoretical analysis and discourse.
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The recent changes in the international realm, summarised in the term globalisation 
are changing the role of the state as an actor. Modem analyses of the effects, 
however, assume that the state will be able to adjust to the changing circumstances. 
They remain within the state-centric thinking of the classical IR theories. Postmodern 
analyses see the changes as far reaching and fundamental. Their analyses see the state 
as a concept and as a political actor withering away. The concepts that lie at the basis 
of the state, territoriality and sovereignty are reconceptualised and replaced. The 
postmodern criticism of this concept of territoriality argues that the modem concept 
of separated time and space is replaced. Pace is replacing space, the nonterritorial 
functional political spaces become increasingly important, eroding the modem 
conception of territoriality. The alternative is a complex web of interactions on an 
indefinite amount of possible levels. The postmodern criticism of sovereignty shows 
that the concept is used to legitimise exclusionary practices and serves to marginalise 
dissident approaches and opinions. However the postmodern criticism does not offer 
any alternative and is based on very radical epistemological assumptions. These deny 
the possibility of knowledge since each attempt to ‘know’ is in itself an exclusionary 
practice.
Postmodern approaches see the ‘state’ as being replaced by a complex and 
ever changing web of social interactions and constructions. This approach is correct 
in analysing the nature of the changes in the international realm. However it does not 
appreciate that these changes are not equally forceful and are do not have the same 
impact in all regions. Therefore the concept of ‘unequal globalisation’ is central for a 
discussion of the nature of political identity.
As has become clear, neither the modem nor the postmodern concepts of 
political identity offer viable and useful theoretical bases for an empirical study. The 
modem approach seems to be too limiting, while the postmodern approach outlines a
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complex web of interaction on a limitless number of levels. This approach it was 
argued cannot be included in a theoretical framework for an empirical study since it 
would be impossible to identify any ‘signifiers’ or levels for an empirical study. In 
addition to this it has been pointed out in passing that the epistemological 
assumptions of postmodernism are radically denying the possibility of knowledge.
On the analytical level, the modem and postmodern approaches need to be 
modified. Rosenau’s conceptualisation of the international system was introduced as 
a first step in this direction. Rosenau sees the international system as characterised by 
forces of integration and fragmentation at the same time. He calls this 
‘fragmegration’. Political boundaries are transformed into more porous and wider
‘Frontiers’. The territorial dimensions of politics are transformed. The ‘Frontier’ is 
along issues, not along geographical spaces. Although it was argued that this 
conceptualisation of the international system cannot be completely accepted since it 
has a certain technological determinism, it can serve as an analytical guideline.
Based on this, a new theoretical approach to political identity building was 
introduced: the ‘three level model’. It identifies three major levels of identity 
formation: the substate level, the state level and the supra-state level. Using the 
constructivist approach to state identity building of Alexander Wendt, this new 
model treats identity and interests as dependent variables. It argues for ‘theorising 
from the bottom up’ and for seeing identity building as an outgrowth of interaction 
among the different units on the three levels.
The aim of this chapter was to argue for a rethinking of the problem of 
political identity building. It analysed the two major ‘schools’ of thinking on this 
problem: the modem and the postmodern approaches. It tried to outline the 
limitations of both approaches. It concluded that a middle ground between the 
modem and the postmodern thinking was required in order to take into account the
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changes in the international system and the change in the territorially bound nation 
state without slipping into the ‘radical’ standpoint of postmodernism. The ‘three level 
model’ of political identity building has been introduced. The new model is only 
outlined in this chapter. It will be treated in more detail in the second chapter of the
thesis. The interaction and the interconnection of the three levels will be more
specified and the ‘signifiers’ of political identity building (perception of territoriality, 
perception of history, perception of ethnicity, religion, language and gender) will be
introduced into the model.
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Political Identity:
Three Levels and Six Significators
The first chapter of the thesis argued that the process of political identity building has 
to be located on three analytical levels: the substate level, the state level and the 
supra-state level. In this chapter the issue of political identity building is analysed 
more closely. There are two more distinctions which are important to make. Identity 
can vary in two different dimensions: breadth and depth. As far as breadth is 
concerned identity can vary from assumptions of an identity for the whole of 
humanity (Christian identity makes this theoretical claim for example) to the creation 
of identity of one individual. As far as depth is concerned, it can have three basic 
forms. As Connolly describes it:
“An identity might have ontological depth because it construes itself to be the 
bearer of a fundamental truth and look forward to a day when the faith is 
translated into knowledge; it might conclude that it must always be founded 
on a contestable faith in its truth; or it might conclude that it is both crucial 
to its individual and collective bearers but historically contingent in its 
formation and ungrounded ontologically in its truth - ungrounded, not 
because it alone in the world of identities has no ground, but because it treats 
as true the proposition that no identity is grounded in ontological truth; no 
identity is the true identity because every identity is particular and 
contingent. “I59
Here both aspects of identity are analysed. The breadth of political identity will be 
shown during an analysis of the three levels: substate (individual/group), state level,
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and supra-state level. In the first three parts of this chapter each level will be analysed 
separately. As far as the substate (individual/group) level is concerned, it will be 
argued that the process of political identity building is an individual phenomenon.
The individual actor defines him- or herself in contrast to others in social
interactions. On the second, the state level it will be shown that political identity 
building is an elite led phenomenon The concepts of ‘nation’, ‘nationalism’ and 
‘national identity’ will be analysed in some detail. It has already been pointed out 
during the discussion on the emerging conditions of globalisation that the third level, 
the supra-state level is of growing importance. Groups on this level can be expected 
to try to influence the decision making on the state level as well. However keeping in 
mind that the area of the case study is the Middle East and keeping equally in mind 
that the conditions of globalisation are not as advanced in this area as in Europe or 
North America, it can be assumed that this level does not have as strong an influence 
on the state level as does the substate level. The process of political identity building
on this level is shown to be a mixture of individual differentiation and elite led
mechanisms. Following Rosenau’s argument in the preceding chapter, the 
relationship between the three levels of political identity building can be 
conceptualised as an increasing challenge of the substate and the supra state level to 
the state level. It has been argued in the preceding chapter that the formation of the 
elite led political identity on the state level becomes increasingly difficult under the 
changing conditions of globalisation and that the state level is under pressure both 
from below and from above through the parallel forces of fragmentation and 
integration.
The last part of the chapter looks at the ontological depth of political identity. 
Here six basic building blocks of political identity are analysed. To try to identify all
159 Connolly op. cit.: p. 331.
82
of the most basic building blocks for the formation of identity is an almost 
impossible task. Identity is based on a multitude of interrelated factors. However it is 
important to have some theoretical guideline for an empirical enquiry. As Chris 
Farrands argues
“explanations of the origins and character of identity based on single factors
are at best incomplete [...] Identities are always historically, socially and 
materially grounded, but they cannot be reduced to these elements. They
retain distinctive features of which the most important [...] are the links 
between political, cultural and social processes and the importance of the 
historical specificity and particular experience of identities in particular 
cases and situations. “160
Political identity tries to locate the individual in the universe and answers a number 
of crucial questions: Who are we? Where do we belong? Where do we come from? 
What are we? ‘What is our position in the community?’ Along the lines of these 
questions, one can allocate crucial elements of political identity formation: ‘sense of 
ethnicity’ (who are we?), ‘sense of territoriality’ (where do we belong?), ‘sense of 
history’ (where do we come from?), ‘sense of language’ and ‘sense of religion’ (what 
are we?), ‘gender’ (what is our position in the community?). Each of these variables 
will be analysed separately. It will be argued that all these variables cut across the 
three levels of political identity building. However, they are not all necessarily found 
on each level. The interconnections between and the relative weight of these 
variables within and across the three levels cannot be determined analytically. This is 
an empirical question. If one would try to define these structures, one would limit the 
theoretical approach presented here to just one specific case study. Since the aim of
160 Farands, Chris. “Society, Modernity and Social Change" in Krause, Jill and Neil Renwick (eds) 
"Identities in International Relations" (London: Macmillan Press, 1996): p. 19f.
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this approach is to be a general theoretical approach to political identity building, 
these structures will not be described here. They will be highlighted during the 
discussion of political identity building in the Israeli and Palestinian society.
I. Level One: Self and Group-Identity
LI. Social Science: Neglect of the Individual in Favour of
Structure
Social sciences in the post-Second World War period have been dominated by a 
theoretical approach that puts the social structure before the individual. The 
individual was seen as largely formed by these structures, without the possibility to 
influence or resist this ‘socialisation’ process. The emergence and successive 
importance of Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism can be seen as the translation of this 
view into the theories of International Relations. As outlined already in the previous 
chapter the ‘agent-structure’ problem will be seen in a different way: following 
Wendt’s approach agent and structure will be seen as mutually constitutive. The 
emphasis here will be on the individual. It will be shown that to start out with an 
emphasis on the individual’s identity is an important step, since only with an 
adequate theoretical grasp of this phenomenon will it be possible to formulate a 
theoretical approach to political identity building. “In treating individual’s either 
explicitly or by default as merely socially or culturally driven, ignoring the authorical 
or ‘.se/^driven’ aspects of behaviour, is to render them at best partially, and, perhaps 
more often, as fictitious ciphers of the anthropologist’s [or in our case social 
scientist’s, HJS] invention44*61. *
161 Cohen, Anthony P. “Self Conciousness. An Alternative Anthropology of Identity “ (London: 
Routledge, 1994): p. 7.
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As it was argued in the previous chapter, it is necessary to theorise from the ‘bottom- 
up’. The emphasis on the individual offers in turn a better view of the social 
structures. “If we regard social groups as a collection of complex selves (complex, 
because any individual must be regarded as a cluster of selves or as a multi­
dimensional self) we are clearly acknowledging that they are more complicated and 
require more subtle and sensitive description and explanation than if we treat them 
simply as a combination of roles“162.
This first section of the chapter consists of three major parts. The first part 
will look at the ‘classical’ conception of the individual in the tradition of the 
Enlightenment. The individual will be seen as a coherent unified rational self. The 
second part presents a radical challenge to this conception: postmodernism. Starting 
out from philosophical criticisms of the unified self by Nietzsche, Husserl, Lacan and 
Foucault, it will then look at the ‘postmodem-individual’, a fluid multitudity of 
selves which are inherently incoherent. It will be shown that this view of the 
individual presents serious problems for a social science, which takes the individual 
as its primary concern. The third part of this section is concerned with an approach 
that acknowledges the criticism of postmodernism without dissmissing the notion of 
a coherent individual as the starting point of the inquiry. Following the approaches of 
Giddens, Rosenau and Preston, a theoretical approach of individual and group- 
identity building under emerging conditions of globalisation is explicated
LIL The ‘Classical’ Notion of the Self in Enlightenment
The modem concept of the ‘subject’ stands in contrast to the premodern 
understanding. The premodern understanding of the individual was not
162 Ibid: p. 7.
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differentiating between the subject and his or her ‘core’ group, such as the family, the 
clan, or the tribe. The subject was defined by his or her connection to this core group. 
The Enlightenment changed this situation. It argued for the independence of the 
rational self, the individual. The individualised, rational subject was in turn seen to 
belong to a wider political community, the nation. This group was seen as the rational 
reaction to the need for protection and security. This community was either created 
by a Leviathan in the Hobbesian sense or by a rational social contract in the sense of 
Rousseau. The modem concept of the subject is best summarised by Pauline 
Rosenau. The modem subject is seen as
"a hardworking, personally disciplined and responsible personality. S/he is 
constrained by 'effort ’ and has a self image of ‘trying hard’ and doing his/her 
‘best ’. S/he has no personal idiosyncrasies, or at least s/he does not dwell on 
such issues. S/he plans ahead, is organized, and defers gratification. The 
modern subject may become committed to political projects and work for 
goals of an ideological character. S/he may believe in free will and personal 
autonomy, but s/he will follow majority opinion (or the party line) once the 
vote has been taken and a decision is made. The modern subject is, in other 
words, willing to subordinate her/his own interests for the good of the 
collective. S/he respects rational rules, the general will, social conventions, 
fixed standards that seem fair. S/he searches, in good faith, for truth and 
expects that ultimately such quest will not be fruitless. This means the modern 
subject has confidence in reason, rationality, and science and puts all these 
ahead of emotion. S/he is optimistic about the future of mankind and the
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possibility of progress [...] S/he claims to be a knowledgeable human agent, 
and s/he has a distinct, set personal identity. ”163
One of the basic outcomes of this view is the creation of the subject/object 
dichotomy. Both sides of this dichotomy are dependent on each other. They are 
mutually constitutive. This view of the individual is implicit in several studies 
concerning the identity of the individual. To take only one example, we look at 
Laing’s study “Self and Other”164. Laing’s study looks at the interaction between 
people and the dependency of the self on the other. He argues that the individual can 
only ‘realise’ him/herself with the help of the ‘other’. “The other person’s collusion 
is required to ‘complement’ the identity self feels impelled to sustain“165. The self is 
realised or destroyed by its interaction with the ‘other’ who is treated as an 
‘objectified’ subject. In consequence, identity also develops in contrast to the other. 
“A person’s ‘own’ identity cannot be completely abstracted from his identity-for- 
others. His identity-for-himself; the identity others ascribe to him; the identities he 
thinks he attributes to them; the identity or identities he thinks they attribute to him; 
what he thinks they think he thinks they think...“166. Laing points out that the sense of 
self-identity can be destroyed and lead to psychological problems, if the identities 
ascribed to the self by others is permanently inconsistent or contradictory.
“The others tell one who one is. Later one endorses, or tries to discard, the
ways the others have defined one. It is difficult not to accept their story. One 
may try not to be what one knows ’ one is, in one ’s heart of hearts. One may 
try to [...] create by one’s own actions an identity for oneself, which one tries
163 Rosneau, Pauline Marie. “Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences. Insights, Inroads and 
Intrusions" (Princetown: Princetown University Press, 1992): p. 43.
164 See: Laing, R. D. “Self and Other" (London: Renguin Books, 1990).
165 Ibid: p. 111.
166 Ibid: p. 86.
87
to force others to confirm. Whatever its particular subsequent vicissitudes, 
however, one’s first social identity is conferred on one“167.
The definition of the self by the ‘other’ is done by confirmation and disconfirmation. 
This process transcends language, as an identity can be confirmed or discontinued by 
body language, behaviour and conversation. However, what Laing seems to 
underemphasise is the fact of self-awareness, self consciousness. The importance of 
an established and stable awareness of the self is pointed out by Cohen. In order to 
cope with the different demands made to the self on different levels of social 
interaction, it is necessary to have an established awareness of self-identity. “It seems 
to me remarkable that as individuals, we generally manage to cope with these many 
incompatible claims on our allegiance without cracking under the strain. It is little 
short of a triumph that we do so while also preserving a reasonable sense of loyalty to 
our own sense of self, that is, to our individuality"168. The sense of reflexitivity in the 
construction of self identity is seen by Giddens as one of the prime features of 
modem identity. “In the context of a post-traditional order, the self becomes a 
reflexive project [...] In the settings of modernity, [...] the altered self has to be 
explored and constructed as part of a reflexive process of connecting personal and 
social change"169.
LIII. The Postmodern Criticism of the Rational, Coherent and 
Unified Self
This modem subject is a focal point of criticism in postmodern approaches. 
Postmodernism rejects the modem notion of the self as coherent, rational and unified.
167 Ibid: p. 94f.
168 Cohen: p. 9.
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This theoretical standpoint originated with the philosophical criticisms in the late 19th 
and early 20 century. Husserl for example detected a crisis in European philosophy. 
“The ‘crisis’ could [...] become clear as the ‘seeming collapse of rationalism’64 . He 
saw a new philosophical thinking about the ego. “The ego is no longer an isolated 
thing alongside other such things as the given world. The serious problem of 
personal egos external to or alongside each other comes to an end in favour of an 
intimate relation of beings in each other and for each other“169 170 71. Perhaps the most 
critical analysis of the modem self is the approach taken by Nietsche. He argues that 
the unified subject, the self, is a fiction. “After Nietzsche and Freud [...], it would 
seem difficult to take the existence of the self as a priori as firmly established.”172 
Nietzsche argues that the idea of the unified self is a fiction, produced to make 
human life possible. He shows that the self cannot be unified. Essential to this is the 
idea that the fundamental activity of the mind is an activity of interpretation. Since all 
interpretation is false interpretation the activity of the mind is seen as an “aberrant 
reading dependent on simplifying, schematizing, omitting, a making equal of things 
which are not equal.”173 Thinking, so Nietzsche describes, does not occur, it is a 
fiction. Therefore the thinker, the self does not exist either. The thinking spirit, as in 
the Cartesian ‘cogito ergo sum’ does not exist. “There exists neither ‘spirit’ nor 
reason, nor thinking, nor consciousness, nor soul, nor will, nor truth: all are fictions 
that are of no use. There is no question of ‘subject’ and ‘object’, but of a particular 
species of animal that can prosper only through a certain relative rightness; above all,
169 Giddens, Anthony. ""Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age “ 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991): p. 33.
170 Husserl, Edmund. “ Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy" Translated by Quentin Lauer 
(London: Harper Torchbooks, 1965): p. 191.
171 Ibid: p. 190.
172 Miller, Hills J. “The Disarticulation of the Self in Nietzsche" In the Monist. An International 
Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry. 64, 2 1981: p. 247.
173 Ibid: p. 249.
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regularity of its perceptions.”174 The end of this disarticulation of the self is that there 
is not one self in one body but multiple selves. In consequence, there is not only one 
identity but multiple identities in each person.
Based on these philosophical assumptions, Lacan developed his 
psychoanalytic approach to the self. However, in contrast to the modem approach of 
Laing, Lacan argues against a unified, stable rational self and self-identity. “Lacan 
says that we are never going to get a stable image. We try to interpret our relation to 
others but there is always the possibility of misinterpretation. There is always a gap, a 
misrecognition. We can never be certain of the meaning of the other’s response. We 
have an idea of our identity, but it does not correspond with reality [...] In his view 
the stable ego is illusory“175 176. Lacan argues that there is no reality outside 
representations. Since representations always have to be interpreted, there will always
be a factor of unstability as far as the identity of the self is concerned. In addition to 
this, identity always depends on the recognition by the other: “full mutual recognition 
is not possible partly because of the ambiguity of signifiers. There is a gulf between 
saying and meaning44’76. Therefore a stable unified, rational and secure self is 
impossible. We are always searching for our true identity with the impossibility of 
reaching it.
Foucault developed his approach to the modem subject in a similar way. 
Foucault’s aim is to show how the subject is objectified and therefore dehumanised 
under modem conditions. “My objective [...] has been to create a history of different 
modes by which in our culture, human beings are made subjects. My work has dealt
174 Nietzsche, Friedrich. “77?e Will to Power" Translated by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1968): p. 266.
175 Sarup, Madan. "An Introductory Guide to Post-Structuralism and Postmodernism" (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 1993): p. 12.
176 Ibid: p. 13.
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• ♦ 177with three modes of objectification which transform human beings into subjects4' . 
In the Order of Things, Foucault tries to show how the human being became the 
object of science and therefore became dehumanised. “Michel Foucault sought to 
write not the general theory [...] of an archaeology of knowledge, but its application 
to the human sciences, and [...] he set out to show when and how man could have 
become an object for science, as nature had been in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries"177 78. Foucault denies the fixed character of the modem subject, which 
resulted in the assumption that the identity is unified and unchangable. Instead of this 
Foucault proposes the radical fluidity of self-identity.
The dissolution of the self in postmodernism provides special problems for 
the social sciences. Is there a possibility of a social science analysis without the 
subject in any form? The modem subject is rejected as 1) a product of modernity, 2) a 
focus on the modem subject assumes the correctness of a humanist philosophy, 3) a 
subject requires automatically an object, which leads to the rejected subject-object 
dichotomy. The possibility of an analysis without a subject in any form however is 
impossible. Nevertheless the notion of the unified modem subject has to be displaced 
from the centre of analysis. It is no longer possible to see the subject as having a 
coherent, unified and rationally ordered self. It has to be understood that the 
individual ‘carries’ multiple selves and therefore multiple identities. In addition the 
subject can not be understood outside its social relations. Its multiple selves and 
multiple identities are dependent on its social relationships. But the social 
relationships cannot be understood without a notion of the subject. Both have to be 
seen as mutually constitutive. Changes in the social structures will introduce changes
in the individual self and vice versa.
177 Foucault, Michel. “The Subject and Power" in Dreyfus, Hubert L. and Paul Rabinow. ‘‘''Michel
Foucault. Beyond Strucutralism and Hermeneutics" (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982): p. 208.
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The introduction of the postmodern subject into the social sciences is a problem. The 
assumptions of postmodernism assume a highly developed society, which is globally 
integrated and has highly developed communication networks. As Gibbins and
• 17QReimer argue, these characteristics only apply for the most developed countries. 
Therefore the introduction of the postmodern individual into a general theoretical 
approach of political identity building would limit the approach only to highly 
developed states. However neither Israeli nor Palestinian societies belong to this 
category A different notion of the self has to be developed which acknowledges that 
the individual will carry multiple identities while at the same time does not go as far 
as the postmodern approaches in arguing the radical destruction of the notion of the 
self. James Rosenau’s, Gidden’s and Preston’s approaches seem to be helpful.
LIV. A New Approach to Self-Identity under Conditions of
Globalisation
It has become clear in the preceding parts of this section that a new approach to self- 
identity has to be developed. This new approach has to take into account of the 
changes in the structures of society under conditions of globalisation on the one hand 
and the changes in the individual’s capacities on the other hand which result and run 
parallel from the changes in the structures as we have seen in the preceeding chapter. 
In order to explain this, three approaches that of Giddens, Rosenau and Preston will 
be used. All three approaches shed light on different aspects of the problem of self- 
identity. Once the new approach is developed the new role of group membership in 
the process of political identity building will be outlined.
178 Canguilhem, George. “The Death of Man, or Exhaustion of the Cogito?“ in Gutting, Gary (ed)
“The Cambridge Companion to Foucault" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994): p. 85.
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According to Giddens, “transformations in self-identity and globalisation [...] are two
poles of the dialectic of the local and the global in conditions of high modernity [...] 
the self becomes a reflexive project44’80. The individual is confronted with a wide 
range of diverse opportunities. At the same time, because high-modernity (the term 
by which Giddens describes the changing conditions of globalisation) offers no
foundation to enable the individual to make a choice, therefore the concept of 
lifestyles becomes important. “A lifestyle can be defined as a more or less integrated 
set of practices which an individual embraces [...] they give material form to a 
particular narrative of self-identity44’81. The changes in the social fabric of society 
have profound impact on the self-identity building. Under the conditions of high- 
modernity, Giddens identifies ten major characteristics of self-identity building. 1) 
The seif is seen as a reflexive project. The building and rebuilding of a coherent and 
rewarding sense of identity is a fundamental aim. 2) The self forms a trajectory of 
development from the past to the anticipated future. 3) The reflexivity of the self is 
continuous as well as all-pervasive. 4) “It is made clear that self-identity, as a 
coherent phenomenon, presumes a narrative: the narrative of the self is made 
explicit44’82. 5) Self-actualisation implies the control of time, the primacy is given to 
personal time. The future is to be ordered by exactly those active processes of 
temporal control and active interaction on which the integration of the seifs narrative 
depends. 6) The reflexivity of the self extends to the body, which is seen as part of an 
action system rather than merely a passive object. “Body awareness is [...] as a means 
of construction a differentiated self4’83. 7) Self actualisation is seen as a balance
179 See: Gibbins, John R. and Bo Reimer. "The Politics of Postmodernity. An Introduction to 
Contemporary Politics and Culture" (London: Sage, 1999).
180Giddens, Anthony. "Modernity and Self Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age" 
(Cambridge Polity Press, 1991): p. 32.
181 Ibid: p. 81.
182 Ibid: p. 76.
183 Ibid: p. 77.
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between opportunities and risk. 8) “The moral threat of self-actualisation is one of 
authenticity [...] ‘being true to oneself"184. 9) The course of life is seen as a series of 
passages. “Such traditions are drawn into, and surmounted by means of , the 
reflexively mobilised trajectory of self-actualisation"185. 10) The line of develpment 
of the self is internally referential. “Personal integrity, as the achievement of an 
authentic self, comes from integrating life experiences within the narrative of self- 
development"186.
As becomes obvious from this outline of Gidden’s approach, it is very 
structure centred. It analyses correctly the structural changes that the individual has to 
cope with. However, following the argument that structures and agents are mutually 
constitutive, these changes in the structures must trigger changes in the agent’s 
capacities. Rosenau’s approach on the other hand acknowledges these changes in the 
individual’s capacities.
Rosenau pays special attention to what he calls the ‘skill revolution’. Skill 
revolutions refers to the spread of education and information among the individuals 
of a society which enables them to cope with the increasing structural changes. 
Rosenau makes three major arguments. 1) Citizens have become more analytically 
and emotionally skillfull. 2) “This skill revolution at the micro level matters [...] 
through perceptual and aggregative processes citizens are shaping macro outcomes 
more extensively than they have in the past"187. 3) The macro system of the world 
has entered a stage of rapid change, which makes it more vulnerable to micro inputs. 
The skill revolution “resulted in individuals around the world being increasingly able
184 Ibid: p. 78.
185 Ibid: p. 79.
186 Ibid: p. 80.
187 Rosenau (1997) op. cit: p. 280.
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to grasp the global nature of their circumstances and to collectively demand they be 
heard and heeded by their leaders44’88.
These processes have a profound effect on political identity building. “The 
inner need to maintain macro attachments and political identities persists, but the foci 
of the attachments and identities have been increasingly obscured by transformative 
events. There are no moorings on to which people can readily latch44 . This makes 
the problem of identity building more complicated. The dynamics of change, 
according to Rosenau, alters constantly the boundaries, norms and goals through 
which the individuals relate to their fellow citizens. “They cannot act or remain 
passive without somehow seeing themselves in relation to their surroundings. Such 
judgements tend to be constant as long as continuity and stability mark the course of 
events, but they are subject to transformation in a period of turbulence44’90. Similar to 
Giddens notion of lifestyles, which centred on the individual’s orientation towards 
his or her personal identity, Rosenau introduces the notion of ‘self-environment
orientation’. This notion centres on the individual’s orientation within the wider
community. “By self-environment orientation is meant the appraisal people make of 
the relative worth of themselves and their most relevant macro collectives [...] self­
environment orientations can never be more than subjective appraisals developed 
through personal experience, society’s socialization processes, and the class, 
economic, political, and other objective circumstances that prevail at any moment in 
time44’91. A shift in these self-environment orientations will have deep impacts on the 
formation of political identities. In order to understand these processes, an approach 
is needed which looks closely at the individual. In order to develop such an approach 
a closer look at Preston’s argument is necessary. * *
188 Ibid: p. 278.
189 Ibid: p. 297.
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Preston analyses political-cultural identity. “The idea of political-cultural identity 
expresses the relationship of individual selves to the community considered as an 
ordered body of persons4*190 191 92. He argues that an identity is always learned. “The shift 
from the self of modernity to the self of high modernity can be constructed as an 
exercise in learning4*193. In addition identity is always multi-layered and multi­
centred. Preston argues that a political cultural identity can take a series of broad
forms.
“First person-centered (how an individual construes their relationship to the 
community they inhabit); second, group-centered (how persons lodge 
themselves in groups and thereafter how a grouping of persons construe their 
relationship to other groups within the community); and third, nation- 
centered (how persons ordered as groups thereafter construe themselves in 
relation to other separate groups). At the present time it is clear that there is 
change along all these axies“194.
The new approach presented here is combining the three approaches of Giddens, 
Rosenau and Preston. Following the premise of the first chapter, structures and 
agents are seen to be mutually constitutive. Giddens approach is useful to highlight 
the deep structural changes that occur in late- or high-modernity. Giddens highlights 
the new challenges that are imposed on the individual. The social structures changed 
towards a greater openness and more opportunity for the individual, which in turn
creates more choices with less foundations to orient the individual. Rosenau’s
approach highlights the individual’s increased ability to cope with these structural 
changes and the new demands on him or her. The ‘skill revolution’, the spread of
190 Ibid: p. 283.
191 Ibid: p. 283ff.
192 Preston op. cit.: p. 9.
193 Ibid: p. 171.
194 Ibid: p. 177.
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education and information enables the individual to cope with the new structural 
demands and to place him- or herself in the new environment. Preston points towards 
the fact, that identity is always learned. In addition he highlights the multi­
layeredness and multi-levelness of political-cultural identity.
After having outlined a theoretical approach for self-identity, it is now 
necessary to look at the consequences this approach has for group identity.
I. V. Group Identity
The change in self-identity building has also a deep impact on the process of group 
identity building. The new reflexive self, with his or her increased education and 
capabilities, can be expected to form more effective political groups and try to 
influence the political decision making on the state level. As Rosenau points out, 
since the end of the Cold War in 1989, the spontaneous, unorganised uprising of 
publics has increased. “The communist parties of Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union were not toppled by well and highly organized opposition parties. 
Rather, the prime movers were instantaneous coalitions of citizens facilitated by 
rudimentary instruments of mobilization"195. Because of the coinciding structural 
changes and the ‘skill revolution’ which enhanced the capacities of the individual, 
the character of group identities changed. “Once the micro-level shifts began, 
alterations in the status of states, governments, and subgroups were bound to follow 
as people became receptive to the decentralizing consequences inherent in their 
growing capacity to locate their own interests more clearly in the flow of events"196. 
Rosenau argues that the fact that these uprisings were spontaneous, can be used as an 
argument that the capacities of individuals increased, since they both see and
195 Rosenau (1997) op. cit.'. p. 300.
196 Ibid: p. 302.
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contribute to the opportunities that offer themselves to them. As Rosenau points out, 
the individual must not only see the opportunites but also must trust that enough of 
his or her fellow citizens will act in the same way in order to ensure that these micro 
sentiments are translated into macro outcomes. These spontaneous uprisings are 
evidence “of relocated authority, of decentralizing tendencies having combined with
newly refined skills of citizenship to produce a greater readiness to become involved 
in collective action“197. Rosenau points out that subgroups also have increasing 
support and present a serious challenge to the authority of states. “The decentralizing 
surge, in other words, is inherent in the emergent structures of world politics as each 
subgroup’s success feeds on itself and fosters tendencies toward further 
fragmentation [...] the result is a restructuring of authority relationships and an 
intensified potential for local and regional conflicts capable of globally cascading 
along the fault lines of subgroupism“198. This tendency is translated into a rapidly 
rising organisational explosion of groups on a worldwide scale. This development is 
based on the establishment of wide networks of communication, aided by the 
development in electronic communication media, like the internet and the fax
machine.
As will be shown in the case study of the thesis, identity groups have become 
increasingly important in Israeli as well as Palestinian society. Although in both 
societies the state level is an important and central point of identification (to be an 
Israeli and to be a Palestinian is a central aspect of political identities), the state elites 
have more and more difficulties in maintaining a coherent widely accepted political 
identity. What it means to be Israeli or Palestinian is increasingly contested. Groups 
on the substate level offer alternative political identity conceptions. Interestingly, in
197 Ibid: p. 308.
198 Ibid: p. 312f.
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both societies radical religious groups, which offer antagonistic political identity 
conceptions, are among those whose political identity increasingly influences policy
choices on the state level.
In this section a new approach to self-identity was attempted. The modem and 
postmodern approaches towards this issue were presented. The modem approach sees 
the individual as having a rational, unified and stable self. This approach is highly 
criticised by postmodern analysis. The postmodern approaches argue for a 
decentered, fluid self on a multitude of levels. However, these analyses which go as 
far as denying the usefulness of a notion of a self at all, present special problems for
social science which has the individual at its centre. In addition to this, the
postmodern approaches require a highly decentralised, globally integrated society 
which presents no problems for communication. Therefore, a new approach had to be 
developed. In order to do this the analyses of Giddens, Rosenau and Preston were 
combined. Each outlines several aspects which are important for self-identity under 
the conditions of globalisation. Giddens outlines the structural changes which are 
encountered by the individual. New opportunities and choices are combined with less 
foundations to make judgements by. Rosenau clarifies the ‘skill revolution’ which 
enables the individual to cope with these challenges. Preston shows that political 
identity is formed on different levels and that it is a learned identity. This new 
approach follows the premise that agents and structures are mutually constitutive as 
outlined in the first chapter. Finally the emergent importance of group identity has 
been presented. Following from the new opportunities that the conditions of 
globalisation and structural changes offer to the individual, coupled with the 
increased skills and education of the individual, subgroups and spontaneous public 
uprisings become more and more important. This goes so far that one can argue that
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these subgroups are filling in the ‘need-gaps’ which governments under the emerging 
conditions of globalisation can no longer fill. This argument on the co-existence and 
mutual dependency of the substate and the state level leads to the second section of 
this chapter.
In the next two sections of this chapter, the analysis shifts from the agent to
the structure of Wendt’s agent-structure problematique. The second and third level of
political identity building will be analysed. In the following section the second level 
of identity building will be at the centre of the analysis: the state level. It will be 
shown that the state level remains an important level of political identity building 
even under conditions of globalisation. However it will be argued that this level is no 
longer the only or even primary level of identity building, since it is connected with 
and influenced by the substate (individual/group) level as well as the supra-state 
level. The state level has to be put into a theoretical system of political identity 
building which accounts for all three levels. Of prime importance for the argument in 
the second section of this chapter will be the changes in the conception of political 
community which occur under conditions of globalisation.
II. Level Two: State Level
This part of the chapter is concerned with the analysis of the second level of political 
identity building, the state level. The ‘classical’ concepts used to describe identity 
building on this level are ‘nation’, ‘nationalism’, and ‘national identity’. Therefore it 
is necessary to analyse these concepts in some detail. It will become clear that these 
concepts are the logical outcome of a state-centred approach to identity building. 
They assume that the individual has as one stable, overriding political identity: 
national identity. However, as the discussion in the previous chapter has shown, the
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overriding importance of the state level is questionable under the conditions of 
globalisation. However here it will be shown that although the state has lost its 
function as the overriding political identity (as assumed in the traditional conceptions 
of ‘national identity’) it is going too far to assume that the nation will become 
completely irrelevant. A new concept of national identity will be developed showing 
in which directions it has changed its character. It will be argued that the state will 
still be an important level of political identity building and that it can adapt and 
further the development of the political community.
ILL Concepts of‘Nation’, ‘Nationalism’ and‘National
Identity“
Questions of Definition
The ‘state as actor’ model in International Relations theory saw the international 
arena populated first of all by states. Therefore identity is equated with national 
identity. “The main received idea of identity in International Relations has been 
nationalism and the linkages between the nation and the state?4199 This question 
inspired a large amount of literature.199 200
199 Farrands (1996) op. cit. : p. 2.
200 A few examples of the wide range of literature are: A) On the concept itself: Black, Antony “Nation 
and Community in the International Order“ Review of International Studies 19 (1993): pp. 81-89; 
Daimond, Larry and Marc F. Plattner (eds) "Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy" 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) 
"Nationalism" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Kellas, James G "The Politics of Nationalism 
and Ethnicity" (London: Macmillan, 1991); Mayall, James "Nationalism and International Society" 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Pfaff, William "The Wrath of Nations. Civilization 
and the Furies of Nationalism" (London: Simon&Schuster, 1993); Periwal, Sukumar "Notions of 
Nationalism" (Central European University Press, 1995). On national identity: Bloom, William 
"Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations “ (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990). Critical Approaches to the concept: Horseman, Mathew and Andrew Marshall "After the 
Nation-State. Citizens, Tribalism and the New World Order" (London: Harper Collins, 1995); 
Pingrose, Majorie and Adam J. Lerner (eds) "Reimagining the Nation" (Buckingham: Open 
University Press, 1993).
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The first step in discussing the problem of nationalism and national identity is to 
define what is meant if we use the term ‘nation’. This problem has evoked a whole 
range of different definitions. The basic problem is to decide what distinguishes a 
‘nation’ from a ‘state’ since these two concepts are often used interchangeably. 
Ernest Renan’s definition is one of the most prominent ones. Renan defines the 
concept of ‘nation’ as a moral, spiritual principle, that combines the past with the 
present. “Only two things, actually, constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is 
in the past, the other is in the present. One is the possession in common of a rich 
legacy of remembrances; the other is the actual consent, the desire to live together, 
the will to continue to value the heritage which all hold in common"201. Renan 
stresses the point of national sufferings because, “national sorrows are more 
significant than triumphs because they impose obligations and demand a common 
effort"202. The importance of suffering in the conception of political identities in both 
Israeli and Palestinian society is central. While Israeli society has the holocaust and 
the centuries of persecution of Jews worldwide as its central justification, Palestinian 
society remembers the war of 1948/49, ‘the catastrophe’ (al-nakhbar, as it is termed) 
as well as the subsequent Israeli occupation, including the first and second intifada. 
Renan argues that because of its will to community, the ‘nation’ establishes a moral 
conscience, because the individual feels obliged to put the good of the community 
over his or her personal gain. “A great aggregation of men with a healthy spirit and 
warmth of heart, creates a moral conscience which is called a nation"203. This 
definition, although intuitively right has a serious flaw in the fact that it does not 
explain how the group of people who identify with the past form a community in the 
first place. The definition is, to use a metaphor; a head without a body.
201 Renan, Ernest. “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?44 in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds)
“Nationalism" (Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press, 1994): p. 17.
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Karl Deutsch tries to give a functional definition of the concept of ‘nation’. He 
defines nationality as based on the ability to communicate. “Membership in a people 
essentially consists in a wide complementary of social communication. It consists in 
the ability to communicate more effectively over a wider range of subjects, with 
members of a large group than with outsiders44204. This ability to communicate is 
based on their ethnic complementarity. This ethnic complementaiy is relatively wide 
in range and is therefore distinguishable from other vocational complementarities 
such as members of the same profession have for example. The use of a common 
system of symbols, a language, enables the communication. Therefore his definition 
of ‘nation’ is: “In the political and social struggles of the modem age, nationality, 
then means an alignment of large numbers of individuals from the middle and lower 
classes linked to regional centers and leading social groups by channels of social 
communication and economic intercourse, both indirectly from link to link and 
directly with the center44205. The creation of modem Hebrew (Ivrit) as the central 
communications tool in Israeli society is one example of this. According to Deutsch 
national aspirations turn into nations when they have the power to back up their 
aspirations, i.e. form a state. When the nation has a state as a political apparatus of 
communication it has become a sovereign nation-state. Deutsch’s definition has the 
merit of making a clear distinction between the concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘state’. 
However he does not explain how this system of symbols, this language (which need 
not, as Deutsch points out, be the same spoken language as in the case of the Swiss 
nation) came into being. Deutsch is, without explicitly saying it, basing his definition 
on a territorially united community. Therefore he cannot take into account nations
202 Ibid: p. 17.
203 Ibid: p. 18.
204 Deutsch, Karl. “Nationalism and Social Communication4' in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D.
Smith (eds) “Nationalism" (Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press, 1994): p. 27.
205 Ibid: p. 28.
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without a territory, as the Palestinians were from 1948-1994 and the Jewish 
community from antiquity until 1948.
Clifford Geertz tries to solve this problem by pointing out that the concept of 
‘nation’ has two components; an ethnic and a civic. The ethnic component, 
primordial attachments, as Geertz calls them, are mostly assumed givens, which 
nevertheless are a social existence of the individual: “immediate contiguity and kin 
connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being bom into a 
particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a 
language, and following particular social practices14206. The second element, the civic 
allegiance to a state, is equally important. “To an increasing degree national unity is 
maintained not only by calls to blood and land but by a vague, intermittent, and 
routine allegiance to a civil state, supplemented to a greater or lesser extent by 
governmental use of police powers and ideological exhortation11207. Geertz’s 
elements certainly do represent important components of the concept of ‘nation’; 
however he fails to show how these elements are working together to create a nation. 
His analysis is, as it was the case with Deutsch’s, based on a community bounded 
together by a territory and an administrative and political system, a state. Therefore 
Geertz also has problems dealing with nations without a territory.
Anderson’s definition of the concept of ‘nation’ is the most useful so far. “It 
is an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and 
sovereign.11208 It is imagined, so Anderson states, because the members of even the 
smallest nation will never be able to know or even meet most of their fellow citizens.
This does not necessarily prevent a community from being established, since “in fact,
206 Geertz, Clifford. “Primordial and Civic Ties“ in Hutchinson. John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) 
"Nationalism” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994): p. 31.
207 Ibid: p. 31.
208 Anderson, Benedict “Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism" (London: Verso, 1983): p. 6.
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all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps 
even these) are imagined?4209 At the same time the nation is limited, because even the 
largest of them has finite boundaries beyond which lie other nations. These
boundaries are essential to the formation of nations. “No nation imagines itself 
coterminous with mankind?4210 The nation is imagined being sovereign.
To achieve more clarity between the concepts of ‘state’ and ‘nation’ it is 
useful to look at the definition, which Connor offers. He agrees with Anderson’s 
argument about the ‘imagining’ of the nation. While discussing ethnicity as one of 
the core elements of ‘nation’, he argues that ethnic origins and ethnic connections 
between people of one nation are in most cases not based on actual facts. However, 
“what ultimately matters is not what is but what people believe is [...] This is a matter 
which is known intuitively and unquestionably, a matter of attitude and not of 
fact44 . Therefore a nation, in contrast to an ethnic group, is not other-defined, but 
self defined. For Connor, the ethnic origins of a ‘nation’ are paramount. He drops the 
connection between nationhood and territory which was prominent in the definitions 
discussed above. His definition is very simple: “a nation is a self-aware ethnic 
group44 . As long as an ethic group does not define itself as different from other 
ethnic groups and as a ‘nation’ it cannot be conceptualized as one. Connor argues 
that this short definition gives a conceptual advantage over other definitions, which 
lump the concepts of ‘state’ and ‘nation’ together. “Employing ethnic group or 
ethnicity in relationship to several types of identities therefore beclouds the 
relationship between the ethnic group and the nation and also deprives scholarship of
209 Ibid: p. 6.
210 Ibid: p. 7.
Connor, Walker “A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group is a...“ in Ethnic and Racial 
Studies. 1,4 1978: p. 380.
2,2 Ibid: p. 388.
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an excellent term for referring to both nations and potential nations44213. Palestinian 
and Jewish societies can be seen as prime examples of imagined communities. The 
Jewish community preserved their sense of belonging over nearly 1800 years. This 
feeling of belonging enabled the Zionist movement in the 19th century to develop a 
secular, national ideology. The majority of Palestinian society is living in the
diaspora since 1949. However this has not weakened their sense of a common fate
and belonging.
The discussion of different definitions of the concept of ‘nation’ has shown 
that there are a whole range of different possible definitions. However the definitions
of Anderson and Connor seem to be the most workable ones. Their definitions offer
categories which can be applied to nations which do not have a state as their political 
expressions. Their argument about the importance of the ‘imagining’ of a ‘nation’ 
points towards the importance of myths in nation-building. Before an analysis of the 
role of myths in nation-building and nationalism is attempted it is important to look 
at some possible explanations for the development of the notion of ‘nationalism’ and 
why this phenomenon has such a high importance in political thinking and policy 
making.
Nationalism
Nationalism as a concept is of enormous importance. It has provoked a wide range of 
attempts at explanation. Most writers agree that ‘nationalism’ is a modem 
phenomenon. However the concrete point of origin of nations and nationalism is 
highly controversial. Walker Connor points to this problem. “Given that nationalism 
is a mass, not an elite phenomenon, the contemporary nations of Europe emerged far
213 Ibid: p. 388.
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more recently than has generally been recognised442 1 4. His study shows that peasants, 
for example, were not until recently cognisant members in the nations to which 
nationalist writers and outsiders assigned them. The problem is, according to Connor, 
at which point a sufficient proportion of the population has internalised the ideas of a 
national identity in order for it to be an effective force of mobilisation. He argues that 
democratic institutions are not a prerequisite for a nation. “However if a society 
describes itself as a democracy, then the refusal to permit large sections of the 
populace to participate in the political process may be viewed as tantamount to 
declaring that those who are disenfranchised are not members of the nation“214 5. 
Nation-building is a process not a phenomenon, as Connor points out. His analysis 
shows that any claim for any nation existing before the 19th century should be treated 
cautiously. Both Palestinian and Israeli ‘national’ identity conceptions were 
developed in the 19th century as the ideas of Enlightenment and modernity penetrated 
the Middle East and Eastern Europe respectively.
If one accepts the argument about the recent origin of nationalism, it still 
remains obvious that the concept was based on earlier feelings of solidarity, which 
were transformed into the concept of nationalism. This transformation did not occur 
evenly, but was dependent on a range of social, economic, and political factors. 
Because these factors developed differently in different communities, the concept of 
‘nationalism’ spread unevenly. Hugh Seton-Watson distinguishes two different types 
of nations: old nations and new nations. ‘Old nations’ are “those which had acquired 
national identity or national consciousness before the formation of the doctrine of 
nationalism442 1 6, like the English, Scots and French. The ‘new nations’ are “those for 
whom the two processes developed simultaneously: the formation of national
214 Connor, Walker. “When is a nation?44 in Ethnic and Racial Studies. 13, 1 1990: p.95.
2,5 Ibid: 98.
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consciousness and the creation of nationalist movements. Both processes were the 
work of small educated elites”216 7; these nations include the German and the Italian 
nations, also the Palestinian and Israeli ‘nations’ could be included in this category. 
For the ‘old nations’, the process of the formation of national consciousness was an 
incremental event, according to Seton-Watson. It was not planed or willed by anyone.
The main factors were the identification of the sovereign (the monarch in this case)
with the community as a whole, the social differentiation of the masses, the spread of 
education and communication and above all the spread of monarchic power. This 
spread of power “determined the boundaries within which the sense of community 
should develop”218. For the ‘new nations’, so Seton-Watson says, the main factor in 
the creation of national consciousness was language. Because of this and the spread 
of modem means of communication, nationalist elites were able to recruit the 
masses, which were discontented with the political and social conditions. “This 
discontent was directed by the nationalist elites into nationalist movement rather than 
towards economic change”219. The reoccurring forces for the forming of national 
consciousness are: state power, religion, language, social discontents, economic 
pressures and elite leadership.
The importance of premodem solidarity of a community for the development 
of the concept of ‘nationalism’ is of central importance, as Van Den Berghe explains 
when he talks about kinship solidarity: “The kinship was real often enough to 
become the basis of these powerful sentiments we call nationalism, tribalism, racism, 
and ethnocentrism”220. One could even argue, as John Armstrong does, that
216 Seton-Watson, Hugh. “Old and New Nations" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) 
“Nationalism" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994): p. 134.
2.7 Ibid: p. 134.
2.8 Ibid: p. 138.
2.9 Ibid: p. 136.
220 Van Den Berghe. “Race and Ethnicity: A Sociobiological Perspective" in Ethnic and Racial 
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‘nationalism’ itself is part of a cycle of ethnic conciousness over a long duree. “A 
longer look suggests that widespread intense ethnic identification although expressed 
in other forms is recurrent44221. This shows, according to Armstrong the fundamental 
but shifting significance of boundaries for human identity. However Armstrong 
argues that there is nothing predetermined about the boundaries that distinguish an 
ethnic collectivity. Central to the maintenance of these boundaries are boundary 
mechanisms such as symbols, communication and myths. “In their origins and in 
their most fundamental effects, ethnic boundary mechanisms exist in the minds of 
their subjects rather than as lines on a map or norms in a rule book44 . These 
mechanisms work over a long period of time, tying past experience to the present. 
This point will be elaborated in the discussion of the role of myths later on. “Over a 
long period of time, the legitimising power of individual mythic structures tends to 
be enhanced by fusion with other myths in a mythomoteur defining identity in 
relation to a specific polity44223. The myths like Massada for Israeli society and the 
glorious past of the Arab nation for Palestinian society are central elements of their 
respective political identities.
Apart from the question of when did a community achieve its status as a 
nation, if it is an ‘old’ or a ‘new nation’, a further important question is how did a 
community achieve this status. Anthony D Smith points towards different ways in
which communities achieved the status of nations. Smith’s distinction describes the
different ways in which the status of nationhood was achieved. Smith argues that 
there are two different types of ethnic groups which achieved nationhood: lateral 
ethnies (aristocratic, lacks social depth) and vertical or demotic ethnies (socially 
diffused, greater degree of popular mobilization and fervour). “Taking the lateral *
221 Armstrong, John. “Nations before Nationalism" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) 
“Nationalism" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994): p. 141.
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route first, we find that aristocratic ethnies have the potential for self-perpetuation, 
provided they can incorporate other strata of the population”222 223 4. In addition to this 
prerequisite the aristocracy had to develop an administrative apparatus “which could 
be used to provide cultural regulation and thereby define a new and wider cultural 
identity”225. Smith calls this ‘bureaucratic incorporation’. Here the state was used to 
form the nation. “The ‘state’ formed the matrix of the new population-unit’s format, 
the ‘nation’. It aided the type of compact, unified, standardised and culturally 
homogenised unit and format that the nation exemplifies”226. In difference to this, 
vertical or demotic ethnies were only indirectly affected by the state and its 
administration. “The funds of cultural myths, symbols, memories and values was 
transmitted not only from generation to generation, but also throughout the territory 
occupied by the community or its enclaves, and down the social scale”227. The chief 
mechanism of nation-building was organised religion, which transformed into an 
ethnic religion: the myths, symbols of decent and election, the ritual and the sacred 
texts helped to perpetuate traditions and social bonds of the community. All that was 
left was to obtain an independent state for the community. Israeli society is an 
example of this process (although the territorial link was missing for nearly two 
millennia). Here organised religion was the basis on which Zionist nationalism could
build.
It becomes clear now that the origin of the concepts of ‘nation’ and 
‘nationalism’ have to be located around the 19th century if one wants to maintain the 
notion of ‘nationalism’ as a mass phenomenon. It has been shown that nation­
building is a long, complex process that depended more or less on elite guidance.
222 Ibid: p. 144.
223 Ibid: p. 145.
224 Smith, Anthony D. “The Origins ofNations“ in Ethnic and Racial Studies. 12, 3 1989: p. 349.
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Therefore the notion of a necessary and unavoidable development of nationalism 
must be rejected for any case (‘old’ or ‘new nations’, lateral or vertical ethnies). 
Although nationalism in some cases built on premodem feelings of solidarity within 
a community, it still remained an elite dominated phenomenon and was used by the 
elites to achieve political aims. The boundaries of ‘nations’ as was argued by 
Armstrong were the result of monarchic power policy and, although helpful for the 
formation of political identity to the individual, were not geographically inevitable. 
The notion of ‘nationalism’ as a political concept, formed, implemented and 
instrumentalised by the elites will become even clearer if one looks at some 
explanations for the concept of ‘nationalism’.
The theme of elite domination of the concept of nationalism is further 
developed by Hobsbawn. The concept of ‘nation’ is, according to Hobesbawn, a 
“recent historical innovation, [...] with its associated phenomena: nationalism, the 
nation state, national symbols, histories [...] All these rest on exercises in social 
engineering which are often deliberate and always innovative, if only because 
historical novelty implies innovation44228. The state forms the nation through a 
standardised administration and education which constitute citizenship. State and 
society converged through public education, public ceremonies and the state’s 
production of mass monuments. Paul Brass argues along the same lines. “The leaders 
of ethnic movements invariably select from traditional cultures only those aspects 
that they think will serve to unite the groups and that will be useful in promoting the 
interests of the group as they define them“227 228 29. The importance of the pioneer
227 Ibid: p. 353.
228 Hobsbawn, Eric. “The Nation as Invented Tradition" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith 
(eds) “Nationalism" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994): p. 76.
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generation in Israeli society and the PLO elite in Palestinian society will be shown in 
the case study.
Benedict Anderson analyses the conditions under which the concept of 
‘nation’ became imaginable for the masses. Three fundamental changes occurred 
which made this possible: 1) a particular script language did no longer offer 
privileged and exclusive access to ontological truth 2) society was no longer 
organised around and under high centres 3) the conception of temporality in which 
cosmology and history were indistinguishable was rejected. Economic change and 
scientific discoveries separated cosmology and history. This development was aided 
by what Anderson calls ‘print-capitalism’, the spread of modem means of 
communication. “The revolutionary vemacularizing thrust of capitalism was given 
further impetus by three extraneous factors, two of which contributed directly to the 
rise of national consciousness44230. The first was the change in character of Latin, 
which returned to the classic Ciceronian routes in its usage which made it more 
difficult. It acquired an esoteric quality. Therefore it spurred the use of vernaculars. 
The second was the impact of the reformation, which challenged the authority of the 
Roman Church and mobilised the masses for religious purposes. The third was the 
“slow, geographically uneven, spread of particular vernaculars as instruments of 
administrative centralisation by certain well-positioned would-be absolutist
no i
monarchs44 . The spread of these vernaculars was, as Anderson emphasises, not 
based on nationalist feelings. “Nothing suggests that any deep seated ideological, let 
alone proto-national, impulses underlay this vemacularization where it occurred [...] 
what [...] made the new communities imaginable was a half-fortudious, but 
explosive, interaction between a system of production and productive relations * *
230 Anderson op. cit.: p. 36.
231 Ibid: p. 40.
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(capitalism), a technology of communications (print), and the fatality of human 
linguistic diversity4*232. Capitalism created a way of distributing information through 
print-languages which in turn helped the creation of national consciousness. It 
created a united field of exchange and communications. It gave a new flexibility to 
language, which in the long run helped to built that image of antiquity so central to 
the subjective idea of the nation. In turn this created ‘languages of power’ different 
from the older administrative vernaculars. At this point the ‘nation’ became 
imaginable. However, “the concrete formation of contemporary nation-states is by no 
means isomorphic with the determinate reach of particular print-languages4*233.
Anthony Smith describes three main responses elites could take in the face of 
these transformations. Close to Anderson’s arguments, Smith describes the impact of 
rationalism and science. Due to these changes a new confidence in human capacities 
arose. “This meant that the quest for scientific truths necessarily took on the nature of 
a crusade on behalf of freedom of enquiry and the superiority of human reason to 
divine revelation**234. This caused a grave danger for the social fabric, as one of the 
legitimising factors for society was challenged. In addition to this, the social context 
of these transformations was characterised by the emergence of powerful centralised 
governments. However the absolutist territorial states were in competition with each 
other. “Interstate competition bred therefore not only [a] new ‘national’ sentiment 
[...], but also those drives for scientific and technical modernisation which became so 
characteristic of western bureaucratic states**235. This crisis of legitimisation for the 
state transferred the question of meaning from the spiritual to material and social 
planes. Religion became a private matter. However, as Smiths makes clear, “there
232 Ibid: p. 4 Iff.
233 Ibid: p. 46.
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was nothing inevitable, either, about the process itself, or about its trajectory44236. The 
basic choice that presented itself was whether the social structure would be 
dominated by religious authority or by ‘rational-legal’ authority. The first possible 
response to this problem was 4neo-traditionalism’. This position tries to accept the 
achievements of rationalism and science without taking on the underlying 
assumptions. It is a kind of “modernised religion and politicised tradition442 3 7. The 
link between this standpoint and nationalism is made by giving the religious 
community a history and turning it increasingly into an ethnic community. The 
second possible standpoint is called ‘reformist’. Proponents of this standpoint accept 
science and its modes of critical reflection. However it does not completely reject 
religious authority. It proposes a dual legitimisation: divine order and scientific state. 
“In the still-meaningful traditions and beliefs of the community, the reformist 
discerns the ‘essence’ of a modem faith“238. The true religion in this view can only be 
realised within the national community. The third position is that of the 
assimilationsists, which “saw their task as that of assimilating themselves and their 
communities to the norms and lifestyles of the one global civilisation44239. The 
scientific state was seen as a universal construct. However as these cosmopolitan 
aspirations were shattered the assimilationists transferred their ideas to their 
particular political community. Smith points out that all three possible responses 
have in common that they “concede the twin premises of [...] historians, that entities 
have origins and purposes in time, and possess identities and boundaries in space, in 
a world of analogous entities442 40. The case study will show that all three ways of 236 237 238 239 240
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conceptualising the relationship between the political and the religious can be found 
in Palestinian and in Israeli society.
Ernest Gellner points towards the importance of education in the process of 
modem nation-building. “The minimal requirement for full citizenship, for effective 
moral membership of a modem community, is literacy44241. Similar to Smith he sees 
the impact of modernity as a problem for the question of legitimacy. The impact of 
modernity was characterised by an increase in literacy, the transformation of 
economic life, greater mobility, the emergence of an industrial proletariat, a language 
of modem organisations and the erosion of local structures. These changes however 
occur unevenly. Therefore in the early stages of this process, the redrawing of 
loyalities is possible. “Essentially, nationalism is a phenomenon connected not so
much with industrialisation’s and modernisation as such, but with its uneven 
diffusion44242. This results in a sharp social stratification which is unhallowed by 
custom, unprotected by social mechanism and which seems redeemable by ‘national’ 
secession. Tom Naim follows the same line of argument. He sees the phenomenon as 
an outcome of capitalism’s uneven spread. “The most notoriously subjective and 
ideal historical phenomenon is in fact a by-product of the most brutally and 
hopelessly material side of the history of the last two centuries44243. Gellner explains 
that the phenomenon of ‘nationalism’ is based on a new social organisation “based 
on deeply internalised, education-dependent high cultures, each protected by its own 
state“241 242 243 44. Gellner points out that ‘nationalism’ selects elements for its high-culture 
from older folk cultures. “A modem, streamlined, on-wheels high culture celebrates
241 Gellner, Ernest “Nationalism and Modernization" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) 
"Nationalism" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994): p. 55.
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itself in song and dance, which it borrows (stylising it in the process) from a folk 
culture which it fondly believes itself to be perpetuating, defending, reaffirming44245. 
This can be clearly seen in the creation of the Zionist symbolism and mythical 
constructions which combine religious traditions and symbols, historical events and
some elements of the culture of the shtetl in Eastern Europe.
John Hutchinson introduces another important distinction of the phenomenon
of‘nationalism’: political and cultural nationalism. Both share an antipathy towards a 
bureaucratic state. However political nationalism is essentially modernist. The 
political nationalist believes that “because the world is divided into a multiplicity of 
political communities, they are forced to work within a specific territorial homeland 
in order to secure a state that will embody their aspirations44246. The political 
nationalists’ goal is the achievement of a nation state with uniform rights and duties 
for the citizens. In cultural nationalism the state is accidental, the “essence of a nation 
is its distinctive civilisation44247. Cultural nationalism has an integrative objective; it 
tries to morally regenerate the nation by re-uniting the different aspects of the nation. 
In their view “an authentic national politics derives not from rationalist constitutions, 
but from a united community shaped by its history, belief, customs, industries and 
habitat44248. The nation in this view is not a static project but one that is constantly 
evolving and transforming itself. “Cultural nationalists regard the nation as a 
spontaneous solidarity that from its foundations is continuously evolving through 
cycles of achievement and decline44249.
Elie Kedourie and John Breuillly both show the importance of historiography 
in the process of nation-building. Kedourie argues that “when nationalist * * * *
245 Ibid: p. 58.
246 Hutchinson, John “The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism " (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987): p.
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historiography applies itself to the European past, it produces a picture of nations 
slowly emerging and asserting themselves in territorial states44250. The general aim of 
this historiography was to show that nations, nationalism and nation-states were 
natural ordering principles of humanity. However, as Kedourie argues, this was an 
invention: “whatever ethnological or philological doctrine may be fashionable for the 
moment, there is no convincing reason why the fact that people speak the same 
language or belong to the same race should by itself, entitle them to enjoy a 
government exclusively their own“249 250 51 252. John Breuilly explains how history was used 
in the doctrine of nationalism to create a notion of distinctiveness (by arguing for a 
cultural distinctiveness following Herder’s historicism) and to promote the return to 
the ‘spirit’ of the past. “The notion of a return to the spirit of the past was often 
accompanied by an historical perspective which read the appropriate trends into 
events. Figures in the past became instruments of the national destiny or obstacles in 
its path44 . The creation of Palestinian identity by combining elements of Arab 
history with the specific tragic history of the Palestinians is a good example of this.
It has been shown in this discussion that the concept of ‘nationalism’ is an 
elite dominated phenomena which is based on fundamental economic, social and 
political changes that marked the rise of modernity. However it has become equally 
obvious that the concept of ‘nationalism’ was not an inevitable solution to the 
challenges and the crisis of legitimisation. The importance of education and a distinct 
notion of history are central to the phenomenon of ‘nationalism’ (cultural and 
political nationalism alike). The importance of history, or more correct the
249 Ibid: p. 32.
250 Kedourie, Elie. “Nationalism11 Fourth Expanded Edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998): p. 7If.
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importance of the production of history in order to help the nationalist cause, points 
towards the significance of national myths.
Myths and Nationhood: The Importance of History
“Myth is one of the ways in which collectives - in this context, more specially nations 
- establish and determine the foundations of their own being, their own systems of 
morality and values. In this sense, therefore, myth is a set of beliefs, usually put forth 
as a narrative, held by a community about itself4253. As Schopflin points out, these 
myths are about perceptions rather than historical validated truth. They are used to 
bring order into chaos and ambivalence. “The language of symbols, rituals, myths 
and so on is, consequently, a part of the web of communication shared by any 
community and is, incidentally, more significant than language itself4254. Myths have 
a variety of functions. They are an instrument of self-definition, identity transfer, and 
means of communication; they delimit the cognitive field and therefore simplify 
complexity. In politics, myths are “a significant factor in conditioning the limits of 
the possible, in establishing the cognitive field and in underpinning the rule- 
boundeness which makes politics work442 5 5. They offer explanations for the fate of 
the community (glory or failure), help in the maintenance of memory, and structure 
the cultural system of a society. Because of this central importance of myths for 
‘nations’ and ‘nationalism’, they are elite controlled. “A political elite deploys myth 
in order to preserve its power by erecting barriers to comprehension, by stressing 
myth to ensure that its actions cannot be challenged44256. Schopflin identifies nine 
major types of myths: myths of territory, of redemption and suffering, of unjust 253 254 255 256
253 Schdpflin, George “The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths“ in Hosking, Geoffrey and 
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treatment, of election, of military valour, of rebirth and renewal, of foundation, of 
ethnogenesis and antiquity and of kinship and shared descent. “Precisely because the 
function of the myth - one of its functions - is to construct coherence, different myths 
receive emphasis at different times to cope with different challenges. Their 
underlying function is the same, though: to ensure that the integrity of the group is 
safeguarded, that cultural reproduction is not prejudiced, and that the collective world 
made simple by myth remains, so that individuals may construct their identities as 
individuals and simultaneously as members of a community4*257.
Anthony Smith looks at the prerequisites myths have to fulfil to be ‘usable’ as 
such a controlling mechanism. He singles out three major elements, which a usable 
myths must include: authenticity, inspiration and the capacity for reinterpretation. 
Authenticity: “It can refer to the reapproriation of a communal possession, to the 
representativeness of shared cultural elements, to their indigenous and original 
qualities and to their correspondence with ‘objective’ truth“258. A myth must be 
demonstrably ‘our’ (the communities) myth. Inspiration: A myth must be able to 
inspire the inspiration of large parts of the population and not only of elite 
intellectuals. “They must be applicable to all citizens of the nation and must strike a 
chord in the hearts of the common people as well as the elites. Capacity of 
reinterpretation: Myths must be selected in the light of present social needs (the 
present shapes the past), the special qualities of the past (the past shapes the future), 
and its transmission in records and through oral memories. However the invention, or 
fabrication of these myths must keep within certain limits. It must relate to the 
individuals of the nations directly. “Pure ‘invention of tradition’ is ineffective”259.
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As has been briefly shown, myths are a central element of the concepts of ‘nation’
and nationalism. They are the tools with which elites can control the populations of a 
society. They can have different functions, but generally they are a “source of 
continual inspiration, establishing the authenticity and continuity of the community’s 
culture and conferring dignity on nations-to-be and well-established nations alike“260 261. 
The centrality of historical myths in both the Palestinian as well as the Israeli society 
will become clear in the case study.
The Modern Concept of 'National identity ’
Nationalism was the basis on which national identities where constructed. Through 
the construction of powerful inside/outside divides between the order inside and the 
anarchy outside the nation state, national identity was constructed and reinforced. 
Boundaries between territories but also between citizens and foreigners played a 
major role in this process. Miller points out what distinguishes national identity form 
other forms of personal identity. It is a community “1) constituted by shared belief 
and mutual commitment, 2) extended in history, 3) active in character, 4) connected 
to a particular territory, and 5) marked off from other communities by its distinct 
public culture44261. Nationalism was not only a political policy but a social movement. 
As Craig Calhoun describes it, “it is used to shape and legitimate state policies, 
secessionist movements, and attempts to join existing states. It is the most prominent 
rhetoric for constituting or arguing over the ‘selves’ at stake in political self- 
determination.44262 Calhoun argues that from the very beginning the discourse of 
nationalism was linked to the creation of political publics (several public spheres). 
This had influence on the identity formation of citizens. “The identities of members
260 Ibid: p. 59.
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were formed and revised partly through their participation in the public sphere, not 
settled in advance.”262 63 This had the effect that varying identities became suppressed 
(since the national identities were fixed by a definition of what belonged to the public 
spheres). In his eyes it is necessary to overcome this situation by critically reassessing 
the categories of nation and people. Postmodernism, by contrast, is not only critical 
of the notion of a national identity, it rejects it as an exclusionary practice.
ILIL Postmodern Criticism of the Concept of the State,
Nation, Nationalism and National Identity
Much of the postmodern criticism of the concept of the ‘state’ has already been stated 
in the first chapter. It is not necessary to rehearse the entire argument here. Only the 
major points will be summarised. It has been pointed out that under the assumed 
postmodern conditions, ‘territoriality’ is loosing its primary importance as an 
analytical tool. Speed and pace are new factors. The speed of the transmission of 
information and capital is becoming more important than the possession of territorial 
space. It has equally been shown that postmodern approaches see the concept of 
‘sovereignty’ has having severe analytical problems. It is argued that the concept is 
based on arbitrary analytical assumptions presented as universal and timeless and 
apolitical truths. ‘Sovereignty’, ‘state’, and ‘territoriality’, postmodern writers argue, 
while treated as universal truths are in fact arbitrary historical constructions. 
Following Derrida, Ashley shows that the logocentric procedure (logocentrism 
always needs one universal and firm standpoint of truth from which to argue) 
‘‘disposes participants in the regime of modernity to effect an antihistorical
262 Calhoun, Craig. “Critical Social Theory. Culture, History, and the Challenge of Difference " 
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closure44264. Ashley argues for the “radical undecidability of history442 65. He shows 
how modem statecraft could be seen as mancraft since it shapes the expectations of 
its subjects. One should focus the analysis “upon modem statecraft as modem 
mancraft, the art of constructing a paradigmatic figure of sovereign man at the centre
of modem narratives of state and society through the representation of dangers that 
man will know to fear and desire to control44266. Therefore the nation-state can be 
seen as a specific invention in history and not a necessary condition of human 
political community. The concept of ‘nation’ can been seen as limiting. It is 
supported by a sharp exclusionary mechanism which defines inside and outside, 
excludes and marginalises foreigners and outsiders. Bhabha argues for a 
concentration on the analysis of outsiders, like immigrants, in order to show the 
arbitrary power structures that sustain the concept of ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’. 
“Nations like narratives, lose their origins in the myths of time and only fully realise 
their horizons in the mind’s eye“264 265 266 7. The concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’ are 
constructed through myths and are ‘imagined’ rather than objectively real. Bhabha 
shifts the focus of his analysis to the narrations of ‘nation’ and of ‘nationalism’. He 
concentrates on the narrative character of the mythomoteurs of the nation in order to 
be able to show how they are based on an ambivalent concept of knowledge. “To 
encounter the nation as it is written displays a temporality of culture and social 
consciousness more in tune with the partial, overdetermined process by which textual 
meaning is produced through the articulation of difference in language; more in 
keeping with the problem of closure which plays enigmally in the discourse of the
264 Ashley, Richard. “Living On Border Lines. Man, Poststructuralism and War" in Der Derian, James 
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sign44 . What Bhabha criticises is the mechanism of exclusion and marginalisation, 
which go hand in hand with the process of nation building. “These imaginative 
geographies that spanned countries and empires are changing, those imagined 
communities that played on the unisonant boundaries of the nations are singing with 
different voices44269. Bhabha argues against the process of cultural homogenisation 
that the modern nation needs to implement in order to unify its subjects. He criticises 
the regulative character of the myths of nations, which by their very nature have to 
exclude and marginalise deviant interpretations of history. “The nation as a form of 
cultural elaboration [...] is an agency of ambivalent narration that holds culture at its 
most productive position, as a force for ‘subordination’, fracturing, diffusing, 
reproducing, as much as producing, creating, forcing, guiding44270. Bhabha also 
criticises the questionless acceptance of the boundaries of the nation, which serve, 
like myths, as a mechanism of exclusion and marginalisation. Bhabha labels the 
boundaries as ‘Janus-faced’, since they offer security for the price of limited political 
options. Bhabha emphasis that the inside/outside divide, created by these boundaries 
does not work effectively, since “the other is never outside or beyond us; it emerges 
forcefully within cultural discourse, when we think we speak most intimately and 
indigenously ‘between ourselves’44271.
As can be seen, Bhabha conceptualises ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’ as 
exclusivistic modern concepts that serve the political interests of those in power. 
From this standpoint it can be argued that it is necessary to free oneself from the 
heavy baggage of these concepts and to look for different concepts of political 
identity. As becomes clear form this, a postmodern approach to the concepts of
268 Ibid: p. 2.
269 Bhabha, Homi K. “DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modem Nation44 in 
Bhabha, Homi K. (ed) "Nation and Narration" (London: Routledge, 1990): p. 319.
270 Ibid: p. 3f.
271 Ibid: p. 4.
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‘nation’ will lead to a very vague analytical concept, not a useful alternative for an 
empirical study of political identity. It can be seen that the postmodern criticism of 
the concepts of ‘state’, ‘nation’, ‘nationalism’ and ‘national identity’ leave no room 
for a political identity on this level of social interaction. However as has already been 
argued in the first chapter, such a radical approach overestimates the depth and 
breadth of the changes that occur under the conditions of globalisation. Therefore an 
alternative concept of ‘national identity’ is needed which combines the insights from
modem and postmodern approaches .
ILIIL ‘National Identity9 under Conditions of Globalisation?
An Attempt at a Redefinition of ‘National Identity9
It has become clear that the position of state as the primary political community is 
under attack. This will directly affect the influence of national identity as a form of 
political identity. It is argued here that ‘national identity’ is no longer the primary 
source of political identification. However the assumption that it will disappear 
completely, that political identification will shift completely away from the state 
level is going to far. Smith points towards the continuing importance of national 
identification for the individual. He argues that identities are not only situational 
(defined by the social situations in which the individual finds him- or herself) but 
also persuasive.
“At the collective level, it is not the options and feelings of individuals that 
matter, but the nature of the collective bonds. Through socialization, 
communications and sometimes coercion, we find ourselves bound by 
particular identities from birth. We may seek to resist their power, but our
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efforts may prove unavailing. This is frequently the case which ethnic and 
national bonds “272.
These bonds exert, according to Smith, a powerful influence on the lives of
individuals and remain durable and resilient forces of identification. He offers four
arguments why national identification is unlikely to disappear completely: 1) It is 
politically necessary. It has enlarged and humanised the political order of the 
interstate system by basing it on cultural and historical criteria (based on the prior 
existence of historic culture-community). 2) “National identity as opposed to other 
kinds of collective identity, is pre-eminently functional for modernity, being suited to 
the needs of a wide variety of social groups and individuals in the modem epoch“273 274. 
3) Smith sees national identities as historically embedded in earlier existing ethnic 
identities. He sees it as the modem heir and transformation of these earlier loyalties. 
“Nationalism can be regarded as a ‘religion surrogate’ and the nation as a 
continuation, but also a transformation, of pre-modem ethno-religious 
community44274. 4) To identify with the nation offers personal rewards. “It is to be 
offered personal renewal and dignity in and through national regeneration. It is to 
become part of a political 4 super-family’“275. It connects the individual to the wider 
political community.
Andrew Linklater, although more sceptic about the long term future of the 
idea of national identity, does not predict the demise of the state level. “State 
structures have been able to mobilise sufficient power to prevent the reconstruction
272 Smith, Anthony D. “Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era" (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995): p. 
124.
273 Ibid: p. 155. One could counter this argument with pointing out that central aspects of modernity 
are changing and therefore national-identity will continue to loose on importance.
274 Ibid: p. 159.
275 Smith, Anthony D. “NationalIdentity" (London: Penguin, 1991): p. 161.
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of political community44276. He sees the continuing political significance of the state 
level and predicts its adjustment to the new conditions under postmodemity. “This is 
not to advance the unlikely proposition that conventional state structures either will 
or should disappear, but rather to suggest that states should assume a number of 
responsibilities which have usually been avoided in the past“276 7. The state, in 
Linklater’s view will mediate between conflicting identities within its population . 
This would not change if the state would share authority with substate and supra-state
actors.
“The need for political institutions which perform this task could not cease to 
exist just because national societies had become more responsive to 
cosmopolitan morality or more sympathetic to claims for the public 
recognition or cultural differences, nor would it end were states to share
authority with institutions in their domestic regions and international 
organisations “278.
Linklater even sees the state as helping the transformation and opening up of society 
in order to adjust it to the new and changed circumstances under postmodern 
conditions. “The rational state eschews the totalizing project, encouraged the 
emergence of new forms of political community in which the potential for higher 
levels of universality and difference is realised and, in doing so, transcends the 
limitations of the Westphalian era“279.
In the analysis of the second level of political identity building, it has been argued 
that the ‘state level’ is still an important bearer of political identity, although it has
276 Linklater, Andrew. “The Transformation of Political Community. Ethical Foundations of the Post­
Westphalian Era“ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998): p. 27.
277 Ibid: p. 44.
278 Ibid: p. 45.
279 Ibid: p. 45.
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lost its overriding importance under the conditions of globalisation. Here the main 
question was how important the state level is in the process of political identity 
building under conditions of globalisation. It has been argued that the state level is 
challenged from below (substate level) and above (supra-state level) since these 
groups can solve certain problems within society more effectively. However it has 
equally been shown that to argue that the state is completely withering away is going 
analytically too far. A strong argument has been made for retaining the state level as
one possible bearer of political identity. Even under the increasing changes of society 
in a postmodern direction (larger fluidity of political identity building), the state can 
adapt and retain an important role in the process of political identity building. 
Identity building on the state level can be expected to be an elite led phenomenon. 
Elites on the state level hold the access to and power over institutions of education 
and information. These can be used to reinforce a sense of group identity on a state 
wide level. The importance that myths, political memory and a sense of history play 
will be pointed out in the discussion of the six significators in the last part of this 
chapter.
The challenge to the state level from above, from the supra-national level will 
be analysed in the next part of this chapter. It will be shown that the supra-state level 
is becoming an important level of political identity building under the conditions of 
globalisation.
III. Level Three: Globalisation and the Locations of
Political Identity
The growing importance of the international realm under the emerging conditions of 
globalisation has become a common place in analysis of international relations. As
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has been shown in the first chapter of this thesis, modem as well as postmodern 
approaches analyse what they see as the major changes in the international system. 
Because of this, the third level of political identity building can no longer be ignored 
in any serious analysis of political identity. The main aim of this part of the chapter 
will be to show where possible locations for the process of political identity building 
are. In order to develop a model of the third level of identity building which sees the 
supra-state level as independent from the state level it is important to point out four 
possible locations where identity building can occur: economy, politics, 
culture/media and the diaspora. In these locations, political identity on the supra-state 
level can be found. These locations will now be examined independently.
The first location, the economy can best be grasped through the introduction of the 
term ‘social forces’. Particularly helpful here is the use of the concept by Cox.
“Social forces are not to be thought of as existing exclusively within states. 
Particular social forces may overflow state boundaries, and world structures 
can be described in terms of social forces [...] The world can be represented 
as a pattern of interacting social forces in which states play an intermediate 
role between the global structure of social forces and local configurations of 
social forces within particular countries [...] power is seen as emerging from 
social processes rather than taken as given in the form of accumulated 
material capabilities1,280.
Cox analyses an ‘internationalisation of the state’ through those social forces which 
are no longer bound by or dependent on state boundaries. This internationalisation, 
this integration of the national economy in to the world system results in a shift of
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political emphasis towards economic issues. Production becomes internationalised 
and expands through direct investment. At the same time a “new informal 
corporative structure64281 is emerging. One part of this new structure is a transnational 
managerial class. This could be one possible location for a process of identity 
building on the third level. Castells argues for a profound transformation of the 
international economic systems towards a network society.
"As an historical trend, dominant functions and processes in the Information
Age are increasingly organised around networks. Networks constitute the 
new social morphology of our societies, and the diffusion of networking logic 
substantially modifies the operation and outcomes in processes of production, 
experience, power and culture1,282.
These networks are globally integrated constantly changing organisations of firms 
and individuals that come together to fulfil certain business tasks. The idea of the 
creation of a third, transnational level (in addition to the individual and the state 
level) by social forces and international production is further developed by Ruggie’s 
analysis of the transformative powers of ‘multilateralism’.280 281 282 83 Ruggie’s analysis 
shows the location of political identity building in the political sphere. Ruggie’s 
argument is that multilateralism is not only a co-ordination of action between three or 
more states, but a new quality of relations between these states.
“Multilateralism is an institutional form which coordinates relations among 
three or more states on the basis of ‘generalized’ principles of conduct - that
280 Cox, Robert W. “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory41 
in Keohane, Robert O. (ed) "Neorealism and its Critics" (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1986): p. 225.
281 Ibid: p. 232.
282 Castells, Manuel. "The Rise of the Network Society" (London: Blackwell, 2000): p. 500.
283 See: Ruggie, John Gerard. “Multilateralism at Century’s End“ in: Ruggie, John Gerard. 
"Constructing the World Polity. Essays on International Institutionalization " (London: Routledge, 
1998). Ruggie distinguishes between nominative/formal and qualitative/substantive multilaterism. 
Here the emphasis is on the qualitative or substantive multilateralism. This means the emphasis is on
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is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for classes of actions, 
without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic
no/
exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence “ .
Ruggie shows that multilateral institutions, like the EU or the UN are robust and can 
adapt to change. In addition they can develop a life of their own, independent of the 
founding states. This is what distinguishes this concept from that of regimes. 
Regimes are dependent on the states that created them. For multilateral institutions in
the sense Ruggie is arguing, this is less the case. They adapt to changes by
themselves. “Much of the institutional inventiveness within mulitlateral
arrangements today comes from the institutions themselves, from platforms that 
arguably represent or at least speak for the collectives at hand“284 5 286. Based on this it 
can be argued that these multilateral institutions are possible locations of political 
identity. At the very least, they can not be discounted as factors playing into the 
process of political identity building.
Rosenau’s argument describes the sphere of non-governmental organisations. 
This is the second aspect of the political realm (next to governmental, multilateral 
arrangements) in which political identity is formed in the international sphere. 
Rosenau’s analysis is that “globalization, the skill revolution, and the advent of 
pervasive authority crises have all contributed to an explosive transformation of the 
private world“ . This revolution resulted in an explosive increase in number and 
importance of non-governmental organisations (NGO) in the international realm. 
These NGOs undergo a transformation from elite to mass organisations. Rosenau, 
sees the innovations in technology and communication as the basis for the increase in
the kin of relations that the parties have with each other and not only on the number of parties involved 
(although there need to be more than two in order for the term ‘multilateralism’ to make sense).
284 Ibid: p. 109.
285 Ibid: p. 129.
286 Rosenau (1997) op. cit.: p. 330.
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influence of these organisations. Because of these technological innovations it has 
become easier for these organisations to communicate, plan and exercise their
actions.
"The fax machine and Internet not only facilitate relationships between local 
and national or transnational organizations, but they also make it possible to 
build networks and alliances among like-minded organizations “ .
The growing role of the NGO’s can also be seen in the fact that they no longer only 
serve in the role of outside lobbyists in the international sphere (the consulting status 
of NGOs in the UN is only one example). Rosenau sees an emerging partnership 
between governmental organisations (of the multilateral form), national governments 
and NGOs. “NGOs and other non-governmental actors [...] are playing roles, meeting 
expectations, and filling gaps that national governments cannot fill on their own“287 8. 
These organisations open up a new space for political identity building. Their 
influence on this process should not be underestimated. The third location of possible 
political identity building in the international sphere is the cultural realm which is 
transmitted through media. In order to explore this aspect, the analysis of Morley and 
Robins is particularly helpful.
Morley and Robins argue that the new developments in the media make 
national boundaries seem arbitrary and irrational. They present obstacles to the 
reorganisation of media business strategies. What they invisage is the emergence of 
‘television without frontiers’: A new media landscape which shapes identity not on 
the state but on the supra-state level (the regional as well as the global sphere). “What 
we are moving towards is a fundamental delocalised world order articulated around a 
small number of concentrated centres for production for knowledge and storage of
287 Ibid: p. 333.
288 Ibid: p. 338.
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9RO
information as well as centres for emission of images and information44 . Morely 
and Robins argue, (see first chapter) that a parallel process of horizontal integration 
and vertical disintegration is emerging. “What is in fact emerging is a certain 
displacement of national frameworks in favour of perspectives and agendas 
appropriate to both supra-national and sub-national dynamics44290. In this process, a 
space for identities in the international realm is opening up. Castells also points to the 
increasing importance of the media, especially the new media, such as the internet, 
for the political process. “The new power lies in the codes of information and in the 
images of representation around which societies organize their institutions, and 
people build their lives and decide their behaviour. The sites of this power are 
people’s minds44291. However the impact of the media and the new media on the 
political process must not be overestimated. While it certainly has a tranformative 
effect, this cannot assumed to be equally so all over the globe. It certainly has 
changed the political process in the more technologically advanced countries. 
However, these changes have yet to show their full potential.292
Nevertheless contemporary cultural identities have a distinctly international 
aspect. “Contemporary cultural identities must also be about internationalism in a 
direct sense about our positions in transnational space44293. Morley and Robin give the 
examples of the francophone identities, or the Tatin audiovisual space’. A particular 
role in the construction of these identity spaces is attributed to the film and television 
media. They play a particularly important role in the reorganising of the ‘stories of 
the past’ which help to construct our identities of the present. This is of particular * * * * *
289 Morley, David and Kevin Robins. “Spaces of Identity. Global Media. Electronic Landscapes and 
Cultural Boundaries" (London: Routledge, 1997): p. 29.
290 Ibid: p. 34.
291 Castells, Manuel. “The Power of Identity" (London: Balckwell, 1997): p. 359.
292 See the studies in: Axford, Barry and Richard Huggins (eds). “New Media and Politics” (London: 
Sage, 2001).
293 Morley and Robins op. cit.'. p. 41.
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importance since the old stable identities of the past, grounded in the idea of the 
‘Heimat’, the homeland and its historical myths and stories have become unsettled.
“ There can be no recovery of an authentic cultural homeland. In a -world that 
is increasingly characterised by exile, migration and diaspora, with all the 
consequences of unsettling and hybridisation, there can be no place for such 
absolutism of the pure and the authentic. In this world, there is no longer any 
place like Heimat “294.
The place of the diaspora is the fourth and final location of a political identity on the 
supra state level. The diaspora is a different kind of identity (compared to the other 
identities on the supra-state level) since their members political identity is closely 
connected to their ‘homeland’. This location is the most important one for the case 
study on this level of political identity building since the majority of Jewish and 
Palestinian community live in the diaspora. In addition, as Rapport has shown, even 
immigration to Israel, for example, does not necessarily mean that diaspora identities 
are changed or revoked.295 Diaspora as a location of identity and political identity is a 
long standing feature in international politics although its definition is somewhat 
sketchy. Cohen gives a fairly detailed definition of a diaspora.296 There are ten central 
features which characterise a diaspora: 1) A diaspora, or their ancestors have been 
dispersed from an original homeland, often accompanied by the memory of a single 
traumatic event 2) they retain a collective memory, vision or myth about their 
homeland 3) they believe that they are not and never will be fully integrated in their 
host societies 4) their home country is idealised and either they or their descendants 
should return 5) they believe all members should be committed to the maintenance,
294 Ibid: p. 103f.
295 See: Rapport, Nigel. “Coming Home to a Dream: A Study of the Immigrant Discourse of ‘Anglo- 
Saxons’ in Israel" in Rapport, Nigel and Andrew Dawson (eds) "Migrants of Identity. Perceptions of 
Home in a World of Movement" (Oxford: Berg, 1998).
296 See: Cohen, Robin. "Global Diasporas. An Introduction" (London: UCL Press, 1997): p. 23 ff.
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restoration or even creation of their homeland 6) they continue to relate to that 
homeland and their ethnocommunal consciousness and solidarity are in an important 
way defined by the existence of such a relationship. 7) a disapora can also consist of 
groups that scatter for aggressive or voluntaristic reasons (colonisation) 8) some time 
has to pass before a group is really a diaspora (if it does not integrate into the host 
society) 9) there also are some positive virtues of retaining a diasporic identity, such 
are increased scientific and cultural achievements 10) member of a diaspora are not 
only characterised by a collective identity in their place of settlement, and their 
relationship to their homeland (real or imagined), but also by a common identity with
co-ethnic members in other countries.
Globalisation has an impact on diasporas. They are not only able to take 
advantage of the increased possibilities of communication but they are also able to 
exploit these processes to their advantage, in international trade for example. 
“Deteriorialized, multilingual and capable of bridging the gap between global and 
local tendencies, diasporas are able to take advantage of the economic and cultural 
opportunities on offer44297. In addition, globalisation increases the movement of 
people and thereby creates new diasporas. Cohen argues that the process of 
globalisation enhances the process of diasporisation although there is no clear causal 
link between them. “Globalization and diasporization are separate phenomena with 
no necessary causal connections, but they do ‘go together extraordinarily well“298. As 
Pellerin argues, “global restructuring generates or amplifies migration and, in turn, 
the movement of people across borders is an indication of the globalization of 
societies, and of the obsolescence of national boundaries44299. The immigrants who * * *
297 Ibid: p. 176.
298 Ibid: p. 175.
299 Pellerin, H^ldne. “Global Restructuring and International Migration: Consequences for the 
Globalization of Politics" in Kofman, Eleonore and Gillian Youngs (eds) “Globalization. Theory and 
Practice" (London: Cassell, 1998): p. 81.
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form the new diasporas are involved in the process of global restructuring in two 
related ways: as objects of the global restructuring and as participants in the process.
“As agents of change migrants participate in the process of transforming 
social organisation. Their movement, and the conditions surrounding it, 
imply change in the organization of production, in territoriality of societies, 
as well as in the social production of ideas and identities, both in regions of 
origin and destination “30°.
Pellerin argues that the process of migration has contributed to the spatial
disarticulation of societies. In addition and in connection with this, the flows of
migrants have become less structured and state controlled. Pellerin views the 
migrants as one of the main factors of transformation in the process of globalisation. 
“There has been a shift from state-controlled emigration to more transnational forms 
of emigration where migrants themselves manage their movement44301. These new 
global diasporas open up a new location for transnational identities, as communities 
disperse around the globe. However, all this said, the developments of new locations 
for identity on the supra-state level - in economy, in politics (private or state-based), 
in the culture/media and in the diaspora - cannot be assumed to be equally opening 
up around the globe. The breadth and depth of these processes is unevenly 
distributed.302 For the analysis of the empirical cases here it needs to be clarified that 
when the analysis refers to political identity on the supra-state level, this does not 
necessarily mean a ‘global’ identity, like political identities in the environmental or 
feminist movement. Supra-state political identity can be located in the diaspora. A 
political identity on the supra-state level can be a political group of members of a 
diaspora that tries to have an influence on the politics of their homeland. 300 301
300 Ibid: p. 81.
301 Ibid: p. 89.
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The four major locations of political identity building in the international realm are: 
economy, politics, culture/media and diaspora. In each of these locations identity 
building happens. However the process is not the same in each location. It is a 
combination of the ways in which political identity building was theorised on the first 
level (individual/group) and the second (state). In the locations of economy and 
diaspora and some of the NGOs (the second part of the location politics) the main 
process of political identity building is individual-driven. It follows the processes 
outlined in the first part of this chapter (the ‘other’ as orientation of the individual’s 
own identity). In the location of multilateral politics and culture/media the process of 
political identity building is an elite-driven phenomenon. It follows the processes in 
the second part of this chapter (state-level). The diaspora is the main location of 
identity building for the case studies. Here, identities are constructed by an individual 
feeling of solidarity with and belonging to one’s ‘original’ homeland (real or 
constructed). It is clear that these characterisations are only markers which serve as 
points of orientation in the empirical analysis. Which process in which particular case 
of a location is dominant is an empirical question and cannot be analytically resolved.
After having identified the three levels of political identity building it is now 
time to turn to some considerations about some fundamental ontological questions 
which have to be answered in the process of the construction of political identity on 
each level. Here six significators are identified which correspond to six basic 
ontological questions: sense of territoriality, sense of ethnicity, perceived sense of 
history, sense of language, sense of religion and sense of gender role. To these 
significators the analysis turns now.
302 See the discussion of uneven globalisation in the first chapter.
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IV. Six Significators of Political Identity Building
In the first three parts of this chapter the discussion centred around the ontological 
breadth of political identity building. Three levels of political identity building were 
analysed: the substate (individual/group) level, the state level, and the supra-state 
level. Parallel to the discussion about the location of political identity, three 
mechanisms of political identity building were developed. On the individual/group 
level one can expect political identity building to be an individual process of 
differentiation during social interaction. On the state level it was argued that one can 
expect the process to be an elite controlled and elite led phenomenon. On the supra- 
state level one can expect it to be a mixture of individual and elite led phenomena 
depending on the location of the process. This last part of the chapter looks now at 
some of the main variables along which the process of political identity building (all
three mechanisms: individual differentiation, elite controlled, and mixture use these 
variables) is orientated. This serves two purposes. On the one hand it will ‘flesh out’ 
the abstract ‘bones’ of the three mechanisms of political identity building with some 
concrete issues. On the other hand the variables can be used as empirical guidelines 
for the empirical analysis in the second part of the thesis.
Six main variables will be analysed. Every variable answers one of the basic 
ontological questions of an individual and a group: ‘sense of ethnicity’, answering 
the question ‘who are we?’, ‘sense of territoriality’ answering the question ‘where do 
we belong?’, ‘sense of history’ answering the question ‘where do we come from?’, 
‘sense of language’ and ‘sense of religion’ answering the question ‘what are we?’, 
and ‘sense of gender’ answering the question ‘what is our position in society?’.
Three clarifications need to be made. Firstly the basic assumption is that these 
variable can be found on all three levels of political identity building (although not
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necessarily all of them on every level). Secondly the list of variables is not 
exhaustive, but these variables are the most central ones. Thirdly the connections 
between and the relative weight of the variables on each level and across the three 
levels is an empirical question. It cannot be analytically resolved. To try to specify 
these connections would mean to narrow the theory for just one case study. Since the 
aim is here to develop a general theoretical approach to political identity building it
would be counterintuitive to do this. Each variable will now be discussed
individually.
IV.I. Significator: ‘Sense of Ethnicity9: ‘Who are we?9
Although it is widely agreed that a sense of ethnic identity is one of the key concepts 
in the process of political identity building, there is no agreed definition of the term 
‘ethnicity’. “The sense of a common ethnicity has remained to this day a major focus 
of identification by individuals"303. There is also wide agreement in the literature that 
“ethnicity has something to do with the classification of people and group 
relationships1^. One tentative definition is that of Manning Nash. Ethnicity here is 
defined as a regulator of group boundaries. These boundaries are maintained by
cultural markers of difference in order to define who is a member and who is not.
The differences among groups are index features which must be easily seen, grasped, 
understood, and reacted to in social situations. These index markers implicate or 
summarise less visible, less socially apparent aspects of the group. Ethnicity is 
therefore defined by these boundary mechanisms. These include cultural markers 
such as presumed kinship, commensality (eating together), and common cult and 
surface pointers. “Surface pointers include dress, language, and (culturally denoted)
303 Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith. “Introduction" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D.
Smith (eds) "Ethnicity" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): p. 3.
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physical features"304 05. The historical dimension of ethnicity is grasped in the concept 
of ‘tradition’. "Tradition is the past of a culture, as that past is thought to have 
continuity, a present, and a future"306. This tentative definition by Nash is somewhat 
incomplete. It does not account for the sources, the persistence and the resurgence of 
ethnicity. It is at this point that the debates in the literature on the concept start. There 
are two major approaches to the concept of ethnicity: ‘primordialists’ and
’instrumentalists’.
The ‘primordialists’ consider “ethnicity as stemming from a given division of 
human beings into ethnic groups in nature and therefore beyond human control: the 
identity comprising what a person is born with"307. In the words of Walker Connor, 
ethnic ties are assumed to be beyond reason.308 One of the most prominent 
‘primordialists’ is Clifford Geertz. He argues that the sense of ethnicity is based on 
primordial attachments. By these attachments Geertz is refering to assumed ‘givens’
of social existence:
“immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the
givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, 
speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and 
following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech,
custom, and so on are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, 
coerciveness in and of themselves “309.
304 Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. "Ethnicity and Nationalism" (London: Pluto Press, 1993): p. 4.
305 Nash, Manning. "The Cauldron of Ethnicity in the Modern World" (London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1989): p. 12.
306 Ibid: p. 14.
307 Davies, Richard. “Ethnicity: Inside Out or Outside In?“ in Krause, Jill and Neil Renwick (eds) 
"Identities in International Relations" (London: Macmillan Press, 1996): p. 81.
308 Connor, Walker. “Beyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethnonational Bond" in Hutchinson, John and 
Anthony D. Smith (eds) "Ethnicity" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): p. 69.
309 Geertz Clifford. “Primordial Ties“ in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) "Ethnicity" 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): p. 42.
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Steven Crosby develops this concept further. He argues that from birth a human 
being does not only belong to his or her immediate family but also to the wider 
collective. The infant develops into a person by taking part in the objectified, past 
and current achievements of the collective. He or she participates in the culture.
“The individual participates in these given, a priory bounded patterns. The 
patterns are the legacy of history; they are tradition. Many traditions, too, 
are constituted by cognitive beliefs focused on primordial objects. Ethnic 
groups and nationalities exist because there are traditions of belief and 
action towards primordial objects such as biological features and especially
territorial location “ .
Van den Berghe adds another aspect to ‘primordialism’. He argues that the 
boundaries of an ethnic group are maintained by biologically programmed nepotism. 
“Consciously or unconsciously we must be able to discriminate according to degree 
of biological relationship to ourselves, if our beneficence to others is to increase our 
inclusive fitness44 . This recognition is achieved by physical and cultural markers. 
Physical markers include similarities in physical appearance (skin pigmentation, 
physical stature for example), cultural markers include dress and language. These 
historical and biological bonds are translated into an actors ‘being’, ‘knowing’ and 
‘doing’. As Fishman points out, ethnicity is intuitively defined and experienced as 
part of an actor’s ‘being’. “Ethnicity is partly experienced as being ‘bone of their 
bone, flesh of their flesh, and blood of their blood’“312. The aspect of ethnic ‘doing’ 
is directly related to the ethnic ‘being’. “The physical heritage of ethnicity creates 
expressive obligations and opportunities for behaving as the ancestors behaved and 310 311
310 Grosby, Steven. “The Inexpungable Tie of Primordiality“ in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. 
Smith (eds) "Ethnicity" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): p. 55.
311 Van den Berghe, Pierre. “Does Race Matter?" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) 
"Ethnicity" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): p. 57.
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preserving their great heritage by transmitting it to generation after generation*'312 3. 
This ethnic ‘doing’ is expressed, among other mediums, through songs, chants, 
sayings, prayers, innvocations, formulas, rites, jokes, and riddles. Ethnic ‘knowing’ is 
the conviction that the ‘doing’ is authentic. “Ethnicity is a Weltanschauung that helps 
to explain origins, clarify eternal questions, rationalize human destiny, and purports 
to offer an entre to universal truths"314 315.
Primordialists see ethnicity as a phenomenon determined by forces beyond 
reason and human control, may they be biological or cultural in expression. The 
individual is formed and his or her behaviour guided by these forces. The 
‘primordialist’ approach has the advantage of being able to explain the emotional 
power of ethnic identity as well as the persistence of the phenomenon in the face of 
increasing globalisation. What they are not able to explain is the disappearance of old 
and the emergence of new ethnicities. This aspect is highlighted by the second 
approach to the phenomenon, the ‘instrumentalist’ approach. The ‘instrumentalist’ 
approach sees ethnicity as a
“product of particular economic, political and social conditions. In this view, 
ethnicity is an adaptive identity which is determined by, or may vary with, the 
context in which an individual finds himself or herself and thus the attitudes 
which one has towards a particular set of circumstances. Ethnic identity in 
this case is voluntaristic rather than enforced identity 1,315.
Frederick Barth sees ethnic groups therefore as categories of ascription and 
identification by actors themselves. They organise interaction among people. “To the 
extent that actors use ethnic identities to categorize themselves and others for
312 Fishman, Joshua. “Ethnicity as Being, Doing, Knowing" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. 
Smith (eds) "Ethnicity “ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): p. 63.
313 Ibid: p. 65.
314 Ibid: p. 66.
315 Davis op. cit.: p. 82.
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□ 1 A
purpose of interaction, they form ethnic groups in this organizational sense" . The 
organisation into ethnic groups is done by social and cultural markers. However these 
markers are only significant if the actors perceive them to be significant. These 
markers are things such as dress, language, houseform or more general life style. 
They are also basic value orientations, like the standards of morality. These markers 
define the boundary of an ethnic group. Ethnic groups need organisational 
requirements in order to emerge and to become significant. “The organizational 
requirements are clearly, first, a categorization of population sectors in exclusive and 
imperative status categories, and second, an acceptance of the principle that standards 
applied to one such category can be different from that applied to another"316 17. If these 
requirements are not given or disappear (through intermariage for example) the 
ethnic group does not emerge or disappears respectively.
Abner Cohen and Paul R. Brass argue that the boundaries of ethnic groups are 
neither given nor emerge by themselves but are political phenomena and outcomes of 
elite competition. For Cohen “ethnicity is essentially a political phenomenon, as 
traditional customs are used only as idioms, and as mechanisms for political 
alignment"318. Paul R. Brass argues that ethnic groups, so far as they are subjectively 
self-conscious, should be called ethnic communities. These are created by elites and 
are used in their competition for political power. “Ethnic communities are created 
and transformed by particular elites in modernizing and in postindustrial societies 
undergoing dramatic social change. This process invariably involves competition and 
conflict for political power, economic benefits, and social status between competing
316 Barth, Frederik. “Ethnic Groups and Boundaries" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) 
“Ethnicity" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): p. 78.
3,7 Ibid: p. 81.
318 Cohen, Abner. “Ethnicity and Politics" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) 
“Ethnicity" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): p. 84.
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elite, class, and leadership groups both within and among different ethnic 
categories4*319.
Daniel Bell tries to explain the saliency of ethnic identity in a modernising 
world. For him the revival of ethnic ties is not simply the result of the plural nature of 
most societies world-wide (which nurtures a need for identification with a subgroup 
within the state), but stems from the fact that ethnicity combines affection with 
material interest. “Those social units are most highly effective, clearly, which can 
combine symbolic and instrumental purposes. In the political history of our times, it 
is clear that ‘class’ and ‘ethnicity’ have been two such dominant modes of coherent 
group feeling and action4*320. Since ‘class’ does not seem to carry any strong affective 
tie any more (“the union has focused on the job, and little more4*321), ethnicity has 
gained on importance as a way of group identification.
The ‘instrumentalist’ approaches presented here pay attention to the changing 
character of ethnic identification. They see ethnic identity as a voluntaristic approach 
in which the individual actor has a choice. In addition to this they point to the 
political aspects of ethnic identity. This identification can serve as a political force 
either within the state or across state boundaries. Ethnic groups can be elite led and 
be used as a tool in the struggle for political power and economic benefits. However 
while the ‘primordialist’ approaches are too static as far as the group dynamics of 
ethnicity are concerned, the ‘instrumentalist’ approaches don’t pay enough attention 
to the durability of etlmic identification. They neglect the emotional ties that are 
involved in the process.
319 Brass, Paul R. “Ethnic Groups and Ethnic Identity Formation" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. 
Smith (eds) "Ethnicity" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): p. 89.
320 Bell, Daniel. “Ethnicity as Social Change" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) 
"Ethnicity" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): p.142.
321 Ibid: p. 143.
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The approach of Anthony D. Smith tries to offer an alternative approach to the 
‘primordialist’-‘instrumentalist’ debate. His conceptualisation of ethnicity sees the 
two approaches as extremes and instead stresses the historical and symbolic-cultural 
attributes of ethnic identity.322 323 324An ethnic community therefore has six main 
attributes:
“7. a collective proper name
2. a myth of common ancestry
3. shared historical memories
4. one or more differentiating elements of common culture
5 an association with specific 'homeland’
6. a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population "
An ethnic community does not have to possess all six of these attributes. However 
the more it possesses these attributes and the more attributes of these it possesses, the 
closer it approximates the ideal type of an ethnic community or ethnie. This approach 
shows that ethnicity is neither fully ‘instrumental’ nor is it fully ‘primordial’. “All of 
this suggests that the ethnie is anything but primordial [...] As the subjective 
significance of each of these attributes waxes and wanes for the members of a
community, so does the cohesion and self awareness of that communities 
membership44324. An ethnic community, according to Smith, is formed by either 
amalgamation of smaller units or by a subdivision of a larger unit.325 It is this 
approach to ethnicity that will be used in this study. It will become clear during the 
case study that the ethnic element is strong in Israeli and in Palestinian society. All 
five points of Smith’s definition are existing in Israeli and Palestinian political
322 Smith (1991) op. cit. distinguishes between ‘ethnic category’ which is a group which is perceived 
by outsiders as such but has only marginal self-awareness and ‘ethnic community’ or ‘ethnie’ which is 
a group that is distinguishable by objective criteria and is subjectively conscious of its distinctiveness.
323 Ibid: p. 21.
324 Ibid: p. 23.
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identities. However it will equally become clear that the importance of the ethnic 
element varies among the different groups in each society.
As can be seen in Smith’s approach (point 5 above), territoriality still has 
importance for the process of political identity building. It is to this significator that
we turn now.
IV.IL Significator: 6Sense of Territoriality9: 6 Where do we
belong?9
The significator of territoriality is another important issue of political identity 
building, as it was argued during the discussion of Smith’s notion of ethnicity above. 
One can argue that if a political identity is oriented towards a specific group or a 
specific society (in difference to an orientation towards the whole of humanity, as it 
is the case with Marxist political identities for example), it has to take the specific 
territory in which this group or society lives into account. It has to be spatially 
oriented. In the first chapter it was shown that, even under the emerging conditions of 
globalisation, territoriality still holds an important position in political identity 
building. This has several reasons. First of all, as Deudney shows, there is evidence 
of the continuing spatial orientation of political identity. “Evidence for topophilia in 
modem national identity can be found in the symbolic content of various mottos, 
anthems, monuments, and literary works."325 26 In addition, William E. Connolly shows 
territoriality to be one of the basic building blocks for democracy.327 Furthermore, it 
has been argued in the first chapter that the emerging conditions of globalisation are
325 See: Ibid: p. 24.
326 Deudney, Daniel. “Ground Identity: Nature, Place in Nationalism" in Lapid, Yosef and Friedrich 
Kratochwil (eds) “The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory" (London: Lynne Rienner, 1996): 
p. 132.
327 Connolly, William E “Democracy and Territoriality" Millenium. Journal of International Studies. 
20,3 1991: pp. 463-484.
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not equally forceful in all parts of the globe. In regions in which the conditions of 
globalisation have not yet reached their full potential, or in which these changes are 
just emerging, territory remains a significant aspect of political identity. It is 
especially important in cases in which the perceived political identity of a group
clashes with the territorial boundaries in which it lives, as it is the case with
minorities or refugee communities (irredentism). Here, having a state, obtaining a 
state, or returning to a state is of the highest significance for political identity. In 
addition, territory can be an important variable in political identities that take religion 
as their central element. Here, territory can be seen as a sacred space that is necessary 
for the concrete realisation of religious beliefs.328 During the analysis of Israeli and 
Palestinian society this factor will become clear. Jewish radical religious identity and 
fundamentalist Islamic identity see territory as sacred. For the former, Jewish 
settlement redeems the land and thereby furthers the coming of the Messiah, for the 
latter, the land is a sacred religious endowment to the believers (waqf). Finally, when 
territory is contested, political identity necessarily centres around the question of 
territory. This is the case in the two societies analysed in this study. It has been 
pointed out in the first chapter that the concept of having a state is central to the 
political identities in both Israeli and Palestinian societies. It was argued (and we will 
see this in the analysis in the empirical part of the study) that the concept of being 
Israeli and Palestinian is central to the political identities prevalent in both societies. 
However, we will also see that the concrete meaning of being Israeli and being 
Palestinian is now contested. Political identity groups on the substate and the supra- 
state level offer different conceptualisations for this problem. This situation is close 
to what Rosenau argues when he talks about the ‘Frontier’ an analytical space in
328 See: Smith, Anthony D. “The ‘Sacred’ Dimension of Nationalism" in Millenium. Journal of 
International Studies. Special Issue Religion and International Relations. 29, 3 2000.
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which different groups from the sub- and suprastate level compete with the state level 
for the allocation of authority.329 Historic memory is another important building 
block of political identity.
IVJIL Significator: ‘Sense of History’: ‘Where do w come
from?’
The importance of a sense of history and the role of political myths has already been 
pointed out in connection with the concept of national identity. Perceived history 
plays a central role in the formation of political identity. As Friedman points out, 
“cultural realities are always produced in specific socio-historical contexts and [...] it 
is necessary to account for the processes that generate those contexts in order to 
account for the nature of both the practice of identity and the production of historical 
schemes."330 The importance of foundation myths in the building of group identity is 
also pointed out by Farrands. The historicity of these foundation myths however “is 
wholly irrelevant."331 They serve as a basis for the building of a unifying identity, 
therefore it is important to examine their purpose in identity formation rather than 
their historical correctness. Dienstag points to the importance of the narrative, of the 
construction of a ‘past’ in political theory and to the direct relevance of this to 
personal identity. “Our sense of ourselves, at least on an individual level, is somehow 
tied to our pasts - to our education, family, employment, or nationality, for 
example"332. By looking at the past, so the argument goes, political theory constructs 
a sense of the past which then leads to expectations for the future. “It makes sense in 
thinking about politics and the future to think about history or the past [...] the project
329 See: Rosenau (1997) op. cit.
330 Friedman, Jonathan. “Cultural Identity and Global Process" (London: Sage, 1994): p. 117.
331 Farrands (1996) op. cit.: p. 17.
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of political theory is not so much to reform our morals as it is to reform our 
memories4*332 33.
There are two broad strategies with which political theory tries to reform the 
past: reconciliation and redemption. Reconciliation with the past (a strategy chosen 
by Hegel and Heidegger) implies the assumption that the individual is ‘thrown’ (the 
notion of ‘throwness’ is a Heideggerian concept334 335) into being to which his or her 
past is an integral part. The individual cannot choose or influence the past and has to 
accept it. As past, present and future are intrinsically connected it follows that the 
individual cannot change the future. The strategy of redemption (chosen by Locke 
and Nietzsche) has a different aim.
“Who chooses to attempt a redemption must accept an unreconciled
existence, one with loose ends and sharp edges. One gives up the sense of an 
ending, the good feeling of narrative closure that comes with reconciliation. 
One gives up without guarantees for the future a sense of time that feels solid. 
One gives up ‘freedom to reveal what is ’ for the unpromising freedom to 
remember, and imagine what is not “325.
The role of the narrator is central in the project to ‘reform memory’. Through his or 
her work coherence can be given to events which they do not naturally have. The 
narrators “refigure, and retell the past in an attempt to discuss the present and 
future4*336. Therefore their work is highly political. The ‘politics of memory’ as 
Dienstag calls it, directly relates to our sense of identity.
“Attempts to divorce politics from history and argue about the future as if the 
past were a blank slate result only in a posture of willful amnesia amidst a
332 Dienstag, Joshua Foa. “Dancing in Chains. Narrative and Memory in Political Theory “ (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1997): p. 2.
333 Ibid: p. 22.
334 See: Heidegger, Martin “Being and Time" (SanFrancisco: Harper, 1962).
335 Dienstag op. cit.: p. 197.
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community of stories. There is always the threat that history will enslave us; 
but if anything we increase the threat when we attempt to deny the role of
narrative in politics “ .
Smith argues along similar lines. He points to the importance of a special kind of 
narrative for group identity: myths of election. In the context of ethnic and group 
identity Smith argues that the myth of ethnic election plays a central role. “We need 
to pay more attention to the subjective elements in ethnic survival, such as ethnic 
memories, values, symbols, myths and traditions4338. Under ‘myths of ethnic 
election’, Smith understands the notion that a group perceives itself as historically 
unique and that there is a special purpose for the group to fulfil, that they are
‘chosen’.
“To be chosen is to be placed under moral obligations. One is chosen on 
condition that one observes certain moral, ritual and legal codes, and only 
for as long as one continues to do so. The privilege of election is accorded 
only to those who are sanctified, whose life-style is an expression of sacred 
values. The benefits of election are reserved for those who fulfil the required 
observances“336 337 338 39.
The myth of election is particularly salient in some more radical religious groups in 
both societies, Israeli and Palestinian. On the one hand, the myth of the chosen 
people, on the other hand the myth of Jihad in which the chosen ones fight God’s 
war. Therefore only by paying attention to these ethnic myths can we understand the 
salience and power of group identities. The phenomenon of the myth of election 
explains how group identity is maintained even when the group is under pressure to
336 Ibid: p. 199.
337 Ibid: p. 211.
338 Smith, Anthony D. “Chosen Peoples: Why Ethnic Groups Survive" in Ethnic and Racial Studies 
15,3 1992: p. 440.
339 Ibid: p. 441.
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assimilate or is in the diaspora for a prolonged period of time. These myths of 
election and the historical memory of a particular group are expressed in a language 
common to the group. Only those who speak the group-language can be members. 
These myths are also often of religious character. They relate the groups identity to 
the supernatural. This leads to the next two significators: language and religion which 
will be analysed now.
IV.IV. Significators: 'Sense of Language9 and 'Sense of
Religion9: 'What are we?9
Language is one of the weaker significators analysed here. While the possession of a
common language makes group identification easier (which follows from the premise 
that communication is an essential part of the process of identification), a common 
language is not a fundamental necessity. The role of language in the building process 
of political identity is shown by Suleiman.340 341 342Suleiman reasons that “the symbolic 
function of language is at least as important as its communicative role in signalling 
collective identity boundaries, both in terms of inclusion and exclusion?4341 Although 
Edwards argues that language is but one of the markers of group identity he concedes 
that “many have considered that the possession of a given language is well-nigh 
essential to the maintenance of group identity44342. Language per se is not enough to 
maintain group identity. Other elements (cultural and social markers, self 
consciousness as group) are necessary in order to maintain a sense of group 
identification among the individual members. Edwards even argues that “identities
340 Suleiman, Yasir. “Language and Identity in the Middle East and North Africa“ (Richmond Surrey: 
Curzon, 1996).
341 Ibid: p. 1.
342 Edwards, John. “Language, Society and Identity “ (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985): p. 3.
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can and do survive the loss of the original language4*343 344. Language is a symbolic 
marker of group boundaries which can be used by groups in the struggle for political
power.
“With regard to language the point is that while, ordinarily, communicative 
and symbolic facets co-exist, they are separable. Among mainstream 
populations the language of daily use is usually also the variety which carries 
and reflects group culture and tradition. Among minority groups or within 
groups in which language shift has occured in the reasonably recent past, the 
value of language as a symbol can remain in the absence of the 
communicative function1,344.
One example of this process is the attachment to Gaelic in the definition of Irishness 
although the language is no longer widely spoken. Horowitz demonstrates the 
political use of language as a symbol. Language can be used as a symbol of 
domination in the struggle for political influence and legitimacy.
“For groups uncertain about their worth the glorification of the language is
also intended to reflect a revised or aspirational evaluation. The status of 
language is a symbol of newfound group dignity. Claims for official status for 
a language are typically demands for an authoritative indication ‘that some 
people have a legitimate claim to greater respect, importance, or worth in the 
society than have some others’"345.
Language is, Horowitz argues, an important symbolic issue. It links political claims 
to ownership with psychological demands for group affirmation. In addition to this, it 
ties this “aggregate matter of group status to outright careerism, thereby binding elite
343 Ibid: p. 159.
344 Edwards, John. “Symbolic Ethnicity and Language" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith 
(eds) "Ethnicity" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): p. 226.
345 Horowitz, Donald. “Symbolic Politics and Ethnic States" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D.
Smith (eds) "Ethnicity" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): p. 288.
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material interests to mass concerns”346. Language is often then an issue not because 
of the special importance of lingusitic differences but because in a multilingual state 
there has be to a decision which language (or languages) is the official one. This 
choice directly translates then into career opportunities or barriers for group elites. 
“Policy choices have consequences, not just for careers of members of one or another 
ethnic group, but for social-class mobility, for bureaucratic effectiveness, and for 
international contact”347. Balibar follows Horowitz in this respect. Language, so 
argues Balibar, is used to erect and maintain group boundaries. In a state this is done 
through the schooling process. Education is used to give the language a sense of 
naturalness (expressed in the expression ‘mother tongue’). In turn this gives the
group a certain claim to be based on ‘natural’ criteria’.
“All linguistic practices feed into a single ‘love of the language ’ which is 
addressed not to the textbook norm nor to particular usage, but to the 
‘mother tongue’ - that is to the ideal of a common origin projected back 
beyond learning process and specialist forms of usage and which, by that 
very fact, becomes the metaphor for the love fellow nationals feel for one 
another “348.
The linguistic construction of identity is, according to Balibar, by definition open. 
Although no individual chooses a certain language as his or her mother tongue, there 
is always the possibility to learn other languages and to turn oneself into a different 
bearer of discourse and of the transformations of language. The linguistic community 
immediately naturalises new acquisitions. “It does so too quickly in a sense. It is a 
collective memory which perpetuates itself at the cost of an individual forgetting of 
‘origins’. The ‘second generation’ immigrant inhabits the national language (and
346 Ibid: p. 289f.
347 Ibid: p. 290.
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through it the nation itself) in a manner as spontaneous, as ‘hereditary’ and as 
imperious [...] as the son of [the] heaths“349. The language community exists in the 
present. It produces the feeling that it always existed, but it does not lay down a 
destiny for successive generations. “Ideally it ‘assimilates’ anyone and holds no one. 
Finally it affects all individuals in their innermost being (in the way in which they 
constitute themselves as subjects), but its historical particularity is bound only to 
interchangeable institutions4435 0. Language also plays an important part in the next 
significator which will be analysed: religion. Sacred texts are usually written in a 
sacred language which by virtue of mostly being a ‘dead’ language does not only 
constitute group boundaries between groups but also boundaries between elites and 
masses within a particular group. In the case study it will become clear that language 
is a weak element in the political identities present in Israeli and Palestinian society. 
However language is not an element that can be neglected. This can be seen in the
fact that the Zionist movement created a new common language,(Ivrit) for the state of 
Israel. The important integrative force of language can also be seen in the fact that the 
Russian immigrants to Israeli in the early 1990s who did not by and large learn Ivrit 
remain in isolation from the wider Israeli society.
It is a common place that religion is an important aspect of the process of 
political identity building. Although this somewhat sweeping assumption must be 
qualified in regard to the geographical region of which one is talking, there is 
evidence that religion is assuming a more political role even in highly secularised 
societies. Jeff Haynes shows that religious groups generally assume a higher political 
profile than they did two decades ago. “Religious organizations of various kinds 
seem openly to be rejecting the secular ideals dominating national policies, appearing
348 Balibar, Etienne. “Fictive Ethnicity and Ideal Nation" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith 
(eds) “Ethnicity “ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): p. 166.
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as champions of alternative, confessional options. In keeping faith with what they 
interpret as divine decree, increasingly they refuse to render to non-religious power 
either material or moral tribute"349 350 51. He argues that religion is refusing to accept the 
private space it is assigned under the process of secularisation. There are important 
differences between the West and the Third World, so the argument goes, but the 
overall trend is towards a more visual role by religious groups in the political arena. 
He explains this phenomenon with a twofold argument: firstly under emerging 
conditions of globalisation which increase disorientation, uncertainty, and growing 
alienation, religion offers a stable base for personal and group identity. Secondly the 
ongoing process of secularisation pushes religion into the private realm. The strategy 
of religious groups is therefore to mount a cultural defence by pushing into the 
political realm. “Many religious communities have survived and flourished to the 
extent that they have not tried to adapt themselves to the perceived requirements of 
an increasingly secularized world"352. This process can be observed in Israeli as well 
as Palestinian society. On both sides religious groups have gained substantially in
influence in the last three decades.
In order to analyse the political role of religious groups, Haynes offers a very 
useful definition of the concept of ‘religion’. It is either 1) a system of beliefs and 
practices related to an ultimate being, beings or the supernatural or 2) that which is 
sacred in a society, that is ultimate beliefs and practices which are inviolate. It can be 
approached a) from a perspective of a body of ideas and outlooks (theology, ethical 
code) b) as a social group (religious groups and movements).353 For the issue of 
political identity building 2) and b) are of particular importance. “It is necessary to
349 Ibid: p. 166f.
350 Ibid: p. 167.
351 Haynes, Jeff. "Religion in Global Politics" (London: Longman, 1998): p. 1.
352 Ibid: p. 220.
353 See: ibid: p. 4.
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distinguish between religion at the individual and group levels: only the latter is 
normally of political importance44354. To highlight the different importance and role 
of religion in different states, Haynes devised five categories of states: 1) 
‘Confessional states’ (ecclesiastical authority preeminent over secular power): Iran, 
Saudi Arabia for example, 2) ‘Generally Religious States’ (guided by religious 
beliefs in general, civic religion is important, but not tied to any specific religious 
tradition): USA, Indonesia for example, 3) ‘Officially Established States’ (are also 
highly secular): England, Denmark, 4) ‘Liberal Secular States’ (notion of secular 
power holding sway over religion): Netherlands, Turkey for example, 5) ‘Marxist 
Secular States’ (religion only permitted to exist as a private matter): China, North 
Korea.354 55 Neither Israeli and Palestinian society fit the models closely. They present a 
mixture between the ‘officially established states’ and the ‘confessional states’ 
categories. However, in both societies strong tendencies work to move society closer 
to the ‘confessional states’ category.
Cynthia Enloe highlights the direct connection between religion and group 
identity. She points to the importance of religion for stability of group boundaries. 
She introduces four distinctions for religious practices: 1) the extent to which supra- 
empirical authorities are explicitly and coherently defined, 2) the difference in 
organisational structures used to implement clerical authority and the extent of 
hierarchy and integration in those organisations, 3) the extent of taboos determining 
dress, diet and other behaviours, 4) the approach to evangelical proselytizing.
354 Ibid: p. 5.
355 See: ibid: p. 1 Of. Haynes does not mention Israel or the Palestinian controlled eras in this 
distinction. For the purpose of the empirical study attempted here I would argue that they would fall as 
far as their official state structure is concerned in category 3 (‘Officially Established Faiths). However 
both have strong substate groups which aim to transform the state to category 1 (‘Confessional 
States’). This makes the concept of religion one of the central categories of political identity building 
inside and between the two societies.
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“The kind of religion - along these lines of distinction - as part of an ethnic
group’s communal package will determine how porous the ethnic boundaries 
are [...] The most tense interethnic relationship occurs when two ethnic 
groups confess different religions, each religion is theologically and 
organizationally elaborate and explicit, and when those religions have 
generated taboos operative in the routine aspects of life, for instance diet. 
The intensity is increased when each religion has a tradition of 
evangelism “356.
Religion can play a major role in the process of identity building since it offers a
clear mechanism for inside/outside divisions. That religion can be one (but not the
only) factor in political conflicts is also clearly shown by Fox. However one has to be 
careful not to overestimate the conflict potential of religion.357 He explains that 
“ethno-religious conflicts are different from other ethnic conflicts [...] religion does 
play a role in some ethno-religious conflicts but [the] role is not as common as one 
would believe given anecdotal evidence taken from current events/358
The last significator analysed is the concept of ‘gender’. This significator is of 
special importance since it can cross cut not only all three levels of political identity 
building as the other five significators can but also cross cuts each of the five 
significators analysed so far. Gender differences can be found in relationship to the 
sense of ethnicity, the sense of territoriality, the sense of history , the importance of 
languange and most obviously the importance of religion.
356 Enloe, Cynthia. “Religion and Ethnicity" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds) 
“Ethnicity" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): p. 196.
357 See: Fox, Jonathan. “The Salience of Religious Issues in Ethnic Conflicts: A large-N Study" Paper
Presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association. Toronto 1997. 
358 Ibid: p. 1.
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IV. V. Significator: ‘Gender9: ‘What is our Position in the
Community?9
Gender is another central aspect of personal but also of political identity. Jill Krause 
summarises this point eloquently.
“Gender is one of the most obvious facets of our personal identity. It is clear 
that in an important sense our view of ourselves, how we relate to others and 
how we understand our world and our place in it are all coloured by our 
perception of ourselves and others as gendered individuals “
Krause argues that while ‘gender’ is a social construct, ideas about it are so pervasive
and powerful that they seem to be ‘natural’. Because one’s self-awareness as a
gendered individual is connected with various social institutions which tie gender 
into patterns of domination it is also a highly political concept. As Jill Steans argues 
“Feminist scholarship has shown that gender plays a role in both the construction of 
national identity and in defining ‘woman’s place’ within the national order“359 60 361. 
Jacqui True shows how the institution of marriage ties in to the domination of 
women by the state. The state has the monopoly over legitimate force, so marriage 
has a monopoly on legitimate reproduction and property inheritance and acts as a 
‘protection racket’. Women seek protection from the violence of other men and 
economic insecurity (because the international division of labour devalues their 
work) through marriage.367
Challenges to this pattern of domination are exceptional and only possible if 
the basis for the structural domination is not yet established or challenged. One such
359 Krause, Jill. “Gendered Identities in International Relations" in Krause, Jill and Neil Renwick (eds) 
“Identities in International Relations'1 (London: Macmillan Press, 1996): p. 106.
360 Steans, Jill. “Gender and International Relations. An Introduction" (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1998): p. 69.
361 See: True, Jacqui. “Feminism" in Burchill, Scott, Andrew Linklater et. al. “Theories of 
International Relations" (London: Macmillan Press, 1996): p. 235.
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case is the struggle for national liberation. Especially during the mobilisation for 
national liberation spaces for a challenge to the dominant gender relations are opened 
up. “However, at the same time, it demonstrates how the existing power relations 
limit the possibilities for long-lasting change“362. Cynthia Enloe follows this 
characterisation of the role of ‘gender’ as a concept in nationalist struggles. Using 
colonial postcards and Hollywood movies as some of her sources, Enloe traces the 
masculinity within nationalist movements. “Nationalist movements have rarely taken 
women’s experience as a starting point [...] Rather nationalism typically has sprung 
from masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation and masculinized hope.“363 
Five basic assumptions are connected with women: 1) they are seen as the nation’s 
most valuable possessions, 2) the principal vehicles for a cross generational 
transmission of the whole nation’s value system, 3) the bearers of future generations,
4) being the most vulnerable to defilement and exploitation by oppressive alien rulers
5) being most susceptible to assimilation and co-operation by insidious outsiders.364 
But it is not only the role of women that is important here. Elshtain points to how the 
concept of ‘feminity’ is used in the construction of national sovereignty and
identification:
“The sovereign may bear a masculinized, face but the nation itself is 
feminized, a mother, a sweetheart, a lover. One can rightly speak [...] of
‘political love’ a love that retains the fraternal dimensions of medieval 
caritas but incorporates as well a maternalized loyalty symbolized 
domestically: the nation is home and home is mother “365.
362 Enloe, Cynthia. “Bananas, Beaches and Bases. Making Feminist Sense of International Politics" 
(Berkley: University of California Press, 1989): p. 70.
363 Ibid: p. 44.
364 See ibid: p. 54.
365 Elshtain, Jean Bethke. “Sovereignty, Identity Sacrifice" in Peterson, Spike V. (ed) ‘‘Gendered 
States Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory" (London: Lynne Rienner, 1992): p. 
149.
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The politicisation women experience during a nationalist movement can also have 
the effect that they become aware of their political role as women. As Enloe explains, 
women who are active within national movements (South Africa, Ireland, 
Afghanistan) try to analyse how their ’home’ and the international sphere are
interconnected. The movement as a whole often includes women’s concerns in their
programmes and entices their participation in the struggle by promising later benefits. 
But when independence is finally reached, as Margot Light and Fred Halliday 
mention, “they have rarely kept their promises to make fulfillment of women’s needs 
a priority?4366 The subordinate role of women is maintained or even increased. Here, 
Palestinian society can serve as a good example. Although women were active in the 
struggle against Israel, especially during the first intifada, they were pushed back to 
the political margins shortly after the establishment of the Palestinian National 
Authority (PNA).366 67 368 369In conclusion, Enloe argues that nationalist movements which 
shaped the face of the international sphere in the last two centuries (starting with the 
French Revolution) have been patriarchal movements, which generally did not 
change the placement of women in their societies. Deniz Kandiyoti also argues that 
the state as a social construct is “itself a direct expression of men’s interests44368. 
Kandiyoti shows the double side of the nationalist discourse. On the one hand, it 
presents itself as a modem project “that melts and transforms traditional attachments
in favour of new identities and as a reaffirmation of authentic cultural values culled 
from the depth of a presumed communal past44369. This has a direct influence on
366 Light, Margot and Fred Halliday. “Gender and International Relations" in Groom, A. J. R. and 
Margot Light (eds) “Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory^ (London: Pinter, 
1994): p. 48.
367 Another interesting aspect is the different role refugee camps play for men and women. As Enloe 
explains, refugee camps are for young men staging areas for guerrilla campaigns, for women refugee 
camps in Pakistan meant an even stricter seclusion. The men believed, that “the risk was greater that 
their women would be seen by men outside the safe boundaries of the family." Enloe op. cit. : p. 57.
368 Kandiyoti, Deniz. “Identity and its Discontents: Women and the Nation" in Millenium. Journal of 
International Studies. 20, 3 1991: p. 429.
369 Ibid: p. 431.
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gender relations. Yet, “ironically, the very structures defined as backward, feudal or 
patriarchal by the modernising state are the ones that get redefined as ethnic markers 
or as symbols of ‘national’ identity, especially if they are forcibly obliterated by an 
authoritarian statist project"370.
The underlying reason for the reassertion of women’s traditional roles is the 
equation of women with nature. This is argued by Runyan: “it is women’s long 
association with nature in Western political discourse that has given them a
‘privileged’ position in the construction of not only the political, but also the 
patriarchal authority of the state"371. This has direct and deep consequences for the 
political discourse. Zalewski and Enloe, while discussing the professional identities 
of American defence intellectuals which they call ‘strategic identities’ show how the 
assumptions of weakness and unprofessionalism connected with the concept of 
‘femininity’ regulate discourse. “Gender and specifically that which is identified as 
belonging to femininity acts as pre-emptive deterrent to certain modes of thought, 
action and speech. If the constructions of strategic identity has the power to inhibit 
what can be said and thought [...] it is indeed a powerful tool with potentially very 
damaging consequences"372. Gender as a concept is not only relevant for the 
subnational or state level. As Peterson shows, gender has to be taken into account in 
the discussion of globalisation. She argues that gender has to be treated as a central 
variable if one wants to understand globalisation. “Ungendered identities, 
epistemologies, states and markets are not to be found and we do well to take
370 Kandiyoti, Deniz. “Women, Ethnicity, and Nationalism" in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. 
Smith (eds) “Ethnicity" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): p. 314.
371 Runyan, Anne Sisson. “The ‘State’ of Nature: A Garden Unfit for Women and Other Living 
Things" in Peterson, Spike V. (ed) “Gendered States Feminist (Re) Visions of International Relations 
Theory" (London: Lynne Rienner, 1992): p. 123.
372 Zalewski, Marysia and Cynthia Enloe. “Questions about Identity in International Relations" in 
Booth, Ken and Steve Smith (eds) “International Relations Theory Today “ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1995): p. 291.
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seriously how feminists integrate conceptual and contextual critiques of naturalized 
dichotomies"373.
It has been argued in this analysis that ‘gender’ is one of the central variables 
of political identity building. It has shown how assumptions about gender roles, 
especially the role of woman and ‘femininity’ influence identity building on the 
substate, the state and the supra-state level. It has been argued that the structural 
domination of women cannot be easily reversed since its social construction has 
become so pervasive and powerful that it is treated as ‘naturalised’ by the actors. 
Both Palestinian and Israeli societies remain highly gendered. The hierarchical
division between men and woman is seen as natural.
The above discussion has highlighted the centrality of the six significators chosen for 
this study. They represent central issues along which individuals and groups on all 
three levels of political identity building orient themselves. Ethnicity is certainly the
most difficult one to define. The reason for this is that the literature on this
phenomenon is both extensive and contradictory. It has been shown that the 
‘primordial’ approaches neglect the possibility of change of ethnic groups while the 
‘instrumentalist’ argumentation does not pay enough attention to the emotional bonds 
that ethnic groups generate and the persistence they show (in some cases over 
centuries) The approach of Anthony D. Smith was presented as a way of finding a 
middle ground between the two extremes.
A sense of territoriality is the second important variable of political identity 
building. Here it was argued that territoriality still plays an important role in political 
identity building even under emerging conditions of globalisation. Political identity,
373 Peterson, Spike V. “Shifting Ground(s): Epistemological and Territorial Remapping in the Context 
of Globalisation(s)“ in Kofman, Eleonore and Gillian Youngs (eds) "Globalization. Theory and
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if it is oriented towards a specific group or society, has to conceptualise the territory 
in which this group lives. In cases where territory is contested between two 
communities, political identity has to have a concept of territoriality as a central 
variable. Furthermore, radical religious identities can see territory as sacred, as the 
basis for the concrete fulfilment of their religious beliefs.
The importance of a sense of history, of memory and myths for political 
identity building has already been pointed out in the first chapter of the thesis. Here it 
was shown that on the one hand narrative memory is central to political theory and 
from there translates directly into political identity. On the other hand myths of 
election are an important factor in the formation and maintenance of group
boundaries.
Language and religion directly relate to the sense of history. Although 
language is a weaker significator, it is still an important social marker of group 
identity. However because of its openness it cannot by itself guarantee the persistence 
of group boundaries over time. The observation that religion is an important aspect of 
personal and group identity is somewhat of a common place argument. However 
Haynes’ study showed that religion assumes a more political role even in highly 
secularised societies in recent decades. Enloe showed the importance of religion for 
group cohesion and group conflict.
It has been shown that gender roles and assumptions about ‘femininity’ are
used to establish and maintain structural domination over woman on all three levels.
It has been argued that these power structures are nearly impossible to change unless 
the underlying structural causes of the domination (equation of ‘femininity’ with 
‘nature’ and the need for control) are either not yet firmly established or seriously 
challenged (as during the struggle for national liberation).
Practice" (London: Cassel, 1998): p. 22.
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The aim of this first part of the thesis was to present a general theoretical approach to 
the problem of political identity building in international relations under emerging 
conditions of globalisation. Globalisation has been defined as conditions of 
increasing interconnectedness through global information systems, increasing 
penetration of state boundaries by international capital, and multinational
corporations, and as the transformation of traditional authority structures (which are
no longer automatically allocated on the state level). The focus was here on political 
identity. Political identity has been defined as those ideas, convictions, and 
identifications of actors (individuals and groups) which translate directly into 
political action.
The theoretical approach presented here tried to combine modem and 
postmodern approaches to the problem of political identity building. It has been 
argued that neither of the two paradigms offers a satisfying answer. The modem 
approaches are inherently limited. They only allow one level on which meaningful 
political identity building can be located: the state level. The importance of ‘national 
identity’ is overriding any other expression of political identity on any level of social 
interaction. This assumption is based on three major concepts: the modem concept of 
territoriality, the modem concept of sovereignty, and the modem concept of the state. 
The modem assumptions about political identity are based on an exclusivistic 
conception of territoriality. The state, so it is assumed, has complete and exclusive 
control over its territory. This control is manifested and embedded in an exclusivistic 
conception of sovereignty. The assumption is that a state is always sovereign on the 
inside (monopoly of legitimate power) and on the outside (mutual recognition of 
sovereignty by all states). Because of this a special political community, the ‘nation’ 
which is in most cases tightly connected with the state apparatus (hence the concept 
of the ‘nation-state’) can develop. This community demands a monopoly over
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legitimate political identity. These assumptions present the problem of political 
identity in a very limited manner. Only one possible level of social interaction can be 
taken into account. In addition to this the basic assumptions of this approach no 
longer hold under the emerging conditions of globalisation. States no longer have 
exclusive control over their territory. Because of this it no longer makes sense to 
allocate political identity exclusively on the state level.
The postmodern approaches presented here acknowledge these
transformations. However they assume a radical fluidity in international relations
which is highly problematic in two respects. On the one hand the assumptions about 
the radical transformation of the international system can not be assumed to be an 
even global phenomenon. On the other hand if one would accept the assumptions of 
the postmodern approaches about the end of the state and the radical fluidity of social 
relationships one would end up with the conclusion that the concept of ‘political 
identity’ is no longer useful. Identity would have to be seen as a fluid ever changing 
social concept. It would therefore not be possible to use such a concept as the basis 
for an empirical study.
A combination of the modem and postmodern assumptions about political 
identity was attempted. This new approach was based on Rosenau’s concept of the 
‘Frontier’ and ‘Fragmegration’ as well as Wendt’s ‘Structurationism’ and his 
solution to the agent-structure problematique. It was argued that effects of the 
emerging conditions of globalisation for the problem of political identity building can 
be best understood if one assumes a three level model of political identity building. 
Three levels have been identified: the substate (individual/group) level, the state level 
and the supra-state level. Each of the three levels has been analysed separately with 
respect to the problem of political identity building. It has been shown that on the 
substate (individual/group) level the process of political identity building is an
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individual phenomenon. The actor identifies him- or herself in difference to others in 
the process of social interaction. On the state level, political identity building is an 
elite led and controlled phenomenon. It has become obvious that the state level is still 
an important location of political identity. This is in contrast to the postmodern 
approaches which assume that the state level has completely lost its significance. 
However it is no longer of overriding importance as the modem approaches assume. 
The third level analysed was the supra-state level. Here it was pointed out that this 
level is becoming increasingly important with the development of the phenomenon of 
globalisation. The actors on the third level are no longer just nation-states. There are 
a whole range of locations for political identity: multilateral organisations, 
multinational corporations, NGOs, and diasporas. It was pointed out that political 
identity on the supra-state level does not necessarily have to express itself as a 
globally oriented political identity (as it is the case in the feminist or the 
environmentalist movement). Political identity on this level can also express itself in 
a political identity of a diaspora group that tries to influence the politics of their 
‘homeland’. On this level, the process of political identity formation was assumed to 
be a mixture of the two mechanisms of the first two levels. Political identity 
formation can be individualistic or elite led depending on the location in which 
political identity building is observed.
After the discussion of the ontological breadth of political identity building, 
the emphasis changed to the problem of the ontological depth. In order to analyse this 
problem six significators have been discussed. These six significators answer six 
main ontological questions: ‘sense of ethnicity’ (who are we?), ‘sense of 
territoriality’ (where do we belong?), ‘sense of history’ (where do we come from), 
‘sense of language’, ‘sense of religion’ (what are we?), and ‘gender’ (what is our 
position in the community?). It was argued that the list of variables was not intended
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to be exhaustive, but it was shown that the six significators are the most important 
variables and can serve as a guideline for the analysis in the case study. It was argued 
that these six significators have explanatory power on all three levels of political 
identity building, although not necessarily all variables on all levels at the same time. 
An analysis of the question of the interconnections between and the relative weight 
of the variables on and between the different levels was not attempted. It was argued 
that this is an empirical question and cannot be analytically resolved. If one would 
attempt to describe these structures one would limit the theoretical approach to just 
one particular case study. Since the aim was to develop a general approach, which
could be used in different cases, this question had to be left open. The different 
importance of the significators and their connections and relationship to each other 
will become clear during the case study.
In this first part of the thesis a multilevel model of political identity formation 
in international relations under the emerging conditions of globalisation has been 
developed. This theory combines the insights of modem and postmodern approaches 
to political identity building and pays attention to the ontological breadth and depth 
of political identity. It identifies the locations in which political identity formations 
can be observed and presents six major significators which can guide the analysis.
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The Peace Process and the Quest for Jewish /
Israeli Political Identity
The question of Jewish / Israeli identity has become of new importance since the start 
of the Oslo Process. The possibility of a peaceful resolution of the long standing 
conflict between the two societies opened up a debate not only on the nature of the 
state of Israel but also on the relevance of the traditional Zionist ideology and by
extension on the nature of Jewish / Israeli political identity. Several different identity 
groups are now challenging the traditional Zionist basis of Israeli identity and are 
competing for recognition of their notion of Jewish / Israeli political identity. This 
development did not appear over night but is the result of debates and conflicts 
within the Israeli society that started with the Yishuv and the debates surrounding the 
formulation of Zionism as a coherent political and social ideology.
This chapter will outline the historical development of Israeli society and the 
impact of the Oslo process on Jewish I Israeli identity. An in-depth analysis of the 
different identity groups will be postponed to the last chapter of the thesis. The main 
emphasis in this part of the thesis will be to analyse how the Zionist ideology served 
as a unifying force in Israeli society during the decades of conflict and which political 
circumstances enabled the change towards a possible peaceful solution of the dispute. 
The chapter has two main parts. The first part of the chapter analyses the 
development of the Jewish and Israeli polity from the 19th century until the recent 
government of Prime Minister Barak. The second part of the chapter examines the 
five main issues that result from the negotiations of the peace process: the question of 
territory, the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, the problem of external
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and domestic security of Israel, the role of religion in the state, and the resulting 
quests for a new and different Jewish I Israeli identity. These issues strike at the core 
of Jewish / Israeli identity building. The Oslo process which newly opened up the
debate about Jewish / Israeli identity is the result of long historical and political 
developments inside Israeli society which enabled this historic breakthrough. 
Without an understanding of these developments the current identity debate in Israel 
cannot be fully understood.
I. Historical Development of Israeli Political Identity: From
Labor Zionism to ‘Normalisation’?
LI. From Zionism to the Yishuv
The idea of a physical in addition to a spiritual return of the Jews to Palestine 
developed in Eastern Europe in the Middle of the nineteenth-century. This was due to 
the situation of Jewish communities within the czarist empire, which responded to 
the threat from Western reforms during and following the period of the 
Enlightenment and the Napoleonic era by “imposing new restrictions and 
intensifying the fight against subversive liberal ideologies. The Jews became the 
chief victims, as fresh restrictions were imposed on Jewish movement, places of 
residence, and employment"374. As a response to these persecutions new Jewish 
movements emerged, propagating the idea of a Jewish nationalism.
These movements established the first modem Jewish settlements in Palestine
(the First Aliy ah, immigration). However their numbers were small and the 
settlements were dependent on donations from benefactors in the diaspora. The
374 Peretz, Don and Gideon Doron. "The Government and Politics of Israel" (Oxford: Westview 
Press, 1997): p. 13f.
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various different movements unified under the leadership of Theodor Herzl at the 
turn of the century to become the World Zionist Organisation. The Jewish Agency 
for Palestine was later set up to organise and finance immigration and the acquisition 
of land in Palestine. The World Zionist Organisation held its first congress in Basle 
in 1897. Herlz became the symbol of modem Zionist aspirations. His work, ‘Der 
Judenstaat’ (1896), can be seen as the foundation of the international Zionist
movement. In this short book he developed the idea that “since there was no 
reasonable hope for the disappearance of anti-semitism, an orderly exodus of the 
Jews to their own homeland and the creation there of a sovereign Jewish state, would 
have to be worked out in conjunction with the Great Powers“375.
Herzl’s was a top down strategy, first seeking the approval of the ‘Great 
Powers’ (notably the Ottoman Empire and the European Powers), then initiating the 
actual immigration. This ‘political Zionism’ contrasted with the bottom up approach 
of the Russian Zionists (practical Zionism) which argued for continuing immigration 
and settlement first. “The two branches competed, but competed more or less 
cooperatively, until 1904, when Herzl died“376. The year of Herzl’s death also 
marked the start of the Second Aliyah (1904-1914). This immigration wave brought 
some of the future leaders of the state of Israel to Palestine. “The early labour parties 
and leaders came from this group, and the political institutions that the Second 
Aliyah founded had a great impact on the future of both the pre-state Yishuv and 
subsequently the State of Israel. The members of this Aliyah were more highly 
motivated than those of the First, being predominantly young, single, socialist
375 Wistrich, Robert. “Theodore Herzl: Zionist Icon, Myth-Maker and Social Utopian" in Wistrich, 
Robert and David Ohana (eds) “The Shaping of Israeli Identity. Myth, Memory and Trauma" 
(London: Frank Cass, 1995): p. 19.
376 Garfinkle, Adam. “Politics and Society in Modern Israel. Myths and Realities" (London: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1997): p. 39.
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males”377. The members of the Second Aliyah wanted to create an exclusive Jewish 
economy and therefore did not employ the local Arab workers.
At the same time as the members of the Second Aliyah began to organise the 
Yishuv politically and economically, the Zionist World Organisation achieved a 
significant political success. “By the summer of 1917 the British government had 
begun to look to the Zionist movement as another possible ally in a war which 
seemed to be going badly for the Allies on all fronts”378. Dr. Chaim Weizmann, a 
Russian bom chemist teaching at Manchester University, was able to use his contacts 
with the British Foreign Minister Arthur Balfour to get a commitment from the 
British government, the Balfour Declaration.379 During their campaign against the 
Ottoman Empire, the British government gained control over Palestine just over a 
month after the declaration was given.380
Shortly after the First World War the Third Aliyah made its way to Palestine
(1919-23).
“Much like the Second Aliyah, the Aliyah was composed mainly of young 
single males who were not only ideologically committed to Zionism, but also 
brought with them an appreciation of the importance of political organisation 
and control gained from their experience in Europe. They had come to 
Palestine to build a Jewish state, and had received political instruction in
377 Lochery, Neill. “The Israeli Labour Party. In the Shadow of the Likud" (Reading: Ithaca Press, 
1997): p. 4.
378 Fraser, T. G. “The Arab-Israeli Conflict" (London: Macmillan Press 1995): p. 8.
379 The wording of the declaration is as follows:
His Majesty’s Government view in favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the 
Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being 
clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of 
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights of and political status enjoyed by Jews in 
any other country.
380 With this declaration the British government was contradicting the promises of independence that 
the British High Commissioner McMahon had made to the Sharif of Mecca, Hussein in 1915. The 
pledges were made to enlist the support of Arab tribes in the fight against the Ottoman empire. The 
pledges had specific geographical exclusions which Hussein assumed to be referring to parts of Syria 
and the later Lebanon, but the British later argued referred to Palestine.
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their countries of origin to help prepare them for their role. Crucially, they 
accepted the leadership of the Second Aliyah, and together these two groups 
became known as the founding fathers of Israel"381.
In 1920 one of the most important political organisations of the Yishuv was founded, 
the Histadrut (General Federation of Hebrew Labour). The Histadrut not only worked 
on workers’ issues but also organised immigrant absorption and social services. 
Within a couple of years this organisation would develop into a quasi-state 
organisation and one of the main political instruments of the Yishuv.
Following the disturbances of 1929, when rioting broke out between the Arab 
and the Jewish communities in Palestine382, the British government announced its 
intention to limit Jewish immigration. This was based on the recommendations of 
two British Commissions investigating the causes for the rioting (Hope-Simpson 
report). However the government had to backtrack because of strong pressure from 
the British Conservatives and the Zionist organisation. The Arab Revolt (1936-1939) 
and its aftermath brought another Commission to Palestine. This time the 
recommendation was partition (Peel Report) of the country into a Jewish and an Arab 
state. The Zionist organisation in the meantime had experienced a serious split at its 
Congress in 1935. Ze’ev Vladimir Jabotinsky, a political activist, along with his 
‘Revisionist Movement’ split from the World Zionist Organisation. The split had 
been foreshadowed at the World Zionist Congress in 1931. “The Congress of 1931 
pitted the left against the right in a bitter confrontation. Both political tendencies had 
by this time coalesced into structured ideological movements"383. Both movements 
also developed separate defence organisations. The Labor Zionists controlled the
381 Lochery op. cit.-. p. 5.
382 During these riots, the old Jewish community in Hebron was partly wiped out. The survivors were 
evacuated by the British after the riots.
383 Shindler, Colin. “Israel, Likud and the Zionist Dream. Power, Politics and Ideology from Begin to 
Netanyahu" (London: I. B. Tauris, 1995): p. 9.
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Haganah, the Revisionists the Irgun. This split laid the foundations for the first 
general cleavage in Israeli society, between left and right of the political spectrum.
In 1938 a new British policy foresaw the independence of Palestine within ten 
years as a unified country. In addition it limited the number of Jewish immigrants to
75, 000 which meant that the Jewish community would remain a minority in
Palestine. Until 1938 the Fourth (1919-1923) and Fifth Aliyah (1933-1936) brought 
mainly Jews from Poland and Germany to Palestine.384 This ended with the British 
policy of limited immigration. This new policy was aimed at securing Arab oil for the 
coming Second World War.385 386“The Holocaust intensified Jewish nationalistic fervor 
and galvanized most organized Jewish communities behind Zionist demands for a 
Jewish state in Palestine44386. The end of the Second World War marked the 
beginning of the 'Jewish Revolt’, a paramilitary campaign directed mainly against the 
Mandatory power. Its aim was to drive the British out of Palestine. Increasing clashes 
between the British forces and the Jewish community387 led Britain to hand the 
Mandate over to the United Nations in 1946. The General Assembly adopted on the 
29th of November 1947 a compromise partition solution. The country was divided 
between the Arab and the Jewish communities. The leadership of the Yishuv 
accepted the resolution but the leaders of the Arab community rejected it. The British 
decided to leave Palestine on May 15th 1948. The day before the official end of the 
British Mandate on the 14th of May 1948, the state of Israel was declared by David 
Ben Gurion. chairman of the Jewish Agency for Palestine and leader of the Yishuv. 
The first country to recognise the new state was the United States of America.
384 The Fifth Aliyah altered the class structure of the Yishuv. Most of the new arrivals (mainly from 
Germany) were physicians, engineers, musicians and other highly educated people with diverse skills.
385 However the limitation on Jewish immigration had especially severe consequences for European 
Jews since it meant that the gates to Palestine as a possible refuge from the Holocaust remained closed.
386 Peretz and Doron op. cit.'. p. 41. The Holocaust is of central importance to Jewish and Israeli
identity. It will analysed in more detail in the last chapter of the thesis.
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LII From the Declaration of the State of Israel to the Begin
Government 1948 -1977: The Dominance of Labor
Zionism
“The State of Israel was declared, and its first government was established amid war 
and chaos on May 14th 1948. Actually, a de facto government had begun to function 
several months earlier in anticipation of the end of the mandate443 8 8. From this time 
until the fall of the Labor government in 1977, Israel’s politics was dominated by the 
ideas and ideology of Labor Zionism in various different coalitions. “The Israeli 
political system was, until at least 1973, a one-and-one-half party system. Israeli 
politics revolved around the perennial coalition between a large, governing labor 
party (Mapai), and the preeminent religious party (Mafdal)44 .
However the new state immediately faced an existential crisis. Shortly after 
the declaration the new state was attacked not only by the militias of the Arab 
community in Palestine but also by the armies of a coalition of the Arab League 
states. At the end of the war Israel had conquered substantial amounts of land 
especially in the Galilee and the western part of Jerusalem. The war also resulted in 
the expulsion and flight of several hundred thousand Palestinian Arabs to 
neighbouring countries and created the refugee problem that still exists today.387 388 389 90
387 The most famous one is Irgun’s attack on the headquarters of the mandate power, the King David 
Hotel in Jerusalem on the 22nd of July 1946 in which 91 people died.
388 Peretz and Doron op. cit.: p. 42.
389 Roberts, Samuel J. “Party and Policy in Israel. The Battle Between Hawks and Doves “ (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1990): p. 3.
390 How this mass exodus of Palestinian Arabs came about and if they fled on false promises of a quick 
victory by their leaders or if they were systematically expelled is one of the most intensely debated 
issues in Israeli academia. A group of Israeli academics, the ‘New Historians’, assert that most of the 
Palestinians were systematically expelled and that the ‘myth’ of their voluntary flight was created as a 
cover up. Others criticise the ‘New Historians’ for interpreting intentions into documents that were not 
there. The issue is too complicated and the debate too vast to be discussed here in detail. For the ‘New 
Historians’ see: Moris, Benny. “The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem" (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), Moris. Benny. “1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians" 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), Finkelstein, Norman G. “Image and Reality of the Israel- 
Palestinian Conflict" (London: Verso, 1995). One fierce critic of the ‘New Historians’ is Efiraim
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Over the newly controlled areas the Israeli government imposed military law until 
1966. In addition to a night-time curfew “limitations on freedom of movement were 
placed upon Israeli Arabs during daytime as well. A regime of licences cast a heavy 
shadow over their lives, inhibiting their development”* 391 392. The land that was left by its 
inhabitants during the conflict was declared state land through the ‘absentee property 
law’. Only about 35,000 refugees were allowed back, mainly as part of family 
reunification programs. The rest remained stranded in the neighbouring Arab
countries.
Labor Zionism developed into an ideology characterised by a combination of 
socialism and nationalism, termed ‘mamlachtiut’ (statism) by Ben Gurion. This 
new concept, which was developed by the state elite, was used to cover up and
suppress already existing cleavages within Israeli society. ‘Mamlachtiut’ 
encapsulated the overriding importance of the state in the political identity of the 
individual. This overriding importance did not only cover the political but also the 
economic realm where a state dominated economic system was implemented. This 
constructed consensus remained intact, though not unchallenged, until 1977. It was 
gradually eroded until then by increasing economic difficulties, social unrest due to 
the heightened political awareness of the Sephardim, and several political scandals 
within the Labor Zionist elite. The Histadrut remained the most important political 
organisation in the new state. “Since the unity of the control of the union-party-state 
was consolidated within months of independence, the relationship of the Israeli 
government to the economy and society was mediated through the Histadrut long
Karsh, see: Karsh, Efraim. ‘'Fabricating Israeli History. The ‘New Historians’" (London: Frank Cass, 
1997).
391 Stendel, Ori. "The Arabs in Israel" (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1996): p. 5.
392 For a discussion how far nationalism and socialism played a role in the thinking of ‘founding 
fathers’ see: Stemhell, Zeev. "The Founding Myths of Israel. Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making 
of the Jewish State " (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
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after 1948“393. The question of the influence of religion in the state was determined 
in what is called the ‘status-quo agreement’ between Labor Zionism and religious 
Zionism. This ‘status-quo agreement’ gives the religious courts exclusive influence 
on family matters and conversions to Judaism as well as determines that the state will 
respect the religious rules and traditions, for example religious holidays and the fact 
that all official buildings serve only kosher food. The religious groups were also 
allowed to build up their own educational system with state funds. This was the 
origin of the second basic cleavage in Israeli society: secular versus religious. The 
revisionist opposition was pushed to the margins, its military organisation included in 
the Haganah which transformed into the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). The Knesset, 
originally the constitutional assembly, transformed itself into a parliament on the 14th 
of February when it became clear that no consensus for a constitution could be 
reached.394 395In 1949 the Knesset passed the Transition Law which served as a quasi 
constitution and has since been amended by the Basic Laws.
In 1956 Israel participated alongside Great Britain and France in the attempt 
to regain control of the Suez Canal which had been nationalised by the new Egyptian 
leader Nasser. This resulted in a short occupation of the Gaza Strip and parts of Sinai 
peninsular by Israel. However, after the United States and the Soviet Union forced a 
cease-fire, Israel had to withdraw from those territories. During the 1950s and 1960s 
Israel was threatened by cross border attacks, mainly by Palestinian groups. This
'IQC
reinforced the Israeli perception at being under constant threat. This in turn led to 
the development of a security doctrine which favoured massive military retaliation
393 Garfinkel op. cit.: p. 84.
394 Because of the insistence of the religious parties that halakha, the Jewish law be incorporated in the 
constitution. The basic constitutional arrangements are regulated by Basic Laws which are not 
officially a constitution but should serve as the basic building blocks of a future constitution.
395 Which in turn is based on the Jewish experience in the diaspora. See: Luz, Ehud. “Through the 
Jewish Historical Prism: Overcoming a Tradition of Insecurity4' in Bar-Tai, Daniel. Dan Jacobson and
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against the country in which the Palestinian groups were based.396 It is from this time 
that the question of internal security in Israeli society originates. One of the crucial 
wars in the history of Israel, however, was fought in 1967 (June 5th to June 10th). The 
Six Days War in which Israel attacked Syria, Jordan and Egypt in a pre-emptive 
strike lead to the occupation of the Golan Heights, the West Bank of the Jordan 
River, the Gaza Strip and the Sinai desert by Israel.
This war and the following occupation by Israel had wide ranging effects in Israeli 
society. It triggered a political discussion on what to do with the newly won 
territories. Two general positions were brought forward. On the one hand, right wing 
Zionists promoted an inclusion of the territories in the state of Israel and its 
settlement by Jews at the expense of the Palestinians. On the other hand,
“for most other thinking Zionists, the territories were a mixed blessing. The 
strategic advantages were important. But the political entity that was
emerging was far from the idea of a Jewish state: three million Jews 
dominating the lives of over one and a half million Arabs living under 
military rule, in addition to more than a half a million Israeli Arab 
Palestinians, formally citizens of Israel. It was just too far removed from the 
simple and classical goal of Zionism, the Jewish state, to be acceptable as a 
permanent situation “397.
This was termed ‘demographic threat’, the fear that the Jewish majority would be lost 
by the incorporation by territories with a high number of Palestinian inhabitants. The 
groups holding these two views were termed ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ respectively. On
Aharon Klieman (eds) “Security Concerns. Insights from the Israeli Experience“ (London: Jai Press, 
1998).
396 See: Brecher, Michael. “The Foreign Policy System of Israel. Setting Images, Processes" (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1972) and Brecher, Michael. “Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy" (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1975).
397 Kaminer, Reuven. “The Politics of Protest. The Israeli Peace Movement and the Palestinian 
Intifada" (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1996): p. 8.
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June 27th 1967 the Knesset however passed a set of laws extending Israeli 
jurisdiction and administration to the eastern part of Jerusalem. Between 1968 and 
1970 constant military struggles between Egypt and Israel were fought along the 
Suez Canal in what became known as the ‘war of attrition’. In 1973 another large
scale war broke out between Egypt, Syria and Israel. The ‘Yorn Kippur War’ or 
‘October War’, surprised the Israeli military establishment and resulted in a near 
defeat of Israel in the early days of the conflict. Together 1967 and 1973 can be seen 
as turning points in the Arab Israeli conflict. Both wars showed the limits of force as
a political instrument in the conflict. “This disillusionment began with the 1967 Six
Day War, which dealt militant pan-Arabism a mortal blow and disabused many in the
Arab World of their hopes to destroy the State of Israel. It continued with the 1973 
October War, which shattered Israeli illusions that the Arabs could be forced into any 
solution"398.
The debacle in 1973 also had domestic ramifications. “The failure of the
leadership - and in particular the Prime Minister, Golda Meir, and her Defence 
Minister, Dayan - to act on intelligence briefings warning of an imminent Arab attack 
illustrated the arrogance and the lack of a clear sense of direction coming from the 
elite"399. The Labor Party, hitherto the leading party in power, lost the elections of 
1977 to its rival, the Likud Bloc, under Menachem Begin. However the disastrous 
war was not the only reason that brought down the Labor Party. Neglected social 
problems, financial scandals and internal struggles among the leadership of the party 
contributed to its downfall. The first major crisis in the Labor Party was the “Lavon 
Affair" from 1954 onwards.400 The 1970s saw the rise of a Sephardim protest
398 Karsh, Efraim. “Peace Despite Everything" in Karsh, Efraim (ed) “From Rabin to Netanyahu. 
Israel’s Troubled Agenda" (London: Frank Cass, 1997): p. 118.
399 Lochery op. cit.; p. 17.
400 The affair began with the arrest of an Israeli spy-ring in Cairo in 1954 and their trial and conviction. 
Pinhas Lavon, then Minister of Defence, was blamed for acting without informing the government.
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movement, the ‘Black Panthers’. “Borrowing the name of the notorious American 
black revolutionary group, the Israeli Panthers were the closest thing to a 
revolutionary movement Israel’s citizens had ever seen in their country”401. The 
movement addressed the concerns of the Sephardi immigrants in Israel. These 
immigrants from Africa and the Near East, the Balkans, India and the Muslim 
Republics of the former Soviet Union were mostly living in the so called 
‘development towns’ in the south and the north of the country. In these towns 
unemployment was high and social problems were severe. The ‘Black Panthers’ 
operated from 1971 onwards and directed their protest against the government’s 
neglect of the concerns of the Sephardim and directly against Prime Minister Golda 
Meir. Although the movement declined in 1972 it was the first emergence of the 
Sephardim as a political force in Israel. It led the Herat (later one of the main factions 
of the Likud Bloc) to target the Sephardim as a group of voters. This was to play a 
decisive role in the elections in 1977. Less than a year after the 1973 war, Golda Meir 
resigned and was replaced by Yitzhak Rabin. The Rabin government however was 
hindered by the strong personal rivalry between the Prime Mininster Rabin and the 
Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. In 1976 the partnership between the religious parties 
and the Labor Party broke down because Rabin had scheduled an official government 
event on the eve of Shabbat. In addition the government had to handle several 
political and financial scandals during its term in office. All these factors finally led 
to the defeat of the Labor party in the 1977 elections.
The affair led Ben Gurion to leave Mapai in 1965 and form his own party, Rafi. Although Rafi joined 
the newly formed Labor Party in 1968, Ben Gurion refused to join.
401 Sprinzak, Ehud. "Brother Against Brother. Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from 
Altalena to the Rabin Assassination" (New York: The Free Press, 1999): p. 133.
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LIIL From Begin to the Second Premiership of Yitzhak Rabin
1977-1992: Zionism and the Vision of ‘Greater Israel’
“During the era of Mapai political domination, Labor was perceived by many, even 
its rivals, to be an indispensable permanent fixture. When Likud became the largest 
party following the May 1977 election, shock waves radiated throughout the entire 
political system“402. Likud’s electoral victory was due in large parts to its appeal to 
the Sephardim electorate. With the new Herat government, the classical Labor 
Zionist ideology was amended by a greater emphasis on the idea of ‘Greater Israel’. 
This meant a stronger emphasis on holding on to the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and 
the Golan Heights. This can be seen in the more structured settlement policy of the 
new government compared to the Labor administration. Under the Herat party the 
settlement activity in the occupied territories intensified.403
Shortly after the electoral victory of Begin and his Herat party, the president 
of Egypt Anwar Sadat made a bold move in the Middle East peace process. From the 
19th until the 21st of November 1977 Sadat visited Israel and gave a speech in the 
Knesset (20 ) in which he urged negotiations and a settlement of political disputes.
However this political move did not bring any immediate results. It was not until the 
Camp David Summit from the 5 th to the 17th of September 1978 that a framework for 
a peace treaty was agreed. The summit resulted in the bilateral peace treaty between 
Israel and Egypt in 1979. Begin agreed to evacuate the Sinai in exchange for peace
with Egypt (which also meant the evacuation of various Israeli settlements and one 
newly build town). The Begin government was willing to give up the Sinai since it
402 Peretz and Doron op. cit.: p. 79. At the following election in 1981, the newly formed Likud Bloc 
was able to gather 60 % of the Sephardim vote which gave it a second decisive victory. See: Peretz, 
Don and Sammy Shmooha. “Israel’s Tenth Knesset Elections - Ethnic Upsurgence and Decline of 
Ideology" in Middle East Journal 35,4 1981.
179
did not have the same religious connotations and significance as the West Bank, 
Gaza and the Golan Heights. But the government’s vision of ‘Greater Israel’ was not 
changed by giving up the Sinai. Consequently, the Israeli Prime Minister did not 
agree on a comprehensive settlement of the status of the other territories occupied in 
1967. Begin’s proposal for the Palestinians was personal but not political autonomy. 
“His definition of the Palestinians was couched in Jabotinskyian terms and focused 
on their status as a national minority. They were part of a wider Arab nation that had 
already secured national self-determination in a plethora of countries“403 4. The 
government’s stand towards the occupied territories can also be seen in the decision 
to annex the Golan Heights (14th of December 1981) to Israeli territory.
The following year the Israeli government answered the continuing attacks on 
its northern border with Lebanon with a large scale invasion of the country. “Begin 
perceived the build-up of conventional Palestinian forces in Southern Lebanon to be 
a great danger“405. On the 6th of June 1982 Israeli forces entered Lebanon in the 
‘Operation Peace for Galilee’. It became quickly clear that the Israel intended to 
install a Christian regime under Bashir Gemayel in Lebanon. However shortly after 
his election as Lebanese president (23rd of August 1982), Gemayel was assassinated 
(14th of September). Two days after the assassination of Gemayel the Phalangists 
entered the refugee camps of Sabre and Shatilla and murdered hundreds of 
Palestinian civilians. Although a later Israeli commission of inquiry did not allocate 
direct responsibility for the massacre to the Israeli military commanders, it blamed 
them and Defence Minister Sharon for serious neglect of their duties. The massacre 
provoked massive protests against the government. After the demonstration of 400,
403 The first settlements were established shortly after the 1967 war. However the Labor government 
did not officially support the settlement activities. It only declared the settlements legal after their 
establishment. For a more detailed discussion of Israeli settlements see below.
404 Shindler op. cit.-. p. 89.
405 Ibid: p. 116.
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000 at a Peace Now rally in Tel Aviv, Begin was forced to dismiss Sharon. However 
the lingering war in Lebanon and the aftermath of the massacres resulted in Begin’s 
resignation in September 1983. His successor was Yitzhak Shamir.
The Lebanon war and the massacres gave rise to a more visible Israeli peace
movement. The Lebanon war was seen by a substantial segment of the Israeli public 
as an unnecessary military adventure. This openly showed the division between 
‘doves’ and ‘hawks’ in Israeli society. The national elections of 1984 brought no 
decisive results. In consequence Labor and Likud decided to form a National Unity 
Coalition which remained in power until 1990. The two main tasks of this coalition 
under the rotating premiership of Shimon Peres (until 1986) and Yitzhak Shamir 
were the control of the deteriorating inflation and the end of the war in Lebanon.
Ever since the 1973 war, the Israeli economy was deteriorating. The huge costs of the 
replacement of arms and equipment crippled the economy and caused the budget 
deficit to soar. “Fuelled by budget deficits which ran at levels of 10-14 per cent of 
GDP in the early 1980s, inflation marched steadily higher, reaching triple digit levels 
in 1979 and developing into full-fledged hyper-inflation after 1983“406. After the 
election, the government installed the Economic Stabilisation Programme ESP which 
showed quick results. The same year the government decided to withdraw from most 
of Lebanon except for a small security zone in the south of the country. The early 
1980s also saw the rise of a radical right wing movement, Kach (Thus). Lead by the 
New York rabbi Meir Kahane the movement openly advocated violence against 
Palestinians and gained its first seat in the Knesset in 1984.
“What was significant about his victory was Kahane’s ability to present with 
great clarity a fundamental contradiction between democracy and the Jewish-
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Zionist character of Israel. Others were unable to answer questions raised 
such as how to cope with Arab nationalist aspirations, with Jewish-Arab 
intermarriage, with equality of non-Jews in a Jewish state, and with the 
dilemma of integrating the occupied territories with over a million Arabs“406 07.
Two factors threatened the new economic recovery in the late 1980s and the early
90s: the intifada and the immigration of around 400,000 immigrants from the 
republics of the former Soviet Union. The tension between Israelis and Palestinians 
reached a new height with the start of the intifada in 1987.
“The intifada caught the Israelis unaware [...] The massive size of the
demonstrations [...] its rapid spread from Gaza to East Jerusalem and the
rest of the West Bank, the discipline shown by the demonstrators, the use of 
nonviolent actions [...] the rapid formulation of an indigenous Unified
National Leadership [...] and the breadth of involvement by Palestinians 
were all unexpected"408.
The intifada created downward pressure on the economy with low GDP growth and 
rising unemployment. These problems were increased with the mass immigration of 
Jews from the republics of the former Soviet Union.409 “More than half a million 
citizens of the former Soviet Union have emigrated to Israel, increasing the 
population by about 10 per cent.“410 This aliyah was distinctly different in its 
compositions from the earlier ones. First of all, the Jews from the Soviet Union have 
on average a higher education than the Jews in the earlier aliyas. Another significant
406 Landau, Pinchas. “The Israeli Economy in the 1990s: Breakout or Breakdown" in Kyle, Keith and 
Joel Peters (eds) "Whither Israel? The Domestic Challenges" (London: LB. Tauris, 1994): p. 63f. In 
the election year 1984 the inflation was 400 per cent per annum.
407 Peretz, Don and Sammy Shmooha. “Israel’s Eleventh Knesset Election" in Middle East Journal 39, 
1 1985: p. 91f.
408 Gemer, Deborah J. "One Land, Two Peoples. The Conflict over Palestine" (Oxford: Westview 
Press, 1994): p. 98.
409 For a more in-depth analysis of the immigration see: Quigley, John. "Flight into the Maelstrom. 
Soviet Immigration to Israel and Middle East Peace" (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1997).
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difference was that these immigrants were mostly not ideologically or religiously 
motivated to immigrate to Israel. “There was less ‘ascending up to Zion’, more 
quitting Russia or the other republics “410 1 These two factors created social tensions, 
because on the one hand, it was difficult to find appropriate jobs for the new 
immigrants, and on the other hand they did not have the ideological conviction to 
accept this. A third factor which makes the absorption of the Russian immigrants 
more difficult is that they take pride in the preservation of their cultural heritage. 
“Since the immigration of the Jews of Germany in the 1930s, there has been no wave 
of immigrants with such pride in the culture of their country of origin and 
determination to preserve it.“412 413These changes and divisions led to the increasing 
decline of the societal consensus in Israel.
On a more concrete level, these problems resulted in the collapse of the 
National Unity Government in 1990. Shimon Peres brought the government down in 
an attempt to form a Labor led coalition. However, after a ruling of an American 
rabbi prevented the small religious party Agudat Israel from joining the coalition, the 
attempt failed and Shamir formed a narrow right wing coalition. “Public indignation 
at these abuses of power was profound and universal; it seemed as if the nation’s 
leadership conducted its affairs without the slightest regard for the ethical standards, 
not to mention the interests of their constituents44413. These protests lead to the 
electoral reform of 1992 which stipulated that the head of government is to be elected 
directly and that the Knesset cannot pass a motion of no confidence without
410 Shepherd, Naomi. “Ex-Soviet Jews in Israel: Asset, Burden, or Challenge" Israel Affairs 1,2 1994: 
P 245.
411 Kyle, Keith. “Questions for the Future" in Kyle, Keith and Joel Peters (eds) “Whither Israel? The 
Domestic Challenges" (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993): p. 236.
412 Shepherd op.cit.-. p. 261.
413 Klein, Yitzhak. “The Problem of Systemic Reform" in Kyle, Keith and Joel Peters (eds) “Whither 
Israel? The Domestic Challenges" (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993): p. 56.
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dissolving itself. These reforms took effect for the first time during the elections in
1996.
The same year in which the National Unity Government fell, the Kuwait crisis 
and the subsequent second Gulf War brought a new impetus into the Middle East 
peace process. The Madrid peace conference was initiated in which Israel took part. 
However the negotiations in Madrid and Washington were slow and did not yield any 
tangible results. During the 1992 election campaign the Labor Party under Yitzhak 
Rabin focused on the peace process and promised a decisive move ahead should they 
be elected. Several issues played a role in the fall of the Likud led coalition in 1992.
First of ail there was a shift in the perception of the importance of the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip for Israel in an increasing part of Israeli society. “The 
outcome of the election was portrayed as a vote for peace. The Israeli public had cast 
its verdict on the peace process, forsaking the intransigence of Yizthak Shamir and 
the dream of Erez Yisrael Hashlema (Greater Land of Israel) for the path of peace 
and compromise/4414 The building of further settlements was widely seen as 
unnecessary expenditure. Labor leader Rabin had no problems terming further 
settlements as ‘political’ rather than ‘strategic’ settlements.* 415 This attitude towards 
settlements seems to be a long term trend in Israeli society. As early as 1985, Falk 
observed that a near majority of Israelis:
“-Believe Israel has enough settlements for its security.
-Do not favour a policy of placing settlements in populous Arab areas of the
West Bank and Gaza
4,4 Peters, Joel. “The Nature of Israeli Politics and Society44 in Kyle, Keith and Joel Peters (eds) 
“Whither Israel? The Domestic Challenges" (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993): p. 1.
415 ‘Strategic settlements’ were defined as necessary for Israel’s security, while ‘political’ settlements 
were defined as projects out of a radical Zionist ideological position without any direct relevance to 
the security of the state.
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-Oppose annexation, but feel Israel should maintain some form of military 
presence in the West Bank and Gaza“416.
One other reason for this shift in the perception of the importance of the occupied 
territories was influenced by the newly arrived immigrants from the former Soviet 
Union. The immigrants were very critical towards the building of further settlements.
This was for several reasons. The immigrants felt that these ‘political settlements’
were diverting resources which were needed for the development of the economy in 
order to cope with their absorption. In addition, the new immigrants “have never 
been fully committed to the idea of the Greater Land of Israel.“417 Because of this, 
economic and social aspects dominated among the immigrant electorate. “They’ too’ 
had been waiting for Israel’s post-Gulf War recovery. Instead they were faced with a 
national unemployment rate of 11.5 per cent and a rate which was much higher in 
their towns and neighbourhoods/418 The immigrants from the former Soviet Union 
brought the balance between Sephardi and Ashkenzi Jews back to equilibrium. 
During the 1980s the Sephardi Jews were slowly gaining the majority. As Bar-On 
notes, Sephardi Jews had in general a greater psychological affinity towards right­
wing parties.419 Another factor which influenced the new immigrant electorate was 
the international level. The late government of Yizhak Shamir responded to inflow of 
immigrants in 1989 “with an expanded building and settlement programme in the 
West Bank which the Americans saw as a further obstacle to prospects for peace/420 
The Bush administration connected a $ 10 billion loan guarantee to a freeze in the 
settlement programme. When the American Congress passed its foreign aid bill the
416 Falk, Gloria H. “Israeli Public Opinion: Looking Toward a Palestinian Solution14 The Middle East 
Journal 39, 3 1985: p. 249.
417 Sprinzak, Ehud. “The Israeli Right" in Kyle, Keith and Joel Peters (eds) “Whither Israel? The 
Domestic Challenges" (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993): p. 136.
4,8 Ibid: p. 136.
419 Bar-On, Mordechai. “Trends in the Political Psychology of Israeli Jews 1967-86“ Journal of 
Palestine Studies 17, 1 1987: pp. 21-36.
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loan guarantees requested by Israel were not included. “The policy that Bush adopted 
was not new - every U.S. administration since 1967 had expressed its opposition to 
Israeli settlements in the occupied territories - but Bush was the first to enforce that 
policy.“420 21 These loan guarantees however were of vital importance to Israel in order 
to be able to settle the thousands of new immigrants. This situation, combined with 
the immigrants indifference towards settlements in the occupied territories, led to an 
overwhelming protest vote of the new immigrants in favour of Labor. After being 
elected, the new government announced a stop in settlement programs and therefore 
secured the American loan guarantees.
In addition to these problems, the Likud Bloc was weakened during the 
elections by a internal dispute between Yizhak Shamir and David Levy. This debate 
was fought along ethnic lines since Levy was the leader of the Sephardim in the 
Likud Bloc. “Most detrimental to Likud, its nominating system took the ethnic genie 
out of the bottle. In actual distribution of places on the party list [...] Levy was 
located fourth after Shamir, Arens and Sharon, with his supporters relegated to the 
bottom of the list. The infuriated Levy quickly claimed that he was the victim of a 
plot between the Shamir and the Sharon factions, inspired by anti-Sephardi 
sentiments?*422 This dispute damaged Likud’s reputation and lost Sephardim votes.
The second important feature on the domestic level was the personalised 
campaign of the Labor party. It focused on Rabin as the military hero of the 1967 war 
who would guarantee the progress of the peace process without jeopardising Israel’s 
security. The question of religion also played a significant role in the campaign and 
in the following coalition bargaining. As Peters observes, the religious parties belong
420 Fraser op.cit.'. p. 141.
421 Cleveland, William I. “A History of the Modern Middle East" (Oxford: Westview Press, 1994): p. 
441.
422 Elazar, Daniel J. and Shmuel Sandler. “The 1992 Knesset Elections Revisited: Implications for the 
Future" Israel Affairs 1, 2 1994: p. 223.
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to the losers of the 1992 elections. “While their percentage of the vote did not fall
dramatically the overall distribution of seats means that they no longer hold the 
balance of power in the Knesset “423 424The fact that Shas entered the government 
coalition against the expressed opposition of one of its spiritual leaders, Rabbi 
Schach, shows the internal division of the religious camp. “Rabbi Schach remains the 
only implacable Haredi opponent, but his influence has declined considerably/4424 
The election in June 1992 resulted in a very astonishing outcome. “On June 23, 1992,
Israeli voters and a new set of political, social and economic tremors produced an
electoral ‘earthquake’ that reduced Likud from 40 seats to 32 seats in the Knesset, 
while Labor increased its power from 39 seats to 44 seats “425 The new government, 
formed under Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, included the left wing alliance Meretz, 
the Sephardim religious party Shas, and the tacit support of the Arab Democratic 
Party and the communist dominated Democratic Front for Peace and Equality.
I.IV. Rabin, Netanyahu, and Barak 1992-1999: The
Breakdown of Societal Consensus
One year after its electoral victory, the new Israeli government concluded the 
‘Declaration of Principles’ with the PLO. “The September 1993 Israel-PLO 
agreement marked the greatest advance towards peace in the Arab-Israel conflict’s 
history. “426 As Kyle and Peters point out, Rabin was under pressure to show results 
in the peace process. “It was apparent that something would have to give, and
423 Peters op.cit.'. p. 10.
424 Friedman, Menachem. “The Ultra-Orthodox and Israeli Society" in Kyle, Keith and Joel Peters 
(eds) “Whither Israel? The Domestic Challenges" (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993): p. 201.
425 Hadar, Leon T. “The 1992 Electoral Earthquake and the Fall of the ‘Second Israeli Republic’" 
Middle East Journal 46, 4. 1992: p. 594.
426 Rubin, Barry. “From War to Peace" in Rubin, Barry, Joseph Ginat and Moshe Ma’oz (eds) “From 
War to Peace. Arab-Israeli Relations 1973-1993" (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1994): p. 3.
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quickly, if the Labor-led coalition was not to lose all credibility?4427 That the Israeli 
public expected results can be seen in the immediate public support in favour of the 
Oslo accords. Within a few days the opinion polls showed a support in the high sixty 
percent. The perception of officials in the government towards negotiations with the 
PLO changed as well. “With the Oslo talks, both Israel and the PLO recognized that 
negotiations were a positive-sum if nonsymmetrical game. Even though neither side 
could get everything it wanted, both agreed that an imperfect solution was better than 
no solution. [...] Domestic support (or the expectation of such support) was vital to 
the agreement?4428 This new perception of negotiations did not generate out of thin 
air. Ben-Dor points out that since the Yorn Kippur war in 1973, negotiations between
Israelis and Arabs slowly but steadily built up confidence in the other side’s
• > • 429intentions.
On the international level, the conditions for peace negotiations with the 
Palestinians were very favourable. On the one hand “the Gulf war drastically 
weakened Israel’s most powerful foe, Iraq [...] buried the myth of a united Arab 
political front and left the radical Arab camp in disarray; and demonstrated that the 
United States, Israel’s patron and the world’s only post-Cold War superpower, would 
intervene in the Middle East to protect its vital interests?4430 As we will see in the 
following chapter, the war also weakened the PLO considerably. Therefore the Israeli 
government went into the negotiations in a position of considerable advantage vis-a- * * * *
427 Kyle, Keith and Joel Peters. “Preface" in Kyle, Keith and Joel Peters (eds) '"Whither Israel? The 
Domestic Challenges" (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993): p. viii.
428 Flamhaft op.cit.'. p. 184.
429 Ben-Dor, Gabriel. “Confidence Building and the Peace Process" in Rubin, Barry, Joseph Ginat and 
Moshe Ma’oz (eds) “From War to Peace. Arab-Israeli Relations 1973-1993 " (Brighton: Sussex 
Academic Press, 1994): pp. 61-77.
430 Makovsky, David. “Making Peace with the PLO. The Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo 
Accord" (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996): p. 107.
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vis the PLO. This can be seen in the emphasis on Israeli security rather than on the 
Palestinians needs that the Oslo accords entail.431
The Oslo process however brought to the forefront the internal divisions in
Israeli society. The growing breakdown of the basic societal consensus can be seen in 
the frequent changes of government since. Despite Labor’s achievement of a 
framework agreement with the Palestinians, the Israeli parliamentary elections at the 
29th of May 1996 brought another change in government. The leader of the Likud 
Bloc and candidate for the election of prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, 
succeeded in the national elections. “Six months after public fury at the killing of 
Yizhak Rabin [4th of November 1995, HJS] catapulted his successor, Shimon Peres, 
to a 3:1 lead in the polls, and while the duo’s crowning feat - the Oslo Accords - 
retained support of a clear majority of the electorate, including many Likud voters - 
Peres contrived to lose the 1996 election by a narrow but convincing margin.“432 
These were the first elections in which the prime minister was directly elected. 
Although Netanyahu won the premiership, the Likud Bloc did not win any more seats 
in the Knesset. They secured 32 seats while Labour won 34. The religious parties, 
however, had their best ever result. Shas, NRP and Thora Block (formerly Agudat 
Yisrael) secured 23 seats. Netanyahu formed a coalition in which he included the 
religious parties plus the Russian immigrants party, Yisrael BeAliya, and the 
moderate party ‘Third Way’. This coalition gave Netanyahu a majority of 66 seats 
(out of 120). “Netanyahu’s government [was] heavily weighted to the right.“433
The issue of territory played again, as in 1992, a major role in the election 
campaign. The main focus was on the negotiations with Syria over a peace settlement
431 For an analysis of the different agreements see following chapter.
432 Kidron, Peretz “Netanyahu Seizes Victory for Likud“ Middle East International (7th of June 1996): 
p.3.
433 Morris, Benny “Israel’s Elections and their Implications" Journal of Palestine Studies 26, 1 1996: 
p. 76.
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and the return of the Golan Heights. Although Israel was willing to negotiate 
withdrawal in return for stringent security provisions, Syria was perceived as 
unwilling to come to an agreement before the elections in 1996. In consequence,
Peres broke the negotiations off. “Netanyahu was able to portray him as having 
offered major concessions (the whole of the Golan Heights) to an Asad uninterested 
in peace : Peres had been duped by the Arabs and had displayed ‘weakness’ in his 
headlong rush for peace.“434 In addition to this, in February and March 1996 several 
suicide bombings and Katyushka attacks questioned Peres ability to guarantee 
Israel’s security. Peres’ military action to ensure the security of northern Israel, 
‘Grapes of Wrath’, back fired when the UN outpost Kafr Kana in southern Lebanon 
was accidentally attacked and over a hundred civilians died. This was not only an 
international embarrassment for Israel but also alienated the Israeli Palestinian435 
electorate. “A large number of Arab voters either boycotted the polls or cast a blank 
ballot for the premiership.“436
The second major factor which was important for the election result was 
again the vote of the new immigrants from the former Soviet Union. In 1992, 70 per 
cent of the new immigrants decided to vote for Labor. However in 1996, the vote 
went for the Likud Bloc. Again this was a protest vote against the poor economic 
conditions in which they were living. In addition, as Morris points out, the 
immigrants “had never really been Labor supporters/437 Coming from a socialist- 
communist regime which discriminated against them, their allegiance is more likely 
to lie within the Likud Bloc. These votes contributed to the 11 percent lead 
Netanyahu had within the Jewish vote.
434 Ibid: p. 74.
435 In terming Palestinians with Israeli citizenship Israeli Palestinians, rather than Israeli Arabs or Arab 
Israelis, I follow this group’s self definition. See: Rouhana, Nadim N. "Palestinian Citizens in an 
Ethnic Jewish State: Identities in Conflict" (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).
436 Ibid: p. 73.
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The third major factor in the election was the religious vote. On the one hand, 
Netanyahu got “cliff-hanger endorsements [...] by [...] Haredi rabbis.”437 38 They 
declared his campaign a ‘holy war’ and blessed Netanyahu. The other reason for such 
a strong religious vote was the fact that for the first time the prime minister was 
elected by a direct vote. It was not required for him to have the majority in the 
Knesset. Therefore many voters did not feel that they had to cast their vote for one of 
the large parties and voted instead for one of the smaller religious parties.
The loss of Prime Minister Rabin in 1995 meant a major blow to the Labor Party. 
The achievements of Rabin during the history of Israel made him a leader that 
seemed to be able to ensure Israel’s security during the peace process. “The popular 
Rabin - the former IDF chief of staff and victor of the 1967 war- was the only Labor 
Party leader capable of carrying the nation with him through the peace process.“439 
The personalised election of the prime minister, due to the new election law of 1992 
favoured Netanyahu’s campaign. He did not only manage to unite the Likud Bloc 
after its defeat of 1992, but also managed a “successful courting of the pivotal 
Orthodox community.”440 Peres on the other hand did not manage to exploit the 
‘outrage vote’ against the right after the assassination of Yizhak Rabin. Even during 
the election campaign in 1996, the assassination of Rabin was barely mentioned. 
“Lastly, Labor contributed to its own defeat by mounting a poor election 
campaign.”441 The powerful television campaign of Benjamin Netanyahu was 
countered by portraying Peres as “an elder statesman, an incumbent prime minister
437 Ibid: p. 74.
438 Lutick. Ian S. “Reflections on the Peace Process and a Durable Settlement: Roundup of Views" 
Journal of Palestine Studies 26, 1 1996: p. 10.
439 Morris op.cit.-. p. 70.
440 Kidron, Peretz. “Bibi’s adroit Footwork" Middle East International (21st June 1996): p. 9.
441 Morris op.cit.-. p. 75.
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above the ffay.“442 This campaign did not succeed in mobilising the Israeli electorate 
for Peres.
The new government faced very difficult coalition negotiations which resulted in a 
coalition which included a wide range of different parties with different political 
aims 443 This uneven coalition was put to its first test in January 1997 with the 
conclusion of the ‘Hebron Protocol’ in which the Netanyahu government agreed to 
re-deploy its troops out of most of the city of Hebron while maintaining control over 
the old part of the town and the settlers living in the city. The Protocol passed with a 
small cabinet majority. However the 1998 Wye River memorandum proved the 
stumbling stone of the coalition. It clearly showed the influence of right wing and 
religious groups in the government and in Likud which did not accept further 
territorial concessions to the Palestinians. After the government agreed to the 
document which envisaged a further re-deployment of Israeli troops in the occupied 
territories as well as the resumption of the final status negotiations between the 
Palestinians and the Israeli government, several small parties walked out of the 
coalition and subsequently the government was forced to schedule early new 
elections for May 1999. During the months before the elections the negotiations 
between the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government came to a standstill. 
The Wye River Memorandum was not implemented. In addition the government had 
to face continuing high unemployment and economic recession.
The 1999 election campaign was dominated by a very personalised campaign 
against Prime Minister Netanyahu. Before the elections several leading Likud figures 
left the party to form a new group called ‘Center Party’ which stood in opposition to
442 Ibid: p. 75.
443 For an analysis of the coalition bargaining of the Netanyahu government see: Mahler, Georg S.
“The Forming of the Netanyahu Government: Coalition Formation in a Quasi-Parliamentary Setting14 
in Karsh, Efraim (ed.) “From Rabin to Netanyahu. Israel’s Troubled Agenda" (London: Frank Cass
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the policies of Prime Minister Netanyahu. Former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir 
also openly criticised Netanyahu and let it be known that he would not vote for Likud 
in the elections. David Levy one of Netanyahu’s oldest allies walked out of the 
coalition and joined an alliance with Labor, now led by Ehud Barak.444 445These factors 
resulted in a devastating defeat of the Likud Bloc (going down from 32 to 19 seats) 
and Prime Minister Netanyahu (winning only 43.9 per cent of the vote) in the May 
1999 elections. The Sephardim religious party, Shas, had the largest gain in the 
elections, increasing its share of seats in the Knesset from 10 seats in 1996 to 17 seats 
in 1999. Again, the new government, led by new Labor leader Ehud Barak, faced 
difficult coalition negotiations. However, it was able to build a majority of 75 seats 
(out of 120).443
Shortly after the elections, the government resumed the final status 
negotiations with the Palestinians which had started in May 1996 but had reached a 
deadlock shortly after the election of the Netanyahu government. In September 1999 
the new government signed the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum which was mainly 
concerned with the implementation of the already agreed Wye River Memorandum 
of the preceding year. In October 1999 a safe passage route for Palestinians travelling 
between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank was opened. However the final status 
negotiations in late 2000 in Camp David failed, which led to increased violence 
between Israelis and Palestinians. In consequence Prime Minister Barak resigned in 
early 2001 and was defeated by Likud’s Ariel Sharon in the following elections.
1997) and Caspit, Ben and Ilan Kfir. “Netanyahu. The Road to Power" (London: Vision, 1998): pp. 
184-187.
444 This new alliance, ‘One-Israel’, included the Labor Party, Meimad (a liberal religious party) and 
Gesher (Levy’s faction)
445 The coalition included: One-Israel, Shas, Meretz, United Torah Judaism, National Religious Party, 
and Yisrael b’Aliyah (Russian immigrant party). In addition the government could count on the 
support of the Arab parties and two smaller Jewish parties which brought its majority up to 97 seats.
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The new stage of the Middle East Peace Process which started with the declaration of 
principles in 1993 touches several issues which go to the core of Israeli identity and
have been debated Israel since the Yishuv and the establishment of the state of Israel.
These issues are: 1) the problem of territory, and the extend of the state of Israel. 2)
Connected with this is the issue of the character of the state: Jewish and/or
democratic. 3) The role that religion plays in the state (the question of the sanctity of 
territory). 4) The problem of internal and external security and the question of the 
status of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. These issues which have been 
touched upon in the preceding overview of the development of Israeli society, will be 
the focus of the next part of the chapter.
II. The Peace Process and the Quest for Israeli/Jewish
Identity
ILL The Question of Territory
The question of territory lies at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. “The 
predominant importance given to the territorial dimension of this conflict can be 
attributed to the often violent nature of this struggle."446 During the time of the 
establishment of the Yishuv the already existing Palestinian society was developing 
national aspirations of its own. In consequence, in order to realise the Zionist aim of 
a state, a struggle over territory was unavoidable. The Zionist consensus was: 
“Judaism in its primarily traditional forms of existence in the Diaspora had become 
untenable under conditions of modem nationalism and that, therefore, Jews, too,
446 Romann, Michael. “Territory and Demography: The Case of the Jewish-Arab National Struggle" 
Middle Eastern Studies 26, 2 1990: p. 371.
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must recreate their own national homeland in Zion.“447 However, the issue of 
territory became increasingly relevant for the Israeli society after the 1967 war in 
which Israel conquered the West Bank, the Gaza strip and the Golan Heights.448 
Since this time the discussion within Israeli society centres around the question of 
whether these territories are an inalienable part of Israel or if they can be given back 
as part of a peace agreement. As far as Israeli identity building is concerned, two 
basic and antagonistic positions can be observed: Land for Peace / Land is Peace449, 
which encapsulates the basic difference between ‘doves’ and ‘hawks’. These two 
antagonistic positions reflect the internal division in Israeli society as far as the future 
of the occupied territories is concerned. There are three different political approaches 
to this problem in Israeli society:450
1) Right-Wing Nationalist Zionism, which sees all occupied territories as 
inalienable lands of Israel and aims in extreme cases at the expulsion of all Arabs 
form Israel451 Religious right wing groups add another dimension to the 
interpretation of territory. Their messianic ideas claim that the redemption of all 
territory of Eretz Israel by Jews is a necessary precondition for the redemption of 
the world. Therefore all territory is sanctified.
2) Mainstream Zionism, which wants to negotiate some of the territories but under 
no circumstances endanger the security of Israel. This includes the non-Zionist
447 Bar-On, Mordechai. “Zionism into its Second Century: A Stock-Tacking“ in Kyle, Keith and Joel 
Peters (eds) “Whither Israel? The Domestic Challenges" (London, I. B. Tauris, 1993): p. 20f.
448 It also conquered the Sinai but as we have seen, this territory was given back to Egypt following the 
Camp David agreement.
449 See: Aronson, Geoffrey. "‘Creating Facts: Israel, Palestinians and the West Bank" (Washington 
D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987), p. 93ff.
450 See: Kaminer, Reuven. “The Politics of Protest. The Israeli Peace Movements and the Palestinian 
Intifada" (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1996): p. xxif.
451 This position is based on a long lasting division within Zionism. As we have seen, in 1935 a group 
of radical Zionists under the leadership of Vladimir Jabotinsky separated from the World Zionist 
Congress. The question of territory was at the heart of the division. Jabotinsky advocated a maximalist 
version of Zionism, named Revisionism. For a short overview of the influence of Revisionist ideology 
and political groups see: Heller, Joseph. “The Zionist Right and National Liberation: From Jabotinsky 
to Avraham Stem“ Israeli Affairs 1, 3 1995: pp. 85-109.
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left and sections of the Zionist Left in Israel, which propagate the establishment
of a Palestinian state as a solution to the conflict
3) Anti-Colonialist and Anti-Zionist position, which sees Palestine as an Arab
country. The national rights of the Jews should be recognised within a 
restructuring of the whole region. This position however is only held by a small 
minority.
The issue of territory is also one of the central concerns of the Oslo process. It
can be argued that the Rabin-Peres and Barak governments followed the second
approach mentioned above (Mainstream Zionism). The government of Netanyahu 
was closer to the first approach (Right-Wing Nationalist Zionism). One of the most 
important parts of the negotiations concern the extend to which the Palestinian 
authority is allowed to control its territory and how much territory it is allowed to 
control. It can be argued that the Israeli government so far has given the Palestinian 
Authority a structured autonomy, not sovereignty over the areas under its control.452 
Connected with the problem of territory is the question of the sovereignty of a 
possible future Palestinian state. As far as this problem is concerned, the political 
leadership of Israel is very hesitant. Neither Likud nor Labor have yet committed 
themselves to the achievement of this goal.
“Israeli fears are profound. Obviously. A Palestinian state would not 
represent a conventional military threat to the most powerful army in the 
Middle East, but the history of attacks launched against Israel from the 
Occupied Territories is reason enough to give Israelis pause about giving up 
control here “453.
452 See following chapter.
453 Ciment, James. “Palestine / Israel. The Long Conflict" (New York: Facts on File, 1997): p. 153.
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The issue of the final status of the borders has therefore been postponed to the final 
status negotiations. One practical problem that is connected with the issue of territory 
is the status of the Israeli settlements that have been build in the occupied territories 
since the end of the Six Days War in 1967. Because of the importance of this 
problem, an analysis of its importance for Israeli political identity is necessary.
ILIL The Settlements in the Occupied Territories
“The establishment of settlements in the West Bank since 1967 has undergone 
a number of changes in emphasis. These changes relate to the way in which 
the dominant political party of the time perceives the relationship between the 
state of Israel and the Land of Israel, in particular that part of the West Bank 
known as Judea and Samaria which has specific religious and historical 
connotations and is distinct from the Jordan Valley “454.
The first post-1967 Israeli settlement was established in Hebron. The city has specific 
religious importance for Jews since it houses the Cave of Patriarchs. In April 1968, a 
group of Jews under the leadership of Rabbi Moshe Levinger rented rooms in a Hotel 
in Hebron for Passover. After the feast was over they refused to leave, declaring that 
they had established the first Jewish presence in Hebron since the 1929 massacre. 
The Labor government did object to the move of the settlers but did nothing to
evacuate them. After a clash outside the hotel between the settlers and local
Palestinians, the government moved the group to a nearby military camp. In 1971 the 
government of Golda Meir tried to diffuse the situation by constructing the Kiryat
Arba settlement on the outskirts of Hebron. Another motive behind settlement was
security. “The Labor government was ideologically tom between its professed
454 Newman, David. “The Evolution of a political Landscape: Geographical and Territorial 
Implications of Jewish Colonization in the West Bank“ in Middle Easter Studies 21, 2 1985: p. 193.
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commitment to the Geneva accords, which bans transfer of indigenous peoples and 
implantation of foreign populations in occupied territories, and its determination to 
establish a security presence, including armed settlements, in the West Bank"455.
The move to establish settlements acquired an organisational framework after
the 1973 war. Gush Emunim was founded in 1974 as a movement within the
‘National Religious Party’. Gush Emunim can be seen as a reaction to the near
military defeat of Israel in the 1973 war on the one hand and on the other hand, as a 
religious alternative to the socialist and by then tired ideology of the Labor Party. 
“Gush Emunim in the 1970s touched a sensitive cord in the Israeli collective psyche, 
namely the cherished memory of Zionist settlement and pioneering. [...] Gush 
Emunim emerged to build and expand the borders of Zionism."456 Gush Emunim’s 
declared aims were to settle anywhere and everywhere in the Biblical Lands of Israel. 
Its religious-political doctrine states that the coming of the Messiah depends on the 
political restoration of the Jewish people. While the precise territory of the Land of 
Israel is subject to dispute, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are not negotiable. 
“Settlement is of paramount importance because Jews can partake in the Grace of 
God and attain spiritual purification only when they live in the Land of Israel."457 
Gush Emunim has translated its doctrine into political action, by pursuing the 
extension of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.458 The 
movement transformed into the YESHA council, the umbrella organisation of the 
Jewish community in Judea, Samaria, Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights.459 Under
455 Ciment op. cit.: p. 47.
456 Sprinzak (1993) op. cit.: p. 124. The doctrine of Gush Emunim is outlined in: Don-Yehiya. “Jewish 
Messianism, Religious Zionism and Israeli Politics: The Impact and Origins of Gush Emunim“ Middle 
Eastern Studies 23, 2 1987: pp. 215-234.
457 Weissbrod, Lilly. “Gush Emunim and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Modem Religious 
Fundamentalism in Crisis" Israel Affairs 3, 1 1996: p. 88.
458 The role of Gush Emunim in the West Bank is analysed in: Goldberg, Giora and Effaim Ben- 
Zadok. "Gush Emunim in the West Bank" Middle Eastern Studies 22, 1 1986: pp. 52-73.
459 The revocation of the old biblical names, Judea and Samaria, for the territory of the West Bank also 
shows the strong religious overtones that are prevalent in the settler movement.
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the Likud government after 1977 the emphasis changed. “The Likud government 
immediately announced their intention of widespread settlement throughout Judea 
and Samaria [...] the Gush Emunim settlement movement was legalized, and the 
government provided increased ideological and practical support for the 
establishment of new settlements in the Judea / Samaria mountain region”460. The 
fact that Begin agreed to evacuate settlements in the Sinai dessert under the 
Israeli/Egyptian peace treaty can be explained by the fact that this territory does not 
have high religious importance for Judaism. Nevertheless the government had to use 
force in order to make the settlers leave. In 1978 the Israeli ministry of agriculture 
modelled its settlement plan on the vision outlined by Gush Emunim. “Its aims were
twofold: to settle 100,000 Jews in the territories between 1982 and 1987, and to 
increase their numbers to half-a-million by the year 2010“461. Begin’s successor 
Shamir was equally committed to the settlements as can be seen in the debate over 
the $ 10 Billion loan guarantees from the USA.
Although the government under Rabin/Peres committed itself not to build any 
further settlements, existing settlements were expanded. However the massacre of 
Palestinians in the Hebron mosque in February 1994 by a Jewish settler from Kyriat 
Araba led the government to contemplate plans to evacuate the small Jewish 
community living in the centre of Hebron. Although the plan was never officially 
announced, the mere possibility of an evacuation led to strong settler protest which 
achieved that the plans were dropped. The Netanyahu government followed the 
Labor government in mainly expanding existing settlements with the notable 
exception of the allowance to build 132 apartments inside East Jerusalem which was 
granted to an American Jew in 1996 and the building of a new settlement in Abu
460 Newman op. cit.: p. 193.
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Ghunheim. The government of Prime Minister Barak evacuated some small 
settlements in November 1999 in the West Bank. However during its short term in 
office it granted over 3000 permission to build houses in existing settlements (in 
comparison the average number of building permits by the Netanyahu government
was 3000 annually).
As can already seen from the discussion of the settlement problematic, 
security plays a vital role in the Oslo Peace Process. Some of the original settlements 
had been build to ‘secure’ the newly occupied territories, a tactic that had been
developed during the time of the Yishuv. These settlements served both as
agricultural industries and military bases. The issue of security will therefore be
analysed as an independent issue in the next part of the chapter.
ILIII The Problem of Security
The question of external and internal security has been discussed in Israel since the 
Yishuv. The five major wars that Israel fought proved the importance of this issue. 
Three basic premises guided the Israeli’s approach to their nation’s security:461 62 First, 
their Arab neighbours were hostile to Zionism, the return of Jews to the Land of 
Israel. Second the Middle East and the International System are anarchic: no single 
agent has a monopoly of force that would guarantee the existence and survival of the 
other states. “The third basic perception affecting almost every facet of Israeli efforts 
to cope with Arab hostility was that in all categories of national power the Arab 
countries enjoyed a quantitative advantage”463. Because of these perceptions, Israel
461 Efrat, Elisha. “Jewish Settlements in the West Bank: Past, Present and Future" in Karsh, Efraim 
(ed) “Peace in the Middle East. The Challenge for Israel" (London: Frank Cass, 1994): p. 145.
462 See: Feldman, Shai. “Israel’s National Security: Perceptions and Policy" in Feldman, Shai and 
Abdullah Toukan “Bridging the Gap. A Future Security Architecture for the Middle East1' (Oxford: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 1997): p. 7ff.
463 Ibid: p. 8f.
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developed a military strategy of self reliance and a large indigenous military 
industrial complex. “The main motivation behind the development of the defence 
industry was the fear that weapons needed for Israel’s security would be unavailable 
on the world market for political reasons“464. However, Israel was at no point in 
danger of becoming a military dominated state. The IDF played and continues to play 
a major political and social role in Israel. However, as Yehud Ben-Meir shows, 
although Israel had been in a perpetual state of war from its creation onwards, the 
IDF “nevertheless does not pose any real threat to the democratic institutions of the 
state“465. The IDF is a civilian institution, controlled by the civilian authorities of the
state.
Because of its lack of strategic depth, Israel became sensitive to the problem
of an Arab surprise attack, a fear that proved justified after the 1973 October War. 
This situation led Israel to develop a nuclear capability which in turn made Israel less 
vulnerable to such an attack. Karsh and Navias even argue that this nuclear capability 
was one of the catalysts for a Israeli-Arab reconciliation. “It was only after the 
suspicion that Israel had managed to acquire nuclear weapons had become an 
established reality in the minds of her Arab neighbours, that a slow process of 
acquiescence in the fact of Israel began to evolve“466.
The external threat to Israel from her immediate neighbours has been step by 
step reduced since the 1973 war. The first step was the Camp David accords and the 
subsequent peace treaty with Egypt. The peace treaty with Egypt had also highly 
symbolic meaning. As Mandelbaum points out, the conflict arose “from the
464 Inbar, Efraim and Shmuel Sandler. “The Changing Israeli Strategic Equation: toward a Security 
Regime" in Review of International Studies 21 1995: p. 46.
465 Ben-Meir, Yehuda “Civil-Military Relations in Israel" in Kyle, Keith and Joel Peters (eds)
“Whither Israel? The Domestic Challenges" (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993): p. 224.
466 Karsh, Efraim and Martin Navias. “Israeli Nuclear Weapons and Middle East Peace" in Karsh, 
Efraim (ed) "Between War and Peace. Dilemmas of Israeli Security" (London: Frank Cass, 1996): p . 
86.
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conviction that Israel was transient and illegitimate. For Egypt to treat Israel like 
other nations was symbolically to abandon that position”467. This trend was 
complemented by the signing of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty on the 26th of 
October 1994. Therefore, the only two countries which border Israel and which do 
not have a peace treaty with her are Lebanon and Syria. The Peres administration 
tried to advance the negotiations with Syria before the elections in 1996 however the 
negotiations remained unsuccessful.468
The negotiations with the Palestinians concern the internal security of Israel. 
“There are two levels on which security would be considered: the political and the 
technical”469. On the political level Israel is likely to resist the formation of a fully 
fledged Palestinian army in order to prevent the possible future Palestinian state to 
become a military threat. On the technical level, questions of border controls and 
demilitarised zones between Israel and the Palestinian authority are of major 
importance. Here Israel is likely to insist on exclusive control of the borders of a 
future Palestinian entity. The political importance of internal security can be seen in 
the fact that the suicide bombings of 1996 decisively influenced the elections, wiping 
out the massive lead prime minister Peres had over Netanyahu in the polls which led 
to his narrow defeat in the national elections.470
In addition to Palestinian terrorism, Jewish terrorism is the another internal
security problem. The settler movements oppose the Oslo formula of ‘Land for 
Peace’. Up until now only a handful of small settlements have been evacuated; 
however the question remains as to what will happen if the Israeli government
467 Mandelbaum, Michael. “Israel’s Security Dilemma“ in Orbis. A Journal of World Affairs 32, 3 
1988; p. 363.
468 Barak withdrew the Israeli forces from the security zone inside Lebanon.
469 Sirriyeh, Hussein. “Is a Palestinian State Politically Possible?" in Karsh, Efraim (ed) “Between War 
and Peace. Dilemmas of Israeli Security" (London: Frank Cass, 1996); p . 49.
470 See: Steinberg, Gerald M. “Peace, Security and Terror in the 1996 Elections" in Israel Affairs 4, 1 
1997: pp. 209-234.
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decides to remove larger settlements or settlements that have symbolic character. The 
magnitude of this threat was tragically highlighted by the assassination of Prime 
Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995. As Sprinzak shows, the assassination was not a 
singular event, but the culmination of a long process. “Rabin’s assassination did not 
take place in a vacuum. Although Amir [the assassin, HJS] acted alone, his act was 
the culmination of a process of delegitimization of the Israeli government by Israel’s 
ultranationalists“471.
The direct influence of religion on the politics of Israel can be clearly seen 
from this tragic event. The peace process has opened up an intense debate about the 
role of religion in Israeli society. This question has several ramifications. It not only
concerns the question of the sanctity of territory, the idea of the land as a holy 
possession of the Jewish people, but also the influence of the religious parties in 
politics and on the peace process. The role of religion in Israeli society will be the 
focus of the next part of the chapter.
1l.IV. The Role of Religion
The influence of religion and religious groups can be traced back to the 
beginnings of the state of Israel. In 1949 the government of Ben Gurion and the 
‘National Religious Party’ (NRP) concluded the ‘status quo’ agreements. “They 
included agreement not to draw up a permanent constitution - something that the 
NRP insisted would have to be based on the Halacha or religious law - and the 
establishment of a ministry of religious affairs, with formal authorization over many 
aspects of Jewish life, for example marriage.“472 In addition to these concessions, 
religious students are excluded from the nation service, all food served in official
471 Sprinzak (1999) op. cit.: p. 245.
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buildings and restaurants has to be kosher and official business is not allowed during 
the Sabbath. Another feature which shows the influence of religious parties is that the 
orthodox community in Israel uses government funding for their own education 
system. As Cohen points out, the religious community’s interpretation of the state is 
becoming an increasingly legitimate alternative to the classic Zionist conception, 
which had been accepted earlier even by religious Zionists. The basic question in 
Israeli society is what role religion, Judaism, should play in the state and how far the 
state should be defined by Judaism. The two basic positions can be formulated as 
whether Israel is a ‘state of Jews’ or a ‘Jewish state’. “A phenomenon accompanying 
the revival of religion and Jewish religious customs is a renewed emphasis on 
Jewishness as traditionally defined, rather than on the Zionist synthesis ideal of the 
‘new Jew’.“472 73 474
Many Israeli Jews have embraced a neo-traditional Jewish nationalism which 
stresses particularistic Jewish claims and goals in the Land of Israel. Gush Emunim, 
mentioned above must be seen in this intellectual context. “A consensual base clearly 
exists among the religious-nationalists regarding the theological legitimacy of Isarel’s 
claim to Judea and Samaria“414. This claim is based on a combination of biblical 
precedence and halachic jurisprudence with the belief that Zionism and Jewish 
settlement heralds the beginning of the messianic era. The growing influence of 
religious-nationalism in the wider Israeli society was demonstrated by the rise of 
Rabbi Meir Kahane’s radical Kach movement in the early 1980s.475 The massacre of
472 Owen, Roger. “State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East" (London: 
Routledge, 1992): p. 190f.
473 Cohen, Eric. “Israel as a Post-Zionist Society" Israel Affairs 1,3 1994: p. 209.
474 Jones, Clive. “Ideo-Theology: Dissonance and Discourse in the State of Israel" in Karsh, Efraim 
(ed) “From Rabin to Netanyahu. Israel’s Troubled Agenda" (London: Frank Cass, 1997): p. 29.
475 See: Mergui, Raphael and Philippe Simonnot. “Israel’s Ayatollahs. Meir Kahane and the far Right 
in Israel" (London: Saqi Books, 1987). Rabbi Kahane was assassinated in New York in 1992 and his 
Kach movement was banned in Israel for propagating racist ideology. The movement however exists 
now under the new name of Kahane Chai (Kahane Lives).
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Palestinian civilians in Hebron in 1994 showed how dangerous the presence of these 
radical groups is in highly contested areas such as Hebron.
The Haredim (or ulta-orthodox) communities are the second largest group in 
the religious camp. Traditionally they were opposed to the state of Israel since in 
their eyes only a state based on halacha is a legitimate Jewish state. However since 
the 1973 war the Haredim community has, for pragmatic reasons (funding for their 
educational and social institutions), softened its traditional opposition to the secular 
Israeli state and consequently joined Israeli government politics in 1977476. The ultra­
orthodox community felt justified in its negative assessment of the Zionist ideology. 
In their eyes “the Yorn Kippur war proved that the Haredi analyses of Zionism and
the condition of Israel were correct. The result was to magnify Haredi self-confidence 
and this is certainly a precondition to the kind of co-operation with secular Jews that 
is required by a government coalition4*477.
In the late 1970s and the early 1980s divisions inside the religious camp
emerged. These became obvious for the first time after the elections of 1988. “Far 
from being a united block as many Israelis, particularly the secular opponents of 
religious coercion, had feared, the religious parties showed themselves during the 
coalition bargaining [after the election in 1988] to be badly divided.4*478 Since then 
the three major parties of the religious camp are the NRP, the ultra-orthodox Agudat 
Yisrael and the Sephardim ultra-orthodox Shas. Nevertheless, the twelfth Knesset 
elections in 1988 brought about a “dramatic rise in the political power of the Haredi
476 Agudat Israel joined Begin’s coalition in 1977. This was the first time an Haredim party joined a 
government coalition. For a detailed analysis ultra-orthodox politics in Israel see: Kook, Rebecca, 
Michael Harris and Gideon Doron. “In the Name of G-D and Our Rabbi: The Politics of Ultra- 
Orthodox in Israel” in Israel Affairs 5, 1 1998: pp. 1-18.
477 Liebman, Charles S. “Paradigms Sometimes Fit: The Haredi Response to the Yorn Kippur War“ in 
Wistrich, Robert and David Ohana (eds) "The Shaping of Israeli Identity. Myth, Memory and 
Trauma" (London: Frank Cass, 1995): p. 181.
478 Freedman, Robert O. “Religion, Politics and the Israeli Elections of 1988“ in Middle East Journal 
43,3 1989: p. 422.
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(or ultra-Orthodox) parties?'479 Since 1988 the religious parties have become a 
political force which is neither associated with Labor Party nor Likud. Therefore they 
can negotiate coalitions with either side. “The Haredim had thus become an essential 
component of any coalition, thereby gaining significant positions of influence?'480
The national-religious and ultra-orthodox groups do not only differ in their 
political goals from large parts of the Israeli population, they offer a completely 
different notion of Jewish/Israeli identity. This touches on the most basic issue of the 
peace process: what kind of state is Israel? A democratic state or a Jewish state or 
both? What political identity does this state represent: a religious Jewish identity or a 
secular Israeli identity or a combination of both? Since the beginning of the peace 
process, these questions have achieved growing political relevance. After the easing 
of the pressure of an outside military threat with the conclusion of peace treaties with 
Egypt and Jordan and with the chance for a peaceful coexistence with the Palestinian 
society, the question of the form and identity of the state of Israel has again become a 
hotly debated issue. It is to this issue that we turn in the last part of the chapter.
IIL V. The Quest for Identity
“The signing of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles (DOP) in September 1993 
reawakened a dormant ambivalence regarding Israeli identity"481. One can argue that 
the voluntary relinquishment of territory to the Palestinian authority strikes at the 
core of Jewish/Israeli identity. This can be seen as a de facto admission that the 
ancient historical claims to the territory are no longer valid in the face of more recent 
claims. On the other hand with this process Israel admits that these territories were
479 Friedman, Manachem. “The Ultra-Orthodox and Israeli Society44 in Kyle, Keith and Joel Peters 
(eds) “Whither Israel? The Domestic Challenges" (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993): p. 177.
480 Ibid: p. 177.
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taken by force and unjustly. “If Israelis were intruders in 1967, they were as much 
intruders at the turn of the century. An unethical origin is an unacceptable constituent 
of identity; no group asserts distinctiveness by dint of a trait or action to which it 
itself ascribes a negative connotation4*481 2. Therefore a novel moral justification for 
the existence of the state of Israel is required in order to maintain a minimum of
group cohesion.
The traditional Zionist ideology can no longer be sufficient as a basis for this
group identification. “Like older nations, Israel is discovering that its citizens feel the 
need for sources of identity narrower than the national one“483. Consequently, the 
dominant Zionist collective identity is challenged no longer only from marginal 
groups at the fringes of the political spectrum (like the Haredim or communist 
groups) but also from political and cultural leaders representing the political centre.
“Avraham Burg, the new head of the Jewish Agency, the premier Zionist 
institution whose raison d’ etre has been to encourage and facilitate 
immigration to Israel, argued that Zionists must finally accept the Diaspora 
as a permanent reality [...] The privileging of Israel’s position over that of 
the Diaspora has been one of the most sacred and central aspects of Zionist 
dogma. By promoting [...] equality, Burg implies that the Jews who choose to 
remain in Exile are no less legitimate than those who choose to make the 
Zionist Return ”484.
The decline in the appeal of classical Zionist ideology and national themes could be 
seen during the elections of 1996. The highly personalised electoral campaign was
481 Weissbrod, Lilly. “Israeli Identity in Transition44 in Karsh, Efraim (ed) “From Rabin to Netanyahu. 
Israel’s Troubled Agenda” (London: Frank Cass, 1997): p. 47.
482 Ibid.: p. 58.
483 “The Economist. A Survey of Israel. After Zionism. Israel at 50“ in The Economist, 25th of April 
1998: p. 5.
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characterised by an unprecedented public disinterest in the political issues that were 
debated. Both candidates Shimon Peres and Benjamin Netanyahu positioned 
themselves in the centre of the political spectrum. “The moderate political position 
the prime ministerial candidates espoused was directed at an electorate increasingly 
concerned more with itself than with issues of national concern4*484 5. This 
development can be seen as a change of classical Zionism its transformation from an 
ideology to an aspect of everyday life in Israel. Azaryahu argues that “the decline of 
messianic and eschatological notions is a necessary condition for fulfilling the old 
Zionist dream about ‘normalization’4*486.
This ‘normalisation’ results in the search for a revaluation of past certainties. 
Two of the most striking examples are the discussion of the position of conservative 
and reform Judaism in Israeli society and the already mentioned discussion 
surrounding the ‘New Historians’. The debate around the status of Conservative and 
Reform Judaism (summarised under the slogan: ‘Who is a Jew?’) has direct 
implications for Israel’s relationship with the diaspora. “In Israel only the'Orthodox 
tradition is officially recognised by the state; in the diaspora, the leading traditions 
are Reform and Conservative. Israel would have to become more pluralistic in its 
religious orientation to maintain its ties with world Jewry**487. The relaxation of the 
Law of Return which allowed more loosely defined Jews to come to Israel has 
brought this international problem into the domestic arena as well. The election of 
several conservative rabbis into religious councils in 1999 started a heated public
484 Aronoff, Myron J. and Pierre M. Atlas. “The Peace Process and Competing Challenges to the 
Dominant Zionist Discourse" in Peleg, Ilan (ed) “The Middle East Peace Process. Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives" (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998): p. 50f.
485 Ben-Moshe, Danny. “Elections 1996: The De-Zionization of Israeli Politics" in Karsh, Effaim (ed) 
“From Rabin to Netanyahu. Israel’s Troubled Agenda" (London: Frank Cass, 1997): p. 67.
486 Azaryahu, Maoz. “It is no Fairy Tale - Israel at 50“ in Political Geography 18 1999: p. 145.
487 Peretz and Doron op. cit.: p. 276.
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debate about the exclusive recognition of Orthodox rabbis as members of religious
councils.
The debate surrounding the ‘New Historians’ is another expression of this 
reorientation in Israeli political identity. “Historical ‘Revisionism’ is in fashion in 
Israel as in most of the western world as established views of the past are critized, 
reassessed or openly debunked“488. The revaluation of the War of Independence and 
the question whether or not the Palestinians fled or were expelled by Israeli forces 
strikes at the heart of the Zionist project by questioning the picture of the Yishuv as 
the threatened entity that was defending itself in a moral and restrained manner. It
can be seen as a result of a change in the character of Israeli society. “In 
contemporary Israel, with its technological sophistication, its more easy-going 
individualism and all-too-cynical knowingness, nothing it would seem, is sacred any 
more“489.
In this situation different identity groups compete in the political arena for the 
recognition of their notion of Jewish / Israeli political identity. One can distinguish 
three main identity groups:
1) Right wing religious identity:
This group sees Zionism as a de-secularised ideology and tries to integrate Jewish 
national aspirations into a wider religious, or messianic framework. Its emphasis lies 
on exclusivist Jewish goals. The state of Israel is seen as a Jewish state, i.e. a 
religious state. Here the element of democracy is seen as secondary since Judaism, as 
a religious or ethnic variable takes precedence in the definition of the state. Its radical 
fringe envisage Israel as a theocracy.
488 Wistrich, Robert and David Ohana. “Introduction” in Wistrich, Robert and David Ohana (eds) 
"The Shaping of Israeli Identity. Myth, Memory and Trauma" (London: Frank Cass, 1995): p. vii.
489 Ibid: p. viii.
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2) Mainstream secularised Jewish nationalists:
This group is split into three subgroups: a) ‘Doves’ are willing to negotiate about the 
territories while not endangering the security of Israel, b) ‘Hawks’ promote the 
annexation of the occupied territories but not of the Palestinians living in it. The two 
options which are proposed for the Palestinian population of these areas are transfer 
out of the territories or the acceptance of their status as second class citizens. This 
movement sees the state of Israel as a state of the Jews, c) Religious liberalists: They 
envisage Israel as a “Jewish state based on universalistic values, which would ensure 
the personal liberty and civil rights to all its citizens, irrespective of creed an 
origin“490. All three see the state of Israel as both a Jewish and democratic state that 
is not endowed with eschatological or messianic meanings.
3) Secular binationalists:
This group propagates a separation of state and religion in which personal and not 
national goals are given priority. The state of Israel is to become a secular 
democracy. This group emphasises a secular Israeli political identity, irrespective of 
one’s religion. This however is still a minority position, held by Jewish left wing 
groups and by the majority of Palestinian-Israelis.
These groups act and interact on all three levels of political identity building. 
Their different notions of political identity and their positioning in relation to the 
centres of political power directly influences the political decision making in the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The last chapter of this thesis will turn to a more in­
depth analysis of these identity groups.
The aim of this chapter was to analyse the basic political and historic developments 
in Israeli society that led to the Oslo process and the impact of this process on
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Jewish/Israeli political identity building. In order to be able to fully understand this 
impact, the historical development of Israeli society had to be analysed. During the
Yishuv and the first decades of Israeli statehood Labor Zionism was the main
unifying ideological force in Israeli society. However this notion of Zionism was not 
uncontested. Since the split of the ‘Revisionist Movement’ from the World Zionist 
organisation in 1935, two competing versions of Zionist ideology existed. In addition 
the Zionist narrative was contest by religious movements which negated the secular 
aspects of Zionism. In 1977 the revisionist ideology was able for the first time to 
penetrate the centre of political decision making, the government.
The religious notion of Jewish/Israeli identity became a decisive political factor in 
the aftermath of the 1967 war and the settlement drive into the occupied territories. 
The developing Middle East peace process that had its first peak with the Camp 
David accords and the subsequent Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty slowly easing the 
security threat that hang over the state of Israel since its creation. However the 
Palestinian problem was not seriously addressed until the 1990s, after several years 
of the intifada and the near collapse of the PLO following the Second Gulf War in
1991.
The Oslo process starting with the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 
1993 offered on the one hand the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the conflict 
between the two societies. On the other hand the issues of the negotiations made a 
revaluation of the traditional Zionist ideology a necessity. By dealing with issues 
such as the voluntary relinquishment of territory to the newly established Palestinian 
Authority, the negotiations struck at the heart and core of the traditional 
Jewish/Israeli identity. Questions about the form and the character of the state of 
Israel and the connected questions of the external and internal security of the state,
Ibid: p. 212.
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the future of the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories and the role of religion 
in Israeli society became of fundamental importance.
This new debate lead to an increased fragmentation of Jewish/Israeli political 
identity into three different identity groups which can be characterised as ‘right wing 
religious identity’, ‘mainstream secularised Jewish nationalists’ (including religious 
liberalists), and ‘secular binationalists’. These three different identity groups 
increasingly compete for recognition of their notion of Jewish/Israeli identity. Their 
positioning in relation to the centres of political power directly influences the 
decision making process in the peace process.
The next chapter of the thesis will attempt to analyse the development of Palestinian 
political identities as well as the constrains on Palestinian political identity building
in the autonomous areas.
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Constrains on Palestinian Political Identity
Building in the Autonomous Areas
This chapter analyses the structures in which Palestinian political identities in the 
autonomous areas operate. An examination of the social and political structures is 
necessary since these structures can either aide or constrain political identities. The 
analysis will attempt to show that internal and external constraints exist that make the 
expression of political identities difficult. This will provide the framework for the 
analysis of the process of political identity building and its influence on policy 
decision which will be the aim of the last chapter of the thesis.
The chapter has two main sections. First the external constraints that
Palestinian society is facing will be examined. A short historical overview of the 
main events in the formation of Palestinian political identity will be pointed out. 
This should serve as a background for the analysis of the external constraints 
imposed on the Palestinian society during the negotiations with Israel. In addition the 
agreements themselves will be analysed. The main focus will be on the Oslo
Accords, the Gaza-Jericho agreement, the Israeli-Palestinian Economic Protocol and 
the Hebron Protocol. After the analysis of the agreements, the effects of these 
arrangements on Palestinian society will be examined. Here the emphasis will be on 
the economic situation and the problem of water, the problem of the Palestinian 
refugees, external security of a possible future Palestinian state, and the status of the 
Israeli settlements. It will be argued that all these elements constrain the development
of a Palestinian state structure. This structure could serve as one level on which
Palestinians could express their political identities.
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The second section of the chapter will look at the internal constraints that make an 
expression of Palestinian political identities difficult. The emphasis is here on an 
examination of the internal political and social structures of the autonomous areas.
The aim will be to show how these structures influence the ability of Palestinians to
express their political identities on the substate level. The main issues discussed in 
this respect are: the autocratic and neopatrimonial structure of the PA, the 
institutional arrangements inside the autonomous areas, especially the role of the 
Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), civil society and democracy, the role of the 
internal security apparatus, and the problem of legal reform.
I. External Constrains on the Ability to Express Palestinian
Political Identities
This section of the chapter looks at the struggle for Palestinian national identity. It 
has two main parts. In the first part the historical development of the national 
Palestinian identity and the national movement will be described. The main argument 
will be that Palestinian national identity asserted itself at the beginning of the 19th 
century and inspired the struggle for independence which reached a new stage with 
the Oslo accords. The second part of this section will look at the Oslo process and the 
different agreements between the PLO and the state of Israel. It tries to evaluate how 
far these agreements allow and constrain political identity building in the Palestinian 
society in the autonomous areas.
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IJ. The Development of Palestinian Political Identity
The origins of a distinct Palestinian ‘national’ consciousness can be traced back to 
the beginning of the 19th century. One of the most significant influences on the 
development of a national consciousness among the population of Palestine under 
Ottoman rule were the reforms of the Young Turk movement. Most important among 
these reforms, as far as the development of a Palestinian national consciousness is 
concerned, was the spread of education and the development of a administrative 
apparatus which unified the regions of Palestine. “In the rapid evolving new 
dispensation of the Tanzimat, education was to a large degree secularized and 
brought under control of the government, which established a network of new public 
schools throughout the country“491 These new schools laid stress on Ottoman 
patriotism and developed the origins of a modem (European) national consciousness. 
The reformed state administration offered opportunities for the graduates of the 
secular school system and was therefore an alternative to a traditional religious 
career. These reforms “were crucial instruments in the transformation of society in 
terms of the formation of new social strata, professionalism along Western lines, and 
familiarization of large segments of society with the everyday routines of the modem, 
Western world“492. A new Westernised elite of urban notables formed which was the 
vanguard of the developing national consciousness. The development of an 
awareness of a distinct national identity in Palestine can be seen in the numerous 
publications and newspapers of the time.493 However from the onset ‘Palestinian’ 
identity was not sharply differentiated from Arab or even Islamic identity. The
491 Kahlidi, Rashid. “Palestinian Identity. The Construction of Modern National Consciousness" 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1997): p. 39.
492 Ibid: p. 47.
493 The most popular and widely distributed was ‘ Filastin’. The newspaper was published from 1911 
onwards and ran a nationalist editorial line. For a content analysis of ‘Filastin ’ and other Palestinian 
newspapers of the time see: Ibid: pp. 119-144.
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Palestinian elite was concentrated in the urban centres: Jerusalem, Akko, Haiffa, 
Jaffa, and Nablus. Especially Jerusalem developed into the centre of intellectual and 
cultural life in Palestine. The main economic factor in Palestine was agriculture. Few 
industrial developments took place (especially glass and soap in Nablus). However
the elite was constituted of landed urban notables. The concentration of land in the
hands of the upper class was accelerated by the land reform of 1861 which enabled 
the purchase and registration of state land as private land. The reform also enabled 
foreigners to own land (which would greatly help Jewish immigration later on). As a 
consequence “a great number of peasants lost the legal right to their land and became 
sharecroppers, tenant farmers, and rural wage laborers4*494. At the same time the first 
wave of Jewish immigration into Palestine occurred (First Aliya). However tensions 
with the new immigrants did not start until the Second Aliya (1904-1914). These new 
Jewish immigrants aimed at establishing a exclusively Jewish economy and pushed 
the tenant farmers off the land that they had purchased from the absentee landlords in 
Palestine and Lebanon (Beirut mainly). These tension caused the “development of 
the Arab and Jewish economies and, eventually the creation of two separate 
nationalist movements**495.
These separate movements collided during the British Mandate. After the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire following World War I. Britain occupied Palestine. 
The official Mandate was given to Britain by the League of Nations in 1922. The 
tensions between the Palestinian inhabitants and the new Jewish immigrants resulted 
in several incidents of which the 1929 incident was the most serious. During the riots
494 Farsoun, Samih K and Christina E. Zacharia. “Palestine and the Palestinians" (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1997): p. 39.
495 Kimmerling, Baruch and Joel S. Migdal. "Palestinians. The Making of a People" (Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1994): p. 24. For an analysis of the Arab reaction to the Jewish immigration 
see: Muslih, Muhammad Y "The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism" (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1988): pp. 69-87.
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133 Jews and 116 Palestinians were killed.496 497The first Palestinian nationalist 
uprising on a major scale occurred between 1936-1939. During the so called ‘Arab 
Revolt’. The British administration nearly lost control over Palestine. “It mobilized 
thousands of Arabs from every stratum of society, all over the country, heralding the 
emergence of a national movement in ways that isolated incidents and formal 
delegations simply could not accomplish44497. Internal struggles among the Arab 
population, a shrinking military leadership (due to deportations and imprisonment by 
the British administration), and a massive military operation by the British 
administration finally crushed the revolt. The ‘Arab Revolt’ can be seen as the first 
major political assertion of Palestinian national identity. However it left Palestinian 
society with a weakened political and military leadership which can be seen as one of
the causes of the devastating Palestinian defeat in 1948/49.
The ‘Arab Revolt’ is important in one more aspect. During the revolt the
British government established the Peel Commission to inquire into the causes of the 
uprising. This commission published its report in 1937. In this report, the partition of 
Palestine was suggested. The report was hesitantly embraced by the ‘Zionist 
Executive’; however the ‘Arab High Committee’ rejected any partition of the land, 
because the partition would have left thousands of Arabs in northern Palestine under
Jewish rule. After the end of the ‘Arab Revolt’ tensions between the two national
movements in Palestine continued and slowly increased to the level of civil war. The 
main point of contention was Jewish immigration (which had been limited as a result 
of the revolt). Two major national movements were established in 1941, the 
‘Congress of Workers’ and the ‘Union of Section of Arab Workers’. Both were
496 See: Farsoun op. cit.: p. 102.
497 Kimmerling op. cit.: p. 96. For a detailed analysis of the revolt, its causes, and the major incidents 
see: Ibid.: pp. 96-123.
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nation wide Palestinian organisations and under the influence of the communist
movement.
After the World War II the newly founded United Nations (UN) established 
the ‘United Nations Special Commission on Palestine’ (UNSCOP) in 1947. This 
commission published a report in which the partition of Palestine in a Jewish and an 
Arab state was recommended. The UN general assembly agreed to the plan on the 
29th of November 1947. The Arab side rejected it while the Jewish Agency adopted 
the plan. On the 14th of May 1948 the British Government ended the Mandate in 
Palestine. On the same day the Jewish Agency declared the state of Israel. The 
following military confrontation between Jewish/Israeli and Arab forces ended in
1949 with a devastating defeat of the Palestinian side and the exile of thousands of
Palestinians.
The defeat and the following exodus of thousands of Palestinians between 
1948 and 1949 is one of the most important turning points in the development of 
Palestinian national identity. '‘Al-Nakbah’ (catastrophe) deprived the Palestinian 
society of a territorial base under their own sovereign control. “Al-Nakbah meant the 
destruction of Palestinian society and patrimony and Palestinian dispossession, 
dispersal and destitution44498. The exodus established a large diaspora community 
which was destined to play the leading role in the development of Palestinian 
national identity until the outbreak of the intifada in 1987 and finally the 
establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1994.4" As a result of the exodus 
of the Palestinians, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 194 which 
established the right of the refugees to return to Palestine or seek compensation.
498 Farsoun op. cit.: p. 123.
499 The defeat and exodus established also the so called Israeli Palestinian. This problematic will not 
be analysed here. For an overview see: Stendel op. cit. and the discussion in the following chapter.
218
The emphasis of Palestinian national identity building was from then on mainly 
located in the diaspora. It was here where the Palestinian society started to rebuild 
itself. The Mufti of Jerusalem tried to reorganise his influence by declaring an ‘All 
Palestine Government’ in Gaza with Egyptian protection. However this institution, 
which was constituted mainly of old notables and landlords, failed to establish 
legitimacy. In 1952 the Arab League dissolved the ‘All Palestine Government’. The 
years between 1948 and the six days war in 1967 were characterised by the rise of a 
new Palestinian elite in the diaspora. Three major organisations were founded in this 
period. In 1951 George Habash organised the ‘Arab Nationalists’ Movement’ (which 
later transformed into the ‘Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’ PFLP). In
1959 Yasir Arafat created the Fateh movement and in 1964 the PLO was founded.
All three organisations had a Pan-Arab orientation. The ‘Arab Nationalists’ 
Movement’ and the Fateh movement were advocating ‘armed struggle’ as the way to 
liberate Palestine. This concept became the prime focus of Palestinian national 
identity building after the 1967 war. The hopes for a Pan-Arab solution to the conflict 
were shattered in 1967 when the Arab armies suffered a major military defeat. 
However the defeat had two effects on Palestinian society. Firstly it became clear that 
the hope of help from outside states had to be abandoned. In consequence a distinctly 
Palestinian political identity began to take precedence over the Pan- Arab political 
identity. Secondly, because of the occupation by Israel the Palestinians that remained 
in Israel after 1948/49 were reunited with the Arabs in the newly occupied territories. 
In response to the war, the UN security council adopted Resolution 242, which called
for a two-state-solution and the “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories 
occupied in the recent conflict44500. The missing ‘the’ before the term ‘territories’ is 
crucial as it allows Israel to claim it needs to withdraw only from part of the occupied
500 Security Council Resolution 242, November 22, 1967“ in Farsoun op. cit.'. p. 319.
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territories. The problem of the Palestinian refugees is only mentioned in one phrase 
that calls “for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem"501.
Efforts to form a national Palestinian identity inside the occupied territories 
resulted in the establishment of a National Guidance Committee (NGC) in 1979. It 
was formed by majors which had a nationalistic ideology and orientation. These 
came to power in the 1976 municipal elections. However, outside the occupied 
territories guerrilla groups took the lead in the struggle for an expression of 
Palestinian national identity after the 1967 war. Although they differed in ideological 
orientation they had one concept in common. “Throughout their evolution, the 
guerrilla groups composing the PLO consistently described armed struggle as the 
principal, even the exclusive means of liberating Palestine"502. How much this 
ideological goal became part of the mainstream Palestinian thinking can be seen from 
the fact that in 1969 Yassir Arafat’s Fateh guerrilla movement took control of the
PLO. The Palestinian national movement’s main concern after 1967 was to find
bases from which it could carry the armed struggle into Israel and the occupied 
territories. The development between 1967 and 1982 was characterised by two major
defeats which forced the nationalist movement to relocate its bases further and
further away from its theatre of operation. The first base of operations was Jordan. 
However as the guerrilla groups gained more and more autonomy they posed a threat 
to the regime of King Hussein. The tensions came to a height on the 6th of September 
1970 “when members of the PFLP flouted Jordanian sovereignty so openly as to 
bring three hijacked international airliners into the desert airstrip in Jordan"503. This
501 Ibid: p. 319.
502 Sayigh, Yezid. “Armed Struggle and State Formation" in Journal of Palestine Studies 26, 4, 1997: 
p. 17. For a detailed analysis of the concept of armed struggle and its importance in the development 
of Palestinian struggle for a state see: Sayigh, Yezid. "Armed Struggle and the Search for State. The 
Palestinian National Movement 1949-1993 " (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
503 Cobban, Helena. "The Palestinian Liberation Organisation. People, Power and Politics" 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984): p. 49.
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incident sparked a military confrontation between the Jordanian troops and the 
Palestinian guerrillas which ended with the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan in 
1970/71. The organisation was forced to relocate in Lebanon. The 1973 October war 
which resulted in the Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1979 did 
not enhance the position of the Palestinians in their struggle. Although there were
provisions for the Palestinian problem in the agreement, these were never followed 
up.504
In 1974 at the meeting of the ‘Palestinian National Council’ (PNC), one of the 
main political organs of the PLO, the decision was made to found a state on any part 
of the ‘liberated’ homeland. This was a crucial decision since it was the first step in 
changing the general political goal of‘liberating’ all of Palestine to accepting a ‘two- 
state-solution’. The state envisaged was an independent Palestinian state in the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip. This decision had ramifications for the Palestinian diaspora. 
The diaspora was now effectivley split into two groups: the refugees of the 1948/49 
and the Palestinians which fled after the 1967 war. The first group of refugees were 
effectively marginalised from the political process since, with an independent 
Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, only the second group could 
expect to return to their former homes. Israel had and has no interest in allowing the 
refugees of the 1948/49 war return to their original homes. This would substantially 
alter the demographic balance between Jews and Arabs in Israel and therefore 
‘threaten’ the Jewish character of the state. During the summit of the Arab League in 
Rabat (Morocco) on the 26th of October 1974, the Arab states backed this decision 
and recognised the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian 
people.
504 As a result of Camp David, Egypt was ousted by the Arab world which lost with Egypt its main 
military and political power.
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With this diplomatic backing the PLO set out to develop its already existing 
structures in Lebanon into a quasi-state structure. However starting from 1975 the 
organisation became increasingly involved in the Lebanese civil war. Its involvement 
continued until the 1982 invasion of Israel, which after a siege of Beirut for several
weeks, forced the PLO in August to evacuate to Tunis. This marked the end of the 
Palestinian quasi-state in Lebanon. This exodus of the leadership from the region 
meant that for the first time it was territorially separated from the occupied territories. 
In the following years this physical separation from the conflict was mirrored by the 
PLO’s weakness in the international arena and by a slow development of a new 
leadership inside the occupied territories. The PLO’s weak stand was reflected in the 
resolutions of the 1987 Amman summit of the Arab League. For the first time in the 
history of Arab summitry, “both the concluding statement and the secret resolutions 
failed to mention the goal of an independent Palestinian state [...] The outcome 
reflected the summit’s low priority regarding the Palestinian issue, to which the 
Palestinian community responded with overt rage and frustration'4505.
The discontent on the part of the Palestinian society living in the occupied 
territories, coupled with agitation from part of the PLO under Abu Jihad (which 
aimed at escalating the situation in the occupied territories), resulted in a massive 
uprising starting in December 1987, the intifada.505 06 The intifada had profound effects 
on the situation of the Palestinian national movement. Firstly it propelled the 
Palestinian problem back to the attention of the international media. As the uprising 
continued the international ‘image’ of Israel was damaged as the media portrayed the 
brutality of the ‘iron fist’ policy devised by then defence minister Yitzhak Rabin.
505 Sela, Avraham. “The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Middle East Politics and the Quest for 
Regional Order" (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998): p. 296.
506 For an analysis of the aims and tactics of Abu Jihad and the military wing of the PLO see: Inbari, 
Pinhas. “The Palestinians between Terrorism and Statehood" (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press,
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Secondly, during the intifada a new internal leadership asserted itself in contrast to 
the PLO leadership in Tunis. Thirdly, at the outbreak of the uprising one of the most 
important radical Islamic organisations, Hamas, was founded. “Hamas - the Islamic 
Resistance Movement - was bom of the intifada which marked the beginning of the 
true political revival of the Islamic forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip“507. 
Hamas is based on the Muslim Brotherhood movement and serves as its military 
wing. Hamas soon developed into a “serious challenge to the secular forces led by the 
PLO“508.
During the uprising the developments on the diplomatic arena continued. On 
the 31st of July 1988 King Hussein of Jordan declared that he no longer claimed 
sovereignty over the West Bank. “On the 15th of November 1988 the uprising 
reached its peak. The Palestinian National Council in Algiers proclaimed, in seldom 
found unanimity, an independent Palestinian state“509. The basis of the declaration 
was UN General Assembly Resolution 181, the resolution which decided on a 
partition of Palestine. Included in the declaration were also a recognition of 
Resolutions 242 and 338. This recognition marked a shift in official PLO policy. 
Inherently, in the acceptance of these resolutions is a recognition of the state of Israel 
and the goal of a two-state settlement of the conflict. Parallel to this the PLO and the
US government approached each other. After Arafat’s statement in Geneva in 
December 1988 in which he recognised the rights of all participants in the Middle 
East conflict (including Israel) and denounced terrorism, the USA and the PLO 
entered into an open dialogue. These talks resulted in an American Peace initiative
1996): pp. 64-83. Within days protests developed into a massive uprising with mass demonstrations, 
strikes, road blocks and later on mass resignations of Palestinian tax officials and police men.
507 Abu-Amr, Ziad. “Hamas: A Historical and Political Background" in Journal of Palestine Studies 
22, 4, 1993: p. 5.
508 Ibid: p. 12.
509 Baugarten, Helga. “Palastina. Befreiung in den Staat“ (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991): p. 
305. [Translation by the author]
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(the ‘Baker Plan’). After a failed terrorist attack on Tel Aviv on the 29th of May 1990, 
which Arafat failed to denounce, the US terminated the official dialogue with the
PLO.
The start of the Gulf crisis in August 1990 marked the beginning of one of the
worst disasters for the Palestinian national movement. “The 1990-19 Gulf crisis
resulted in one of the worst setbacks for the Palestinians in modem times. Only the 
1936-39 Arab Revolt and the 1948 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars were more costly“5,°. 
The decision of the PLO leadership (supported by the Palestinians in the occupied 
territories) to take an neutral position towards Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait 
resulted not only in the extradition of around 300,000 Palestinians from Kuwait 
(which meant the end of their remittances for their families), but also in the end of 
the financial backing of the PLO from the Gulf monarchies. In addition to these 
economic losses, the PLO found itself internationally isolated after the end of the 
Gulf war. It was from this weakened position that the Palestinians took part in the in 
Madrid/Washington peace conference which started on the 31 October 1991 as part 
of the Jordanian delegation.510 11
The negotiations did not achieve any concrete results. Inbari argues that this is 
partly due to the fear of Arafat that a breakthrough at the conference would result in a 
power loss of the ‘outside’ PLO elite.512 The stalemate at the negotiations was also 
caused by the hard line approach of the Israeli Likud government under Prime 
Minister Shamir. The change of government in Israel in 1992 which brought the 
Labour party to power opened up the possibility of another channel for negotiations. 
The Labour party was elected on an election platform which promised results in the
510 Mattar, Philip. “The PLO and the Gulf Crisis“ in The Middle East Journal 48, 1 1994: p. 31.
511 The composition of the Palestinian delegation which had to be constituted solely of Palestinians 
from the occupied territories (excluding East Jerusalem) that were not members of the PLO was at the
heart of a power struggle of the Palestinian national movement between the new leadership ‘inside’ the 
territories and the ‘outside’ PLO leadership in Tunis. See: Inbari op. cit.-. pp. 139-151.
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‘Peace Process’. In secret negotiations in Norway (of which the Palestinian 
negotiation team in Washington was not informed), the PLO and the Israeli 
government (primarily Yossi Beilin and foreign minister Shimon Peres) negotiated 
the ‘Declaration of Principles’ (DOP). The DOP outlined the establishment of an 
autonomous administration for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and Jericho and a 
timetable for discussions on further developments of the autonomy of the 
Palestinians. The DOP was signed on the 13th of September 1993 in Washington. A 
few days earlier the PLO and Israel exchanged letters of recognition. This marked the 
beginning of a process which resulted in the establishment of the Palestinian
Authority (PA) in the Gaza Strip and Jericho in May 1994.
The historical development of the Palestinian national movement has several 
characteristics. First and foremost it is a struggle to establish a state structure on the 
former territory of Palestine. Since the defeat in 1948/49 the Palestinian society had 
lost the ability to develop its own state structures. Until 1967, the territory of the 
former Palestine were under Israeli, Jordanian (West Bank), and Egyptian (Gaza 
Strip) control. After 1967 Israel dominated the territory alone. It can be seen from 
this outline of the historical developments that the structures of national identity and 
an awareness of a distinct ‘Palestinianess’ (albeit with ‘Arab’ or ‘Islamic’ content) 
which originated in the 19th century remained alive and even survived the destruction 
of the structures of Palestinian society in 1948/49 and in 1967. After the 1967 war, 
the national movement restructured its main focus along the lines of the ideology of 
‘armed struggle’. However in the following years, the movement was expelled from 
its two main bases in Jordan and Lebanon. Before its expulsion the movement 
however was able to establish quasi-state structures and near autonomy in both 
countries. Beginning in 1974, the PLO’s aspiration gradually narrowed from seeking
512 See: Ibid.: pp. 190-200.
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the ‘liberation’ of all of Palestine, to achieving a ‘two-state-solution’. Since 1982 the 
leadership of the PLO (which dominated the movement since 1969) had to operate 
outside the region in Tunis. This situation did not change until 1994 when the PA
was established. The struggle to establish state structures was launched on two fronts: 
the military front in direct confrontations with Israel and on the diplomatic front. 
However at the time of the Oslo process, the PLO was internally and externally in a 
very weak position. This imbalance of power resulted in agreements that are severely 
restricted as far as the possibility of future transformation of the partial autonomy 
into statehood is concerned. In the next part of this section of the chapter, the 
agreements themselves will be analysed.
LII. The Israeli-Palestinian Agreements and the 'Peace
Process9
The ‘Oslo Accords
What is commonly understood as the ‘Oslo accords’ consist of two separate sets of 
documents: the letters of recognition between the PLO and Israel and the 
‘Declaration of Principles’ (DOP).513 Both sets of documents must be seen as an 
integrated whole because the letters of recognition made it possible for the PLO and 
Israel to sign the DOP. “Without the prior agreement on mutual recognition there 
would have been no meaningful agreement on Palestine self-government14514.
The weak bargaining position of the PLO, which will be obvious in the entire 
negotiation process after Oslo, can already be seen in the letters of recognition. 
“While the letters of mutual recognition have great clarity with regard to Israeli
513 For a documentary record of the accords see: Institute for Palestine Studies, Washington D.C. “The 
Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement. A Documentary Record“ (Washington DC: Institute for 
Palestine Studies, 1994).
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demands, they are full of obscurity concerning the rights of the Palestinian 
people"515. The letter from Arafat to Rabin endows the state of Israel with legitimacy, 
however fails to define which Israel is recognised (Israel in which part of the former 
Palestine). The act of recognising Israel amounts to a recognition of Israeli laws 
(including those that are used to expropriate land, expel Palestinians ect.). The PLO 
recognises Israel’s right to exist in peace and security which implies that Israel’s right 
to exist takes precedence over the rights of the Palestinian people. Furthermore the
letter renounces terrorism and declares the parts in the Palestinian Charter which
contradict this as inoperative (with this step Arafat exceeded his authority since only 
the PNC can change the Charter). In the letter of Prime Minister Rabin, which is 
about a fifth in length, Israel simply recognises the PLO as the representative of the 
Palestinian people and declares her willingness to start negotiations with the PLO.
The imbalance in power is also obvious in the DOP. It divides the 
negotiations in two phases: an interim period and a permanent status. During the 
interim period the Palestinian Authority (PA) initially has authority over the Gaza 
Strip and Jericho from which the Israeli military will withdraw. The PA has authority 
in six spheres: internal security, education and culture, health, social welfare, direct 
taxation, and tourism. These powers shall not encompass external security, foreign 
relations, Israeli settlements and Israeli citizens. “These powers are therefore not 
territorial but personal, relating to Palestinians alone and excluding foreigners and 
Israelis"516. The issues for the final status negotiations are: the status of Jerusalem, 
refugees, Israeli settlements, security arrangements and final borders. Both parties 
undertake the commitment not to prejudice or pre-empt these issues in the 
agreements reached for the interim phase. 514
514 Shlaim, Avi. “The Oslo Accord" in Journal of Palestine Studies 23, 3 1994: p. 25.
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This situation leaves the Palestinian side with hardly any bargaining power. The only
concessions it can make are on the final status issues. This situation can be seen in
the fact that the Palestinian side had to accept, however grudgingly, the actions of the 
Israeli governments during the interim process which were of direct relevance for the 
final status issues. Two major issues need to be pointed out. Firstly, the timetable set 
out in the Oslo Accords for the development of the Palestinian autonomy was not 
implemented. Secondly, Israel continued to expand existing Israeli settlements and in
the case of Jabal Abu Ghnheim (Har Homa) even started constructing new ones.
According to the timetable set out in the DOP, the final status negotiations 
should have been concluded in May 1999. The failure to meet this deadline is due to 
substantial delays during the interim period. This has been particularly the case under 
the Likud government of Prime Minister Netanyahu which came to power in 1996. 
“The opponents of the process itself, that is, opponents of the principles of 
compromise upon which it is based, can interrupt, stall, complicate, and even thwart 
it by (prematurely from the point of view of supporters) treating the agreement as a 
legal codex rather than a political framework4*515 516 17.
The second issue which is important in this respect is the enlargements of 
Israeli settlements since the beginning of the ‘Peace Process’ in 1993. This can be 
seen by the rise in the number of settlers: between 1979 and 1989 the number rose 
from 12,000 to 75,000, however from 1989 to 1994 the number rose to 150,000. 
“Strikingly enough, the greatest increase began to manifest itself after the Oslo
515 Dajani, Burhan. “The September 1993 Israeli-PLO Documents. A Textual Analysis" in Journal of 
Palestine Studies 23, 3 1994: p. 6.
516 Ibid: p. 15.




Accords had been signed in 1993“ . The Likud government under Prime Minister
Netanyahu shortly after taking power stepped up the building campaign by voting to 
abolish previously imposed building restrictions in the West Bank and Gaza. In 
addition to this, “the government approved the use of about three hundred 
government owned mobile homes to expand settlements in the West Bank“* 519. The 
relevance of beginning construction of the new settlement on a hill called Jabal Abu 
Ghnheim (Har Homa) at the outskirts of East Jerusalem lies in the fact that this new 
settlement will contribute to a nearly closed ring of Israeli settlements surrounding 
East Jerusalem. Such a ring would prevent any territorial continuity between East 
Jerusalem (which is predominantly inhabited by Palestinians) and a future Palestinian 
state. The expansion of settlements prevents the territorial continuity of a future 
Palestinian state which makes its internal and external security structure dependent
on Israel.
Considering that the final status issues are the most crucial for the 
construction of a sovereign state structure the agreement restricts the Palestinian 
side’s possibilities to develop such a structure and therefore find an adequate 
expression of its political identities. However the accords have one main 
achievement as Michels points out. The agreements recognise that the Palestinian 
people exist and that they have rights. “The Israeli recognition of ‘the legitimate 
rights of the Palestinian people’ (Article III), the first genuine recognition in the 
history of Zionism that the Palestinian are ‘a people’, renounces no less than the 
Palestinians have done, key elements of the Israeli narrative6'520. To sum up, the Oslo
5,8 De Jong, Jan. “The Geography of Politics. Israel’s Settlement Drive after Oslo" in Giacaman, 
George and Dag Jorund Lanning (eds) “After Oslo. New Realities, Old Problems “ (London: Pluto 
Press, 1998): p. 78.
519 Shikaki, Khalil. “The Future of the Peace Process and Palestinian Strategies" in Journal of 
Palestine Studies 25, 1 1996: p. 85.
520 Michels, Jeffrey. “National Vision and the Negotiation of Narratives: The Oslo Agreement" in 
Journal of Palestine Studies 24, 1 1994: p. 29.
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Accords reflect the imbalance of power of the two negotiating parties. They put 
severe constrains on the process of future Palestinian state building and therefore 
constrain the Palestinian’s need for a meaningful expression of their political identity 
on the state level. However in the Oslo Accords Israel is recognising for the first time 
the Palestinian’s existence as a people and their legitimate rights. However the Oslo 
Accords only marked the starting point for a number of further negotiations 
concerning the implementation of the interim phase. We will now turn to the 
agreements reached during these negotiations. Again the main focus will be on the 
question which possibilities and which constraints these agreements construct for the 
expression of Palestinian political identity.
The Interim Stage Agreements
Four agreements will be the main focus of this analysis: The Gaza-Jericho agreement 
reached on the 4th of May 1994 (Cairo agreement), the Israeli-Palestinian Economic 
Protocol singed on 29th of April 1994 (included later in the Cairo agreement), and the 
Hebron Protocol signed on the 15th of January 1997. These three agreements regulate 
the fundamental workings of the PA.
The Gaza-Jericho agreement is the agreement that transferred jurisdiction to 
the PA in those areas. However, as Shehadeh points out, the Gaza-Jericho agreement 
leaves serious legal restrictions in place. Article VII, 9 states that all laws and 
military orders prior to the agreement remain in effect in the Gaza Strip and Jericho. 
This formula “perpetuates, with Palestinian consent, the occupier’s law“521. As far as 
the jurisdiction over land is concerned, the Gaza-Jericho agreement preserves the 
status quo. It does not challenge the land confiscations by the Israeli authorities that
521 Shehadeh, Raja. “Questions of Jurisdiction. A Legal Analysis of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement" in 
Journal of Palestine Studies 23, 4 1994: p. 19.
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occurred during the occupation. As far as the jurisdiction over water is concerned, it 
also does not change the existing situation. The PA can neither change the amount of 
water that is allocated to the Palestinian areas nor can it change the difference in
price for water that Israeli citizens and Palestinians are paying (Palestinians are 
paying ten times the amount per litre). In addition to this, no provisions were made to 
hold Israel liable for the twenty eight years of occupation. “Israel is [...] exempted 
from legal responsibility for acts committed during its nearly twenty eight years of 
occupation”522. All legal claims against Israel have to be referred to the PA. If Israel 
is to pay any compensation, the PA has to reimburse Israel. The Palestinian side also 
undertook the commitment to keep the employees of the civil administration that 
Israel had appointed in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area. This short overview of 
just some of the restrictions shows that the establishment of the PA was from the
outset burdened with legal restrictions in many ways. It did not have full control over
the autonomous areas.
The Economic Protocol which became part of the Gaza Jericho agreement 
imposed further restrictions on the PA. The protocol covers all essential Palestinian 
economic sectors, the Palestinian and Israeli roles, and Palestinian economic
relations with Israel and other countries. It does not allow the PA to have its own
currency (which deprives it of the instrument of monetary policy). However it does 
allow significant control over banking operations and the establishment of a 
‘Palestinian Monetary Authority’ for that purpose. It does allow the PA to collect 
direct taxes, however the collection of indirect taxes (such as tariffs and VAT) is 
restricted. The PA can set tariffs on imports according to the last General Agreement
on Trade and Tariffs GATT which takes effect in Israel. Therefore it can not have
522 Arubi, Naseer H. “Early Empowerment. The Burden not the Responsibility” in Journal of Palestine 
Studies 24, 2 1995: p. 37.
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lower tariffs than Israel. The protocol lists goods that the PA can import from other 
countries (other than Israel). For some of these goods quantitative restrictions are set 
in the protocol. “The protocol states that there is to be free movement of both 
agricultural produce and industrial goods between the two sides without additional 
customs and import taxes“523. However there are quantitative restrictions on 
Palestinian exports of vegetables products, poultry and eggs to Israel. As far as the 
movement of workers to Israel is concerned, the protocol states that the number of
persons allowed into Israel for work would be negotiated from time to time between 
the two sides. The protocol reflects the clear Israeli goal of “protecting its own 
producers and maintaining insofar as possible its dominant share in the Palestinian 
market“524. Taken together the Gaza-Jericho agreement and the Economic Protocol 
arrange the set up of Palestinian autonomy which could serve as a structure for the 
expression of a distinct Palestinian political identity. However this structure is still 
severely restricted. One of the main restrictions at this stage is the limited amount of 
territory that is controlled by the PA. The Hebron Protocol was meant to enlarge the 
area controlled by the PA. It is to this protocol that we turn now.
The Hebron Protocol regulated the control over the city of Hebron. It divided 
the city into two areas, one under the control of the Israeli military (the old city) and 
one under control of the PA. “By signing the protocol and agreeing to pull back from 
West Bank territory, the Likud for the first time was effectively endorsing the 
underlying land-for-peace assumption of the Oslo accords“525. However during the 
negotiations of the protocol the Israeli government received backing from the US 
administration for its claim to maintain control both over the timetable and the scope
523 Elmusa, Sharif S. and Mahmud El-Jaafari. “Power and Trade. The Israeli-Palestinian Economic 
Protocol" in Journal of Palestine Studies 24, 2 1995: p. 23.
524 Ibid: p. 29.
525 Andoni, Lamis. “Redefining Oslo. Negotiating the Hebron Protocol" in Journal of Palestine 
Studies 26, 3 1997: p. 17.
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of future withdrawals. The Hebron negotiations were made difficult by the fact that 
there is an Israeli settlement in the centre of Hebron’s old city. Under the Oslo 
Accords the issue of settlements is a final status issue. The Palestinian side agreed in 
the Oslo Accords not to negotiate the dismantlement of settlements during the 
interim negotiations. However the importance of the Hebron protocol as far as the 
new situation under the Likud government at the time was concerned, lies not the fact 
that 20 percent of the city remain under Israeli control, but in the fact that the Likud 
government agreed to cede 80 percent of the city and to transfer it to Palestinian 
autonomy. The significance of the Hebron protocol for the need to develop a 
Palestinian state structure however is that further problems have been put in its way. 
Especially the Israeli control of the timetable and extent of withdrawals means that 
there are no guarantees or safeguards that the PA will get full control over the West 
Bank in the near future. The aspiration of the Palestinian society to express their 
political identity is therefore further restricted.
The Wye River Memorandum of September 1998 and the Sharm El-Sheikh 
memorandum of October 1999 are basically agreements about the implementation of 
the earlier Oslo and Cairo agreements. In the Wye River memorandum Israel agreed 
to redeploy from a further 13 % of the West Bank, to allow the Gaza airport to open 
and to create a "safe passage’ for Palestinians between the Gaza Strip and the West 
Bank, and to release some Palestinian prisoners. In return, the Palestinian Authority 
agreed to revise the PLO Charter and to erase the passages which call for the 
destruction of Israel. In addition the Palestinian side agreed to reduce the number of 
Palestinian policemen and to make further efforts in the control of Palestinian 
terrorist activities. However on the 2nd of November 1998 the Netanyahu government 
stopped the implementation of the agreement, the day the agreement was scheduled 
to be implemented. The Sharm El-Sheikh memorandum between the Palestinian
233
Authority and the Barak government was in large parts a reiteration of the Wye River 
memomrandum. Again Israel agreed to a phased redeployment of further territories 
of the West Bank, the release of Palestinian prisoners, the creation of a ‘safe 
passage’, and the resumption of the final status negotiations which were stopped 
under the Netanyahu government. The only new item on this list was that Israel 
allowed the beginning of the construction of the Gaza Sea Port. In return the 
Palestinian Authority agreed to further increase its efforts in the fight against 
terrorism. The safe passage route between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank which
allows the connection between the different ‘islands’ of Palestinian controlled areas
was subsequently opened. However the transit of the safe passage route is tightly 
controlled by Israel. Palestinians have to apply to the Israeli authorities for magnetic 
passes in order to be able to use this transit passage. The passage is only open twice a 
week and any Palestinian travelling on this route must keep within a time limit.
Seen as a package all agreements analysed here enable the Palestinian society 
to start establishing a structure which would allow a free expression of their political 
identities.'The agreements recognise the Palestinians as ‘a people’ and as having 
rights to self determination. However the agreements put severe hurdles in the way of 
future Palestinian state building. There are political constraints (the control and 
jurisdiction over territory is limited) and economic restraints (the Palestinian 
economy will remain dependent on the Israeli economy). The main drawback 
however is the postponing of the most important issues as far as the state building 
process is concerned, until the final status negotiations. This situations coupled with 
the missing of any safeguards against Israeli unilateral actions which could create 
facts on the ground needs to be examined in more detail. The next part of this section 
of the chapter will look at this problem. The main focus will be on analysing how the
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‘Peace Process’ developed on the ground and what effect these agreements had on 
the lives of the Palestinian population.
LIIL The ‘Peace Process9 and its Implications for the
Palestinian Population
The ‘Peace Process’ had a profound impact on the lives of the Palestinian society in 
the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The fact that the first Palestinian entity in the 
territory of the former Palestine since 1948 was created is the one of the most 
important aspects of the ‘Peace Process’. Now the question is what form it will have 
and if the PA will be capable and allowed to transform itself into a state structure. 
The problem is, however, that “the agreement does not define the political nature or 
territorial extension of the future Palestinian entity“526. What form this entity will 
take depends to a large extend on the development of the ‘Peace Process’ and on the 
Israeli side’s willingness to let the PA progress towards statehood.527 Among the 
issues that lie ahead in the future negotiation process are: economic development of 
the autonomous areas, the problem of the Palestinian refugees, the external security 
of the autonomous areas (and connected with it the future position of the Israeli 
settlements). The outcome of the negotiations on these issues will depend to some 
extent on the Israeli governments the PA will negotiate with. These issues will now 
be reviewed individually.
526 Butenschon, Nils A. “The Oslo Agreement. From the White House to Jabal Abu Ghnheim“ in 
Giacaman, George and Dag Jorund Lonning (eds) “After Oslo. New Realities, Old Problems “ 
(London: Pluto Press, 1998): p. 19.
527 The PA’s internal challenges will be analysed in the next section of this chapter.
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Economy and Water
The economic situation in the autonomous areas is at a very precarious stage. As a 
World Bank report for 1996 states: “The estimates reveal an economy operating 
under stress44528. Especially hard hit by this development was the Gaza Strip. Here the 
economic decline did not begin only in 1994. It started already in 1982 and was 
accelerated during the intifada and in the aftermath of the Gulf War . The main
reasons for this decline were the drastic cut in the number of permits issued for
workers from Gaza who worked in Israel and the loss of remittances from the
Palestinian guest workers in the Gulf who were expelled after the conflict ended. The 
amount of remittances lost amounted to $ 350 million in 1991 alone. “The steady 
sealing of the Israeli market to Arab labour, especially since the start of the gulf 
crisis, proved most damaging for the Gaza economy given its inordinate dependence 
on employment inside Israel44529. After the implementation of the interim agreements, 
the situation did not change. The use of closures in the West Bank and Gaza did not 
only disrupt the flow of labour but also the flow of goods between Israel and the 
autonomous areas. “The progressively more severe ‘closures’ imposed on Gaza and 
the West Bank not only restricted the flow of workers, but also impended - 
sometimes even halted - the movement of merchandise form the PNA into or through 
Israel"530.
Other problematic issues are the allocation of water quotas and the control of 
water resources. The current situation is characterised by an imbalance of water 
allocation and water pricing between the Palestinian and Israeli side. “While a 
Palestinian uses on average 107-156 cubic meters (cm)/year, an Israeli uses 370 528 529
528 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. “The Palestinian Economy. Excerpts form a World Bank 
Report44 in Palestine-Israel Journal 5, 1 1998: p. 108.
529 Roy, Sarah. “Separation or Integration. Closure and the Economic Future of the Gaza Strip 
Revisited44 in The Middle East Journal 48, 1 1994: p. 14.
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cm/year, and a Jewish settler uses between 605-1,714 cm/year“530 31. The imbalance is 
also reflected in the pricing system. Israelis pay $ 0.40 per cubic metre for domestic 
use and $ 0.16 per cubic meter for agricultural use, the Palestinian standard rate is 
$1.20 per cubic meter. If this imbalance is to be changed, so argues Soffer, the only 
possibility will be to introduce desalination in the future because both Israeli and 
Palestinian water demands will grow. “At this point Israel is the only developed state 
in the Jordan Basin. On this account, demands are being made on Israel to be the first 
to enter the age of desalination and to revolutionize its economy”532. The change in 
distribution and pricing of water is especially important for the autonomous areas 
since their economy is based largely on agriculture. The higher price the Palestinian 
agricultural industry has to pay is a burden on the competitiveness of their produce.
Palestinian Refugees in the Diaspora
The status of the Palestinian refugees in the diaspora has not been addressed in the 
interim agreements. It has been postponed until the final status negotiations. 
Therefore “political progress on the Palestinian refugee issue verges on the 
nonexistent, both in the multilateral and bilateral tracks of the peace process”533. 
Brynen argues that under no conceivable circumstances will the Israeli state agree to 
a large scale return of refugees form 1948. “No Israeli government ever will 
countenance substantially changing the demographic balance of the state, the raison 
d’etre of which is its Jewish character”534. The second possible route is also difficult.
530 Awartani, Hisham and Ephraim Kleiman. “Economic Interactions among Participants in the Middle 
East Peace Process" in The Middle East Journal 51,2 1997: p. 223.
531 Issac, Jad. “A Palestinian Perspective on the Water Crisis" in Palestine-Israel Journal 5, 1 1998: p.
55. .
532 Soffer, Amon. “The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict over Water Resources" in Palestine-Israel Journal 
5, 1 1998: p. 50.
533 Brynen, Rex. “Imagining A Solution: Final Status Arrangements and Palestinian Refugees in 
Lebanon" in Journal of Palestine Studies 26, 2 1997: p. 42.
534 Ibid: p. 45.
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Compensation payments would amount to several tens of billions of dollars. In 
addition to this, little attention has been paid to what possible resources might be 
available for the payments. The approaches of the Israeli and Palestinian side towards 
the problem of refugees are different. As Zureik argues, the Israeli approach to the 
problem seems to be informed by a liberal model. “Thus, each refugee case is treated 
individually, without considering the relevance of group membership to refugee 
rights. When refugee rights clash with state rights, the liberal model accedes primacy 
to the state“535 536. The Palestinian side’s approach seems to be informed by a 
communitarian model which sees the refugees as a group from which the individuals 
define their identity and status. This view of the problem, so argues Zureik, is 
supported by UN General Assembly Resolution 194, which treats the refugees as a 
group and not as individuals. However, by accepting the Madrid formula for the 
‘Peace Process’ which excluded the UN as a mechanism for solving the problem of 
the refugees (and set up its own Refugee Working Group instead), the Palestinian 
side has “seriously weakened their demand for the implementation of the right of 
return" . The issue of the refugees remains therefore unresolved. This puts a severe 
restriction on the efforts of Palestinian state building since large parts of Palestinian 
society are forced to remain in exile.
External Security and Israeli Settlements
Both external security and the connected issue of the Israeli settlements have been 
postponed until the final status negotiations. During the interim period the PA is only 
responsible for internal security and the prevention of terrorist attacks against Israel. 
The internal security arrangements are however limited to Palestinians only.
535 Zureik, Elia. “Palestinian Refugees and Peace“ in Journal of Palestine Studies 24, 1 1994: p. 16.
536 Ibid: p. 16f.
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Settlements, Israeli citizens and foreigners are excluded. In addition, the large 
Palestinian police force that was created for the task is a heavy economic burden on 
the economy in the autonomous areas. “The highly visible police and intelligence 
services consumed a large share of the self-rule administration’s meager financial 
resources64537. One factor that will be decisive for the external security of a future 
Palestinian state is the issue of the Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip and the West 
Bank. All the settlements and bypass roads in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are 
currently fully under Israeli control. If these settlements and roads remain under
Israeli jurisdiction a future Palestinian state would not have territorial continuity. De 
Jong speaks of a ‘cantonisation’ of the Palestinian areas. He sees six cantonal clusters 
emerging: Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jericho, Hebron, and the Gaza Strip. This
cantons would remain largely unconnected. In addition to this, “the Palestinian 
clusters will be subject to a territorial fragmentation, much more serious then appears 
at first sight. The consolidation of Jewish settlement blocs strongly prejudices what 
cohesively remains for the Palestinian areas in between66538. The settlements and their 
bypass roads would cut the six cantons into smaller parts. The main Palestinian 
thoroughfare from Jenin and Nablus in the north to Hebron and Dhahriya in the south 
is intersected at various points by the bypass roads and military checkpoints. 
Therefore any territorial sovereignty of a future Palestinian state would be severely
limited from the outset.
The ‘Peace Process’ enabled the Palestinian society to create an autonomous entity in 
the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank. However the PA which developed since 
1994 faces serious external challenges. It is confronted with a precarious economic * 3
537 Weinberger, Naomi. “The Palestinian National Security Debate" in Journal of Palestine Studies 24,
3 1995: p. 22.
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situation made more difficult by an imbalance of water allocation and pricing 
between Israelis and Palestinians. In addition, large segments of Palestinian society 
still live as refugees outside the autonomous areas. Another unresolved question is 
the issue of external security and the status of the Israeli settlements in the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip. These problems are coupled with the serious delay in the 
timetable set out in the Oslo Accords. This in addition with the continuing expansion 
of Israeli settlements in the West Bank make future negotiations over final status 
issues very difficult. However the external constrains imposed on the PA are only 
one part of the problem. In the next section of this paper the internal constrains that 
the PA itself is imposing on the Palestinian society are analysed. The main focus here 
will be to see if the PA is willing and able to let a democratic structure evolve in 
which a Palestinian civil society could develop and political identities could be 
expressed.
II. Internal Constrains on the Palestinian Society
The main internal constrains that prevent a free development of Palestinian political 
identities are: the autocratic and neopatrimonial structure of the PA, the weak 
political institutions (especially the Palestinian Legislative Council PLC in contrast 
to the Executive Authority), the constrained development of civil society and 
democracy, the newly established internal security services, and the problem of legal 
reform. These issues will now be analysed individually.
538 De Jong op. cit.'. p. 104.
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The Structure of the PA
After the establishment of the PA in 1994, two issues have been pointed out by
critics examining the structure of the Palestinian elite: the personal leadership style of
Yassir Arafat, and connected with this the neopatrimonial structure of elite formation
in the PA. As Brynen argues the “members of the PA appointed (or apparently
appointed) are hardly reflective of the broad scope of Palestinian society in a
statistical sense“539. There is a disproportionate representation of middle-class
professionals and traditional elites, and no members of the opposition. The bulk of
members are from Fateh or pro-Fateh independents. However, taken as a whole the
elite structure is heterogeneous, “characterised by a multiplicity of sources,
overlapping ‘elite-types’ and multiple potential lines of elite cleavage“540. Cohesion
depends on Yassir Arafat’s charismatic leadership which is able to command
legitimacy and influence over all political power structures. Brynen calls the structure
that has been set up a “charismatic autocracy“541 542. Arafat managed to bind all decision
making power to the presidency and more concretely to his person because “any
devolution of political and economic decision-making would weaken is ability to
manage both elites and mass constituencies64542. In order to achieve this, Arafat has,
to a large extent, relied on political patronage and neopatrimonialism.543 Brynen sees
this structure as an internal function of the PLO which enabled Arafat to
accommodate the various groups and factions that make up the PLO structure. It can
be seen as “a direct outgrowth of the 1968 takeover by the resistance movements of
539 Brynen, Rex. “The Dynamics of Palestinian Elite Formation" in Journal of Palestine Studies 24, 3
1995: p. 38. }
540 Ibid: p. 40. j
541 Ibid: p. 41. i
542 Brynen, Rex. “The Neopatrimonial Dimension of Palestinian Politics" in Journal of Palestine
Studies 25, 1 1995: p. 32.
543 Brynen defines the term ‘neopatrimonialism’ following Weber as: a political structure where the
power of the ruler is extended through a complex network of functionaries and subfunctionaries. This
informal legal structure is overlaid by the structure of a state. See: ibid: p. 24f. i
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the PLO“544. This system of trying to accommodate various factions by political 
patronage has been translated into the political structure of the PA. One could argue 
that such an elite based social and political structure would be best for a transitional 
period. It does provide stability at a time of deep transformations in society and in the 
political system. However, as Sabella points out:
“the overwhelming participation of Palestinians in the election for the 
Administrative 'Legislative ’ Council and for the president of the PNA, on 20 
■January 1996, is proof of exactly the opposite point of view, the need for 
democratic and pluralistic systems that would secure the needed stability for 
the society and for the governing authority. Thus exit and opinion polls 
conducted prior to and on election day show Palestinian voter expectations 
for an open and free system ofgovernance “545.
These reflections point towards the society’s need to express multiple political 
identities. The present structure, although guaranteeing a certain coherence on the 
level of the political elites cannot be said to accommodate this need. How strong the 
elite structure is in the PA’s political system and what an overwhelming position the 
presidency commands will become clearer when the institutional arrangements 
(especially the role of the PLC) are examined.
Institutional Arrangements: The Role of the Palestinian Legislative Council PLC 
The Palestinian Legislative Council PLC was elected on the 20th of January 1996. 
The timing of the elections was a crucial fact, partly determining the role the PLC 
would be allowed to play in the Palestinian political system under autonomy. The
544 Hilal, Jamil. “PLO Institutions: The Challenge Ahead" in Journal of Palestine Studies 23, 1 1993: 
p. 55.
545 Sabella, Bernard. “Political Trends and the New Elites in Palestine" in Palestinian Academic 
Society of the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA). “Palestine, Jordan, Israel. Building a Base
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elections took place after the establishment of the executive branch of government 
(as was laid out in the Oslo Accords). This had a particular effect on the role of the 
opposition. “Prior to the elections the National Authority, as the acting government, 
was able to weaken the radical Islamic opposition when the latter tried to challenge 
its authority, and succeeded in establishing itself as the only central power“546 547 548 549. This 
weakening of the opposition had two connected effects. Firstly, it marginalised the 
Islamic opposition and made it therefore harder to control its military wings. 
Secondly, the opposition boycotted the elections of 1996. This was a particularly 
serious failure of the political system. By failing to incorporate the Islamic opposition 
(apart form a couple of Islamists who ran as independent candidates) the PA did not 
achieve legitimisation from this part of the Palestinian society. Therefore it is left 
with the same dilemma it faced before the elections: “the opposition does not 
recognise the legitimacy of the authority, thus reject being a ‘loyal’ opposition44547.
The elections reflected this situation. The Fateh movement won 57 seats in
the PLC, independent candidates (most of the pro-Fateh) won 40 seats in the council 
and 3 seats went to opposition parties. It has been argued that the election system has 
contributed to the sweeping victory of Fateh, since it disadvantaged small parties and 
independent candidates.548 “It is evident that the methods used led to significant 
distortions in the relative representation of the various segments of the 
population44549. The parallel elections of the president ended with a victory for Yassir
for Common Scholarship and Understanding in the New Era of the Middle East" (Jerusalem: PASSIA 
Publications, 1997): p. 239.
546 Hilal, Jamil. “The Effect of the Oslo Agreement on the Palestinian Political System" in Giacaman, 
George and Dag Jorund Lonning (eds) "After Oslo. New Realities, Old Problems " (London: Pluto 
Press, 1998): p. 123.
547 Lindholm Schulz, Helena. “One Year into Self-Government. Perceptions of the Palestinian Elite" 
(Jerusalem: PASSIA Publications, 1995): p. 28.
548 The West Bank and the Gaza Strip were split up into 16 electoral districts, which were allotted a 
number of candidates according to the size of the population. Whichever candidates got the most votes 
were elected to the PLC.
549 Ghanem, As’ad. “Founding Elections in a Transitional Period. The first Palestinian General 
Elections" in The Middle East Journal 50, 4 1996: p. 527.
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Arafat. He could claim 87.1 percent of the vote. His only challenger, Samiha Kahlil 
claimed 12.9 percent. Starting with its inaugural session in March 1996, the PLC 
meets weekly. However the influence of the PLC on the executive authority (the 
‘presidency’) is limited. In its first year of existence, it passed 135 resolutions, none 
of which were implemented. The PLC also tried to pass a Basic Law, that would act 
as a transitional constitution for the interim period. However after the first reading it 
was referred to the ‘president’ and made no further progress. This “leaves the 
Palestinian areas with no legal framework to regulate the various aspects of 
Palestinian life and to ensure a more than superficial separation of powers and 
accountability44550. This failure of a proper separation of powers is reflected in the 
fact that the PLC had no yet access to the full government budget. “The overall 
budget has not been discussed, the budgets of each individual ministry have been 
presented and discussed extensively44551. One can therefore argue that the PLC can 
not fulfil its duty to hold the executive authority accountable. “The PA with its 
various ministries and departments, continues to operate without serious restrains445 52.
Abu-Amr sees eight reasons for the weakness of the PLC553: 1) it has no 
clearly defined mandate, 2) the elections were valued less for their democratic 
significance than for their political value (they enabled further troop redeployments 
by Israel), 3) most social, economic, and political forces in the Palestinian society are 
weak and are absent from the PLC, 4) the power balance is in favour of the executive 
authority; it was therefore able to marginalise the PLC, 5) the individualistic 
leadership of Yassir Arafat, 6) the Fateh majority prevents a head on confrontation 
with the executive authority, 7) a sense of frustration among the members 550 551 552
550 Abu-Amr, Ziad. “The Palestinian Legislative Council. A Critical Assessment*1 in Journal of 
Palestine Studies 26, 4 1997: p. 91.
551 Ashrawi, Hanan. “Guarded Optimist on the Peace Process. An Interview with Hanan Ashrawi“ in 
Journal of Palestine Studies 26, 3 1997: p. 84.
552 Abu-Amr (1997) op. cit.: p. 91.
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themselves, and 8) Israel’s frequent refusal to give permits to members of the PLC so 
that they can travel to the sessions (several times the necessary quorum was 
prevented this way). One other reason has to be added to these. Speaking of the 
Palestinian opposition movement in general, Malki observes: “The Palestinian 
opposition lacks experience; it does not know how to behave as an opposition, or 
how to play the role properly. This lack of experience leads to the confusion that is 
reflected in the opposition’s statements41554. The PLC, one of the central institutions 
in which Palestinian society which could potentially express a multitude of political 
identities, can therefore be seen as failing to fulfil this function. It has already been
pointed out that one of the reasons for the weakness of the PLC is the weakness of
the structures of Palestinian civil society. The reasons for this weakness deserve a 
more detailed analysis.
Civil society and Democracy
As Tamari shows, Palestinian civil society is historically characterised by two deep 
divisions: a localised consciousness, based on clan structures, and a divide between 
the inside (inside the occupied territories) and the outside (exile) leadership.553 554 55 A 
third divide has to be added to this: the divide between secular and Islamic forces
(although it can be argued that this divide is sometimes blurred). These divisions 
translate into different political identities. “The diversity of political views among 
Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza suggests the existence of a highly
553 See: Ibid: pp. 93-95.
554 Malki, Riad. “The Opposition and its Role in the Peace Process. A Palestinian Perspective" in 
Palestinian Academic Society of the Study of International Affairs (P ASSI A) "Palestine, Jordan, 
Israel. Building a Base for Common Scholarship and Understanding in the New Era of the Middle 
East" (Jerusalem: PASSIA Publications, 1997): p. 40.
555 See: Tamari, Salim. “Government and Civil Society in Palestine" in Palestinian Academic Society 
of the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) "Palestine, Jordan, Israel. Building a Base for 
Common Scholarship and Understanding in the New Era of the Middle East" (Jerusalem: PASSIA 
Publications, 1997): pp. 213-217.
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pluralistic body politic44556. This pluralism can only be expressed and protected by 
democratic structures. Therefore 44in the Palestinian case, the question concerning the 
prospects for the development of civil society can be rephrased as a question 
concerning the prospects of democracy in Palestinian society44557. We have already 
seen that the ‘parliament’, the PLC, is in a ‘weak’ institutional position. In addition 
the PA, far from encouraging civil society, seeks to constrain it.
“Holding the view that the requirements of democracy may contradict those 
of national reconstruction, and that in the early stages of state building it is 
more important to assert the state’s right to monopolize power and eliminate
competitors for the people’s loyalty than to democratize the system, the PA
adopted undemocratic policies aimed at ‘protecting’ the peace process and 
the process of national reconstruction “558.
Non Governmental Organisations (NGO), already weakened by the partial loss of 
financial resources due to the Gulf War, found themselves without foreign financial
resources. The donor focus shifted towards the PA and its institutions. “The shift in
priorities not only weakened the institutions of civil society, but also served to 
strengthen the ability of the PA to contain and, if necessary, emasculate these 
institutions44559. Civil liberties have been weakened especially since the establishment 
of military courts in February 1995 (aimed against Hamas and Islamic Jihad). These 
courts allow secret evidence to be presented. Legal representation is not always 
provided and the ‘president’ can weaken or stiffen the sentences. “Several people, 
including opposition figures not directly involved in attacks against Israel have been * * *
556 Ross, Lauren G. and Nadar Izzat Sa’id. “Polling Arab Views on the Conflict with Israel. 
Palestinians. Yes to Negotiations, Yes to Violence" in Middle East Quarterly 2,2 1995: p. 22.
557 Giacaman, George. “In the Throes of Oslo. Palestinian Society, Civil Society and the Future41 in 
Giacaman, George and Dag Jorund Lonning (eds) "After Oslo. New Realities, Old Problems " 
(London: Pluto Press, 1998): p. 11.
558 Shikaki, Khalil. “The Peace Process, National Reconstruction, and the Transition to Democracy in 
Palestine" in Journal of Palestine Studies 25, 2 1996: p. 9.
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convicted by these courts44560. Mass arrests of opposition leaders after an attack 
against Israel are frequently ordered. These arrests are exercised without charge or 
trial. “Many people complained of torture, and several suspects died in jail during 
interrogations44561. This in turn delegitimises the PA, which, by enforcing or claiming 
to enforce Israel’s security imperatives, is suppressing its own people.
Another factor weakening the democratic structures and civil society is the media law 
from July 1995. This allows the Minister of Information and Culture “to ban any 
Palestinian publication that ‘jeopardises national unity’44 . No definition of the term 
‘jeopardises’ was given. This law seriously challenges the freedom of the press and
weakens therefore the growth of the Palestinian civil society.
The role of women in Palestinian is another factor which needs to analysed. 
During the intifada women took an active role in the uprising.559 560 561 562 563 564 65 56They were therefore 
able to establish free spaces of their own activity which gave them a certain amount 
of autonomy. However, “there is no doubt that the worsening economic conditions, 
have greatly diminished the options available to women. So, too has the shift from 
popular organizing to state formation445 64. The fact that only a handful women565 
serve in elite positions in the PA points to the fact that women “are still considered 
subordinate members of the nation [...] the gap between men’s and women’s roles, 
and women’s subordinate status, are maintained445 66.
559 Ibid: p. 10.
560 Ibid: p. 10.
561 Ibid: p. 10.
562 Usher, Graham “The Politics of Internal Security. The Palestinian Authority’s New Security 
Services" in Giacaman, George and Dag Jorund Lonning (eds) “After Oslo. New Realities, Old 
Problems" (London: Pluto Press, 1998): p. 151.
563 For an analysis of the view of women in the Palestinian national narrative before and during the 
intifada see: Massad, Joseph. “Conceiving the Masculine. Gender and Palestinian Nationalism" in The 
Middle East Journal 49, 3 1995.
564 Berger Gluck, Shema. “Palestinian Women. Gender Politics and Nationalism" in Journal of 
Palestine Studies 24, 3 1995: p. 13.
565 Only four women were appointed to the more than three hundred slots in the technical committees 
after the Madrid conference. See Ibid: p. 11.
566 Massad op. cit.'. p. 483.
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To sum up, it can be argued that Palestinian civil society is not supported by a 
strong democratic structure. The weakening of the NGOs, the military courts, the 
media law, and the continued subordinate role of women all serve to strengthen the 
executive authority in the autonomous areas by marginalising developments that 
would help a civil society to grow. The different mechanisms that weaken the 
development of a Palestinian civil society are supported by a strong internal security 
and police apparatus.
The Internal Security Apparatus
In the Oslo Accords it was agreed that the PA is responsible for the internal security 
inside the autonomous areas (excluding the settlements, Israeli citizens, and 
foreigners). One of the central aims of this was to prevent terrorist attacks on Israel. 
To fulfil this commitment a network of different security, intelligence, and police 
agencies has been created. These security agencies consist of the General Security 
Service (GSS), the Preventive Security Force (PSF), the Presidential Guard 
(PG)/Force 17, the Special Security Force (SSF), and a host of police forces. These 
are of special concern because of their “amorphousness, and lack of terms of 
reference, which makes it impossible to define their different responsibilities14567. 
Since their tasks are not clearly defined and since some of them do technically not 
exist either under the Oslo agreement or even according to the PA, “they are in a very 
precise legal sense lawless and boundless both in the occupied territories and the 
autonomous areas445 68.
The initial impression that these services gave was positive. They filled the 
security vacuum that was left after the Israeli military redeployed. “At the time these *
567 Usher Graham “The Politics of Internal Security. The PA’s New Intelligence Services" in Journal 
of Palestine Studies 25, 2 1996: p. 24.
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forces were able to discharge their duties without transgressing the rights of the 
public. It is true that the lack of preparation robbed them of the aura of authority, but 
still the initial impression was positive44569. They seem to have three main tasks: 1) 
They act as a police force. This includes the fight against crime, intervening in clan 
or family disputes and punishing those who are accused of ‘moral offences’ such as 
drug-taking or prostitution. 2) “The PSF especially seems to have assumed powers to 
solve the ‘unfinished business’ of Palestinian collaborators’ [...] despite the
‘amnesty’ pledge in the Cairo agreement, the PA’s public stance vis-a-vis 
collaboration, both past and present, is that the guilty will be punished as traitors44570. 
3) They also are in charge of internal surveillance of Palestinian political opposition. 
All these three tasks are accomplished without any legal basis to restrain and guide 
the agencies actions. This leads to frequent disregard for suspects human or civil 
rights. These violations seriously constrain the freedom of civil society in the 
autonomous areas to develop a politically pluralistic environment. The actions of the 
internal security services should be based on a legal framework. However the issue of 
legal reform is in itself a problem that weakens the position of Palestinian civil 
society.
The Problem of Legal Reform
“Creating a viable legal system in Palestine is among the most daunting yet generally 
unrecognized tasks of the Palestinian Authority445 71. The main problem is that there 
are several distinctly different legal codes operating in the Gaza Strip and the West 
Bank. “The judicial system contains a hodgepodge of British, Jordanian, and Israeli 568 * 570 571
568 Ibid: p. 24f.
559 Abu-Amr, Ziad. “Report from Palestine" in Journal of Palestine Studies 24, 2 1995: p. 42.
570 Usher (1996) op. cit.: p. 25.
571 Robinson, Glenn E. “The Politics of Legal Reform in Palestine44 in Journal of Palestine Studies 27,
1 1997: p. 51.
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laws“572. Until 1948, both areas were under the same legal code: Ottoman law before 
and British law during the Mandate. However, after 1948 the West Bank was under
Jordanian jurisdiction. Jordanian law was extended to the entire West Bank at the 
time it was annexed by Jordan in 1950. The Gaza Strip came under Egyptian control. 
Egypt left the existing legal code in its place, without any changes. After the 
occupation of both areas in 1967, the Israeli government left the different legal 
systems in place and established a military jurisdiction that took most cases from the 
civil Palestinian courts. “By the time of the Oslo accords, neither area possessed any 
mechanisms for legal development or for adopting new laws; in neither area did the 
law in any way reflect the changing needs of the society it served“573. The problem is 
now that Gaza has a legal system based in large part on the British common law 
tradition while the West Bank’s legal code is informed by continental law tradition. 
The fact that the Palestinian negotiators undertook the obligation in the Gaza-Jericho 
agreement to leave all Israeli military orders in place complicates the legal system
even further.
Robinson sees three main obstacles to a legal reform in the autonomous areas: 
1) The divergence in the legal code which has the effect that one set of civil servants 
probably will have to completely revise their legal knowledge. 2) The unconsolidated 
lines of authority in the legal field present a difficulty. It is far from clear if the 
attorney general in the Gaza Strip is also responsible for the West Bank. In addition 
to this two chief justices (one for Gaza and one for the West Bank) and a minister of 
justice have been appointed. However under the British common law tradition in 
Gaza, the chief justice makes the post of minister of justice in principle redundant. 
“This lack of clear hierarchy has meant that there is a an inordinate amount of
572 Segal, Aaron. “Is Palestine Viable?" in Middle East Quarterly 3,4 1996: p. 32.
573 Robinson op. cit.: p. 53.
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political jockeying among different players within the legal establishment44574. 3) The 
overall lack of clarity and jurisdiction complicates the situation further. “Uncertainty 
about legal jurisdiction plagues both legal communities. For example, while Gaza 
law has been applied in select cases in the West Bank, there is no uniformity in its 
application44575. Two more factors add to the complexity of the problem. Firstly, “no 
legal actor has the authority to implement decisions not deemed compatible with the 
security interests at the highest levels of the PA44576. The second factor is the practice 
of customary law. As Frisch shows, customary laws (rules regulating clan fights and 
family disputes, ect.) which are outside the ‘normal’ jurisdiction are practised in the 
autonomous areas. They “provide a an alternative legal system to the civil courts445 77. 
The legal system in the autonomous areas can therefore be described as consisting of 
several sometimes contradictory legal codes and legal traditions. Such a system with 
its lack of clarity, hierarchy and jurisdiction cannot serve as a firm basis on which a 
civil society can be built. The difficult legal situation narrows the legal space in 
which political identities can be meaningfully expressed.
The emphasis of this section of the chapter was on the analysis of the internal 
constrains that the Palestinian society is facing. It was shown that the neopatrimonial 
elite structure, Arafat’s personal leadership style, the weakness of the PLC (the 
central institution in which political identities could be expressed in the state 
structure), the weak position of the civil society and democratic structures, the 
unrestrained actions of the security services, and the difficult and unclear legal 
system all serve to hinder the growth of a social and political structure in which
574 Ibid: p. 55.
575 Ibid: p. 56.
576 Ibid: p. 56.
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political identities could be meaningfully expressed. The Palestinian’s need to 
express the plurality of their political identities within the structure of the 
autonomous areas is therefore to a large extent denied. These structures show one 
consistent pattern: The executive authority is strengthened, possible political 
identities which could serve as an opposition to the executive authority have only a 
weak and severely constricted space in which they can be expressed.
The central aim of this chapter was to analyse the constraints that are imposed on the 
Palestinian society’s process of building up and expressing its multitude of political 
identities. Since the social and political structures of a society are central to its 
expression of political identities, these were the main focus of this chapter. In a first 
step the history of the Palestinian movement was analysed. This historical 
background was necessary in order to be able to explain what external constrains are 
imposed on Palestinian society.
In the short historical overview it has become clear that the Oslo Accords of
1993 and the subsequent agreements between the PLO and the state of Israel have 
been negotiated at a time, when the national movement was in a deep crisis. Since 
1982 the leadership has been acting from outside the immediate region in Tunis. 
Coupled with this geographical distance was the fact that a new, alternative 
leadership developed inside the occupied territories which asserted itself during the 
intifada. In addition to this, the loss of financial and international support for the 
movement after the Gulf War meant that by the early 1990s the PLO was in a deep
internal and external crisis.
The Oslo Accords and the interim agreements, while for the first time 
acknowledging the Palestinian’s as ‘a people’ with legitimate rights, put a series of
577 Frisch, Hillel. “Modem Absolutism or Neopatriachal State Building? Customary Law, Extended 
Families, and the Palestinian Authority" in International Journal of Middle East Studies 29 1997: p.
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external constrains on the new Palestinian entity. The postponement of issues that are 
central for a future statehood to the final status negotiations while having no 
safeguards against unilateral actions by the state of Israel is the most serious 
constrain that could endanger the possibility of the entity to develop into a future 
state structure. These issues are among a host of external constrains: the deteriorating 
economic situation, the unequal distribution and pricing of water, the 
unacknowledged problem of the Palestinian refugees, the unsolved question of 
external security and the independent status of Israeli settlements (part of this
problem is the futures status of Jerusalem). All these issues constrain the Palestinian 
society’s expression of its political identities.
However in addition, there are also serious internal constraints. These internal
problems are: the neopatrimonial character of the Palestinian elite structure, the 
personalised leadership of Yassir Arafat, the weakness of the PLC (the central 
institution for an expression of political identities), the weak democratic structures 
and resulting from this the weak Palestinian civil society, the unrestrained actions 
and proliferation of internal security agencies, and the multitude of difficult, unclear 
and overlapping legal systems in the autonomous areas. All these external and 
internal constrains taken together serve as a network for the continuing restrained 
imposed on a free expression of political identities in Palestinian society.
The next chapter will attempt to analyse comparatively Israeli and Palestinian 
societies and their different identity groups as well as the actions and interactions of 
these groups on the three levels of social interaction, the substate level, the state level 
and the supra-state level. Here the identity model developed in the first part of the 
thesis will be used to analyse the developments in both societies.
346.
253
Political Identity Building in Israeli and
Palestinian Society: A Comparison
In the previous two chapters of this thesis we have looked at the historical and 
political development of Israeli and Palestinian society separately. During this 
discussions the main aspects of political identity building have already been roughly 
outlined. It has been shown that Israeli and Palestinian society have both developed a 
serious internal identity crisis which was aggravated by the peace process itself. In 
this chapter we will now attempt an in depth, comparative analysis of political 
identity building in Israeli and Palestinian society.
The structure of this chapter follows the system developed in the theoretical 
approach to political identity building in the first part of the thesis. It will analyse the 
three different levels of political identity building, the substate level, the state level 
and the supra-state level, separately. Within each level the analysis will look at the 
six main variables, ethnicity, territoriality, history, language, religion, and gender, 
identified during the theoretical discussion, the three level model of political identity 
building. The relative weight of these factors to each other will become clear during 
the analysis. After the separate discussion of the processes of political identity 
building in Israeli and Palestinian society, the similarities and differences will be 
outlined in the concluding section of this chapter.
The chapter has five different aims. First of all. it will attempt to demonstrate 
the growing divisions within Israeli and Palestinian society. It will become clear that 
these division are reaching the stage where the coherence of Israeli and Palestinian 
society is in question. Secondly, the chapter will try to explain the genesis of these
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divisions and the reasons for their political importance. It will argue that these 
divisions have historical roots within each society but are now acquiring growing 
political importance. Thirdly, it will analyse the impact that the peace process has on 
the development of these divisions. It will be argued that while the peace process did 
not create these divisions it deepened the rifts between the different identity groups to 
a point where they are becoming mutually exclusive conceptions on what kind of 
states Israel and Palestine should be. Furthermore, because we have argued in the 
theoretical approach to political identity building that the state level is increasingly 
unable to control the pressures from the substate and the supra-state level, particular 
emphasis will be put on the analysis of this issue. While the state level and the 
concept of ‘having a state of one’s own’ is still an important part of Israeli and 
Palestinian political identities, the societal consensus of what it means to be an Israeli 
or a Palestinian is increasingly difficult to reach. It will be shown that neither the 
Israeli nor the Palestinian state level is able to effectively react to the growing 
division in each society which in turn reinforces these divisions and widens the rifts 
between the different political identity groups. Finally, in the theoretical model it was 
argued that because the reflexive self has increased his/her education and capabilities 
under the conditions of globalisation, he/she is more capable to form politically 
effective groups on the substate and on the supra-state level. Therefore special 
attention will be paid to the analysis of this point. It will be shown that in both 
societies various identity groups have formed, the most effective of which are the 
radical religious groups, which were able to establish their own independent 
educational and social institutions. We will now turn to the discussion of the
processes of political identity building on the different levels in Israeli and 
Palestinian society respectively.
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I. Political Identity in Israeli Society
LI. Substate Level: Fractures and Divisions
The internal crisis in Israeli society has been widely recognised at least since the 
beginning of the intifada. However the roots of the crisis of the Israeli state and the
slow breakdown of societal consensus can be traced back to the formation of the state
in 1948, secondly, to the 1967 war which created the basic question in Israeli society
on how to treat the occupied territories. “The war initiated a strong mobilization of 
traditional expansionist and ‘messianic’ elements in the Zionist movement. They saw 
a historical opportunity in the war gains to extend the State of Israel and shape it 
more according to their own visions“578. In addition, the Labour Industrial Complex 
(LIC), as Grinberg calls it, which was the backbone of the Israeli state until 1977, 
became more and more weakened. The marginalisation of the Histadrut is the main 
example of this development.579
The state however with its highly centralised bureaucracy remained 
unresponsive to these changes.580 This led to a new strategy for translating changes in 
society into political power. “The only real option remaining to the public was quasi 
exit [from the political system, HJS]: the establishment of alternative social systems 
which would exist side by side with the official ones“.581 At the beginning of the 
1990s the situation bordered on non-govemability. “Most of Israel’s basic problems, 
neglected for too many years, were thrown into sharp relief after the fall of the
578 Butenschon, Nils A. “The Frontier State at Work. Models of Contemporary Israeli State Building" 
in Journal of Theoretical Politics 4,4 1992: p. 429.
579 See: Grinsberg. Lev Luis. “The Crisis of Statehood. A Weak State and Strong Political Institutions 
in Israel" Journal of Theoretical Politics 5, 1 1993.
580 See: Yishai, Yael. “Interest Groups and Bureaucrats in a Party-Democracy: the Case of Israel" in 
Public Administration 70, 2 1992.
581 Lehman-Wilzig, Sam N. “Loyalty, Voice and Quasi Exit. Israel as a Case Study of Proliferating 
Alternative Politics" Comparative Politics 24, 1 1991: p. 101.
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National Unity government in March 1990“582. The two basic questions left un­
addressed were the connected problems of the nature of the relationship between the 
state and religion in Israel and the conflict with Palestinian society. This crisis of 
identity became even more pronounced since the start of the Oslo process in 1993, 
since, as I have argued in the preceding chapter on Israeli society, the peace process 
is putting the basic building blocks of the Zionist consensus into question:
“First peace itself will involve questions of essence such as withdrawal from
territories that at least some Israelis perceived as sacred. Second, the ability 
to ignore the Essence Dilemma ‘because of the situation' - an accepted
Israeli formula (or pretext) for not facing up to serious problems - would 
vanish. Third under conditions of peace, the Universalist forces will have an 
opportunity to generate a genuine debate about the fundamental problems 
that have plagued the young Israeli democracy from the start “583.
This situation aggravates the already existing tensions and frictions within Israeli 
society and leads to questions about the Israeli political identity as a group. “In Israel 
the we-feeling that stems out of the membership of a Jewish-Israeli community and 
which was held together by a national consensus is at the moment in the process of 
being differentiated into several different we-feelings“584. Here the tendencies 
towards fragmentation can be seen, as predicted in the theoretical model. Klein sees 
four main cleavages been strengthened: the national cleavage, that between Jewish 
and Arab Israelis; the ethnic cleavage between Ashkenazim and Sephardim (or 
Mizrahim); the religious cleavage between the secular and religious elements of
582 Barzilai, Gad and Yossi Shain. “Israeli Democracy at the Crossroads: A Crisis of Non- 
govemability" Government and Opposition 26, 3 1991: p. 365.
583 Peleq, Ilan. “Epilogue: The Peace Process and Israel’s Political Kulturkampf1 in Peleg, Ilan (ed) 
“The Middle East Peace Process. Interdisciplinary Perspectives" (Albany: New York State 
University Press, 1998): p. 258.
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society; and a cleavage along gender lines. The basic question that these cleavages
bring into focus is: ‘What kind of state should Israel be?’ This debate, which is more 
and more taking the form of a serious Kulturkampf584 85 586, has helped to define three 
basic positions within Israeli society: ‘right wing religious identity’, ‘mainsteam 
secularised Jewish nationalism’, and ‘left wing binationalism’. These three positions
_ roz
correspond to identity groups that have taken shape in Israel. All six variables of 
political identity building (ethnicity, territoriality, religion, language, history and 
gender) that were identified in the theoretical section take on differing values in these 
group identities. Only when we look at the six significators of political identity 
building and their meaning for the different identity groups can their different and 
incompatible answers to the question ‘What kind of state should Israel be?’ be fully 
understood. The three identity groups vary fundamentally in their interpretation and 
importance that they allocate to the elements ‘Judaism’ (defined in religious, ethnic 
and national terms) and democracy in their definition of the state. The political 
consequence of this are their different conceptions on what to do with the occupied 
territories. The three groups struggle for access to political power on the state level. 
This power struggle is reflected in the unstable government coalitions since 1996. 
However, in order to understand the political outcomes of this power struggle it is 
necessary to look at the developments and the group formations on the substate level. 
We shall examine these groups individually to see what the major elements of these 
group identities are.
584 Klein, Uta. “Zum Verhaltnis von Nationalist, Ethnizitat, Religion und Geschlecht: Spaltungen in 
der israelischen Gesellschaft“ in Berliner Debatte INITIAL 8, 1/2 1997: p. 140. [Translation by the 
author]
585 See: Holman, Sabine. “50 Jahre nach der Staatsgrtlndung. Isarel auf dem Weg in den
‘Kulturkampf? Konflikfelder in der Auseinandersetzung um nationale Identitat und regionale 
Legitimation" in Burger im Staat 48, 3 1998.
586 As will become clear during the discussion, the ‘mainstream secularised nationalism’ category is 
the largest but most diverse identity group. The ‘right-wing religious identity’ category is fairly 
coherent in its political identity and has disproportional influence in the political system. -The ‘secular 
binationalism’ category is politically the weakest.
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'Right Wing Religious Identity’
This identity group consists of several groupings which have quite different political 
outlooks. However religion, Judaism, is the central element of their political identity. 
Therefore they share the same basic conception regarding the answer to the question:
“what kind of state should Israel be?“. The common denominator is that all the
groups in this category aim for Israel to be Jewish state, even if this would imply the 
weakening or the abandonment of democratic structures and practices because the 
state would be religiously defined. In consequence all citizens that are not Jewish 
would be necessarily relegated to a secondary status. The two main groups in this 
category are the national religious settlers and the ultra-orthodox community.
The national-religious settler community587 formed after the war of 1967 to 
settle the newly occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. “The 1970s 
and 1980s were crucial [...] for it was then that Israel’s ties with the occupied 
territories were forged and a new map was effectively drawn, influenced by the new 
reality created by the Six Day War“588 589. The ideological underpinnings of the 
settlement "movement were the teachings of Rabbi Abraham Isaaac Kook and 
especially those of his son Rabbi Zvi Yehudah ha-Cohen Kook. The basic elements 
of their teachings are what Ravitzky calls ‘Messianic Religious Zionism’, a 
combination of the religious idea of redemption and the coming of the Messiah with 
the Zionist national ideology. They regard ‘“the state as the embodiment of the vision 
of Redemption’4^89. The coming of the Messiah is hastened by the settlement of the
587 Settlers are defined as those Israeli Jews that live inside the occupied territories i.e. the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip. Obviously not all of those belong to the national religious camp but there is a hard 
core in such settlements, such as Kyriat Arba or the small settlement in Hebron, which form the heart 
of the national religious community.
588 Efrat, Elisha. “Jewish Settlements in the West Bank: Past, Present and Future" in Karsh, Efraim 
(ed) "Peace in the Middle East. The Challenge for Israel" (London: Frank Cass, 1994): p. 136f.
589 Ravitzky, Aviezer. “Religious Radicalism and Political Messianism in Israel" in Sivan, Emmanuel 
and Menachem Frieman (eds) "Religious Radicalism and Politics in the Middle East" (Albany: State 
University ofNew York Press, 1990): p. 17f.
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Land of Israel, the land is redeemed. The flip side of this argument, however, means 
that if settled land is given back to non-Jewish use, the land ceases to be redeemed 
and the coming of the Messiah is in effect delayed. After the war of 1973 this 
ideology crystallised in the Gush Emunim. “GE [Gush Emunim, HJS] is a religious 
revival movement par excellence"590. It combines a mythical messianic belief system 
with a political revolutionary movement. Gush Emunim saw itself as the continuation 
of the early Zionist pioneer movement. Elyakin Ha’Etzni, one of the founders of 
Gush Emunim expresses this intimate combination: “In Judaism the national identity 
and the religious identity is one and the same. For a religious Jew Eretz Israel is a 
religious tennet [...] the Jewish nationality expressed in Zionism, the new form it 
took, drew solely from the religious symbolism"591.
The land and the nation acquire a transcendental, mythic quality. David 
Wilder , international spokesman of the Hebron community, describes the centrality 
of religion for the national religious settler movement: “Your ideology is formed to a 
very large degree by your beliefs, religious beliefs, your outlook on life, which is 
shaped by your religious persuasion. [...] Judaism is not just a religion, it is a people. 
[...] Judaism is a total way of life“592.
The central organisation of the settler communities today is the YESAH 
council of the Jewish communities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. The council is 
responsible for 144 Jewish communities in the occupied territories. Yehudit Tayar, 
spokeswoman of YESHA, highlights the importance of ethnicity in the religious
settler’s worldview:
590 Aran, Gideon. “Redemption as a Catastrophe: The Gospel of Gush Emunim" in Sivan, Emmanuel 
and Menachem Frieman (eds) “Religious Radicalism and Politics in the Middle East" (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1990): p. 159.
591 Ha’Etzni, Elyakin. Kyriat Arba, 22.03.99. [Interview with the author] The names of all the 
interviewees in this chapter are spelled following the interviewees’ personal preferences.
592 Wilder, David. Hebron, 09.02.99. [Interview by the author]
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“Judaism is not an organisation, it is what we are. It is a heritage: a present, 
a past and a future. A relationship with Jews throughout the world and it is 
what links us to this land. Judaism, unlike other religions [...] encompasses 
both an ethnic group, a religion and nationalism “ .
It has become clear that the central element of the religious nationalist identity group
is Judaism, which in one comprises a religious, ethnic and national component. The 
issue of territory flows directly from the religious messianic ideology. It has a 
mythical quality and its redemption is part of the hastening of the coming of the 
messiah. The other identity components history, language, and gender follow from 
this conception and reinforce it. Language for example is seen as the “main bridge 
[...] between the different types of Jews who come here to live or to visit“593 94. But it 
also has a religious connotation:
“The genetic code of the Jewish people is the bible and this code has an inner 
rythm. It has a tenor, it has a texture which is particularly Jewish [...] 
Language is more than a means of communication. Language is a code, it is 
an imprint"595.
The second identity group in the ‘right-wing religious identity’ category are the ultra­
orthodox communities in Israel. The Haredi communities are split up into several 
different groupings which nevertheless share the same conviction:
“The State of Israel is a religiously neutral entity, part of the secular realm 
still belonging to the age of exile [...] it should be judged [...] according to its 
concrete relationship to the Torah, and according to the attitude of its leaders 
and adherents to the precepts of the halakhah “596.
593 Tayar, Yehudit. Jerusalem, 16.03.99. [Interview by the author]
594 Tayar, Yehudit. Jerusalem, 16.03.99. [Interview by the author]
595 Ha’Etzni, Eliatkim. Kyriat Arba, 22.03.99. [Interview with the author]
596 Ravitzky, Aviezer. “Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism “ (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1993): p. 145.
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The two main groups in this sub-category define themselves according to their 
Jewish ethnicity, the Ashkenazim Haredi and the Sephardim (Oriental) Haredi. Both 
live in a chosen internal exile in the state since in principle they do not recognise the 
state’s legitimacy as a Jewish state. The only legitimate Jewish state in their eyes has 
to be based on halacha. However, they make concessions in order to take part in the 
political process of Israel. The main aim seems to be to secure state funds for their 
own separate educational and social networks. “Huge sums are laundered through the 
budgets of key ministries controlled by religious parties”597. The Haredi also fight for 
the maintenance the ‘status quo’ which makes certain allowances towards the 
religious communities.598 The Sephardim community in Israel developed its own 
political grouping in the late 1980s.599 Shas had great electoral success in the last 
elections, growing to be the third largest party in the Knesset. It also was able to 
build up a separate educational and social system for the Sephardim community 
which is by and large state funded.
At the most radical fringe of the Haredi identity group are those ultra­
orthodox Jews which see the establishment of the state of Israel as a sacrilege since 
only the Messiah can bring the Jews back from exile to the land of Israel. The 
argument is that “the physical rebuilding of the Land of Israel entails, by definition, 
spiritual decay and destruction [...] The ‘Holy Land’ sustains its holiness during the 
period of exile only by denying its very materiality”600. This group therefore does not 
take part in the political process apart from protests against state actions such as the 
opening of streets on Sabbath.
597 Silver, Eric. “Sacred and Secular in Contemporary Israel" in Political Quarterly 61,2 1990: p. 173.
598 See preceding chapter on Israeli society.
599 See: Hirschberg, Peter. “The World of Shas “ (New York: American Jewish Committee, 2000): 
http://www.ajc.org/pre/shasf.htm.
600 Ravitzky (1993) op. cit.: p. 47.
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The political identity of the Haredi identity group defines itself out of the religious 
commandments of the Torah, the Talmud and their commentaries. Everything flows 
from this. The Haredi ultimately do not give legitimacy to the Israeli state. Their
conception of a truly legitimate Jewish state is the one to be established at the end of 
the days by the Messiah himself. They feel “an existential state of alienation, both 
personal and collective, reflected in the identification of secular Jewish authority with 
the Gentile ruler“601.
Although relatively small in number, the ‘right wing religious identity’ group 
has had dis-appropriate influence on the political scene in Israel. The already 
mentioned ‘status quo’ is only the outgrowth of the “intricate connections between 
religious leaders and the leaders of the government”602. This disproportionate 
influence can partly be attributed to the fact, that the Zionist discourse had to use 
religious symbolism in order to gain legitimacy.
“From the very beginning, at least on the level of historical consciousness 
and collective identity, essential elements of the Jewish religion were 
included in this culture. The target land for immigration and settlement was 
‘Zion’, the language of the secular Zionist movement was modernised 
Hebrew, and a secularised Bible were all borrowed from the Jewish 
religion “603.
As Shahak shows, the influence of religious groups and ideas in Israeli society has 
steadily increased since the 1967 war.604 Despite the differences within this identity 
group they share the same basic tenets which puts religion at the centre of identity in
601 Ibid: p. 148.
602 Etzioni-Halevy, Eva. “The Religious Elite Connections and Some Problems of Israeli Democracy" 
in Government and Opposition 29, 4 1994: p. 477.
603 Kimmerling, Baruch. “Between Hegemony and Dormant Kulturkampf va Israel" in Israel Affairs 4, 
3/4 1998: p. 50.
604 See: Shahak, Israel. “Jewish History, Jewish Religion. The Weight of Three Thousand Years" 
(London: Pluto Press, 1997).
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general and political identity in particular. All other aspects of the political identities 
of this group are influenced by this basic assumption. In consequence, the territories 
cannot be given back. For the religious settlers they have a sacred character. The 
Haredi also support the claim of Israel for the occupied territories.605 The only 
exception here is Shas which has a changing and unclear position on this. On the one 
hand they opposed the Oslo II agreement, on the other hand, Aryeh Deri, the political 
leader of Shas, was putting pressure on Prime Minister Netanyahu to sign the Wye 
River agreement.606 This shows that there is no necessary connection between an 
ultra-orthodox political identity and intransigence as far as the peace process is 
concerned. However, Shas is not having a clear stand on the occupied territories 
since their main priority is securing state funds for their autonomous social and
educational institutions.
‘Mainstream Secularised Jewish Nationalism'
The second large identity group in Israeli society, the ‘mainstream secularised Jewish 
nationalism’ group offers a much more diffuse picture of political identities. This 
identity group is the largest of the three in Israeli society. It is located in the political 
centre of Israeli society. It is also the most diverse of the three identity groups with a 
wide spectrum of political identities. The main political identity cleavage in this 
category is between the classic political left and right wing orientation which co­
insides with the already mentioned ‘doves’ and ‘hawks’ orientation towards the 
peace process.607 Additional cleavages including that between the new immigrants 
and the olim (those who live in Israel for a longer period), or between Ashkenazim 
and Sephardim, as well as the growing social gap between the top and the bottom of
605 See preceding chapter in Israeli society.
606 See: Hirschberg op. cit.
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the income scale in Israeli society are gaining in importance, although they still seem 
to be overshadowed (and will remain until a final peace agreement with the 
Palestinians is reached) by the 4doves’-‘hawks’ division. Nevertheless, the additional 
cleavages within this category have been the basis for the emergence of several 
strong subcultures which have gained in strength in the last years, like the Sephardim 
subculture and the newly formed Russian subculture.607 08 609 * 611.
All different identity groups in this category answer the question ‘what kind
of state should Israel be?’ with the formula: ‘a democratic state with Jewish
character’, the basic consensus on how this formula can be realised however seems to
have broken down. Israeli society at large today is “on the one hand more 
individualistic, materialistic and aggressive, and on the other hand more conservative 
and traditional44609. Especially the upper class in Israeli society is strongly influenced 
by American materialism. “The innovative, revolutionary vision of the creation of a 
new, secular Israeli culture, which the pioneers had, lost more and more influence 
and substance. Lifestyle, cultural participation and consumption in the upper class 
became more and more Westernised thanks to its strong orientation on America44610.
The weakening of the classic pioneer vision of Israeli society was aided, as 
Shapira demonstrates, by its spiritual rootlessness. Because the pioneer movement 
was secular it could only relate to Jewish fate in the ‘here and now’. Therefore it was
unable to offer the individual a firm orientation in his or her worldview. This is what
Shapira calls the “spiritual-cultural narrowness of the 1948 Generation4461 1. This
607 See preceding chapter on Israeli society.
608 Veit, Winfried. “50 Jahre Israel. Ein Staat auf der Suche nach einer neuen Identitat" in
Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 3 1998: p. 279. [Translation by the author]
609 Sheffer, Gabriel. “Structural Change and Leadership Transformation" in Israel Affairs 5, 2/3 1999: 
p. 68.
6,0 Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah. “Kollektiver Symbolismus und die Krise der Demokratie: Uber die 
Auswirkungen der Ermordung Rabins auf die israelische Demokratie" in Leviathan 24,2 1996: p. 188. 
[translation by the author]
611 Shapira, Avraham. “Spiritual Rootlessness and Circumscription to the ‘Here and Now’ in the Sabra 
World View" in Israel Affairs 4, 3/4 1998: p. 126.
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transformation can also be seen in the weakening of the central historical myths of 
the pioneer society. National traditions such as the celebration of the defence of Tel 
Hai against an Arab attack by the early pioneers, the Bar Kochbar revolt or the 
defence of Masada which belong to the core of pioneer traditions, are increasingly 
being questioned. Their functions as unifying historical myths is lost in the 
discussion about the historical correctness of their representation as historical events.
“The emergence of countermemories and the greater visibility that they enjoy 
in contemporary Israeli culture have become so pronounced during the last 
two decades that Israeli discourse has labeled [sic] this phenomenon niputs 
mitosim (shattering of myths) “612.
The ‘older’ pioneering myths are replaced by the tradition of Holocaust 
remembrance. Shortly after the foundation of the state of Israel Holocaust 
remembrance was not a main part of the Israeli socialisation process. This can be 
seen in the fact that it was not taught as a separate subject in Israeli schools.613 Only 
after the Eichmann trial614 in 1961 did the Holocaust remembrance enter the realm of 
national Israeli traditions. Today, however, it provides the central legitimation for the 
state of Israel in the ‘secularised Jewish nationalism’ identity group. “The further the 
Holocaust lies in the past, the stronger it influences the Israeli consciousness and the 
process of socialisation in Israel"615.
Another central pillar of the Israeli socialisation process is also in a process of 
change, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). The “IDF after all, was not merely a
6,2 Zerubavel, Yael. "Recovered Roots. Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National 
Tradition" (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995): p. 232.
613 See: Schatzker, Chaim. “Die Bedeutung des Holocaust fiir das SelbstverstSndnis der israelischen 
Gesellschaft“ in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 15 1990.
614 Arendt discusses some of the political aspects of the Eichmann trial which was, so her argument, 
conducted in the way it was in order to demonstrate to Israeli society and the world the Holocaust in 
its totality as a historical event and not only to convict Eichmann of the crimes that he had committed. 
See: Arendt, Hannah. "Eichmann in Jerusalem. A Report on the Banality of Evil" (London: Penguin 
Books, 1992).
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fighting force, it was also - and perhaps above all else - an essential instrument for 
new Jewish ‘nation building’“615 6. Because of its structure as a ‘citizens army’, with a 
large part of it made up by reservists, the IDF is particularly vulnerable to changing 
trends in society as a whole. “In absence of domestic consensus with respect to 
security policies, however, the militia nature of such an army renders it vulnerable to 
disaffection**617.
Because of these fundamental changes, ethnicity has become the main 
defining factor for political identity in this group. This process, which started during 
the intifada, has been enhanced by the peace process and brought a new possible 
solution to the conflict between Israeli and Palestinian societies. For this group, 
“ethnic and territorial separation between Israelis and Palestinians has emerged, 
increasingly, as a more plausible method for improving Israel’s conflict management 
capacity"618. Separation is now seen to guarantee the ‘Jewish character’ of the state 
of Israel which has become a central political aim for this identity group as a 
whole.619
Based on these changes and frictions within this identity group, there are three 
basic subgroups of political identity in this category, the left wing, the centre and the 
right wing. At the left fringe of this identity category are those groups which, now for 
the first time, do not see the peace process as the primary element in their political 
work. Here the environmental groups can be seen as one poignant example. Dr. 
Yaakov Garb, an environmental consultant, sees his connection to the land as being a
615 Zimmermann, Moshe. “Die Folgen des Holocaust filr die israelische Gesellschaft" in Aus Politik 
und Zeitgeschichte 12 1992: p. 33. [Translation by the author]
616 Cohen, Stuart A. “The Peace Process and Societal-Military Relations in Israel" in Peleg, Ilan (ed? 
"The Middle East Peace Process. Interdisciplinary Perspectives" (Albany: New York State 
University Press, 1998): p. 115.
617 Ibid: p. 116.
618 Barzilai, Gad and Ilan Peleg. “Israel and Future Borders: Assessment of a Dynamic Process" in 
Journal of Peace Research 31,1 1994: p. 71.
619 See: Benvenisti, Meron. "Intimate Enemies. Jews and Arabs in a Shared Land" (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995).
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concern for the Middle East landscape: “It is not particularly important who owns it 
[...] My allegiance is to the landscape, it is to the palms and the logs and the way the 
light falls“620. Jewishness as an ethnic concept is seen in national terms. Tamir Yaari, 
an environmental educator close the Israeli Green party, defines it in the following 
way: “It is almost synonymous with being Israeli. It is clear that me being Israeli 
comes from me being Jewish. I am definitely first Jewish and that is why I am 
Israeli4*621. Judaism as a religion however does not play a major role in the political 
identity of this subgroup. It is a private affair that does not influence politics. “It 
should be integrated enough to make the secular Jews know and feel about religion 
on the one hand and on the other hand it should not try to suppress their sense of 
freedom4*622.
The human rights groups such as Peace Now and the Meretz party openly 
advocate a secular Israeli state with a Jewish character. Religion, in their view, 
should be separated from the state. “I am for a separation of religion and state. I am 
not religious at all but I want Israel to be the centre of the Jewish people4*623 explains 
Avital Aviram, international secretary of Young Meretz. The Jewish character of the 
state of Israel is of major importance to this subgroup. However the Jewish character 
is related to demographics, devoid of a mystical character. Mossi Raz, Meretz 
candidate for the 1999 national elections and General Secretary of Peace Now, 
defines it in the following way: “For me a Jewish state is a state in which the 
majority is Jewish and in which every Jew from everywhere can come“624. The issue 
of territoriality is seen in the light of the security needs of the state of Israel not in a 
religious connection.
620 Garb, Yaakov. Jerusalem, 08.05.99. [Interview with the author],
621 Yaari, Tamir. Matte Yehuda, 08.05.99. [Interview with the author]
622 Yaari, Tamir. Matte Yehuda, 08.05.99. [Interview with the author]
623 Aviram, Avital. Tel Aviv, 29.03.99. [Interview with the author]
624 Raz, Mossi. Tel Aviv, 12.04.99. [Interview with the author]
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The main groups in the centre of this categories are those which subscribe to the 
Labor party and Centre party program. This group shares with Meretz the view of the 
question of territory being purely a security question. Ran Feingold, organisational 
secretary of the Young Labour party, explains: “I believe in the connection to the 
land. But we need to be pragmatic. I believe also in the connection to human rights. I 
would not like to have a contradiction. I would not like that my right to the land 
means kicking out another people that lived here for generations. I believe that they 
too have some rights to the land [but] it is still very important to have territory from a 
military aspect"625 626. Territory has meaning however as far as the location of the state 
of Israel is concerned. Ron Punik, head of the Economic Cooperation Foundation, 
which is close to the Labour party, emphasises this point: "I am a Zionist, meaning I 
see the Jewish people in Israel. I don’t see them in Uganda or somewhere else. This 
is on the conceptual level. The seize of the territories, [...] I see as a political 
question" . Religion and state should be separated, religion being a private matter: 
“You can maintain a religious character as an individual even though religion and 
state are separated"627 explains Ellis Goldman of the Centre Party. Ethnicity is a 
group identity for this subgroup but it is mainly a national concept. Eran Weintraub, 
chairman of the Young Centre Party, illustrates this: “I was bom Jewish I relate to 
this. [...] I am very attached to our heritage [...] For me being Jewish is first of all 
living in Israel"628.
A small section of the religious community falls in the ‘secularised Jewish 
nationalism’ category. Although religion is central to their political identity, they do 
not see Israel as a purely Jewish state but want to maintain the democratic element. 
Religion is seen as a private affair. “I don’t see Israel having total separation of
625 Feingold, Ran. Tel Aviv, 19.04.99. [Interview with the author]
626 Pundik, Ron. Tel Aviv, 12.04.99. [Interview with the author]
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religion and state [...] I would like more pluralism in the Jewish community 
acknowledged but Judaism is the official state religion but it should not be imposed 
on anybody, especially non Jewish citizens”627 628 29 outlines Yehezkel Landau, one of the 
founding members of Oz ve Shalom, the religious Zionist peace movement. Ethnicity 
is seen as a national and as a religious concept. It is influencing all aspects of life. 
Prof. Joseph Walk, founder of Oz ve Shalom, describes it in the following terms:
"Judaism is nation and religion. [...] We have a very detailed system of laws 
in Judaism, which is based on the Talmut which is developed right into our 
times. [...] The Talmut is very detailed and relevant in some of the most 
contemporary aspects. To name just one example there are religious laws 
concerning workers ’ rights "63°.
The issue of territory is seen in pragmatic terms as Zvi Wolf, director of Diaspora 
relations of MEIMAD the religious dovish party, argues: “At the beginning of the 
21st century we need to be political realists and we might not be able to have 
everything that we have the right to“631.
Right of the political centre, are those groups which attach greater importance 
to the occupied territories than the left wing, although here too ethnicity is taking the 
central position in political identity. Ma’oz Azaryahu, an academic affiliated with the 
Likud, explains: “Being Jewish means that I am committed to Jewish continuity in 
cultural terms, in ethnic terms, in political terms in the sense that Israel represents 
today the idea, the notion and the possibility of Jewish continuity. Judaism is a 
religious, cultural, national and ethnic concept”632. However the occupied territories,
627 Goldman, Ellis. Tel Aviv, 04.05.99. [Interview with the author]
628 Weintraub, Eran. Tel Aviv, 05.05.99. [Interview with the author]
629 Landau, Yehezkel. Jerusalem, 21.03.99. [Interview with the author]
630 Walk, Joseph. Jerusalem, 23.03.99. [Interview with the author, translation by the author]
631 Wolf, Zvi. Jerusalem, 18.04.99. [Interview with the author]
632 Azaryahu, Ma’oz. Tel Aviv, 04.05.99. [Interview with the author]
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especially the West Bank are not seen in purely pragmatic terms as Yod Lavi, 
member of the Likud secretariat, argues:
“This is really the cradle and homeland or our culture and our nation 
although we cannot ignore the perspective of the present circumstances and 
only depend on the history of our nation’s dreams and our nation’s beliefs. 
We have to take into consideration the fact that there are people, Arab 
people, who are living there and who have identified themselves as 
Palestinians [...] they have a right to live there [...] I ask them only to share 
with me this land"633.
Religion and state, in the view of this subgroup are seen as partially integrated: “State 
laws cannot be separated from religion [...] One has to appreciate religion to keep 
one’s identity"634 says Liat Ravner, head of the International Likud. Nevertheless, the 
basic separation of state and religion is seen as necessary. “For me the Jewish state is 
a value. Personally I would like total freedom but we have to realise that total 
freedom means zero Judaism maybe zero Zionism in the future and it gives you 100 
per cent ‘Israelism’ [...] Faced with these options I prefer the conservative way of 
preserving the status quo“635 argues Amir Rosenberg, a lawyer affiliated with the 
centre-right. Language is not seen as a purely instrumental means of communication 
but has important inherent aspects of identity. Ammon Lord, a Likud affiliated 
journalist, describes this as follows: “Hebrew is a language that has the code of this 
land. The bible is written in Hebrew and so in some way the language is like an 
internal code"636.
At the right wing fringe of the mainstream, the boundaries towards the ‘right 
wing religious’ identity group becomes blurred. Here some of the main
633 Lavi, Yod. Ramie, 04.05.99. [Interview with the author]
634 Ravner, Liat. Tel Aviv, 05.05.99. [Interview with the author]
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characteristics of the ‘secularised Jewish nationalism’ identity category, like the 
emphasis of the Holocaust, the basic separation of religion and state are less obvious. 
This can be clearly seen in the views of Madav Ha’Etzni, a right wing journalist:
"The Holocaust is only one element of the chain. When I deal today with any 
aspect of our dispute with the Palestinians I cannot start with the Holocaust. 
[...] It [the land, HJS] is mine only because it was mine 3000 or 4000 years 
ago [■•■] The right does not emerge from the Holocaust“ .
In the ‘secularised Jewish Nationalism’ identity category, several core elements of 
political identity that are common to all groups in this category, despite their obvious 
differences, have emerged. First of all, ethnicity, Judaism as an ethnic, national 
concept, is the central pillar of political identity. Secondly, territory is seen in security 
terms and is largely devoid of religious, mythical meaning, although within the Likud 
it bears historical significance. Thirdly, religion is seen as part of the private domain, 
state and religion should be separated, although Israel should have a definite Jewish 
character. Fourthly, the Holocaust emerges as a central historical tradition, replacing 
the pioneer traditions. Finally, language is a tool for communication. It has religious 
meaning but this fact, if seen at all, is regarded as secondary. The political identities 
in the ‘secularised Jewish nationalism’ category offer slogans like the ‘Jewish 
character’ of the state of Israel without clearly defining what is meant by this.
‘Secular Binationalism ’
The last identity category in Israeli society, the ‘secular binationalist’ offer a 
completely different notion of Israel as a state. Here the Jewish character is not seen 
as something to be maintained but as something to be removed in order to offer equal
635 Rosenberg, Amir. Tel Aviv, 15.05.99. [Interview with the author]
636 Lord, Ammon. Jerusalem, 05.05.99. [Interview with the author]
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individual rights and freedom. This identity category is the weakest of the three main 
identity groups in Israeli society. It consists of the Jewish far left wing fringe and the 
majority of the Israeli Arabs. Because of this, the category has only marginal success 
in the political arena. The fundamental tenet that all groups within this identity 
category share is the overriding value that is ascribed to democracy. Individual 
freedom, equal rights, and human rights are seen as the central political aims. The 
Jewish character of the state of Israel is seen as a problematic factor that prevents the 
realisation of these goals. Territory is described as a ‘homeland’ for all people 
regardless of their religion. Religion, even more so as in the ‘secularised Jewish 
nationalism’ category, is a private affair which should be completely separate from 
the state. Judaism in consequence is mainly seen in ethnic terms.
“My political identity is very difficult for me to define. In general Israeli 
politics the dominant factor is ethnicity [...] the division between Jewish and Arabs is 
the basic division of Israeli society, the basic problem of Israeli politics44638 explains 
Adam Keller, spokesman of Gush Shalom, a left wing Israeli peace movement. 
Tomer Feffer, press officer of the human rights organisation B’tselem, sees equally 
problems with the role ethnicity plays in Israel: “There are 20% of people in Israel 
that are not Jewish [...] I think they are equal in their rights and duties. But I cannot 
ignore the fact that they are not part of Israeli society unfortunately [...] The country 
is combining citizenship with being Jewish44639. Territory is not seen as sacred or 
endowed with religious meaning. There are other overriding factors that are more 
important than territory. Rabbi Arik Ascherman, executive director of Rabbis for 
Human Rights, describes it in the following way:
637 Ha’Etzni, Madav. Jerusalem, 02.04.99. [Interview with the author]
638 Keller, Adam. Tel Aviv, 13.03.99. [Interview with the author]
639 Feffer, Tomer. Jerusalem, 04.02.99. [Interview with the author]
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“Territory is not as important as human life, justice and all these other 
things. I also think that in the realities of today Jews need a state because 
history has taught us that we cannot depend on anybody else to defend us [...] 
The size of the territory is irrelevant. I would want Jews to be able to live in 
safety in all of the land of Israel but state boundaries per se are a function of 
political reality and in my mind they don’t have any sanctity behind them “64°.
For the far left wing fringe of this subgroup, the state of Israel as a Jewish state is 
openly opposed. “I oppose a Jewish state, a state for all the Jews in the world. I want 
Israeli citizenship, Israel as a democratic state for all its citizens"645, demands Sergio 
Yahni, a member of the executive committee of the Alternative Information Centre, 
an Israeli-Palestinian human rights organisation. Religion is seen as a problematic 
factor by the left wing fringe groups. Amira Haas, a left wing journalist, explains it in 
the following terms: “Religion and state should be separated but I don’t think that 
this is possible in Israel today. [...] Israel is now running against so many 
international resolutions that it needs the mystical, religious legitimacy. That is why 
the religious parties are so strong in this country because they give some legitimacy 
that has been dwindled"642.
Similar ideas to those of the left wing fringe Israeli groups are entertained by 
the second and by far numerically larger subgroup in this category: the Israeli 
Palestinians. These are those Palestinians which stayed after the war of 1948 and 
became subsequently Israeli citizens. Because of the distinction that Israel makes 
between citizenship (Israeli) and nationality (Jewish or Arab), the Israeli Palestinians 
have equal rights as citizens but are discriminated against on grounds of their 
nationality. A large segment of the Jewish Israelis do not see the Israeli Palestinians 640 641
640 Ascherman, Arik. Jerusalem, 13.04.99. [Interview with the author]
641 Yahni, Sergio. Jerusalem, 23.03.99. [Interview with the author]
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as fully legitimate participants in the body politique. “While Jews and Arabs formally 
enjoy equal citizenship rights, only Jews can exercise their citizenship as practice by 
attending to the common good“642 3. Therefore Israeli Palestinian parties have so far 
not been included in government coalitions. In addition, since the Anti-Racism Law 
of 1985, a party which negates the existence of the state of Israel as the state of the 
Jewish people is not allowed to run in elections. Therefore even the Israeli 
Palestinian parties, which on the whole have a left wing, socialist orientation, must 
recognise in their program the basis for the discrimination of the people that they 
represent.644
The Israeli Palestinian community as a whole is currently undergoing a crisis 
of identity. Both societies to which they belong, Israel via citizenship and the 
Palestinian via their nationality, see them as a minority. “In the tension between 
modernity and tradition and as an ethnic minority in a state that is ethnically defined, 
the Arabs have yet to find their place“645. Rouhana argues that the Israeli Palestinians 
since 1967 have undergone a re-Palestinisation process and, as far as their self 
identification is concerned, increasingly identify with the Palestinian society.646 
However they have no intention to move to a Palestinian state.647 They expect a 
conclusion of the conflict with the Palestinians to herald an era in which they will 
receive equal rights in Israel. “They expect their prolonged underpriviledged civil 
status, which they attribute mainly to this conflict, to be quickly amended4*648.
642 Haas, Amira. Jerusalem, 03.04.99. [Interview with the author]
643 Peled, Yoav. “Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Construction of Citizenship: Arab citizens of the 
Jewish State" in American Political Science Review Vol. 86 No. 2 1992: p. 432.
644 See: Rouhana op. cit.: p. 34.
645 Senffi, Alexandra “Israelis zweiter Klasse? Die Araber in Israel auf der Suche nach ihrer Identitat" 
in Der Oberblick 35, 3 1999: p. 102. [Translation by the author]
646 See: Rouhana op. cit.
647 See: Al-Haj, Majid, Elihu Katz and Samuel Shye. “Arab and Jewish Attitudes toward a Palestinian 
State" in Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, 4 1993.
648 Hermann, Tamar S. and Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar. “Two People Apart. Israeli Jews’ and Arabs’ 
Attitudes Toward the Peace Process" in Peleg, Ilan (edj “The Middle East Peace Process. 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives“ (Albany: New York State University Press, 1998): p. 61.
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As a result of these processes Israeli Palestinians have a very unique political 
identity. Territory is perceived as the ‘homeland’ which does not entail the need to 
control it. Michail Fanous, executive director of the Open House in Ramie, an Israeli 
Palestinian co-habitation project and member of the city council of Ramie,
elaborates:
“I identify more with Ramie. Ramie was once in Palestine, so we are
Palestinians. Ramie is inside Israel, so I am Israeli. [...] Ifeel that I am in my 
homeland of my family. My family lived here in Ramie for almost a thousand 
years, so this is my homeland. I won ’t leave my homeland to be part of the 
Palestinian state1,649.
Religion, although a part of their identity is for most Israeli Palestinians not endowed 
with political meaning. “Religion is one of the major components of a person’s 
identity. However it all depends on the person himself. It is a personal choice“649 50 
explains Mosbah Ziaed, secretary of the Democratic Front for Peace and Democracy 
(DFPD) in Nazareth. The DFPD is an Israeli Palestinian national party with a left 
wing program.
The issue of ethnicity is most difficult for the political identity of Israeli 
Palestinians. Michail Fanous describes the situation: “I am a Palestinian, so the issue 
between Israel and Palestine of course is having an effect on me because my state 
fights my people and my people fight my state“651.
At the left wing fringe of the Israeli Palestinian political identity spectrum, 
binationalism is seen as the best solution to the conflict. Rayek Rizek, secretary 
general of Wahat Al-Salam/Neve Shalom, another cohabitation project near Ramie, 
explains:
649 Fanous, Michail. Ramie, 30.03.99. [Interview with the author]
650 Ziaed, Mosbah. Nazareth, 07.05.99. [Interview with the author]
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“I don’t accept the idea of a division the land. 1 think historically it was a 
difficult idea to implement and we are still living with this difficulty because 
of what happened in 1947 and 1948. [...] To think again today of dividing the 
land again it is not possible because it will not bring the justice that I think 
should be brought. [...] I am not for dividing the land but for dividing 
authority and having the resources used equally by both people 1,652.
The political identities of the secular binationalism identity category have their basis 
in the belief in democracy, equal rights, and human rights as overriding values. 
Therefore the basic building blocks, territoriality, ethnicity, religion, are seen in this 
light. The Jewish character of the state of Israel is seen as an obstacle in the way of 
achieving these fundamental rights and freedoms. As far as the Israeli Palestinians
are concerned, the Jewish character of the state is the basis for their social and
political underpriviledged status since this means that full citizenship is defined 
ethnically and not territorially (all those who live within the state borders). This 
group is the smallest and politically weakest of the three main identity blocks in 
Israel. It also offers little depth as far as political identity is concerned. It is more or 
less a defensive political identity which argues against existing discriminatory 
practises.
Gender Roles in Israel
In the theoretical model it was argued that the significator ‘gender’ is an important 
variable of political identity that cuts across and influences all other significators. 
Therefore we will now look at ‘gender’ as a variable of political identity building in 
Israeli society. The position of women in Israeli society is characterised by a very low
651 Fanous, Michail. Ramie, 30.03.99. [Interview with the author]
652 Rizek, Rayek. Wahat Al-Salam / Neve Shalom, 18.03.99. [Interview with the author]
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gender awareness and by a latent, deep seated structural discrimination against 
women, who, by and large, remain in their traditional female roles. “That Israel is a 
Jewish state is common knowledge. What is less well known is how Israel’s 
definition of ‘Jewish’ affects the lives of its female citizens64653.
Israel can be characterised as a traditional society as far as gender roles are 
concerned. This became obvious during the interviews conducted on the substate 
level. A striking lack of gender awareness can be observed by all but the most left 
wing interviewees. The influence of religion in combination with policies that put the 
family at the centre of society, relegates women largely to their traditional female 
roles as wives and mothers. “Historical patriarchal influences have produced a 
traditional family-oriented society in which family stability is the rule in all sectors of 
society66654. Because of the status quo agreement between the early state and the 
orthodox religious community all matters concerning personal and family matters are 
handled by religious courts, which legislate according to orthodox Jewish tradition. 
This enforces the subordinate role of women. The secular legal system also reflects 
the patriarchal character of society.
“/w 1951, the Women’s Equal Rights Law was passed, under which women 
were to be entitled to legal equality and equal rights to carry out legal 
transactions. Unfortunately the law did not have constitutional force; while it 
could be used to invalidate laws existing prior to its enactment, as far as 
subsequent legislation was concerned, it was considered merely a directive to
653 Swirski, Barbara and Marilyn P. Safir. “Living in a Jewish State: National, Ethnic and Religious 
Implications41 in Swirski, Barbara and Marylin P. Safir (eds) "Calling the Equality Bluff. Women in 
Israel'" (New York: Pergamon Press, 1991): n. 7.
654 Safir, Marylin. “Religion, Tradition and Public Policy Give Family First Priority" in Swirski, 
Barbara and Marylin P. Safir (eds) "Calling the Equality Bluff. Women in Israel" (New York: 
Pergamon Press, 1991): p. 57.
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assist in the interpretation of ambivalent legislation and a norm allowing 
invalidation of secondary legislation1,655.
The discrimination against women is translated equally into the workspace. “Women 
[...] serve largely as cheap labour, with relatively little authority and with low to 
intermediate levels of skill“655 6. However, women are not only over-represented in 
low pay occupations, they also do not receive equal pay. “Despite the ‘equal 
payment’ law, several studies indicate that in the Israeli labour market, women are 
paid less than men for working in the same occupation”657. Although one can see an 
increase of the number of women in the workforce, the primacy of the family has 
clearly an effect on the kinds of occupations most women choose. A large proportion 
is in part time employment.658
One aspect that has always been seen as a great achievement towards gender
equality is the fact that women, like men, serve in the IDF. However a closer look 
shows a clear gender hierarchy in the armed forces as well. There are no female 
officers above the rank of Brigadier General in the IDF. The rank of Brigadier 
General is held by the officer commanding CHEN the Women’s Corps of the IDF. 
Although CHEN is a separate organisational unit, its commanding officer is not part 
of the General Staff of the IDF. The fact that CHEN is exclusively responsible for 
judicial matters of female soldiers creates a two class society along gender lines in
655 Raday, Frances. “The Concept of Gender Equality in a Jewish State” in Swirski, Barbara and 
Marylin P. Safir (eds) "Calling the Equality Bluff. Women in Israel" (New York: Pergamon Press, 
1991): p. 20.
656 Bernstein, Deborah. “Economic Growth and Female Labour: The Case of Israel" in Azmon, Yael 
and Dalha N. Izraeli (eds) "Women in Israel. Studies in Israeli Society Vol. VI" (London: Transaction 
Publishers, 1993): p. 67.
657 Semyonov, Moshe and Vered Kraus. “Gender, Ethnicity, and Income Equality: The Israeli 
Experience” in Azmon, Yael and Dafha N. Izraeli (eds) "Women in Israel. Studies in Israeli Society 
Vol. VI" (London: Transaction Publishers, 1993): p. 100.
658 See: Azmon, Yael and Dafha N. Izraeli. “Introduction" in Azmon, Yael and Dalha N. Izraeli (eds) 
"Women in Israel. Studies in Israeli Society Vol. VI" (London: Transaction Publishers, 1993): p. 6.
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the IDF659. In addition the fact that most combat related jobs are closed to women 
disables them from reaching the highest ranks in the hierarchy. Because a successful 
military career is a good basis for a political career in Israel, it is no surprise that 
women are also underrepresented at the political level. As Herzog shows, this already 
starts at the local level. “Women’s representation in local governments is lower than 
in the Knesset and in political parties"660. One area however where women are very 
active is grassroots political organisations. “The Palestinian uprising (Intifada) has 
been accompanied by the proliferation of Israeli peace and protest groups in which 
women play a prominent role“661. However since the Oslo process these groups have 
lost political influence and have been marginalised. Nevertheless a slow rise in the 
participation of women even in foreign and security affairs (traditionally been seen as 
an all-male domain) can be observed. “Some gradual modifications in the status of 
women MKs [members of Knesset, HJS], however have become apparent since the 
early 1990s. Women have become more visible in the work of the House, and are 
showing unprecedented professionalism and self-confidence when dealing with 
external relations matters"662.
The situation of Israeli Palestinian women follows the pattern seen among 
Jewish Israeli women. However the family structure in Israeli Palestinian society is
659 See: Bloom, Anne R. “Women in the Defense Forces** in Swirski, Barbara and Marylin P. Safir 
(eds) “Calling the Equality Bluff. Women in Israel" (New York: Pergamon Press, 1991): p. 136.
660 Herzog, Hanna. “Gendering Politics. Women in Israel' (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan 
Press, 1999): p. 22. The representation of women in the Knesset between 1949 and 1984 ranged 
between 9.1 % and 6.7 %. Which was average in Western democracies. In the current 15th Knesset 
(since 1999) it has reached an all time high of 12.5 % (15 out of 120 members). See: Etzioni-Halevi, 
Eva and Ann Illy. “Women in Legislatures: Israel in a Comparative Perspective** in Swirski, Barbara 
and Marylin P. Safir (eds) “Calling the Equality Bluff. Women in Israel' (New York: Pergamon Press, 
1991).
661 Chazan, Naomi. “Israeli Women and Peace Activism** in Swirski, Barbara and Marylin P. Safir 
(eds) “Calling the Equality Bluff. Women in Israel" (New York: Pergamon Press, 1991): p. 152. 
However women are also active in grassroots organisations on the political right. One example is the 
right-wing movement ‘Women in Green’.
662 Hermann, Tamar and Gila Kurtz. “Prospects for Democratizing Foreign Policymaking: The 
Gradual Empowerment of Israeli Women** in Middle East Journal 49, 3 1995: p. 454.
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still more rigid than in the Jewish part of society. Consequently women by and large 
are even more forced into their traditional female roles.663
Women in Israel are still occupying a subordinate role in all the aspects of 
public life as well as in their role in the family. Gender should therefore be an 
important part of political identity in Israel. However only the most left wing 
interviewees on the substate level showed any kind of gender awareness. In addition, 
the women interviewed in the various political identity groups showed no distinctly 
different attitudes from their male colleagues. Therefore a strong gender based 
political identity has yet to emerge. From the power centres of the state level women 
are by and large excluded although the situation is slowly changing.
It has become clear during the discussion of the Israeli substate level that the 
tendency towards fragmentation predicted in the theoretical model can be observed. 
Groups have formed which are presenting different political identity conceptions. It 
is interesting to note that groups in the ‘radical-religious identity’ category are the 
most influential politically when compared with their size. All different identity 
groups presented here try to make their demands heard on the state level. It is the 
power centres of the state level that we will analyse now. The aim is to see if and 
how the changes shown to be happening on the substate level are being translated to 
the state level and in which forms the state level is reacting to these changes.
663 See: Shokeid, Moshe. “Ethnic Identity and the Position of Women Among Arabs in an Israeli 
Town" in Swirski, Barbara and Marylin P. Safir (eds) “Calling the Equality Bluff. Women in Israel 
(New York: Pergamon Press, 1991).
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I.II. State Level: Instability and Unresponsiveness664
It was argued in the theoretical model that identity building on the state level is an 
elite led phenomenon. It was predicted that the state level would still be important for 
political identity building but has increasingly problems to produce coherence in 
society. In the preceding chapter on Israeli society, several elements that are common 
to the elites on the state level have been discussed. The elites show a strong
commitment to the existence of the state of Israel as a state with a Jewish character.
Therefore religion should play a role in the definition of the state. Furthermore, this 
state should be the state of all Jews, not just of its citizens (thereby inherently 
discriminating against Israeli Palestinians). In consequence, one of the state’s aims 
should be to bring the diaspora to Israel.665 In addition, ‘security’, internal and 
external, plays an important role. However, there is no clear, agreed definition of
these different elements between the different state elites. How each element can be
translated in concrete policy is highly contested. The elites follow in their political 
identities those of their different substate supporters.
Since the mid 1990s an important change in leadership style on the state level 
in Israel can be observed. The state level in Israeli society was until recently 
characterised by the dominant position that the parties held in comparison to other 
political actors on the state level. However, this dominant role is currently 
undergoing a deep transformation. As Medding666 argues, the party system in Israel 
has undergone three major changes since 1948. Before 1967 the party system was 
characterised by a government by party and the domination of one party, Mapai.
664 1 have already outlined the major historical developments and changes on the state level in the 
previous chapter on Israeli society. Therefore I will restrict myself only to analyse the major current 
trends on this level as far as they are important for the question of political identity building.
665 For an outline of the elite perceptions of Labor Zionism see: Brecher (1972) op. cit.'. pp. 229-250. 
For the influence of elite perceptions on Israel’s foreign policy decision making until the 1990s see: 
Roberts,op. cit.'. pp. 89-173.
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Between 1967 and 1996 the state level was characterised by domination of specific 
party leaders while the party system was slowly developing into a stalemate with 
Likud and Labor holding roughly equal amounts of votes. Since 1996 Medding 
characterises the system as “government despite party, [a] fluid and extreme multi­
party system, [and] disaggregated majoritarian executive power"666 67.
It was under the second phase, during the stalemate in the party system that 
the rifts between the three political identity categories on the substate level deepened. 
During the time of the stalemate, it was necessary to grant minor coalition partners 
unprecedented influence. “Dictation to the coalition formateur by potential minor 
coalition partners and the increasing willingness and necessity of the major coalition 
party and its leaders to accept such dictation, give ground and make concessions on 
policies and administrative co-ordination, even on major matters, increasingly 
became the norm"668. During this time the religious parties gained increasing 
influence on the Israeli political scene. The religious parties in particular were able to 
build up and finance their separate educational and social system because they could 
extract substantive amounts of government money for this purpose.
In addition to these structural changes, the professionalisation of the large 
parties triggered a process in which the group of party activist grew increasingly 
distant from the general electorate. “The activist’s behaviour responds to the 
demands of political careers [...] Political involvement by party activists feeds on 
itself; in doing so, it increases the differences between activists and the rest of the 
electorate"669.
666 See: Medding, Peter Y. “From Government by Party to Government Despite Party“ in Israel Ajfairs 
6,2 1999.
667 Ibid: p. 191.
668 Ibid: p. 181.
669 Zuckerman, Alan S., Michal Shamir and Hanna Herzog. “The Political Base of Activism in the 
Israeli Labour and Herut Parties" in Political Science Quarterly 107, 2 1992: p. 322.
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Because of the deadlock situation that was particularly obvious in the two national 
unity governments from 1984 until 1990, a widespread feeling developed that 
“political system in Israel requires major repairs44670. These reforms were passed in 
1992 to be implemented for the first time in 1996. Two reforms were introduced. 
First and most importantly, the election of prime minister is now done via a direct 
vote from the electorate. Secondly, the barrier for entry into the Knesset has been 
raised from 1 % to 1.5 %. The direct election of the prime minister is by far the more 
important change. The aim was to counter the constant threat of breakdowns of 
coalitions which under the past system would immediately remove the prime minister 
from office. Now the prime minister can govern with a minority coalition as Prime
Minister Barak demonstrated in the last months of his tenure. However, the reforms
did not have the effect of stabilising the political system as a whole. “Measured on 
the intentions that the lawmakers had in mind at the time the reform was passed, the 
new system seems to achieve the opposite: the small parties were strengthened at the 
cost of the larger parties44671. The need to form coalitions out of a substantive number 
of different parties has remained and with it the fluidity of the system as a whole. 
This has particular dangers as Keren points out: “A political system resting on the 
slim, inconstant, often volatile majorities in the Knesset is, therefore, in danger of 
losing both its balance and its legitimacy44672.
These developments aided and were accompanied by the rise of a new type of 
political leadership in Israel. “This group of leaders pays little heed to ideology and 
they demonstrate little respect or loyalty to their parties. The former Likud leader 
Netanyahu, and the Labor leader, Barak, have been inclined to reduce their parties’
670 Galnoor, Itzhak. “The Israeli Political System: A Profile" in Kyle, Keith and Joel Peters (eds)
“Whither Israel? The Domestic Challenges" (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993): p. 93.
671 Gundermann, Albrecht. “Israel’s staatliche Ordnung nach den Reformen" in Zeitschrift fur 
Politikwissenschaft 8,4 1998: p. 141. [Translation by the author]
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power and influence44673. This new type of leaders, who act independently of their 
parties was not initiated with Netanyahu and Barak. Already under the Rabin/Peres
administration this trend became obvious.
The peace process is the first example of how this new type of leadership tried 
to redefine the political game in order to further their own goals. “Rabin and other 
partisans of the peace process were attempting to draw a line between an Israeli 
national identity that was Zionist and liberal, a particular narrative of Israel, a frame 
that promised peace and prosperity, and a territorial compromise with the 
Palestinians [...] in their view a territorial compromise was imperative if Israel was to 
rid itself of a dire threat to its identity as a liberal and Zionist state44674. The peace 
process was not only initiated in secret, without consultation of the Labor Party elite 
it can also be characterised as the work of a new political class, unbound by former
party structures. “The Oslo Accords of 1993 and all subsequent agreements between
Israel and the Palestinians, were rather consistent with the norms of technocrats, 
industrialists, businessmen, managers, public administrators, professionals, and other 
incumbents to the ‘new class’44675. Another sign of the change in leadership style is 
the fact that Netanyahu refashioned the prime minister’s office, introducing a whole 
array of personal advisors which duplicated the work of the different government 
ministries. “Central to Netanyahu’s thinking in attempting to maximise the influence 
of his office was his desire to control all aspects of the peace negotiations44676.
672 Susser, Bernard. “Direct Election of the Prime Minister: A Balance Sheet" in Israel Affairs 4, 1 
1997: p. 256.
673 Sheffer, Gabriel. “Structural Change and Leadership Transformation" in Israel Affairs 5, 2/3 1999: 
p. 68.
674 Barnett, Michael. “Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Road to Oslo“ in 
European Journal of International Relations1' 5, 1 1999: p. 24 f.
675 Keren, Michael. “Elections 1996: The Candidates and the ‘New Politics’" in Israel Affairs 4, 1 
1997: p. 269.
676 Lochery, Neill. “The Netanyahu Era: From Crisis to Crisis, 1996-99“ in Israel Affairs 6,3/4 2000: 
p. 225.
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That the independence of the prime minister’s leadership is not just limited to foreign 
affairs can be seen on the major policy changes prime minister Barak was suggesting 
in late August 2000. These far reaching social changes concerned one of the major 
domestic issues in Israeli society: the status quo agreements with the religious 
groups. Without consultation Barak informed the Labor party elites that he had set a 
new domestic agenda, concentrating on social issues. This agenda, which was 
quickly termed by the media ‘secular revolution’, included: “a constitution; legal 
options for civil marriage and burial, national service for all (including haredim and 
Arabs); lessons in citizenship, English and mathematics for all (inlcuding yeshiva 
pupils); and the abolishment of the Ministry of Religious Affairs“677. These Reforms 
were complemented by the plan that in the Israeli passport the distinction between 
citizenship and nationality should be dropped “so that it remains open if the owner of 
the passport is a Jew or a member of the Arab minority446 78. These reforms, if 
implemented, would mark a fundamental change in the structure of Israeli society. 
That such an important decision, altering a long standing Labour policy, initiated by 
David Ben Gurion, and observed by every prime minister (Labor or Likud) since, was 
taken without previous consultation and has angered the elite of the Labor Party 
which promptly accused Barak of “violating the party’s traditional allegiance to the 
secular-religious status quo“679. Barak has defended his decision to propose the what 
he calls ‘civil agenda’:
“It is an attempt to find balance in our society between the democratic, 
pluralist, progressive, open society and the Jewish character of the state,
677 Derfher, Larry. “He says he wants a revolution11 in Jerusalem Post Internet Edition:
http://www.jpost.com/Editions/2000/08/24/Features/Features. 11327.html
678 Gtlnther, Inge. “Baraks zivile Reform erhalt Kontur. Zumindest im Pass sollen alle Israelis kOnftig 
gleich sein“ in Frankfurter Rundschau Online', http://www.ff-aktuell.de/ff/102/tl02005.htm 
[translation by the author]
679 Derfher, Larry. “Reaping a social whirlwind11 in Jerusalem Post Internet Edition:
http://www.jpost.com/Editions/2000/09/14/Features/Features.12239.html
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its roots and character. The attempt to find a balance can’t take place if we 
wait until everyone agrees with everyone else, because that will not happen. 
[...] I think [emphasis added, HJS] that it is important for the citizens to have 
a constitution after 52 years “68°.
It becomes clear from this statement that Barak favoured a highly centralised 
leadership style in which he tried to fashion the country according to his beliefs and 
convictions. This leadership style however cannot include all different identity 
groups in Israel and widened rather than narrowed the rifts between the groups in the 
three political identity categories outlined during the analysis of the substate level.
The state level is still an important location for political identification in Israeli 
society. However what it means to be an ‘Israeli’ and what kind of state Israel should 
be is highly contested. Therefore, the state elites have increasing problems to 
establish societal cohesion. The political system at the state level in Israel is at one of 
the same time responsible for the deepening rifts between the groups in the three 
identity categories on the substate level, while being unable to respond to these rifts 
in a manner that would reduce their salience. The fact that small coalition parties, 
especially from the religious part of society, were able since the 1970s to exert 
disproportional pressure on the leading party and in doing so were able to build up 
their own separate educational and social systems, gave their separate conceptions of 
the character of the state of Israel legitimacy and financial support. The only groups 
which were not able to extract financial support were those in the secularised 
binational category which, in turn, isolated these groups from the political centre as 
well. The growing rifts between the different identity groups led to a highly unstable *
680 Keinon, Herb and Jeff Barak. “Exclusive Interview with PM Ehud Barak“ in Jerusalem Post 
Internet Edition: http://www.jpost.com/Editions/2000/!0/02/Features/Features. 13098.html
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political environment in which government crisis were a reoccurring factor. This led 
to structural reforms of the electoral system which however did not achieve the 
expected stability. In contrast the direct election of the prime minister enabled the 
emergence of a new style of centralised leadership. This cannot serve to narrow the 
already existing gaps since the prime minister can only take into account of the 
wishes of a specific part of society. Therefore the state is increasingly unable to react 
effectively to changes in this part of society. However the state level is not only 
coming under pressure from within society. Also the relationship with the diaspora, 
especially the American Jewry is in a state of change. It is this change that will be at 
the centre of the analysis in the next part of this chapter.
LIIL Supra-state level: Changing Relations with Diaspora
In the theoretical model, it was argued that the supra-state level is of increasing 
importance for political identity building and can no longer be left out of the analysis. 
It was pointed out that diaspora communities are one of the groups on the supra-state 
level that are of particular importance. This is because their political identity is 
strongly connected with their ‘original’ (real or imagined) ‘homeland’. The 
relationship with the Jewish diaspora plays a central role in Israel. The state is 
defined as the state of the Jewish people as a whole in its declaration of 
independence. It is a central aim of the state to bring the Jewish diaspora to Israel. 
The American diaspora is playing here a central role for two main reasons: 1) Its size: 
it has more members than Israel has inhabitants, and is sending large amounts of 
monetary contributions to Israel, 2) The close connection since the 1970s between 
Israel and the US makes this diaspora the most important one, politically.681
681 See: Lipson, Charles. “American Support for Israel: History. Sources and Limits" in Sheffer,
Gabriel (ed) “US.-Israeli Relations at the Crossroads" (London: Frank Cass, 1997); also: Ben-Zvi,
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However, since the 1980s, signs of cracks in the uncritical American Jewish support 
for Israel have surfaced. Some major political dramas clouded the relationship 
between the American Jewry and Israel. The most famous one is the Pollard affair. 
Pollard, a civilian intelligence analyst with the US Navy, was unmasked as a Israeli 
spy in 1985 and sentenced to life in 1987.
“Pollard’s arrest sent shock waves through the US Jewish community. There 
was considerable anger towards Israel, which had clearly enlisted an
American Jew to spy against his own country. This had been done with 
seemingly no concern as to the impact his unmasking would have on the US
Jewish community. The case threatened to raise all the old canards about 
dual loyalty and where the US Jewish community’s true allegiance lay“682.
Another factor which brought the differences between American Jewry and Israel 
into the foreground was the still ongoing ‘Who is a Jew’ debate in Israel. The debate 
centres around the question of who can be recognised as a Jew. According to the 
1950 version of the Law of Return, only Jews have the right to immigrate to Israel 
and receive immediate citizenship. However “the Law of Return did not define ‘Jew’, 
a vagueness that would lead to contentious legislation and court rulings"683. In 1970 
an amendment to the Law of Return was passed in which the Knesset tried to define 
the term ‘Jew’ more clearly. However the definition that a ‘Jew’ is a person whose 
mother is a Jewess or who converted to Judaism equally left the question open. It was 
not defined what kind of conversion to Judaism the potential immigrant would have 
to undergo in order to qualify. In addition, the amendment created a category of 
people who had the ‘rights of a Jew’. Those persons could immigrate under the law
Abraham. “Decade of Transition. Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Origins of the American-Isareli 
Alliance" (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
682 Marcus, Jonathan. “Discordant Voices: the US Jewish Community and Israel during the 1980s“ in 
International Affairs 66, 3 1990: p. 551.
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of return but would not be recognised as Jews by the state. “Those individuals 
include any child or grandchild of a Jew (male or female), the spouse of a Jew, the 
spouse of a child of a Jew, and the spouse of a grandchild of a Jew“683 4.
Since then, the so called ‘conversion crisis’ is at the heart of the ‘Who is a 
Jew’ debate. Orthodox parties in Israel have sought to introduce legislation which 
would only recognise orthodox conversions. While in Israel most Jews are either 
secular or belong to the orthodox strand of Judaism, the overwhelming majority of
American Jews are either conservative or reform Jews. If the Law of Return would
only recognise orthodox conversions, those American Jews which are not orthodox 
would not be recognised as Jews in Israel. This, of course, created strong resistance 
among the American Jewish community. “During the late 1980s, American Jewish 
leaders intervened in the Israeli political process with a boldness and vigor not 
equaled before“685.
Not only because of these political factors is the relationship between the 
American Jewry and Israel in a state of change. Steven Bayme, the director American 
Jewish Committee’s Institute on American Jewish-Israeli Relations, paints a 
problematic picture of Israel-diaspora relations:
“One change is demographic. [...] Within the next ten to fifteen years - if 
present trends are not reversed - Israel will surpass the United State as the 
world’s largest Jewish community [...] A second area of transformation is 
political. Israel is now pursuing a peace process with the PLO and its Arab 
neighbours [...] A third area of change is the cultural transformation in 
Israeli-Diaspora relations. Our language divide continues to grow [...] We
683 Anti Defamation League. “The Conversion Crisis. A Backgrounder on the Current Debate on 
Religion, State and Conversion in Israel" (New York: Anti Defamation League, February 1998): p. 2.
684 Ibid.: p. 2.
685 Landau, David. "Who is a Jew? A Case Study of American Jewish Influence on Israeli Policy" 
(New York: The American Jewish Committee, 1996): p. 1.
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are also growing further apart in our attitudes toward intermarriage. 
American Jews are increasingly accepting intermarriage [...] Another 
example of the cultural divide concerns religious pluralism. For the great 
majority of American Jews, plurality of religious expression is an axiomatic 
aspect of contemporary Jewish identity. Israelis, however, who implicitly 
recognise Orthodoxy as the legitimate form of Judaism [...] have little interest 
in religious pluralism for its own sake“686.
These internal and external developments were at the basis of a new attitude of the 
American Jewish leadership towards Israel before the start of the Oslo peace process. 
“Attachment to the State of Israel has of late become far more problematic for 
American Jews“687 688. Although surveys show that the great majority of American Jews 
consistently supported the handling of peace process by the Israeli governments since
£QO
1993 , a critical attitude within the American Jewish establishment developed.
“Some of Israel’s most ardent American supporters concluded that the Rabin 
government was on a suicidal course, and they set out to derail it“689. The long held 
consensus of the major Jewish lobby organisations in America to support whatever
686 Bayme, Steven. “Changing Patterns in Israel-Diaspora Relations. Address at the National 
Conference of the American Jewish Press Association “ (New York: American Jewish Committee, 16th 
of June 1994): p. 2ff
687 Eisen, Arnold. “A New Role for Israel in American Jewish Identity “ (New York: American Jewish 
Committee, 1992): p. 1.
688 However there were significant variations during the tenures of prime ministers Rabin, Peres, and 
Netanyahu: Rabin: 66-70% in 1994, 68% in 1995; Peres: 79% in 1996; Netanyahu: 61% in 1997, 56% 
in 1998; in early 1999 43% answered ‘not enough’ to the questions: ‘Is the Israeli government doing 
enough or not doing enough to carry out the peace agreements it has signed with the Palestinian 
Authority (PLO)?’. See: Cohen, Renate and Jennifer Golub. “The Israeli Peace Initiative and the 
Israeli-PLO Accord. A Survey of American Jewish Opinion in 1994“ (New York: American Jewish 
Committee, 1995); American Jewish Committee. “The Israeli Peace Initiative and the Israeli-PLO 
Accord. A Followup Survey" (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1994); American Jewish 
Committee. “American Jewish Attitudes Toward Israel and the Peace Process. A Public-Opinion 
Survey" (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1995); American Jewish Committee. “In the 
Aftermath of the Rabin Assassination: A Survey ofAmerican Jewish Opinion About Israel and the 
Peace Process" (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1996); American Jewish Committee.
“1997 Annual Survey of American Jewish Opinion" (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1997); 
American Jewish Committee. “1998 Annual Survey of American Jewish Opinion" (New York: 
American Jewish Committee, 1998); American Jewish Committee. “1999 Annual Survey of American 
Jewish Opinion": http//www.ajc.org/pre/ajc99survery.htm.
291
democratically elected government of Israel in at least all aspects relating to security 
is slowly breaking down as well. Rifts between and within the organisations created 
different political factions, similar to the ‘secularised Jewish nationalism’ and ‘right 
wing religious identity’ categories in Israeli society.689 90 691
‘American Religious Nationalism ’
The “American religious nationalism44 group is the smaller of the two identity 
categories. Although religion is one of the central elements of their identity, they do 
not argue for a religious state in Israel. Jordan Frankel, an orthodox Jew and lobbyist 
with the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), argues “I happen to 
think that Israel is a Jewish state and that religion should play a very strong role and 
that you cannot separate religion and state44. On the other hand “you should not use 
religion to coerce others44691. Consequently, ethnicity is seen mainly as membership 
in a group of believers. “Obviously in my mind it is a connected grouping. To say, it 
is a religion would be to limit it“692. The membership of this grouping also entails 
certain obligations. “One of those responsibilities is to do everything you can to 
protect Israel, the state of Israel. This is a Jewish obligation [...] if you are in the 
diaspora you should be somehow involved in something that helps Israel to 
survive4'693. However in contrast to their Israeli counterparts, in principle, territory 
can be given up in order to achieve peace. “I don’t see a religious barrier to giving up 
land4'694. Similar to the members of this identity grouping in Israel, language is seen
689 Goldberg, Jonathan Jeremy. “Jewish Power. Inside the American Jewish Establishment1' (Reading, 
MA: Addison Wesley, 1996): p. 49.
690 Obviously the third category, ‘secular binationalism’ cannot be found in American Jewish lobby 
organisations since an argument for a religiously neutral Israel would necessarily sever the link 
between the American Jewry and Israel since their special relationship is based on the religious and 
cultural affiliation with the Jewish character of the state of Israel.
691 Frankel, Jordan. Washington, D.C., 17.02.99. [Interview with the author]
692 Frankel, Jordan. Washington, D.C., 17.02.99. [Interview with the author]
693 Frankel, Jordan. Washington, D.C., 17.02.99. [Interview with the author]
694 Frankel, Jordan. Washington, D.C., 17.02.99. [Interview with the author]
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as having religious and spiritual meaning. “The Hebrew language is a very different 
language to all other languages. [...] Just take prayers for example. You cannot 
translate the Hebrew prayers, it is impossible [...] There is a certain way of Jewish 
thinking that is closely connected to the language6'695. Within this group, which 
mirrors the political identity of its Israeli counterpart, a strong opposition to the Oslo 
process developed since 1993, the main argument being that it endangers the security 
of Israel. Jordan Frankel characterised the Oslo process as a “danger to the state of 
Israel"696.
'American Secular Jewish Nationalism ’
The ‘American secular Jewish nationalism’ is also a mirror image of its Israeli
counterpart. It is interesting to note that the location of the members of this identity 
group has an impact on their political outlook towards the peace process. In general, 
those working in Israel seemed to have a more optimistic look towards the Oslo 
process than those working in the United States. Also within one lobby group, people 
from different identity groups are working together. There are three identity 
subgroups in this category: left, centre and right of centre.
Guy Brenner, a foreign policy research analyst with AIPAC, is in his political 
identity on the left of the ‘American secular Jewish nationalism’ category. Here, 
ethnicity is not based mainly on a religious definition of Judaism. “There is a variety 
of ways to look at Judaism. Judaism is not only just religion [...] It is a shared identity 
which combines elements of history, culture and of course religion4'697. Territory is 
devoid of religious meaning and is seen mainly from a security point of view. Laura 
Kam Issacharoff, assistant director of the Anti-Defamation League’s Jerusalem
695 Frankel, Jordan. Washington, D.C., 17.02.99. [Interview with the author]
696 Frankel, Jordan. Washington, D.C., 17.02.99. [Interview with the author]
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office, explains: “A good majority of the land that was conquered [...] will eventually 
have to be given up [...] that it has to be done on the basis of Israel’s security 
needs“697 98. Religion and state in the view of the left in this American political identity 
category should be separated. Thomas R. Smerling, executive director of the Israel 
Policy Forum, outlines it: “There should be complete separation between religion and 
state“699. Language is seen in nationalist and not in religious terms. Tom Savicki, 
deputy director of AIPAC’s Jerusalem office, outlines this: “A country is defined by
its language to a very great extend and it is from the language that a cultural identity 
like literature comes forth. I think it is the same for Israel“700.
The centrist position in this American Jewish political identity category is 
taken by those that put more emphasis on the Jewish character of the state. Joseph 
Alpher, who immigrated to Israel in the early 1960s and who is currently the director 
of the American Jewish Committee’s (AJC) Jerusalem office explains:
“I think that religion and politics should be completely separated. But in the 
specific case of Israel I don't think religion and state can be completely 
separated [...] Religion is part of Judaism even if some of us don’t participate 
in it. [...] We have to acknowledge that certain aspects of religion will be 
intertwined with the state“701.
Similarly to the left wing subgroup, territory in the centrist group has no intrinsic 
religious meaning and is seen in pragmatic political terms “Historical claims that 
have to do with the bible have some importance to me but very little compared to the 
historical claims based on who has been living in the area not for hundreds of years,
697 Brenner, Guy. Washington, D.C., 18.02.99. [Interview with the author]
698 Issacharoff, Laura Kam. Jerusalem, 24.03.99. [Interview with the author]
699 Smerling, Thomas R. Washington, D.C., 16.02.99. [Interview with the author]
700 Sawicki, Tom. Jerusalem, 17.03.99. [Interview with the author]
701 Alpher, Joseph. Tel Aviv, 08.02.99. [Interview with the author]
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but for this century66702, argues Jason F. Isaacson director of government and 
international affairs of the AJC. Parallel to the ‘secular Jewish nationalism’ political 
identity in Israel, the Holocaust takes a central position in the political identity and is 
used as the main justification for the state of Israel. George Spectre, associated 
director of B’nai Brith’s Centre for Public Policy, outlines this. “I think it was a very 
sharp spotlight for the need for a Jewish homeland, some place the Jews could 
always go to if they were persecuted64 .
The right of centre position political identity is characterised by a more
central position that nationalism defined as an ethnic concept takes. Alan Schneider,
director of B’nai Brith’s World Centre in Jerusalem, argues “My Jewishness 
expresses itself mainly in Jewish nationalism. In other words I see all of Jewish 
culture and history even religion in a perspective of nationalism. My primary 
affiliation with being Jewish is the national character of that designation66704. In 
addition language is more than just a cultural or national tool in the political identity. 
Stacy Burdett, assistant director of Government Relations of the Anti-Defamation 
League, defines language in the following way: “It certainly enhances the person’s 
connection with the Jewish text and the Jewish past. It [Judaism, HJS] is a religion 
and a culture were the word is the thing667 05.
Israel-diaspora relations, in specific Israel’s relationship with the largest diaspora 
community, American Jewry, is in a state of change. Beginning with the 1980s the 
two communities grew steadily more distinct form each other as far as their social, 
religious and political outlook is concerned. Within the politically active 
establishment, the traditional consensus which demanded that the democratically
702 Isaacson, Jason F. Washington D.C., 16.02.99. [Interview with the author]
703 Spectre, George. Washington, D.C., 17.02.99. [Interview with the author]
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elected government of Israel should be supported in whatever security decisions it 
has made, is slowly breaking down. Between and within the major American Jewish 
lobby organisations similar rifts and cleavages in political identity have appeared as 
we have seen in Israeli society. However the different political identity conceptions 
within the diaspora have not yet become as fundamentally incompatible as have the 
different political identity conceptions in Israel. All of the political identities within 
the American diaspora share the definition of Israel as a ‘democratic and Jewish 
state’. Nevertheless, the American Jewish diaspora has, at least as far as the political
establishment is concerned, become more diverse. Since the 1980s, as we have seen, 
different diaspora groups and actors compete for influence on the highest level of 
political power in Israel in order to give their political identities a hearing in the 
political decision making process of the state of Israel. This in turn puts contradicting 
political pressures on the Israeli state level from the outside. The highly centralised 
decision making in the Israeli government however is unable to accommodate the 
increasing number of different political identity conceptions which woe it for
influence.
Israeli society is an era of fundamental change on all levels of political identity 
building. Starting in the 1980s and intensified by the currently ongoing peace process 
the fundamental consensus in Israeli society is breaking down. Although the concept 
of the state, of ‘having a state of one’s own’ is still an important element of political
identities, the concrete definition of what it means to be an ‘Israeli’ and what kind of
state Israel should be is becoming highly contested. The answers to these basic 
questions have never been agreed upon since the founding of the state. However
704 Schneider, Alan. Jerusalem, 16.03.99. [Interview with the author]
705 Burdett, Stacy. Washington, D.C., 16.02.99. [Interview with the author]
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while during a time of outside pressure and insecurity this question was not at the 
forefront of the political debate and interim solutions could always be found (the 
‘status quo agreement’ and the lack of a constitution in Israel testify to this). This 
situation has now changed. Israel has now peace treaties with two of his three 
immediate neighbours, its troops have withdrawn from southern Lebanon and, the 
riots since October 2000 notwithstanding, it is pursuing a peace process with the 
Palestinians. The easing of the security situation has brought this long neglected 
question to the political debate. The fact that since for the first four decades of
Israel’s existence the question was never seriously tackled has led to the emergence 
of three different, mutually exclusive identity conceptions that are loosing their basic 
common ground (‘right wing religious identity’, ‘mainstream Jewish nationalism’, 
‘secular binationalism’).
The debate has in parts taken the form of a Kulturkampf in which different 
identity conceptions are fighting for political influence. The danger in this situation 
lies in the fact that at least in the two ‘extreme’ categories, ‘right-wing religious 
nationalism’ and ‘secular binationalism’, groups are located, which feel increasingly 
alienated from the state and have violent potential. That the prospect of internal 
violence is not just a theoretical option can be seen on the assassination of prime
minister Rabin and on the violent demonstrations of Israeli Palestinians in October
2000 (which for the first time since 1948 participated in widespread violent 
demonstrations using firearms).
The state level in Israel is increasingly unable to create societal cohesion. The 
political system has developed from a virtual stalemate in the 1980s to a highly fluid 
and unstable system. Because of the direct election of the prime minister, a new type 
of leadership could establish itself. Starting already with the second premiership of 
Rabin and establishing itself with premiers Netanyahu and Barak, political decision
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making has become a highly centralised affair. Therefore the state level is 
increasingly accommodating specific political identity conceptions that are prevalent 
in Israeli society and in consequence unable to reestablish a basic and widely 
accepted societal consensus.
The changing relationship with the diaspora, especially the American Jewry, 
is also affecting the state level. Since the early 1980s American Jewry has steadily 
growing apart form Israeli Jewish society in religious, cultural and political terms. At 
the time of the Oslo process in 1993, the American Jewish political establishment 
had developed a more critical stance vis-a-vis Israel. The old consensus of the 
different American Jewish political organisations that demanded largely uncritical 
support of the democratically elected government of Israel in security matters is 
slowly breaking down. Now for the first time opposition to Israel’s security policy 
from the left and the right is openly voiced and critics trying to become actively 
involved in the political decision making process in Israel which in turn puts 
additional pressure on the Israeli state level.
As we can see the predictions of the theoretical model fit closely the situation 
of political identity building in Israeli society. All three levels of political identity 
building are important and are trying to have an impact on the political decision 
making. Although the state level remains an important element of political 
identification, the predicted problems of the elites on the state level to create societal 
cohesion and a widely accepted political identity can be observed. The weaker role of 
‘language’ as a significator in the political identity of most groups, predicted in the 
theoretical model, can be observed, since only the groups in the ‘right wing political 
identity’ category point to language as an important element of political 
identification. ‘Gender’ on the other hand does not have the explanatory power
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expected. This can be attributed to the still very effective exclusion of women from 
political decision making structures.
After having analysed the situation in Israeli society and the impact of the 
peace process on its political identities we will now turn to Palestinian society to see 
what similarities and differences to Israeli society exist. Particular emphasis will be 
given to the question of whether the Palestinian state level is able to accommodate its 
different political identity conceptions.
II. Political Identity in Palestinian Society
ILL the Substate Level: Divisions and Marginalisation
Palestinian society is in a state of crisis at the present time.706 Not only has it to cope 
with a political situation of extremely limited autonomy but the Palestinian Authority 
(PA) itself is actively engaged in marginalising any independent political 
development within the occupied territories. “Palestinian state building is taking 
place in an era when society is disengaging from the state and the state is retreating 
from society"707. The primary aim of the PA seems to be to perpetuate its hold on 
political power in Palestinian society. “The time in exile deeply influenced the PLO 
and was one of the main reasons that it developed into an organisation that follows 
the primary aim of securing its political dominance"708. To this end the PA has 
developed a political structure that can best be described as ‘neopatrimonial’.709 In 
addition “the Exterior Leadership attained full control over the institutions of the
706 In the previous chapter on Palestinian society I have analysed the major problems and restrictions 
that Palestinian society is facing as far as a free expression of their political identities is concerned. 
Therefore in this chapter I will restrict myself to an outline of only the major factors.
707 Frisch, Hillel. “Countdown to Statehood. Palestinian State Formation in the West Bank and Gaza“ 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998): p. 152.
708 Beck, Martin. “Die Misere der paldstinensischen Autonomiegebiete“ in Leviathan 26, 1 1998: p. 
84. [Translation by the author]
709 See discussion in preceding chapter on Palestinian society.
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autonomy"710. This was the culmination of a struggle for control which started during 
the intifada, as the local United National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), which 
started out as an autonomous body, founded and controlled by the ‘inside’ leadership, 
came increasingly dependent on the PLO cadres in Tunis. Similarly, when the
Palestinian delegation to the Madrid peace conference had to be selected from inside
the occupied territories, the outside PLO leadership “made sure that most of the 
delegation’s members would lack any independent power base. Moreover, the 
delegation’s only source of legitimacy in the Interior was its identification with the 
PLO"711.
In its effort to ‘de-politicise’ Palestinian society in the occupied territories, the 
PA is also strengthening the old clan or extended family (hamula) structure of 
Palestinian society. This structure has traditionally been one of the bases of 
associational life in the occupied territories. “The essence of social organisation is a 
network of hamulas (extended families) and smaller families as well as village, 
neighbourhood, and religious solidarities"712. Along with this tactic goes an effort to 
avoid an institutionalisation of the political system. On the one hand, the Palestinian 
Legislative Council (PLC) was effectively relegated to the margins of political 
decision making. On the other hand, “neither Fatah nor the organized Palestinian 
political opposition (consisting of the Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement, the 
PFLP, and the bulk of the DFLP) transformed themselves into parties or indicated 
their willingness to contest other forces in the political arena"713. In addition, the 
different Palestinian Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) which played a vital
7,0 Litvak, Meir. “Inside Versus Outside. The Challenge of the Local Leadership, 1967-1994“ in Sela, 
Avraham and Moshe Ma’oz (eds) “The PLO and Israel. From Armed Conflict to Political Solution, 
1964-1994“ (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997): p. 190.
711 Ibid: p. 189.
7,2 Muslih, Muhammad. “Palestinian Civil Society** in Middle East Journal 47, 2 1993: p. 259.
713 Frisch op. cit.: p. 152.
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role during the intifada1 are suffering from a loss of international funds as the 
donors emphasis has shifted to the PNA. Furthermore, the PNA has actively tried to 
control the NGOs. In 1995 the PNA drew up a law which “gave the PA the right to 
dissolve or merge together NGOs without their consent and to appoint members of 
the boards of directors, and placed prohibitive restrictions on the handling of NGO 
finances. In short, the draft law gave the PA, and not members of civil society, the 
right to determine if an NGO should exist or not“714 15. Although the law was 
withdrawn it clearly showed the intentions of the PA elite. In addition, “an 
increasingly diffuse situation as far as political, economic and developmental
measures are concerned, is feeding growing doubts about the self government’s 
ability to fulfil its tasks"716.
But not only the politics of the Palestinian authority influence the political 
identity crisis in Palestinian society in the occupied territories.
“The PA’s detractors point out that current agreements represent a challenge 
to the social and spatial inclusiveness of the Palestinian nationalist ideology 
and. structures. There is no longer any clear object of resistance - no 
authority with clear responsibility for economic and social hardships - and 
thus an important tool for social mobilization and carving out the awareness 
of unity has been blunted"717.
714 See: Barghouti, Mustafa. “The Palestinian NGOs and their Contribution to Policy Making" in 
Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) “Civil Society 
Empowerment. Policy Analysis" (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1998).
7,5 Robinson, Glenn E. “Building a Palestinian State. The Incomplete Revolution" (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1997): p. 184.
716 Nasser, Majed. “Das Dilemma bleibt. Die PalSstinenser ‘nach Oslo’“ in Vereinte Nationen 6 1997: 
p. 206. [Translation by the author]
717 Paerker, Christopher. “Resignation or Revolt? Socio-political Development and the Challenges for 
Peace in Palestine" (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999): p. 65.
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As Lindholm Schulz points out, Palestinian national identity was fashioned around 
the concepts of struggle, suffering and sacrifice.718 For decades the PLO and Fatah 
“argued that armed struggle was the only way to liberate Palestine44719. Now the way 
to liberate Palestine is through negotiations with the former enemy Israel. This took 
away one of the central elements, ‘armed struggle’, that served as a common basis of 
the different political identity conceptions of Palestinian society.
These complex tendencies led to a political identity crisis which in turn gave 
rise to two basic political identity categories in Palestinian society: ‘fundamentalistic 
Islamic identity’ and ‘secular nationalism’. Here, similar to Israeli society, 
fragmentation of political identities can be observed, as it was expected in the 
theoretical model. As we shall see, both categories share only their critical stance vis-
a-vis the PA. Their basic conceptions of what kind of state the future state of 
Palestine should be are, nevertheless, mutually exclusive. This can only be fully 
understood if all six signifactors of political identity (territory, ethnicity, history, 
language, religion, gender) are analysed. In the case of the ‘Fundamentalistic Islamic 
Nationalism’ category whose groups advocate an Islamic state in all of the former 
Palestine, the opposition to the PA turns at times to outright active resistance. It is 
this category that we shall analyse first.
‘Islamic Fundamentalistic Identity ’
Modem Islamic oriented groups in Palestinian society have a long history. They are
an outcome of the Islamic renaissance in the whole of the Middle East which 
developed in the late 19th century as a response to European colonialism. The Muslim 
Brotherhood, established in 1928 in Egypt by Hasan al-Banna, opened branches in
718 See: Lindholm Schulz, Helena. “The Reconstruction of Palestinian Nationalism. Between 
Revolution and Statehood" (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999): p. 12 Iff.
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Palestine in the 1930s and 40s. It continued its activities after the establishment of
the state of Israel. Following al-Banna’s teachings, it concentrated mainly on social 
and religious activities, trying to reform and Islamise society from below, rather then 
attempting a revolution from above. “The Brotherhood’s work on campuses and in 
other grassroots settings strengthened its foundations and created a degree of 
dependency on its institutions4*719 20 721. The 1967 war had a decisive impact on Islamic 
movements all over the Middle East and especially in Palestinian society.
“Islamists [...] argued that the war was punishment for misplaced trust in the 
promise of alien ideologies that had been fostered as a means of mobilizing
for modernization and development. The defeat was devastating because the 
margin of deviance from the faith was great" .
The intifada gave the movement an additional boost and heralded the establishment 
of the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas. Hamas was created as an independent 
wing of the Muslim Brotherhood.
"The emergence of Hamas added a new dimension to Palestinian politics. 
The new organisation was not willing to subsume itself within the framework 
of the PLO and threw down the gauntlet in the struggle for political 
power"722.
The start of the peace process in Madrid in 1992 drew immediate opposition from 
Hamas. . Equally, Hamas opposed the Oslo process and in consequence the PA. 
However it is not only the political process as a whole that is problematic for the
719 Gee, John R. “Unequal Conflict. The Palestinians and Israel" (London: Pluto Press, 1998): p. 91.
720 Ahmed, Hishami H. “From Religious Salvation to Political Transformation: The Rise of Hamas in 
Palestinian Society" (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1994):
http://www.passia.org/publications/research_studies/Hamas-Text/chapterl.htm.
721 Haddad, Yvonne. “Islamists and the ‘Problem of Israel’: The 1967 Awakening" in Middle East 
Journal 46, 2 19992: p. 266f.
722 Milton-Edwards, Beverly. “IslamicPolitics in Palestine" (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999): p. 147. 
Therefore Israel was supporting Hamas for a short time after its establishment in order to weaken the 
PLO inside the occupied territories. It is obvious that this strategy has backfired.
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movement. The PA, bound by the security commitments it made with Israel, is 
actively engaged in an attempt to suppress Hamas’s activities. “Oslo has been the 
great challenge faced by Hamas, for the movement has known from the outset that its 
own success is premised on the failure of Yasir Arafat’s colossal gamble on 
accommodation with Israel“723 24. Consequently the first violent clashes between the 
newly established PA and followers of Hamas occurred on the 18th of November 
1994 during which the Palestinian police killed 14 people and wounded 270. After 
the confrontation which cost the newly established PA credibility on the Palestinian 
street, “Arafat changed the rules of the game: by withdrawing PA officials (the 
police) and mobilizing Fatah, he turned the conflict into a factional one between 
Hamas and Fatah - a conflict in which Hamas declined to engage“725. One of the 
problems for Arafat is that with Hamas he is facing “a movement of national 
liberation, not just domestic opposition objecting to his policies”726.
The PA devised a strategy to cope with Hamas which would satisfy Israeli 
security demands without bringing Hamas into complete opposition to the Authority. 
“The authority arrested many supporters of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other groups. 
These arrests were limited and did not intensify the situation to a state of war 
between the two sides”727. The other part of the strategy consisted of attempts to co­
opt Hamas into the newly political structure. One sign of this strategy was the 1995 
tacit agreement between Hamas and the PA that Hamas would no longer attack 
targets in Israel that do not serve Palestinian interests in return for the PA’s easing of
723 See: Miton-Edwards, Beverly. “Political Islam in Palestine in an Environment of Peace?" in Third 
World Quarterly 17,2 1996.
724 Kristianasen, Wendy. “Challenge and Counterchallenge: Hamas’s Response to Oslo" in Journal of 
Palestine Studies 28, 3 1999: p. 19.
725 Ibid: p. 25.
726 Kodmani-Darwish, Bassma. “Arafat and the Islamists: Conflict or Cooperation" in Current History 
597 1996: p. 29.
727 Barghouti, Iyad. “Islamist Movements in Historical Palestine" in Sidahmed, Abdel Salam and 
Anoushiravan Etheshami (eds) "Islamic Fundamentalism" (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996): p. 170.
304
its persecutions of the members of Hamas’s military wing, the ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam 
brigade. Although the agreement was broken with the suicide bombings of 1996, it 
shows that the PA was able to use the argument of a danger of a Palestinian civil war 
in order to bring Hamas into line at least temporarily. This co-optation strategy 
became especially intensive before the 1996 elections for the PLC.
Although Hamas did not participate in the elections, it also did not call for a 
boycott and fielded several ‘independent’ candidates. However, this brought Hamas 
in conflict with its ‘outside’ leadership in Amman.
"The ‘outside ’ activists subscribe to a vision of political Islamism - that is, a 
revolution from above - rather than with religious revelation through 
ordinary processes of communal activity. However they do not have to cope 
with the reality of Israeli occupation, the PA’s domination, and the daily 
hardships of the Palestinian community, which might explain why they can 
afford to adopt a harder line concerning the armed struggle and the Oslo
process .
However, Hamas was able to adapt its ideology and strategy to the political situation if 
this was required. Western concepts, such as ‘democracy’ or ‘nationalism’, were 
integrated into its ideological outlook to respond to policy demands. As Ntisse 
explains, Hamas’s ideology can be be described “as based on traditional Islamic 
teaching, enriched with modem concepts and ideas of mainly Western origin [...] In 
their application to contemporary situations and problems, the interpretation and 
emphasis of [...] elements of traditional Islamic teaching often change“729.
However, in principle, the long term goal is the liberation of all of Palestine. In 
its charter in article 11, the basic justification of this is given: “The Islamic Resistance 728
728 Mishal, Shaul and Avraham Sela. “The Palestinian Hamas. Vision, Violence and Coexistence “
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2000): p. 161.
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Movement believes that the land of Palestine have been an Islamic waqf throughout 
the generations and until the Day of Resurrection, no one can renounce it or part of it, 
or abandon it or part of it“729 30. It becomes clear from this, that similar to ‘right wing 
religious identity’ in Israel, territory is endowed with religious meaning. Religion is 
the central element of Hamas’s political identity. Mahmoud El-Zahar, spokesman of 
Hamas in Gaza, explains this: “By Islam we are speaking our language, not meaning 
our Arab language, but we are expressing ourselves“731. Therefore there can be no 
separation between religion and the state. Ethnicity is seen from a historical and 
religious perspective. El-Zahar argues: “Our life is controlled individually and 
generally by Islam and Islam started with the Arabs, through the language of the Arabs 
and through an Arab prophet“732 733. The political identity of Hamas offers the individual 
clear orientation on all three levels of political identity building. EL-Zahar explains 
this worldview: “We are speaking about three levels, our country, or you can call it a 
state [...] this is part of the Arab world and the Arab nation is one of the nations inside 
Islam“ . In consequence, the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is also seen 
in this wider context. Sheik Wajih Khalil Yaghi, a member of the PLC (as an 
independent) and close to Hamas, argues: “Palestinians are part of the Arab world [...] 
I don’t look at the Palestinian problem as only a Palestinian problem. For me it is a 
Islamic and Arab problem“734.
Islamic Jihad is the second major Islamic movement in Palestinian society. In 
1980 it split from the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, because it “perceived the
729 Niisse, Andrea. “Muslim Palestine. The Ideology of Hamas" (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic 
Publishers, 1998): p. 175.
730 Hamas Charter: gopher://israel-info.gov.iV00/terror/880818.ter.
731 El-Zahar, Mahmoud. Gaza, 12.05.99. [Interview with the author]
732 El-Zahar, Mahmoud. Gaza, 12.05.99. [Interview with the author]
733 El-Zahar, Mahmoud. Gaza, 12.05.99. [Interview with the author]
734 Yaghi, Sheik Waji Khalil. Gaza, 11.05.99. [Interview with the author]
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activities of the Brotherhood as too conservative44735. From its inception, the 
movement carried out terrorist attacks against Israeli targets in order to achieve an
Islamic revolution. Its view on the conflict is similar to that of Hamas. “The Islamic
Jihad sees the Palestinian problem as [...] a problem that concerns the entire Islamic 
nation [...] Islamic Jihad believes in an Islamic popular war of liberation, resulting in 
the destruction of Israel and the creation of an Islamic state in Palestine44736. Islamic 
Jihad sees itself as the revolutionary vanguard of this war. Rather than transforming 
society first, as the Muslim Brotherhood attempts, “Islamic Jihad’s position gives 
priority to the elimination of Israeli rule447 3 7.
For Islamic Jihad, religion is seen at the centre of personal and political 
identity. Sheik Abdullah Achmed Shami, spokesman of Islamic Jihad in Gaza, 
explains: “I believe that Islam is a great way of arranging the relationships between 
human beings and also the relations with the universe in general. It is also a great 
religion of justice447 3 8. Therefore the distinction between personal, religious, and 
political identity is erased. Sheik Shami outlines this in the following way: “I see no 
difference in Islam between the religious, personal or political, they are all under 
Islam44739.
The groups within the ‘Islamic fundamentalist identity’ category in 
Palestinian society put Islam, religion, at the centre of their political identity. In 
addition, because of their rejection of the current peace process as a whole (it is seen 
as fundamentally flawed), the groups in this category can maintain the three basic 
elements of the nationalist ideology: struggle, suffering, and sacrifice. Israel is clearly
735 Schoch, Bemd. "The Islamic Movement. A Challenge for Palestinian State Building" (Jerusalem: 
PASSIA, 1999): p. 44.
736 Abu-Amr, Ziad. "Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza. Muslim Brotherhood and 
Islamic Jihad" (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994): p. 105.
737 Ibid: p. 106.
738 Shami, Sheik Abdullah Achmed. Gaza, 25.03.99. [Interview with the author]
739 Shami, Sheik Abdullah Achmed. Gaza, 25.03.99. [Interview with the author]
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marked as the enemy against which one has to struggle, from which has to suffer and 
against which one as to sacrifice. The aim, an Islamic state in all of Palestine is also 
clearly marked. The groups within this category were able to build up their own 
educational, religious and social network separately from the state. They form a 
society within the society which offers the individual not only spiritual guidance but 
also tends to his or her social and educational needs. However, the specific outline of 
the future Islamic state and what particular strategies one has to use in order to 
achieve this aim, given the current circumstances, are not elaborated. This leaves 
groups within this category without a clear political alternative to the present
situation.
‘Secular Nationalism ’
The second political identity category in Palestinian society is ‘secular nationalism’. 
Being the largest in Palestinian society, this category is includes a diffuse set of 
political identities which are therefore easier to manipulate by the PA. While the 
groups in the ‘Islamic fundamentalistic identity’ category were opposed to the PA in 
general, the groups in the ‘secular nationalism’ category are critical of the policies of 
the Authority without mounting a challenge to the idea of a two state solution in 
general. It’s common ground are the critical stance vis-a-vis the current policies of
the PA and the wish for a democratic secular state in Palestine. However there are
three subdivisions in this category: 1) the old ‘inside’ leadership and those political 
leaders that were termed ‘personalities’, which rose to prominence during the intifada 
(this also includes the supporters of the PA from the ‘inside’ Fateh movement); 2) the 
Palestinian NGOs, an outgrowth of the intifada and now in a struggle with the PA to 
maintain their independence; 3) the leftist opposition, consisting of the different 
factions of the PLO. We now analyse these groups in turn.
308
The ‘inside’ leadership gained in political importance after the PLO left Beirut in 
1982. However it took centre stage in Palestinian political life after the beginning of 
the intifada after 1987. As the intifada progressed however the ‘inside’ became 
gradually more and more controlled by the ‘outside’, exile leadership. During the 
1992 Madrid/Washington negotiations the ‘inside’ and the independent 
‘personalities’ which were conducting the negotiations were already effectively 
marginalised. Nevertheless the experience of the intifada and the peace process after 
1992 changed the perception of the ‘inside’ leadership. “After the exposure of local 
leaders and personalities to the PLO leadership, [...] the local leaders and 
personalities have become aware of the limitations of PLO leaders. And also aware 
of their [own] distinct skills, capabilities and ability to perform vis-a-vis some PLO 
leaders“740. After the establishment of the PA in 1994, the ‘inside’ leadership became 
aware that they were effectively shut out of all important positions of political power. 
This can be seen on the fact that Haidar Abdul Shaft, the former head of the 
Palestinian delegation during the Madrid/Washington talks, resigned from the post of 
speaker of the PLC in protest at the council’s lack of political influence. Nevertheless 
this group supports the PA in general and wants to work with the PA to reform the 
PA’s structure. This can be seen in the fact that a large number of members of this 
group have been elected to the PLC.
The political identity of this group centres around the vision of a secular 
democratic state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Territory is seen in a national, 
historic sense, as a homeland without specific religious connotations. Abdul Shaft 
explains: “The Palestinians are the descendants of the Semitic tribes [...] Before the 
establishment of the Jewish Kingdom, during the Jewish Kingdom and after the
740 Abu-Amr, Ziad. “Emerging Trends in Palestine Strategic and Political Thinking and Practice “ 
(Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1996): p. 41.
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Jewish Kingdom, we had continued presence on this territory and so our entitlement 
to Palestinian territories in its entirety is a fact“741. Because of this historical view on 
territory, ethnicity is seen in an Arab context; Rawya Shawa, an independent member 
of the PLC and member of the Shawa family, an old family in the Gaza Strip, 
explains the connection: “We are part of the Arabs because we are supposed to be 
one nation despite all the plans for divisions since the middle of this century“742. 
Sharif Husseini, general director of the International Relations Department of the 
Orient House, describes it in the following way: “I think it is a matter of circles. The 
inner circle is the smaller circle, Palestinian. The outer circle is Arab“743.
State and religion should be separated as far as politics are concerned. 
However religion in a cultural aspect should influence the state. Mahdi Abdul-Haid, 
head of the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs 
(PASSIA) in Jerusalem, argues: “You cannot exclude the fasting months of 
Ramadan, you can cannot exclude the major feasts, you cannot exclude prayers, you 
cannot exclude maintaining the holy places, the holy sites. [...] They are part of the 
heritage, the culture of the society"744. Hatem Abdel Quader, a Fateh member of the 
PLC, describes the aspired separation between religion and state: “Religion is 
important [...] all our people are interested in religion but not in a political way [...] 
We must create a balance between religion and the political affairs"745. Religion in 
the Palestinian context is a more complex issue as it is in Jewish Israeli society since 
a minority of Palestinians are Christians.746 This gives the question of the 
relationship between the state and religion an added level of complexity. Constantine
741 Abdul Sharif, Haidar. Gaza, 16.04.99. [Interview with the author]
742 Shawa, Rawya. Gaza, 13.05.99. [Interview with the author]
743 Husseini, Sharif. Jerusalem, 19.05.99. [Interview with the author]
744 Abdul-Hadi, Mahdi. Jerusalem, 19.03.99. [Interview with the author]
745 Quader, Abdel Hatem. Jerusalem, 16.05.99. [Interview with the author]
746 See: Tsimhoni, Daphne. "Christian Communities in Jerusalem and the West Bank since 1948. A 
Historical, Social and Political Study" (Westport: Praeger, 1993).
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S. Dabbagh, executive director of the Near East Council of Churches’ Committee for 
Refugee Work (NECCRW) in Gaza, argues: “The state should not be based on 
religion [...] They should adopt in the laws of the state what is good [in all religions, 
HJS]. But they should not have 100% religious laws"747. Language is seen as a 
national symbol devoid of any religious meaning. Saleh Ra’afat, general secretary of 
FID A, summarises: “Arabic is very important. It is my mother tongue"748. In 
summary, the political identity of the ‘inside’ leadership / personalities subgroup is 
centred around a secular democratic state which takes religion as a cultural
background and feels connected to the wider Arab world through common ethnicity, 
religion, history and language. However this identity conception remains vague in 
specifics.
Palestinian NGOs form the second subgroup of the ‘secular nationalism’ 
identity category. “Palestinian civil society in the occupied territories is peculiar in 
one fundamental respect. It encompasses [...] a de facto political society based on 
Palestinian non-governmental organisations"749. Established during the three decades 
of Israeli occupation after the 1967 war, the NGOs formed a separate structure from 
the Israeli occupation authorities. “Pluralism has been a feature of Palestinian life for 
almost three decades, during which the absence of a national government to deal with 
the policies of the Israeli occupier has resulted in the establishment of hundreds of 
NGOs, many of which were established by political factions, partly as a means to 
extend their influence in society by providing services"750. Since the establishment of 
the PA the NGOs have been engaged in a political struggle against the PA to keep
747 Dabbagh, Constantine S. Gaza, 14.05.99. [Interview with the author]
748 Ra’afat, Saleh. Ramallah, 20.04.99. [Interview with the author]
749 Usher, Graham. “Palestine in Crisis. The Struggle for Peace and Political Independence after 
Oslo" (London: Pluto Press, 1997): p. 46.
750 Abdul Haid, Mahdi. “Government and Civil Society - Relationships and Roles: A View from the 
Civil Society" in PASSIA “Policy Analysis. Civil Society Empowerment" (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 
1998): p. 73.
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their independence. They represent a different vision of a secular democratic 
Palestinian state in which civil society has the main political influence.
While different in its political goals, the political identity of this subgroup is 
similar in its basic elements to the ‘inside’ leadership/‘personalities’ identity 
subgroup. Territory is seen as a homeland, a right for a people, as Hasan Barghouti, 
the general director of the Centre for Democracy and Workers’ Rights in Ramallah, 
explains: “First of all you are talking about rights of the people. This is my land, this 
is my home“751. Ethnicity, similar to the ‘inside’ leaders/‘personalities’ subgroup, is 
seen in a wider context of the Arab world. Mahmod Yousef Dahman, director of the
Centre for Democracy and Workers’ Rights in Gaza, emphasises: “I do not see a 
difference between being Arab and being Palestinian. Both are combined“752. 
Religion and state should be separated, although the role of religion is acknowledged. 
Hasib Nashashibi, project coordinator at LAW - The Palestinian Society for the
Protection of Human Rights and the Environment, states: “My ideal would be a
secular state. [...] But it cannot be because religion plays a major role in society [...] it
is also important for our heritage and our relations with the other Arabs because we 
are a part of the Arab world“753. Language is not seen as a central pillar of a 
Palestinian identity; it is a tool for communication as Nassef Mu’allem, director of 
the Palestinian Centre for Peace and Democracy, explains: “To speak Arabic is 
important but one can be Palestinian without speaking Arabic. A Palestinian is any 
person who was bom in Palestine or who was bom anywhere to a Palestinian mother 
or father“754. There is one significant difference between this subgroup and the 
‘inside’ leadership subgroup. Human and civil rights and democracy are at the centre 
of this identity subgroup. Sabhia Joma’a, a lawyer with the Palestinian Independent
751 Barghuti, Hasan. Ramallah, 18.04.99. [Interview with the author]
752 Dahman, Mahmod Yousef. Gaza, 14.04.99. [Interview with the author]
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Commission for Citizens’ Rights, describes this: “In order to build a state, the 
Palestinian Authority would have to respect democracy, the differences between the 
factions, and human rights. At the moment they are not concentrating on building a 
state. The only thing that they seem to care about is keeping the Oslo process 
going"753 754 5.
The third major subgroup in this political identity category are the leftist 
opposition groups. These groups are in opposition to the Oslo process. This can be 
seen in the fact that they boycotted the 1996 elections for the PLC. “The hard core 
secular opposition (DFLP and PFLP) [...] rejected the elections, because they were 
based on the Israeli-Palestinian agreements (Oslo I and Oslo II) and in turn would 
acknowledge the loss of territory, which was seen as a defeat"756. The leftist 
opposition is a small identity subgroup within Palestinian society in the occupied 
territories. In the Palestinian diaspora, as we shall see, these groups play a major role. 
The PA is not seen as legitimate authority by the leftist opposition.
“To them, the Authority lacks legitimacy in terms of both the way it has been 
established/appointed and its functioning [...] It is perceived as a major 
contradiction that the Authority has been established because of the 
occupation and not as an opposing structure to occupation. [...] 
PFLP/DFLP are promoting a democratic struggle, thus challenging the 
authoritarian style of the PNA “757.
Territory is seen as central to Palestinian political identity. Saleh Zeiden, member of 
the political office of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP),
753 Nashashibi, Hasib. Beit Hanina, 02.04.99. [Interview with the author]
754 Mu’allem, Naseef. Beit Hanina, 10.02.99 [Interview with the author]
755 Joma’a, Sabhia. Gaza, 12.05.99. [Interview with the author]
756 Perthes, Volker and Muriel Asseburg. “Palastina auf dem Weg zum Staat“ in Blatter fur deutsche 
und internationale Politik 41,3 1996: p. 269. [Translation by the author]
757 Lindholm Schulz, Helena. “One Year into Self-Government. Perceptions of the Palestinian 
Political Elite" (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1997): p. 48f.
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explains this: “Without land there is no Palestinian history. Without land there is no 
Palestinian identity4*758 759 760. The envisioned two state solution is seen only as a first step 
to a binational state in all of Palestine in which Jews and Palestinians have equal 
rights. “At the present time the solution is the 1967 borders [...] to follow this we 
have to build a binational state44759.
Ethnicity is seen in an Arab context. Rafat Athman Ali Al-Najar, a former 
member of the Central Committee of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP) and now an independent member of the PLC, explains: “Palestinians are part 
of the Arab world. Being Palestinian is more specific than being an Arab but there is 
no deeper difference44760. Jamil H. M. Shadaha, General Secretary of the Arab 
Palestinian Front in Gaza, elaborates: “The relationship between being an Arab and 
being a Palestinian has two implications: the first one is the historical, civilisational 
component, and the second is the struggle, which makes Palestine the central issue of 
interest for all Arabs4*761 762. As can be seen from this, history, Palestinian history is an 
important element of political identity of this subgroup. Religion and state should be 
separated as Mohammed Abbas, the general secretary of the Arab Liberation Front, 
explains: “I believe in a separation between religion and state because we are a multi­
religious society44762. Again, language is not seen as a central component of one’s 
political identity: “Language is not the only element that is shaping the national 
belonging. Nationalism is a group of principles and only one of them is language4*763.
It has become clear that all three subgroups in this category share the same 
vision of Palestine as a secular democratic state which is informed by Islamic religion 
and culture. However the political identities of these groups remain unspecified when
758 Zeiden, Saleh. Gaza, 15.05.99. [Interview with the author]
759 Zeiden, Saleh. Gaza, 15.05.99. [Interview with the author]
760 Al-Najar, Rafat Athman Ali. Gaza, 15.04.99. [Interview with the author]
761 Shadaha, Jamil H. M. Gaza, 11.05.99. [Interview with the author]
762 Abbas, Mohammed. Gaza, 14.05.99. [Interview with the author]
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it comes to details on what guidelines such a state should be following. There is a 
substantial difference as far as strategy and tactics to achieve this goal are concerned. 
While the ‘inside’ leadership/‘personalities’ subgroup (including the ‘inside’ Fateh 
movement) wishes to reform the PA, the NOGs are fighting the PA and accuse it of 
violating human and civil rights and in doing this diminishing the changes of 
establishing a Palestinian state. The leftist opposition groups on the other hand negate 
the legitimacy of the PA as such and reject the Oslo process in principle. Their long 
tenn political aim is a secular democratic state in all of the former Palestine, 
including what is now Israel, although in the medium term the accept a two-state- 
solution, hence in practice they have abandoned their goal of destroying Israel. 
Therefore while agreeing on the general principles, this identity category is diffuse 
and divided when it comes to specific issues.
Gender Roles in Palestine
It is interesting to note that in all groups interviewed, a striking lack of gender 
awareness can be observed. This goes so far that questions concerning gender related
topics were by most dismissed as irrelevant to the discussion. This also included the 
women interviewed in the various identity groups. Similar to Israeli society, ‘gender’ 
does not play a major role in political identity building of Palestinian society. 
Palestinian women live in a highly traditional and patriarchal society. “The family is 
the basic unit of Palestinian society. In her family a Palestinian girl develops her 
social personality and gains consciousness about her gender. On marriage a women 
moves from the sphere of control of her own family into that of her husband“763 64.
763 Abbas, Mohammed. Gaza, 14.05.99. [Interview with the author]
764 Manasra, Najah. “Palestinian Women: Between Tradition and Revolution" in Augustin, Ebba (ed) 
“Palestinian Women. Identity and Experience1' (London: Zed Books, 1993): p.7.
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Traditionally women’s involvement in the public sphere was centred around 
charitable work. This situation began to change after the 1967 war.
“Under occupation [...] traditional family roles are being continuously 
transformed and strained. On the one hand, growing economic need has 
forced women into the labor force to meet the rising costs of living. On the
other hand, with the men either at work in Israel, or deported or imprisoned
at the hands of the Israeli authorities, or else forced to emigrate abroad, it is 
the Palestinian women who now have to bear the responsibilities of holding 
together a secure and stable family under the continuous pressures of life 
under occupation"765 66.
Several women’s committees were founded along the lines of the different factions of 
the PLO. During the intifada, women were mobilised on a large scale to take part in 
popular committees and demonstrations. “The sheer number of women active in 
committee work increased considerably"767. However as the intifada progressed, the 
early achievements made by the women’s movement regarding gender roles 
regressed. “Women continue[d] to be subservient to men, not only at home but also 
in the domain of political activism"768.
In addition, the growing influence of the Islamic movement, especially in 
Gaza, made itself felt. One example of this development is the hijab (headscarf) 
campaign of the Islamic movement in Gaza. During the summer of 1989 the Islamic 
movement stepped up a campaign trying to force all women to wear a hijab. During
765 See: Holt, Maria. “Women in Contemporary Palestine. Between Old Conflicts and New Realities" 
(Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1996).
766 Dajani, Souad. “Palestinian Women Under Israeli Occupation. Implications for Development" in 
Tucker, Judith E. (ed) “Arab Women. Old Boundaries New Frontiers" (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1993): p. 110.
767 Augustin, Ebba. “Development in the Palestinian Women’s Movement during the Intifada" in 
Augustin, Ebba (ed) “Palestinian Women. Identity and Experience" (London: Zed Books, 1993): p. 
23.
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the summer the situation slowly heated and ultimately led to several violent attacks 
on women. The United Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) did not take the issue 
seriously until late August 1989 when it issued a leaflet condemning the harassment
of women.
"The UNLU statement [...] was incapable of reversing the overall effect of 
the campaign, which had already succeeded in positioning women’s dress 
and behaviour as appropriate subjects of political discipline, or as sites for 
the reproduction of the social, and, ultimately, the physical integrity of the
intifada"768 69.
The Oslo process and the establishment of the PA did not reverse this trend. On the 
contrary, under the new authority the decline of women’s organisations and the
regress of women’s achievements continued. “Oslo has contributed to the decline of
an already disintegrating model of a centralized, partisan, and PLO-led women’s 
leadership group“770. The traditional social structures, especially in the public sphere, 
which seemed to be changing during the occupation and especially the intifada, are 
now being reinforced. “Traditional patriarchy within Palestinian political culture has 
been solidified under the PA“771. In order to safeguard their achievements, several 
women’s organisations under the umbrella of the General Union of Palestinian 
Women (PLO affiliated) have come together to draft a Declaration of Principles on 
Palestinian Women’s Rights. “The text stresses three main areas in which women 
seek equality: political rights, civil rights, and (taken together) economic, social, and
768 Giacaman, Rita and Penny Johnson. “Intifada Year Four: Notes on the Women’s Movement" in 
Sabbagh, Suha (ed) "Palestinian Women of Gaza and the West Bank" (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1998): p. 227.
769 Hammami, Rema. “From Immodesty to Collaboration: Hamas, the Women’s Movement and 
National Identity in the Intifada" in Beinin, Joel and Joe Stork (eds) "Political Islam. Essays from 
Middle East Report" (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997): p. 201.
770 Kawar, Amal. “Palestinian Women’s Activism after Oslo" in Sabbagh, Suha (ed) "Palestinian 
Women of Gaza and the West Bank" (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998): p. 242.
771 Abdo, Nahla. “Gender and Politics Under the Palestinian Authority" in Journal of Palestine Studies 
28,2 1999: p. 40.
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cultural rights“772. Although the document was submitted to the PA, it was not acted
upon.
The classical argument of national liberation movements that issues of gender 
equality and women’s rights are secondary to national issues is also widely 
established in Palestinian society even among women’s leaders. Yusra Ibrahim 
Berbery, chairwomen of the Palestinian Women’s Union, is an example of this 
viewpoint: “For the time being, we have to concentrate on political issues, to liberate 
our country“773. The PA established women’s departments in every ministry. 
However their impact on actual policy is questionable as Sana Asi, coordinator of the 
Gender Statistics Program in the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics, points out:
“They gave us ‘traditional’ gifts like women’s departments in every ministry
for example. You can have women’s issues in every department and discuss 
them [...] But if you are looking at the plans and look where the part is that 
women contributed you will find that they are not clearly defined"774.
Gender roles in Palestinian society still largely follow traditional gender lines. 
Women are in a subordinate position in the private as well as the public realm. 
Gender as a pillar of political identity should be important and explain significant 
differences. Although the role of women during the early phase the intifada seemed 
to change the traditional perceptions of women in society, as the intifada progressed 
these achievements regressed. An important role in this process was played by the 
growth of the Islamic movement which led to a general reversal to more 
conservatism in Palestinian society. The establishment of the PA did not change this 
pattern and in certain ways the process was even encouraged by the PA. In the
772 Sabbagh, Suha. “The Declaration of Principles on Palestinian Women’s Rights: An Analysis" in 
Sabbagh, Suha (ed) ‘‘Palestinian Women of Gaza and the West Bank" (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1998): p. 248.
773 Berbery, Yusra Ibrahim. Gaza, 12.05.99. [Interview with the author]
774 Asi, Sana. Ramallah, 06.05.99. [Interview with the author]
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current situation, women are not only absent from the centres of political decision 
making on any level of Palestinian society they are also heavily underrepresented in 
the public realm in general. However all groups interviewed on the substate level 
displayed a striking lack of gender awareness. This shows that an effective political 
identity based on gender has yet to develop.
Similar to Israeli society, the tendency towards fragmentation has led to the 
establishment of different political identity groups. Similar to Israeli society, the 
radical religious groups, here within the ‘fundamentalistic Islamic identity’ category, 
were able to build their own social and educational institutions. All of the opposition
groups on the substate level, however, share one central weakness. “Secular and 
religious opposition however are in a crisis time and again they are criticising the 
declaration of principles, the actions and the work, and the political program of the 
Palestinian leadership without offering a believable alternative for the national 
Palestinian agenda“775. In addition none of the opposition groups, at least as far as the 
groups within the ‘secular nationalism’ category are concerned, are willing to 
seriously challenge the PA: “The opposition’s behaviour [...] vis-a-vis the PA has 
shown very clearly that they will not try to destroy what the PA tries to build. Rather 
they ‘swallow’ policies and decisions rather than openly oppose the PA“776.
Although all groups are trying to put pressure on the state level to make their 
demands heard, this has not led to a fluid and fragmented system of governance, as in 
the Israeli case. In addition to the weakness of the opposition groups, the cohesion of
775 Abdul-Hadi, Mahdi. “Unabhangigkeit Oder Katastrophe. Der FriedensprozeB aus palMstinensischer 
Sicht“ in Internationale Politik 70, 7 1995: p. 19. [Translation by the author]
776 Malki, Riad. “The Opposition and its Role in the Peace Process. A Palestinian Perspective" in 
PASSIA “Palestine, Jordan, Israel. Building a Case for Common Scholarship and Understanding in 
the New Era of the Middle East“ (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1997): p. 41.
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the Palestinian state level is also maintained by its autocratic and neo-patrimonial
character.
ILIL State Level: Dominance and Unresponsiveness
The state level in Palestinian society is an important location for identification. The 
concept of a ‘state’, of having a ‘state of one’s own’ is, similar to Israeli society, an 
important part of Palestinian political identities. Nevertheless, the elites on the state 
level have increasing difficulty to maintain societal cohesion. The PA has since its 
inception in 1994 tried to exclude any independent political development on the 
Palestinian substate level. 777 In contrast to Israeli society where the state level is 
unable to accommodate the diverse political identity conceptions within the wider 
society, the PA was never trying to develop mechanisms through which it could be 
responsive to demands from wider society. This can be seen in the Arafat’s refusal to 
sign the basic laws as well as in the political marginalisation of the PLC.778 The PA 
has developed into a quasi autonomous society within society, mostly unresponsive 
to changes or demands from the substate level. Most members and supporters of the 
PA are located on the state level. This is why they were not included in the analysis
of the Palestinian substate level.
In the eyes of the elites on the state level, the primacy of obtaining an 
independent political entity in the occupied territories overruled democratic 
developments or the building of a strong civil society. That this is the primary aim 
was already outlined by one of the Palestinian signatories to the declaration of 
principles. “The nascent Palestinian entity is striving to break away from the 
dominance of Israel and build for itself an independent existence protected by a
777 See previous chapter on Palestinian society and the introduction to the Palestinian part of this
chapter.
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strong shield44779. While acknowledging the need for democracy and a multi-party 
system, Abu Mazen argues: 44We must move from the mentality of revolution to the 
mentality of state building447 80. As Muslih shows, Arafat’s understanding of 
democracy was questionable from the outset of the PA. Talking an incident in
summer 1995 Muslih describes:
“In a discussion of local Palestinian politics with representatives from 
refugee camps in the Gaza Strip last summer, PLO chairman Arafat was 
asked about his understanding of democracy. His answer: ‘Democracy is 
respect for the Palestine National Authority’“78.
That the elites on the state level do not allow effective political input from the other 
levels of Palestinian society is surprising because in their political identity conception 
the PA’s officials are remarkably close to the groups in the ‘secular nationalism’ 
political identity category. Ethnicity is a central element. Being ‘Arab’ and 
consequently being ‘Palestinian’ is ethnically defined. Marwan Kanafani, spokesman 
of the president’s office: “I believe in the Arab nation, in the Islamic heritage, and the 
uniqueness of the Palestinian people [...] they are unique because of the suffering that 
they had to go through447 82. Yousef Abu-Safieh, Minister of Environmental Affairs, 
elaborates on this national view of ethnicity: “The Arab nationality is very important 
because this is a historical root for the Palestinian. It is part of the Palestinian history 
and heritage. We cannot isolate ourselves from our nationality as Arabs447 83. 
Territoriality is seen in terms of rights to the land, not in religious terms. Hassan 
Asfour, Minister of Negotiations Affairs: “It is our right to have the territory. It is our * * * *
778 See preceding chapter on Palestinian society.
779 Abbas, Mahmoud (Abu Mazen). “Through Secret Channels. The Road to Oslo: Senior PLO 
Leader Abu Mazen's Revealing Story of the Negotiations with Israel" (Reading: Garnet Publishing, 
1995): p. 223.
780 Ibid: p. 223.
781 Muslih, Muhammad. “Arafat’s Dilemma" in Current History 588 1995: p. 23.
782 Kanafani, Marwan. Gaza, 10.05.99. [Interview with the author]
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territory [...] when we accepted the historical compromise with the Israelis it was not
because it is not our land but because we want to have a solution for the 
problems”783 84. Hisham Abd El-Raziq, Minister for Detainee Affairs, summarises this 
viewpoint: “This is our homeland. It is part of our national belonging. It part of our 
religion, history, ideology, and security needs”785. Mohammed Achmod El-Fdilat, 
general director in the Interior Ministry and responsible for the Palestinian NGOs, 
uses ‘classic’ nationalistic terminology to describe the connection to the land: “The 
land is like a mother for the people”786 787 788. Religion and state should be separated 
nevertheless it should play a role as a cultural background. Mohammed Dahlan, head 
of the Preventive Security Force (PSF) in Gaza, makes this point: “It should be 
integrated in the state system. I hope that it would have a very important role in the 
social and religious life of the people but not in everything. In brief I am working for 
a secular state” . Language, although seen as part of Arab culture, is mainly seen as 
a communications tool which is only one element of the political identity, ethnicity is 
more important. Ahmad Abed El-Rahiman, Minister and Secretary General of the 
Cabinet, explains this: “He is still Palestinian even if for him Arabic means 
nothing” . Jamal Zakout, general director of the Ministry for Civil Affairs, agrees: 
“He would still be a Palestinian [without speaking Arabic, HJS] because for us to be 
Palestinian is your identity no matter where you live”789.
It has become obvious that the political identity offered by the state level, the 
PA is very close to the political identity conceptions of the ‘secular nationalism’ 
political identity category. However this did not lead to a situation where the groups
783 Abu-Safieh, Yousef. Gaza, 10.04.99. [Interview with the author]
784 Asfour, Hassan. Gaza, 14.04.99. [Interview with the author]
785 El-Raziq, Hisham Abd. Gaza, 13.05.99. [Interview with the author]
786 El-Fdilat, Mohammed Achmod. Ramallah, 16.05.99. [Interview with the author]
787 Dahlan, Mohammed. Gaza, 17.04.99. [Interview with the author]
788 El-Rahiman, Ahmad Abed. Gaza, 14.04.99. [Interview with the author]
789 Zakout, Jamal. Gaza, 11.05.99. [Interview with the author]
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within that political identity category where included in the decision making of the 
PA. From the outset the PA and Arafat, however, were faced with a dilemma. On the
one hand, the Islamic forces, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, had the potential, through 
terror attacks against Israeli targets, to derail the nascent peace process which in turn 
would threaten the dominance of the PA elites in Palestinian society and politics by 
turning Israel against it. On the other hand, the leftist opposition forces could de- 
legitimise the PA by openly challenging the undemocratic structures and political 
decision making. Therefore the PA is actively working to marginalise all opposition 
groups on the substate level regardless of differences in political identity. In addition, 
the Palestinian NGOs are seen as a disrupting factor in the new power structure. The 
NGOs which functioned as a parallel political structure during the Israeli occupation 
posed now a challenge to the dominance of the newly established PA. Therefore the 
PA attempted to control the NGOs “because it believes that this is its role as a 
government”790. For the same reason, the ‘inside’ leadership and the ‘personalities’ 
are pushed to sidelines of the political process, despite their general support for the
PA.
In order to prevent any substantial challenge to their dominance from 
materialising, the PA adopted a two legged strategy. The opposition from the left 
“have been easily defused by a combination of co-optation, appointments and mild 
repression and by a process of self-exclusion of these groups”791. With the Islamic 
forces, namely Hamas, the PA followed a different pattern. “HAMAS has proven to 
be too formidable an opponent to be subject to these mechanisms of co-optation, and 
was therefore subjected to a strategy of attempted dialogue, followed by direct
790 Dajani, Mohammed. “Government and Civil Society - Relationships and Roles: A View from the 
PNA“ in PASSIA “CivilSociety Empowerment. Policy Analysis" (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1998): p. 71.
791 Tamari, Salim. “Governance, Civil Society and State-Building in Palestine” in PASSIA “Civil 
Society Empowerment. Strategic Planning" (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1998): p. 40.
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repression when that dialogue did not lead to the desired results44792. This two-legged 
strategy seemed to be successful in preventing a direct challenge to the regime.
However it is obvious that this strategy had negative consequences for 
Palestinian society as a whole. First of all, in order to effectively repress the 
opposition, a large police and security apparatus had to be established. Indeed the 
security apparatus, in accordance with the Israeli-Palestinian agreements, was already 
in place before Arafat took over power in the Gaza Strip. “One of the institutions at 
the centre of this structure is the newly-established state security apparatus, including 
the police and internal security forces44793.
The second negative development was the involvement of the nascent 
Palestinian economy in the neo-patrimonial system. In order to co-opt critics, Arafat 
used economic incentives. “At the moment the PNA is the largest employer and also 
has additionally increased its apparatus through a system of clienteles44794. This had 
negative consequences as far as international donor money is concerned. The donor 
countries grew steadily uneasy with the lack of transparency and efficiency within the 
PA. “It became nearly impossible to match the agreed upon donations to individual 
projects because neither the structures for their implementation were established nor 
was the specifically agreed spending of the donations assured44795. The neo­
patrimonial system made it necessary to establish overlapping eras of competence in 
order to create competition between the different ministries and in turn prevent the 
development of alternative power centres. Beck demonstrates that this is part of neo- * * * *
792 Ibid: p. 40.
793 Milton-Edwards, Beverly. “Palestinian State-Building: Police and Citizens as Test of Democracy" 
in British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 25, 1 1998: p. 96. See also the discussion in the 
preceding chapter on Palestinian society.
794 Hofmann, Sabine. “Wirtschaftsentwicklung im Westjordanland und im Gazastreifen zwischen 
politischem Imperativ und wirtschaftlicher Realit3t“ in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 39 1997: p. 
33. [Translation by the author]
795 Hafez, Kai. “Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung des palSstinensischen Autonomiegebietes: 
Fehlinvestitionen in den Frieden? in Orient 36,2 1995: p. 321. [Translation by the author]
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patrimonial systems which strive for “the maintenance their privileged status in the 
power structure - with or without a rational strategy for development44796.
The lack of democracy and civil society is blamed, by officials of the PA, 
exclusively on the situation and on pressure form Israel. Hani Al-Hassan, member of 
the central committee of the PLO argues: “We failed to build a society from which 
we can say that we are satisfied with it [...] It is because of Oslo. Now with the Wye 
River accords you have to arrest people because they are planing, they are thinking to 
plan to do something. How can you have rule of the law?“796 97. While this situation is 
true to a great extend, it does not explain the marginalisation of all the different 
groups of the substate level. The ‘inside’ leadership and the ‘personalities’ group for 
example is not involved in terrorist activities. Nevertheless they too are pushed to the 
margins of the political process.
The Palestinian state level is increasingly unresponsive to demands and 
changes of the substate level. The groups within the ‘Islamic fundamentalistic 
identity’ political identity category pose not only a serious political challenge to the 
PA but also offer a fundamentally different conception of the state of Palestine. 
Therefore it is not surprising that the PA is not attempting to respond to their political 
demands. However, despite wide agreement in political identity conceptions, with the 
groups within the ‘secular nationalism’ identity group, the PA is also unresponsive to 
their demands. The requirements of the maintenance of its political dominance, 
coupled with the outside, Israeli pressures combine to widen the rift between the state 
and the substate level in Palestinian society. Using a system of co-option, patronage 
and violent repression, the PA is isolating itself from the demands of its constituency 
in the occupied territories.
796 Beck, Martin. “Strukturelle Probleme und Perspektiven der soziookonomischen Entwicklung in den
palastinensichen Autonomiegebieten" in Orient 38, 4 1997: p. 647. [Translation by the author]
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As was predicted in the theoretical model, the Palestinian state level, although 
important, is increasingly unable to produce societal cohesion within wider society. 
However, in contrast to the Israeli system, the weakness of the opposition and the 
autocratic and neo-patrimonial structure of the PA prevents the fragmentation of the 
political system on the state level.
However not only the substate level is increasingly marginalised. Since the 
Oslo accords in 1993, the Palestinian diaspora on the supra-state level is also isolated 
from the political decision making. It is to the analysis of this level of political 
identity building in Palestinian society that we turn now.
ILIIL Palestinian Supra-State Level: Neglect,
Marginalisation, Isolation
Similar to Israeli society, the supra-state level is an important level of political 
identity building. Here again, the diaspora (as predicted in the theoretical model) is of 
particular importance. Until 1993, the centre of Palestinian political decision making 
was located in the diaspora. The PLO, located in Tunis, was the internationally 
recognised representation of Palestinian society. As we have seen, even during the 
intifada, the exile PLO was able to regain control of the ‘inside’, after an initial shift 
of emphasis to the occupied territories at the start of the intifada. Since the 
Declaration of Principles in 1993 however, the political power centre has moved to 
the occupied territories. Not only was the PA located in the Gaza Strip and the West 
Bank, but the issue of the Palestinian diaspora, the refugees, was declared a ‘final 
status’ issue. This meant that during the interim phase, the issue would not be 
discussed between Israel and the Palestinians. This relegated the Palestinian refugees
797 Al-Hassan, Hani. Gaza, 08.04.99. [Interview with the author]
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in the diaspora de facto to the margins of Palestinian politics. As Klein argues, the 
PLO never had a clearly defined unified strategy for dealing with the issue of the
return of the refugees. By showing flexibility on the demand of a complete realisation 
of the right of return, the PLO assumes that this issue can be used to put pressure on 
Israel to grant independence.
“Although the PLO leadership has not yet developed any detailed programme 
for realizing the right of return [...] the PLO has developed informal attitudes 
regarding the right of return as an instrumental means to achieve the 
Palestinian independent state, thus assuring the organization the option of 
adjusting itself to changing circumstances “798.
In addition the Oslo process, with the possibility of a two-state solution, has 
reinforced the subdivision in the refugee population created when the PLO moved to 
the acceptance of a two-state-solution after 1974.7" With the implementation of the 
first practical steps towards a two-state-solution, the de facto discrimination between 
the refugees from the 1967 war, which Israel would allow to return to their former 
homes in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the refugees of 1948 which Israel 
will not allow to return (at least not to their former homes in Israel), has been 
strengthened. Only the territories occupied in 1967 are part of the negotiations. That 
the issue is not seen as pressing by the PA can be seen from the fact that until now, 
no programme for the possible absorption of the refugees has been developed. This 
situation has obviously led the Palestinian diaspora communities to join the 
opposition to the PA. The leftist opposition groups, such as the DFLP and the PFLP 
have their main power bases in the diaspora, specifically in Damascus. Already in 
1993 the main opposition groups, the leftist groups, nationalist factions, and the
798 Klein, Menachem. “Between Right and Realization: The PLO Dialectics of‘The Right of Return’" 
in Journal of Refugee Studies 11,1 1998: p. 14.
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Islamist forces formed an alliance in Damascus.799 800 801“Its primary purpose is the 
derailment of the Oslo-based peace process and the persistence in all forms of 
struggle, including armed struggle, to liberate Palestine ‘from the river to the sea’“ . 
However although including most of the oppositional forces of the Palestinian 
diaspora, the alliance was not able to present a coherent program with a realistic 
alternative to the ongoing peace process. “The alliance was set up as an activist front, 
but failure to agree on tactics and strategy has caused it to engage in very little 
constructive activity”802. The armed struggle against Israel is the central aim. 
Ramadan ‘Abdallah Shallah, general secretary of the Islamic Jihad explains this:
“The Palestine question and the struggle against the enemy is a question of 
right and wrong [...] Five years after the Oslo agreement was signed, has the
Palestinian problem been resolved? Have the refugees returned to their 
homeland? [...] the Palestinian cause has no solution through negotiations 
and compromise. The struggle for Palestine is a historical struggle that will 
continue for generations despite attempts to co-opt and terminate [it] “803.
It becomes obvious from this that the concept of continued ‘armed struggle’ is seen 
as an end itself and no clear strategy or goal, apart from the liberation of the entire 
former Palestine in the far future, is offered. Because of this, the oppositional forces 
in the Palestinian diaspora have been largely ineffective in influencing the policies of
the PA.
799 See preceding chapter on Palestinian society.
800 The members of the alliance are: DFLP, PFLP, Palestinian Communist Party, PFLP-General 
Command, Palestine Liberation Front, Palestine Popular Struggle Front, Fatah-Uprising, Sa’iqa, 
Islamic Jihad, Hamas.
801 Stringberg, Anders. “The Damascus-Based Alliance of Palestinian Forces: A Primer" in Journal of 
Palestine Studies 29, 3 2000: p. 60.
802 Ibid: p. 62.
803 Journal of Palestine Studies. “The Movement of Islamic Jihad and the Oslo Process. An Interview 
with Ramadan ‘Abdallah Shallah" in Journal of Palestine Studies 28, 4 1999: p. 66.
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The second politically important Palestinian diaspora are the Palestinians and Arabs 
living in the United States. The major Arab/Palestinian lobby groups in the USA 
work on a political identity basis which is close to the PA’s and the groups within the 
‘secular nationalism’ category. Ethnicity is always seen in a wider Arab context in 
which being Palestinian is a specific identity. Hala Salaam Maksoud, president of the 
Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee, argues: “Being Arab is a wider 
agenda of commitment with the core issue being the Palestinian issue“804. Territory is 
seen as a homeland and as a question of rights. Maya M. Berry, director of 
government relations at the Arab-American Institute defines it in the following way: 
“It is a matter of the rights of self-determination of the people [...] Palestinians as a 
people with their national identity and a homeland deserve the right for this 
homeland to be restored”805. The separation of religion and state is seen as an 
important issue, although the state should be influenced by the cultural heritage that 
religion offers. Muhammad Halleq, former chairman of the Center for Policy 
Analysis on Palestine, argues: “I think of religion as part of a cultural heritage [...] It 
think religion has to play a role in certain mores of society but not in the state. Since 
it is not only a state for Muslims, [as] many Palestinians are not Muslims”806. Similar 
to the secular groups in the occupied territories, language is not seen as core element 
of an Arab political identity. It too is seen in a cultural context. “It [language] is one 
way of strengthening your cultural identification”807 as Maya M. Berry points out.
The influence of the Arab/Palestinian lobby groups are not comparable in 
their influence on American foreign policy to the Israeli lobby organisations. This has 
several reasons. First of all, the Arab/Palestinian lobby organisations are not as 
focused on the Palestinian issue as the Israeli lobby organisations are. They are
804 Maksoud, Hala Salaam. Washington, D.C., 15.02.99. [Interview with the author]
805 Berry, Maya M. Washington, D.C., 19.02.99. [Interview with the author]
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focusing on Arab issues in general, of which the Palestinian issue is only one. In 
addition the lobby groups suffer from a lack of organisation, as Maya M. Berry points 
out: “We ourselves are not organised enough yet to be at a point that if you do 
something against our interests there is a political cost to it“806 807 08. However it is not 
simply a matter of better organisation of the lobby. As Christison shows, there is a 
deep seated historically negative perception of Arabs in general and the Palestine 
issue in particular in the American political establishment.809 “Aside from a large, 
politically active Jewish community, such factors as memory of the Holocaust, Israeli 
assistance to U.S. interests, mutual opposition to Soviet influence and radical Arab 
states, and greater cultural proximity created a positive public opinion toward 
Israel“810. This support for Israel did not fundamentally change during the Oslo 
process in which the USA takes part as a broker between the two sides. “There are no 
illusions, and certainly no claims, that the United States is a disinterested party, a 
neutral party, or a party acting in the broad interests of the region or the interests of 
peace, without looking at its own strategic advantage44811.
It has become clear during the analysis of the Palestinian supra-state level, that 
groups on this level are isolated from the political decision making process of the PA. 
This is partly because the PA has marginalised this level of political identity building 
and partly because the constituencies and groups on this level do not command 
enough political cloud to be heard. This isolation of the supra-state level has several
806 Haileq, Muhammad. Washington, D.C., 15.02.99. [Interview with the author]
807 Berry, Maya M. Washington, D.C., 19.02.99. [Interview with the author]
808 Berry, Maya M. Washington, D.C., 19.02.99. [Interview with the author]
809 See: Christison, Kathleen. "Perceptions of Palestine. Their influence on U.S. Middle East Policy" 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
810 Rubin, Barry. “Misperceptions and Perfect Understanding. The United States and the PLO“ in Sela, 
Avraham and Moshe Ma’oz (eds) "The PLO and Israel. From Armed Conflict to Political Solution, 
1964-1994" (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997): p. 149.
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concrete reasons. First of all, the PA itself at the moment does not see the problems 
of the diaspora as a pressing political issue. The right of return of the Palestinian 
refugees, guaranteed in UN resolution 194 has in the Oslo declaration of principles 
been postponed as a ‘final status’ issue. Secondly, the Oslo agreements created a new 
subdivision of the refugee community, those who fled after the 1967 war and those of 
1948/49. The PLO/PA did not prevent this subdivision from being established. The 
PA also sees the issue of the Palestinian refugees as a political bargaining chip in the 
negotiations over the attainment of independence. The third reason for the 
marginalisation of the Palestinian supra-state level is the fact that those political 
groups which command most of the following among the refugees are opposed to the 
Oslo process itself and do not see the PA as a legitimate authority while being unable 
to offer a realistic alternative to Oslo. Fourthly, the American diaspora community, 
which by living in the country of the broker of the Middle East peace process and 
would normally be an important constituency is politically weak for a variety of 
reasons, lack of organisation, traditional support of the USA for Israel, and strategic 
interest of the US in the region. Although close in their political identity to the PA, 
this constituency is too weak politically to be able to have an impact on the PA’s 
policies. For all these reasons, the state level is not only increasingly isolated from 
the Palestinian sub-state level in the occupied territories but also from the Palestinian 
diaspora on the supra-state level.
Palestinian society is, similar to what we have seen in Israeli society, in a time of 
political identity crisis. The Oslo process and the establishment of the PA are the two 
prime factors underlying this development. However the reasons for this political
8,1 Benny, Phyllis. “Clinton’s Middle East Policy: Continuity or Change?14 in The Center for Policy 
Analysis on Palestine. '‘Honest Broker? U.S. Policy and the Middle East Peace Process"
331
identity crisis are different from what we have seen in Israeli society. In Palestinian 
society groups on all levels of political identity building do not feel represented in the 
centres of political decision making of the state level. The PA’s policies seem to be 
more concerned with the maintenance of their political dominance in Palestinian 
society than with the representation of the constituencies themselves. This can be 
seen on the PA’s policy of marginalising any independent development within 
society.
On the Palestinian substate level two major political identity categories can be 
observed. These have opposing political identity conceptions. Groups within the 
‘Islamic fundamentalistic identity’ category take religion as the central element of 
their political identity. The two main political organisations, Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad agree on the aim of establishing an Islamic religious state in all of the former 
Palestine. The second major political identity category on the Palestinian substate 
level is: ‘secular nationalism’ block. Here a three major subgroups can be seen: the 
‘inside’ ledership/’personalities’ subgroup (including the ‘inside’ Fateh movement), 
the Palestinian NGOs, and the leftist opposition groups. All three subgroups have 
very similar political identities and agree on the aim of establishing a secular 
democratic Palestinian state. However they differ as far as strategy and tactics to 
achieve this aim are concerned. Despite their more or less critical stand towards the 
PA, none of the groups on the substate level has yet been able to offer a viable and 
practical political alternative to the current Oslo process.
The concept of ‘having a state’ is still a central element of political 
identification for all political identity groups in Palestinian society. However, as we 
have seen, the Palestinian state level is increasingly unresponsive vis-a-vis 
Palestinian society at large. Although there is agreement with the majority of groups
(Washington, D.C.: The Center for Policy Analysis on the Palestine, 1997): p. 19.
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as far as political identity and the aim of a secular Palestinian state with Islamic 
character is concerned, the PA’s aim of political power maintenance prevents true
representations of these political identity conceptions. However, herein lies an 
inherent danger for the PA itself. If most of society feels increasingly marginalised 
and sees the state level as unresponsive to its demands, opposition against the PA 
will increase. The Islamist groups offer not only an alternative conception of political 
identity, they also have a social and educational structure which can be seen as a state 
within a state. Substantial parts of society might switch loyalties if they do not feel 
that they have any impact on the PA’s policies. The reasons for this change in loyalty 
does not have to be purely religious; it can be done as a simple sign of protest if all 
other avenues of political expression are closed. The violent protests of Palestinians 
against Israel in October 2000 might have united Palestinian society behind the PA 
for a short time. However if the outcome of these protest is a breakdown of the peace 
process it is more than questionable if the PA will be able to survive.
Similar to the Israeli case, the predictions of the theoretical three level model 
of political identity building can be observed in Palestinian society. Fragmentation 
has led to the establishment of different political identity groups which lack common 
ground in their identity conceptions. The state level, although an important location 
for political identification, is under increasing pressure from above and below. 
However in difference to the Israeli system, cohesion of the state level is maintained 
by the weakness of the opposition groups and the autocratic and neo-patrimonial 
nature of the PA. Similar to the Israeli case the significator ‘language’ is a weaker 
element of political identity building for most groups (with the exception of those in 
the ‘Islamic fundamentalistic identity’ category), as was predicted in the theoretical 
model. The variable ‘gender’ is of limited predictive value since the exclusion of 
women from the centres of political decision making is very effective.
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III. Comparison: The Political Identity Crisis in Israeli and
Palestinian Societies
The Oslo process has had a deep impact on both the Palestinian and Israeli societies, 
not only politically but also in the realm of political identity formation. Both societies 
have developed a basic crisis of political identity which goes to the core of both 
societies and has the inherent danger of breaking up the community. However despite
similarities, the reasons for this crisis are different.
Within Israeli society the Oslo process is aggravating the development of 
three distinct, mutually exclusive political identity blocks which in turn argue for a 
Jewish religious state, a secular democratic state with Jewish character, and a secular 
binational state for all its citizens. These political identity conceptions have 
fundamentally different assumptions and do not share a common ground. Although 
these conceptions were already present at the founding of the state they grew 
increasingly separate during the 1980s and 1990s. During this time groups within the 
‘right-wing religious nationalism’ political identity category were able to build up 
their own autonomous educational and social system, which stands in opposition to 
the state of Israel in its present form. The Oslo process brings these different political 
identity blocks to the forefront. There are two reasons for this. First of all, the 
increased security of Israel because of the conclusion of peace agreements with Egypt
and Jordan as well as the withdrawal from Lebanon allows for domestic issues to
also take to the centre stage of the political debate beside foreign and security policy. 
Secondly, the Oslo process opens up fundamental questions about the nature of the 
state of Israel itself. The question is not only what size the state of Israel should have 
(especially the question of what to do with the occupied territories) but equally what 
kind of state Israel should be. It becomes obvious that for neither of these questions a
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broad consensus in Israeli society exists. The three political identity blocks offer 
mutually exclusive answers to these two questions.
The state level is still an important location for political identification. 
However, while ‘having a state of one’s own’ is central to political identities, what 
this means in concrete terms has become highly contested. In addition, structural 
changes on the state level have made it increasingly difficult for the state elites to 
bridge the different political identity conceptions prevalent in Israeli society. These 
structural changes which developed out of the political deadlock situation of the late 
1980s and early 1990s have had two consequences. The position of the prime 
minister has been giving the central role in the political decision making because of 
the direct election to the post. This in turn allowed for the development of a new,
highly centralised leadership style, as well as an even more fragmented and fluid 
party system. These two developments taken together make it difficult for state elites 
to agree on and create a widely accepted conception of political identity.
The relationship with the diaspora, especially the American Jewry has also
been in a state of change since the 1980s and 1990s. The increasingly separate 
development of the two communities has resulted in a growing critical attitude of the 
diaspora Jewry vis-a-vis Israel. At the time of the Oslo process, the diaspora 
consensus of political support for any democratically elected government had been 
eroded. In consequence, the diaspora, mirroring the divisions within Israeli society, is 
also putting diverse pressure on the Israeli state level.
It becomes clear that in this constellation of growing societal divisions and 
decreasing ability of the state level to include and compromise these different 
political identities, the fundamental discussion about what kind of state Israel should 
be cannot be resolved. This however has some inherent dangers.
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First of all, the groups within the two political identity blocks at the ‘extremes’ of 
Israeli society (‘right wing religious nationalism’, ‘secular binationalism’), have 
violent potential. The assassination of Prime Minister Rabin and the violent protests 
of the Israeli Arabs in October 2000 demonstrate this development. Secondly, in the 
direct contest of political identities in Israeli society, the groups within the ‘right- 
wing religious identity’ category can also back their ideological and religious 
convictions with a autonomous educational and social system, tending to the 
practical needs of the individual. They are increasingly developing towards a
situation in which they form a ‘state within a state’ while exer^ng disproportional 
political influence because they are needed as coalition partners. This is increasingly 
challenging the cohesiveness of Israeli society. Israeli society is experiencing a deep 
seated crisis of political identity. What it means to be an ‘Israeli’ and what kind of 
state Israel should be have become highly contested issues.
In Palestinian society a similar crisis can be observed, however, for different 
reasons. Since the intifada two basic political identity blocks have been developing in 
Palestinian society in the occupied territories: ‘Islamic fundamentalistic identity’ and 
‘secular nationalism’ working for an Islamic state in all of the former Palestine and a
secular democratic state with Islamic character in the West Bank and Gaza
respectively. Here, as in Israeli society, groups within the ‘Islamic fundamentalist 
identity’ category not only have violent potential but were also able to build up their
own autonomous network of social and educational institutions which makes them
increasingly independent from PA institutions.
Although the concept of ‘having a state’ is central to political identities in 
Palestinian society, the divisions within society over what kind of state this should be 
and how to achieve this aim have been growing. This is because the Oslo process in 
general and the establishment of the PA in particular resulted in a marginalisation of
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all levels of Palestinian society from the political decision making process on the 
state level. The primary reasons for this are: the PA’s emphasis on the state building, 
coupled with Israeli overemphasis of the security aspects of the process, and the PA’s 
attempts to maintain their political dominance in Palestinian society in the occupied 
territories. These factors necessitated the development of a neo-patrimonial system of 
clienteles with a highly centralised and personalised form of decision making, 
centralised in Yassir Arafat’s hands. In addition, this system is backed up by a large 
and politically uncontrolled police and security apparatus.
This has led to a rather bizarre situation in which, although there is no 
fundamental disagreement over political identity and over what kind of state 
Palestine should be (only on the means on how to achieve it) between the PA and the 
groups within the ‘secular nationalism’ category, effective political participation 
from the substate level is not allowed. The PA cannot allow independent political 
power centres to emerge, even if they are in basic agreement, because this would end 
their exclusive dominance of the Palestinian political scene. Therefore, the state level 
has developed political marginalisation strategies which in turn make it unresponsive 
to society at large. The Palestinian supra-state level has also been removed from the 
political picture partly because the Oslo process relegated the diaspora communities 
to the margins of the political discussion during the interim phase and partly because 
the diaspora communities are either opposed to the Oslo process in principle or, as is 
the case with the American diaspora, do not command enough political cloud to put 
pressure on the PA.
This situation has inherent dangers similar to the ones in Israeli society. The 
unresponsiveness of the state level marginalises society at large. The fact that no 
independent political development is allowed and that those developments that took 
place are either tightly controlled or reversed through a combination qf co-optation
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and repression is bound to increase the feeling of frustration within society. In 
addition, the deteriorating economic situation which makes life difficult for the 
majority of the Palestinians in the occupied territories does not allow the 
acquiescence of society through rising standards of living. Furthermore, the Islamist 
groups do not only offer an alternative worldview but also an alternative system of 
social and educational institutions which tend to the individual’s needs. This, coupled 
with the potential for violence, creates a challenge for the PA itself. So far, the PA 
has been able to control society and marginalise the challenges to its rule effectively, 
partly because it had the tacit support of a large part of society (including the ‘inside’ 
leadership), partly because with the security services it has effective mechanisms for 
the suppression of serious challenges to its power, partly because the opposition 
groups were unwilling to risk a Palestinian civil war, and partly because the 
opposition was not able to offer a viable political alternative to the Oslo process. 
How much longer this combination of factors can persist is questionable. Most likely 
a failure of the Oslo process to achieve the minimum demands of the Palestinians
will result in the downfall of the PA.
On the analytical level, several similarities between the Palestinian and Israeli
cases emerge. The most important variables for the definition of political identity 
which are common to all groups analysed are: ‘ethnicity’, ‘territoriality’, and 
‘religion’. ‘Language’ and to a certain extend also the variable ‘history’ serve as a 
background but do not seem to explain significant differences between the groups 
(since in both societies, only the radical religious groups mention them as one of the 
central variables of their political identity). The fact that language has been seen as a 
weaker variable in the interviewees’ political identities is surprising, since it can be 
argued that language carries in itself political meaning. One can speculate that this is 
due to the fact that in the Israeli case, modem Hebrew (Ivrit) has only been
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(re)created half a century ago. Therefore, it might not yet be internalised as a political 
variable in identities. In addition, since a majority of the Jewish diaspora does not 
speak Ivrit, a strong emphasis on language as part of political identities would 
separate the diaspora from the Jewish Israeli community. A majority of the
Palestinian interviewees also did not indicate language as a central element of their 
political identity. However, all Palestinian interviewees identified themselves as 
Arabs. Therefore, one can argue that language, Arabic, has become such a 
‘naturalised’ element of political identities in Palestinian society, that it is no longer 
rationalised as having a special influence on political views. A similar argument can 
be made about the variable ‘gender’. Gender as a variable should be an important 
element of political identity building because in both societies there is a clear 
structural discrimination and subordination of women. However, it has only limited 
explanatory force because the overwhelming majority of groups within both societies 
display a striking lack of gender awareness. This was also the case for the majority of 
the women that were interviewed in the different political identity groups in both 
societies. Non of the women did displayed any strikingly different views compared 
with their male colleagues in the same political identity group. In consequence, one 
can argue that the structural discrimination of women has been internalised in the 
individuals’ identities to an extent that the differences are no longer obvious to the 
actors themselves. A strong gender based political identity which has political 
influence has not yet been developed in both societies.
In addition, in both societies groups whose political identities are based on 
radical religious believes are able to back up their political identity conceptions with 
autonomous networks of social and educational institutions. Therefore, in the 
ongoing direct confrontation of political identities in both societies these groups have 
a distinct advantage which could give them increased political support.
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Conclusion
The central aim of this thesis was to develop a general theoretical approach to 
political identity building under conditions of emerging globalisation and to apply 
this approach to the analysis of political developments in Israeli and Palestinian 
society since the start of the Oslo process in 1993.
It was shown that the ‘classical’ theories of International Relations see
political identity as an unproblematic variable since any effective political identity 
rests on the state level, as ‘national identity’. This is based on specific modem 
concepts of exclusive control over territory and exclusive sovereignty. These 
assumptions however are challenged by changes on the macro and micro levels of the 
international system which were summarised under the term ‘globalisation’. As the 
thesis has demonstrated, modem conceptions underestimated the impact of these 
changes on political identity building, while postmodern approaches go too far in 
arguing that these changes dissolve the importance of the state level.
Therefore, combining Rosenau’s concepts of frontiers and fragmegration with 
Wendt’s notion of structurationism and identity building, a three level model of 
political identity was proposed. It was shown that identity building on the substate 
(individuahgroup) level follows a mechanism of self-definition in which the reflexive 
individual uses his\her increased skills and capacities. In consequence it was 
expected that individuals would be able to form more effective political groups. On 
the state level it was argued that the phenomenon of political identity building is an 
elite led phenomenon. It was assumed that the state level remains an important but no 
longer in itself sufficient level for the analysis of political identity. It was also pointed 
out that the state level has increasing problems to present a widely accepted political
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identity. It is under pressure from above and below. On the supra-state level, four 
different locations of political identity building were analysed: economy, politics 
(NGOs), culture\media and diaspora. It was shown that diaspora is a different kind of 
political identity since its members define their political identity in connection with 
their ‘original’ (real or imagined) homeland. Here it was argued political identity is a 
combination of elite led and individually driven self-definition. The ontological depth 
of political identity was analysed through a discussion of the six main significators of 
political identity: territory, ethnicity, history, language, religion and gender. It was 
pointed out that all six significators are present on all three levels although not 
necessarily all on all levels at the same time.
In the analysis of Israeli society it was argued that it is characterised by a 
series of inner societal cleavages. The two most important ones are the left-right 
political cleavage and the secular-religious cleavage. Both were already present at the 
inception of Israeli society in the yishuv. Since 1967, the left-right cleavage marks 
the different assumptions on what to do with the occupied territories (‘hawks’ versus 
‘doves’). The religious-secular cleavage centres around the question on what role 
religion should play in Israeli society. Until the start of the Olso process, these issues 
were not seriously debated in Israeli society. It was possible to avoid those issues 
because any tension arising could be calmed by the recourse to the need for unity in 
face of a precarious security situation. Therefore, temporary compromise solutions 
were found (such as not having a constitution). Since the start of the Oslo process 
this recourse is more difficult. In consequence, these cleavages have moved to the 
centre of the political debate.
During the analysis of the historical development of political identity in 
Palestinian society it was argued that the free development of political identity is 
severely constrained. Due to the power imbalance between the PLO and the state of
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Israel the different negotiated agreements since 1993 put severe limitations on 
Palestinian autonomy. Furthermore, the actions of the Israeli government, mainly the 
continuing expansion of settlements and the building of bypass roads, are limiting the 
possibility to establish a viable Palestinian political entity. In addition, the internal 
structure and workings of the PA constrain free political identity building. The 
emerging structure of the PA can be characterised as an autocratic and neo­
patrimonial system of governance. Arafat displays a very personalised leadership 
style, designed to ensure the overriding importance of his position as the ‘rais’ of the 
PA. This situation is exacerbated by the strong and politically unchecked role that the 
internal security services play and by a difficult, diffuse and unclear legal structure in 
the territories. In consequence civil society and its institutional representation, the 
PLC, are marginalised from the political process.
Both societies display a high level of fragmentation in the current situation. It 
was shown that Israeli society is characterised by three distinct identity groups on the 
substate level. These have been defined as ‘right-wing religious identity’,
‘mainstream secularised Jewish nationalism’ and ‘secular binationalism’. Each one
of these identity categories has a different conception of what kind of state Israel 
should be. Groups within the ‘right-wing religious identity’ category want Israel to be 
a Jewish state, a state defined and guided by halacha, the Jewish religious legal 
codex. This is seen as being of overriding importance. Democratic elements can 
therefore be neglected if they clash with the Jewish religious legal framework. 
Territory is seen as sacred by the religious nationalists; therefore the occupied 
territories cannot be given up. Groups within the ‘mainstream secularised Jewish 
nationalism’ category want Israel to be a ‘Jewish and democratic state’. However, the 
different groups vary in their definition of the precise content of this formula. The 
‘Jewish character’ of the state, defined in ethnic terms, however, is the main factor of
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the political identities of the groups in this category. In principle, all members of this 
category agree that the occupied territories are negotiable. The goal is to preserve the 
Jewish majority in Israel by separating Israeli and Palestinian societies. ‘Secular 
binationalism’ is politically the weakest identity category, mainly consisting of 
Palestinian-Israelis. Here, a secular democratic state is the aim in which both Jews
and Palestinians are equal citizens.
The concept of a ‘state’ of ‘having a state of one’s own’ remains a crucial 
aspect of the political identity of all groups. However the question of what kind of 
state Israel should be and what it means to be an Israeli is increasingly contested. In 
addition, the Israeli state level is fragmenting. The direct election of the prime 
minister, practised since 1996, enhanced this tendency. Therefore the state elites have 
increasing problems in establishing societal cohesion. Small political groups, mainly 
from the ‘right-wing religious identity’ category, have disproportionate political 
influence on the state level since they are needed for coalition building. The supra- 
state level, especially the American Jewish diaspora, is mirroring the cleavages 
prevalent in Israeli society. Here, too, groups try to enhance their influence on the 
Israeli state to make their demands heard. This in turn puts further pressure on the 
already fragmented state structure.
Palestinian society experiences the development of different identity groups 
on the substate level as well. Here, two main categories emerge: ‘fundamentalist 
Islamic identity’ and ‘secular nationalism’. ‘Fundamentalist Islamic identity’
describes groups that aim for an Islamic state in all of Palestine. This state should be 
organised by and oriented towards Islamic religious law. Groups in the ‘secular 
nationalism’ category are generally aiming for a democratic state in the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip. However the exact content of this state is not agreed upon. All
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groups on the substate level of Palestinian society share their critical stance, in some 
cases outright opposition, towards the PA.
However, here, as in Israeli society, the concept of ‘having a state of one’s 
own’ is a central element of all political identities. Nevertheless, the PA and its elites 
are increasingly unresponsive and isolated from wider Palestinian society. The effect 
of different political identity conceptions is absorbed by the autocratic, neo­
patrimonial structure of the PA and by a combined strategy of cooptation and 
repression. This increases the opposition of the different identity groups towards the 
PA in particular and the current peace process in general. The PA’s isolation is all the 
more surprising since its elite’s political identity differs only marginally from the 
political identities of the groups within the ‘secular nationalism’ category. At the 
supra-state level, the Palestinian diaspora is marginalised from the political process 
as well. There are two main reasons for this: First of all, the diaspora, the question of 
the rights of the refugees, has been politically marginalised during the interim phase 
of the negotiations. The question of the ‘right of return’ of the refugees has been 
defined in the DOP as a final status issue. Secondly, the PA seems to count on the 
rights of the refugees as a bargaining chip in the negotiations for full sovereignty of 
the Palestinian political entity.
The effects of the emerging globalisation, predicted in the three level model 
of political identity building, can be clearly observed in Israeli and Palestinian 
society. The increase in the skills and capabilities of the individuals due to the effects 
of increased and more accessible educational opportunities coupled with the increase 
in the availability of communication technology was defined as the basic features of 
globalisation. There are two main effects that these changes have on individuals. First 
of all, they enable them to form more effective political groups. In addition, 
individuals feel more connected on a world wide scale. That globalisation is
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‘emerging’ in Israeli and Palestinian society can be seen on the fact that the 
educational and technological means are available but the feeling of 
interconnectedness is not as widespread as in Europe and the USA for example. 
However the more effective political mobilisation capabilities are already present. 
This can be seen in the effective mobilisation strategies that radical religious groups 
in both societies use. In both societies, these groups were able to manipulate the 
political system in a way that allowed them to build up and maintain their own, 
autonomous social and educational institutions. In addition, the predicted
fragmentation can be seen in the development of different political identity groups in 
both societies which lack common ground in their perceptions of what kind of states
Israel and Palestine should be.
The three level model assumed that the state level would remain an important
location for political identity. However it was argued that the state elites would have 
increasing problems in formulating a widely accepted political identity conception. 
The definition of a ‘national identity’ by the elites on the state level was assumed to 
be contested by alternative conceptualisations of this ‘national identity’ at the 
substate and the supra-state level.
This is the case in Israeli society. Here, the state level is undergoing a process 
of increasing fragmentation. This process led in the 1980s to a political stalemate 
with neither Likud nor Labor being able to get a clear majority. This situation 
resulted in constantly unstable government coalitions. The electoral reforms of 1992, 
enacted for the first time in 1996 were designed to bring movement back in the 
political system. However, the direct election of the prime minister resulted in an 
even more fragmented and fluid political system. In consequence, so far neither of 
the two governments (Netanyahu and Barak) was able to stay in power for their full 
term. In addition, the enhancement of the independence of the prime minister, due to
345
his direct election, favoured a highly centralised leadership style in which the both 
Netanyahu and Barak tried to govern despite and in some cases in opposition to their 
own party. The more fragmented state level is more and more a battleground for 
particular political identities which are prevalent in Israeli society. Therefore, it has 
growing problems to establish societal cohesion.
In Palestinian society the state level, the PA and its elites, did not fragment. 
Through the establishment of an autocratic, neo-patrimonial system of government 
and by employing a combined strategy of cooptation and repression the PA was able
to maintain its internal cohesion. However, this resulted at the same time in an
increased isolation of the PA structure and elites from Palestinian society at large. 
This development increased the support for the opposition to the PA and the current
peace process.
The three level model expected the supra-state level to have an enhanced 
impact on the process of political identity building. This is clearly the case in Israeli 
society. The American diaspora, the largest and politically most influential diaspora 
of the Jewish community, has fragmented into similar political identity groups as 
Israeli society. Since the 1980s and especially since the start of the Oslo process in 
1993, these groups also have been increasingly trying to make their voices heard on 
the Israeli state level. Here, the state level is clearly under pressure from above and 
below, from the substate and the supra-state level.
In Palestinian society the impact of the supra-state level lies in the fact that it 
increases the isolation of the PA from Palestinian society at large. The Palestinian 
disapora has been marginalised in the political process. Not only has the centre of 
political decision making moved from the diaspora (Tunis-PLO) to the occupied 
territories (PA) but the PLO has also agreed in the DOP to define the question of the 
Palestinian refugees as a final status issue. In addition, the PLO seems to count on
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this issue as a bargaining chip in the negotiations for full sovereignty in the 
autonomous areas. In consequence, the opposition to the PA and the current peace 
process has increased in the Palestinian diaspora, further isolating the state level.
Since the process of increasing fragmentation of the substate level, the 
growing difficulties of the state elites to establish societal cohesion and the growing 
impact of the supra-state level became more obvious after the start of the Oslo
process, one could argue that it was the Oslo process that caused these changes and 
not the effects of the emerging conditions of globalisation. The start of the Oslo 
process can explain why questions of political identity became important in both 
societies. However, it cannot sufficiently explain why groups on the substate level 
and on the supra-state level are increasingly able to efficiently present their political 
identity conceptions to society at large, therefore fragmenting the state level in the 
Israeli case and isolating it in the Palestinian case. Only the increase in the 
individuals’ skills and capabilities, combined with the problems of the state level to 
establish societal cohesion can explain the fragmentation of the substate level and the 
growing impact of the supra-state level respectively.
As can be seen, the ontological breadth of political identity building can be 
adequately explained by the three level model of political identity building developed 
in this thesis. In addition, the application of the three level model allows interesting 
observations of the different impact that the emerging conditions of globalisation 
have on different types of political regimes. In Israel, which is at least formally a 
democracy (always keeping the structural discrimination of the Israeli-Palestinians in 
mind), these emerging conditions led to an increase in the fragmentation of the 
political system. The Palestinian structure of governance, the PA, which is autocratic 
and neo-patrimonial, did not fragment. However, due to its strategy to marginalise 
both the substate and the supra-state level, the PA and its elites are increasingly
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isolated from their political constituencies on all levels of political interaction. As a 
reaction the PA has to face growing opposition.
The ontological depth of political identity was analysed according to six main 
significators of political identity: territory, ethnicity, history, language, religion and 
gender. Language was a weaker variable in the political identity of most groups in 
both societies. The only groups which saw language as an important element of their 
political identity were the radical religious groups in Israeli and Palestinian society. 
Being Palestinian or being Israeli was defined in ethnic, not in linguistic terms by the 
other groups. While language was seen as cultural marker, it was not seen as having a 
strong influence on the political aspects of identity. One can speculate that this is 
because in the Israeli case, the language is a ‘recent’ (re)creation, which has not yet 
been internalised. In addition, the majority of the diaspora does not speak the 
language so that it can potentially separate the Jewish Israeli community from the 
diaspora. In the Palestinian case, language has become such a ‘natural’ part of the 
actors’ political identity that its importance is no longer rationalised. The same can be 
said about the variable ‘gender’. Gender, which was assumed to be an important 
variable in political identity building, did not have the predicted explanatory force. 
Even most of the interviewed women did not display a marked awareness of ‘gender’ 
as an important influence on their political identities. This can be explained by the 
highly patriarchal character of both societies and the effective exclusion of women 
from the realms of political decision making. The remaining variables however were 
able to describe and explain important and crucial differences in the political
identities of both societies.
In conclusion, the three level model provided a theoretical framework with 
which political identity building in Israeli and Palestinian society could be analysed 
and the crisis in both societies be explained. Furthermore, it allowed important
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observations about the different effects the emerging conditions of globalisation have 
on varying types of political regimes.
What effects do these mechanisms and structures of political identity building 
have on the future negotiations between the two societies? The first and more general 
remark one has to make in answer to this question is that for Israeli society the 
process of establishing a widely accepted negotiation position is going to be 
increasingly difficult. In Palestinian society the same situation will further isolate the 
PA as the negotiations continue. Nevertheless, it can be argued that both sides have a 
political interest in keeping the negotiations alive as an ongoing process. On the 
Israeli side, the peace process ensures more or less uncritical international and 
American support (although the new stand of the Bush administration remains to be
seen at the time of writing). In addition, once the current hostilities are over, the 
continuation of the process assures a politically and economically dependent PA
which can be pressured into serving Israel’s security needs without damaging Israel’s 
standing in world opinion. In addition, an admission of the failure of the process 
would considerably strengthen the radial elements on the right wing by in some way 
legitimising their opposition towards the peace process in general.
On the Palestinian side, the PA elites have an interest in prolonging the 
process for two reasons. Firstly, it allows them to continue their political domination 
because they can convincingly argue that Israel ‘forced’ them to suppress political 
opposition. Secondly, the PA elites, especially Arafat, have been arguing that the 
constraints on political and economic development and freedom are the ‘price’ that 
the Palestinians have to pay to reach their goal: a sovereign Palestinian state in all of 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. As the first 
attempt to reach a final peace agreement between the two sides, the Camp David 
summit in 2000, showed, not even an Israeli Labor prime minister would be able to
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make such far reaching concessions at this time. To do this would mean the 
relocation of thousands of Jewish settlers, some of which are religious and political 
fanatics, the re-division of Jerusalem and the handing over of the newly built 
infrastructure (bypass roads) to the Palestinians. In addition, the Palestinians would
have to have control over the natural resources in the occupied territories, especially 
the water resources. Finally, Israel would have to allow independent economic 
development in the Palestinian territories rather than prolonging the economic 
dependence of Palestinian society. If all these concessions would be enacted it would 
carry the danger of a Jewish civil war.
Therefore, because the attainment of full sovereignty under these conditions is a 
highly unrealistic scenario, the PA elite tries to keep the process going, as their 
people expect. An admission that the process failed and will not produce the desired 
results could provoke an unpredictable reaction from the Palestinian substate level 
and most likely the removal of the PA elite.
However, the possibility of prolonging the process as a process can only be a 
temporary solution. As the second intifada, the Al-Aqsa intifada, clearly shows, 
sooner or later the discontent with the process will grow to a point where one or both 
societies resort to violence. In this particular case, it is violence between the two 
societies. However, there is also a strong possibility that sooner or later violence will 
erupt inside both societies as well. If the process will not produce the desired results 
for both societies, individual and collective perception of increased security for 
Israeli society, statehood, economic development and growth for Palestinian society, 
the only certain prediction is that one can expect more internal and external violence. 
Considering the political structures and realistic political developments, the 
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Political Group affiliation: 
Position in Group:
Questions concerning political identity
L Ethnicity
1) How important for your political views is the fact that you are Jewish?
Not at all important only of little importance don’t know important very
important
Please explain your choice.
2) What does it mean to you to be Jewish?
3) How does this relate to your view of politics?
4) What role do you think the difference between Ashkenazim and Sephardim plays
in Israel?
5) How does this divide relate to your view of politics?
6) Do you see a difference between being Jewish and being Israeli?
II. Territoriality
1) What importance does the issue of territory have in your view of politics?
Not at all important only of little importance don’t know important very
important
Please explain your choice.
2) What in your view comprises Israel as far as territory is concerned?
3) Is the concept of ‘Eretz YsraeP a desirable political concept for you?
4) What is the main issue concerning territoriality for you?
Religion ideology history security diplomacy
5) Do you see the issue of territory becoming more or less important in the future
political thinking of your group (given the fact that territory can no longer 
guarantee adequate security)?
IIL History
1) What importance does the role of history play in your view of politics?
Not at all important only of little importance don’t know important very
important
Please explain your choice.
2) Which were the most important historical events that shaped your view of
politics?
3) How important are historical claims to territory for you?
4) Are security arrangements or historical claims to territory most important in
deciding how to deal with the occupied territories?
Please explain your choice:
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IV) Language
1) What role do you see Ivrit (modem Hebrew) play as an integrational force in
Israel?
no role at all a small role don't know an important role a very important role
Please explain your choice.
2) What role does Ivrit (modern Hebrew) play in your definition of Jewishness?
3) Can one be fully Jewish without speaking Hebrew?
V) Religion
1) What role does religion have in your view of politics?
no role at all a small role don’t know an important role a very important role
Please explain you choice.
2) How should a state relate to religious values and laws?
3) What role does religion play in your definition of Jewishness?
4) Can one be fully Jewish and secular at the same time?
5) How important do you think religious traditions are in your view of politics?
VI) Gender
1) How far do you think your role as male/female influences your view on politics? 
no influence a slight influence don't know an important influence a very important
influence
Please explain your choice.
2) Do you think that there is a different way in general for men/women to do politics?
3) What role do you see for women in the political system?
4) Do you see an advantage for society when women are active in politics?
VII) Overview of Political Identity
Which of the factors we just talked about (ethnicity, territoriality, history, language, 
religion, gender) are the most significant in you political orientation and why?
Political Orientation/Behaviour
1) What best describes your view of Palestinian rights to land of what they once 
viewed as Palestine?
A) Palestinians wherever they are now living (in the occupied territories or in
the diaspora) have a right to live as equal citizens in the state of Israel.
B) Those who lost their homes in Palestine are entitled to compensation or to
return and those in the West Bank and Gaza an independent state.
C) Those living in the West Bank and Gaza have a right to the land and a state
but the Palestinian diaspora must settle in Arab lands.
D) Palestinians can live in the West Bank and Gaza without an independent
state.
E) There is plenty of room for Palestinians in the Arab states.
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2) What in your opinion describes best the Oslo process?
A) The Oslo process is in Israel’s best interest, because it will lead to a future
Palestinian state.
B) The Oslo Process is in Israel’s best interest because it will give the
Palestinians some autonomy while they are taking care of the 
terrorists.
C) The Oslo process is a danger to Israeli security and should be stopped.
D) The Oslo process is destroying the central aspects of the state of Israel by
giving up land that is an integral part of Israel. It must be stopped 
immediately.
3) What is your view of the Palestinians?
A) Most of them are peaceful people.
B) If we have to, we can get along.
C) Most of them are dangerous terrorists.
D) They are a permanent enemy that wants to destroy Israel
4) How important do you think that settlements are for Israeli security? Should they
be expanded?
5) Would you be willing to dismantle some or all of the settlements in exchange for a
‘real’ peace with the Palestinians?
6) How should the water resources be divided between Israelis and Palestinians?
Should there be any changes to the current allocation of water?
7) Should Palestinians have greater rights to build in the West Bank and Jerusalem?
8) Do you support or reject house demolitions? If illegal Palestinian houses are
demolished should illegal Israeli buildings also be demolished?
9) What do you think should be the future status of Jerusalem?
A) It should always remain frilly under Israeli control.
B) There could be some power sharing between the Palestinians and Israel as
far as the municipal administration is concerned.
C) East Jerusalem should be under Palestinian control, West Jerusalem under
Israeli control.
D) Jerusalem should be the capital of Israel and of a future Palestinian state.
10) As for the autonomous areas, what status should they have in the future?
A) They should develop into an independent Palestinian state.
B) They should remain under autonomous Palestinian control, but there
should not be a state.
C) In these areas the Palestinians should have some autonomy but Israel
should stay in control.
D) They should be brought back under full Israeli control.
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11) Here are some prominent Palestinian and Israeli figures. Please select those with
whom you can identify (at most you can select two per group).
Yossi Beilin Amnon Lippkin-Shahak Shimon Peres 
Binjamin Netanyahu Benni Begin Rabbi Moshe Levinger
Abu Mazin Yassir Arafat Faisal Husseini Hanan Ashrawi
Sheik Yassin George Habash
12) What should a future Palestinian entity encompass?
A) All of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The ‘Green Line’ should be the
border.
B) Most of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, at least more than is now under
Palestinian control.
C) As much as is now under Palestinian control.
D) There should not be a Palestinian entity at all in the future.
13) What is your view on political violence?
A) Under certain circumstances it can be a legitimate political tool.
B) It can only be used as a last resort.
C) It is illegal under any circumstances.
Please explain your choice:
14) Should Israel also allow non Jewish immigrants to become full Israeli citizens?
15) What role do you think the US government should play in the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict?
(QUESTION ONLY FOR US INTERVIEWEES)









Political Group affiliation: 
Position in Group:
Questions concerning political identity
I. Ethnicity
1) How important for your political views is the fact that you are an Arab?
Not at all important only of little importance don’t know important very
important
Please explain your choice.
2) How does this relate to your view of politics?
3) What is in your view the difference between being Arab and being Palestinian?
4) What is the difference between an Arab and a Palestinian view of politics?
II. Territoriality
1) What importance does the issue of territory have in your view of politics?
Not at all important only of little importance don’t know important very
important
Please explain your choice.
2) What in your view comprises the future Palestinian state as far as territory is
concerned?
3) What is the main issue concerning territoriality for you?
Religion ideology history security diplomacy
4) With which territory do you identify more Israel or the Palestinian autonomous
areas?
5) Do you see the issue of territory becoming more or less important in the future
political thinking of your group (given the fact that territory can no longer 
guarantee adequate security)?
III. History
1) What importance does the role of history play in your view of politics?
Not at all important only of little importance don’t know important very
important
Please explain your choice.
2) Which were the most important historical events that shaped your view of
politics?
3) How important are historical claims to territory for you?
4) How important are security arrangements and historical claims to territory for you?
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IV) Language
1) What role do you see Arabic as a language play in your definition of being
Palestinian?
no role at all a small role don’t know an important role a very important role
2) What role do you see Ivrit (modem Hebrew) as a language play in your definition
of being an Israeli Arab?
no role at all a small role don't know an important role a very important role
Please explain your choices.
3) Can one be Palestinian or Arab without speaking Arabic?
V) Religion
1) What role does religion have in your view of politics?
no role at all a small role don’t know an important role a very important role
Please explain you choice.
2) How should a state relate to religious values and laws?
3) What role does religion play in your definition of being Arab/Palestinian?
4) Can one be fully Palestinian and secular at the same time?
5) How important do you think religious traditions are in your view of politics?
VI) Gender
1) How far do you think your role as male/female influences your view on politics?
no influence a slight influence don’t know an important influence a very important
influence
Please explain your choice.
2) Do you think that there is a different way in general for men/women to do politics?
3) What role do you see for women in the political system?
4) Do you see an advantage for society when women are active in politics?
VII) Overview of Political Identity
Which of the factors we just talked about (ethnicity, territoriality, history, language, 
religion, gender) are the most significant in you political orientation and why?
Political Orientation/Behaviour
1) What best describes your view of Palestinian rights to land?
A) Those who lost their homes in Palestine are entitled to compensation or to
return and those in the West Bank and Gaza to an independent state.
B) Those living in the West Bank and Gaza have a right to the land and a state
but the Palestinian diaspora should settle in Arab countries and receive 
compensation.
C) Palestinians can live in the West Bank and Gaza without an independent
state. The diaspora should settle in their host countries.
D) Palestinians whether they are now living (in the occupied territories or in
the diaspora) have a right to live as equal citizens in the state of Israel.
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2) What in your opinion describes best the Oslo process?
A) The Oslo process is in the Palestinian’s best interest, because it will lead to
a future Palestinian state.
B) The Oslo Process is in the Palestinian’s best interest because it gives them
at least some autonomy.
C) The Oslo process is limiting the chances for the Palestinians to ever get a
fully sovereign state. It should be stopped.
D) The Oslo process is destroying the central aspects of Palestinian national
aspirations. It is major Palestinian defeat. It must be stopped 
immediately.
3) What is your view of the Israelis?
A) Most of them are peaceful people.
B) If we have to, we can get along.
C) Most of them are dangerous oppressors.
D) They are a permanent enemy that wants to destroy the Palestinian people.
4) How important do you think a dismantlement of Israeli settlements are for the
security of a fixture Palestinian state?
5) Would you be willing to leave some or all of the settlements where they are in
exchange for a ‘real’ peace with the Israelis?
Please explain your choice:
6) How should the water resources be divided between Israelis and Palestinians?
Should there be any changes to the current allocation of water?
7) Should Palestinians have greater rights to build in the West Bank and Jerusalem?
8) Do you support or reject house demolitions? If illegal Palestinian houses are
demolished should illegal Israeli buildings also be demolished?
9) What do you think should be the future status of Jerusalem?
A) It should be fully under Palestinian control.
B) There could be some power sharing between the Palestinians and Israel as
far as the municipal administration is concerned.
C) East Jerusalem should be under Palestinian control, West Jerusalem under
Israeli control.
D) Jerusalem should be the capital of a future Palestinian state and of the state
of Israel.
10) What solution to the conflict with Israel should Palestinians strive toward of 
accept?
A) Liberation of all Palestine (including Israel proper).
B) An independent state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
C) Autonomy in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
D) A bi-national state in which Palestinians have equal citizenship.
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11) Here are some prominent Palestinian and Israeli figures. Please select those with 
whom you can identify (at most you can select two per group).
Yossi Beilin Amnon Lippkin-Shahak Shimon Peres Binjamin 





Faisal Husseini Hanan Ashrawi
12) What should a future Palestinian entity encompass?
A) All of Palestine
B) Most if not all of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, at least more than is now
under Palestinian control.
C) As much as is now under Palestinian control.
D) There should not be a separate Palestinian entity at all in the future.
Palestinians should be equal citizens in the state of Israel.
13) What is your view on political violence?
A) Under certain circumstances it can be a legitimate political tool.
B) It can only be used as a last resort.
C) It is illegal under any circumstances.
Please explain your choice:
14) Now that the Palestinians have some control over areas of the West Bank and
Gaza Strip should priority be given to the development of a Palestinian civil 
society or to the process of state building?









Political Group affiliation: 
Position in Group:
Questions concerning political identity
I. Ethnicity
1) How important for your political views is the fact that you are an Arab?
Not at all important only of little importance don’t know important very
important
Please explain your choice.
2) How does this relate to your view of politics?
3) What is in your view the difference between being Arab and being Palestinian?
4) What is the difference between an Arab and a Palestinian view of politics?
II. Territoriality
1) What importance does the issue of territory have in your view of politics?
Not at all important only of little importance don't know important very
important
Please explain your choice.
2) What in your view comprises the future Palestinian state as far as territory is
concerned?
3) What is the main issue concerning territoriality for you?
Religion ideology history security diplomacy
4) Do you see the issue of territory becoming more or less important in the future
political thinking of your group (given the fact that territory can no longer 
guarantee adequate security)?
III. History
1) What importance does the role of history play in your view of politics?
Not at all important only of little importance don’t know important very
important
Please explain your choice.
2) Which were the most important historical events that shaped your view of
politics?
3) How important are historical claims to territory for you?
4) Are security arrangements or historical claims to territory most important in
deciding how to deal with the occupied territories?
IV) Language
1) What role do you see Arabic as a language play in your definition of being
Palestinian?
no role at all a small role don't know an important role a very important role
Please explain your choice.
2) Can one be Palestinian or Arab without speaking Arabic?
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V) Religion
1) What role does religion have in your view of politics?
no role at all a small role don’t know an important role a very important role
Please explain you choice.
2) How should a state relate to religious values and laws?
3) What role does religion play in your definition of being Arab/Palestinian?
4) Can one be fully Palestinian and secular at the same time?
5) How important do you think religious traditions are in your view of politics?
VI) Gender
1) How far do you think your role as male/female influences your view on politics?
no influence a slight influence don’t know an important influence a very important
influence
Please explain your choice.
2) Do you think that there is a different way in general for men/women to do politics?
3) What role do you see for women in the political system?
4) Do you see an advantage for society when women are active in politics?
VII) Overview of Political Identity
Which of the factors we just talked about (ethnicity, territoriality, history, language, 
religion, gender) are the most significant in you political orientation and why?
Political Orientation/Behaviour
1) What best describes your view of Palestinian rights to land?
A) Those who lost their homes in Palestine are entitled to compensation or to
return and those in the West Bank and Gaza to an independent state.
B) Those living in the West Bank and Gaza have a right to the land and a state
but the Palestinian diaspora should settle in Arab countries and receive 
compensation.
C) Palestinians can live in the West Bank and Gaza without an independent
state. The diaspora should settle in their host countries.
D) Palestinians whether they are now living (in the occupied territories or in
the diaspora) have a right to live as equal citizens in the state of Israel.
2) What in your opinion describes best the Oslo process?
A) The Oslo process is in the Palestinian’s best interest, because it will lead to
a future Palestinian state.
B) The Oslo Process is in the Palestinian’s best interest because it gives them
at least some autonomy.
C) The Oslo process is limiting the chances for the Palestinians to ever get a
fully sovereign state. It should be stopped.
D) The Oslo process is destroying the central aspects of Palestinian national
aspirations. It is major Palestinian defeat. It must be stopped 
immediately.
382
3) What is your view of the Israelis?
A) Most of them are peaceful people.
B) If we have to, we can get along.
C) Most of them are dangerous oppressors.
D) They are a permanent enemy that wants to destroy the Palestinian people.
4) How important do you think a dismantlement of Israeli settlements are for the
security of a future Palestinian state?
5) Would you be willing to leave some or all of the settlements where they are in
exchange for a ‘real’ peace with the Israelis?
6) How should the water resources be divided between Israelis and Palestinians?
Should there be any changes to the current allocation of water?
7) Should Palestinians have greater rights to build in the West Bank and Jerusalem?
8) Do you support or reject house demolitions? If illegal Palestinian houses are
demolished should illegal Israeli buildings also be demolished?
9) What do you think should be the future status of Jerusalem?
A) It should be fully under Palestinian control.
B) There could be some power sharing between the Palestinians and Israel as
far as the municipal administration is concerned.
C) East Jerusalem should be under Palestinian control, West Jerusalem under
Israeli control.
D) Jerusalem should be the capital of a future Palestinian state and of the state
of Israel.
10) What solution to the conflict with Israel should Palestinians strive toward of
accept?
A) Liberation of all Palestine (including Israel proper).
B) An independent state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
C) Autonomy in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
D) A bi-national state in which Palestinians have equal citizenship.
11) Here are some prominent Palestinian and Israeli figures. Please select those with
whom you can identify (at most you can select two per group).
Yossi Beilin Amnon Lippkin-Shahak Shimon Peres Binjamin 





Faisal Husseini Hanan Ashrawi
12) What should a future Palestinian entity encompass?
A) All of Palestine
B) Most if not all of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, at least more than is now
under Palestinian control.
C) As much as is now under Palestinian control.
D) There should not be a separate Palestinian entity at all in the future.
Palestinians should be equal citizens in the state of Israel.
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13) What is your view on political violence?
A) Under certain circumstances it can be a legitimate political tool.
B) It can only be used as a last resort.
C) It is illegal under any circumstances.
Please explain your choice:
14) Now that the Palestinians have some control over areas of the West Bank and
Gaza Strip should priority be given to the development of a Palestinian civil 
society or to the process of state building?
15) What role do you think the US government should play in the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict?
(QUESTION ONLY FOR US INTERVIEWEES)
Comments about the questionnaire:
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